

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

Mr. Grew: *✓* *File*

Mr. Hyde concurs in
this memorandum prepared
by Mr. Hackworth. It
is based on Mr. Rand's
report.


GAM

June 28

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SOLICITOR

MEMORANDUM.



CONVENTION REGARDING INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF THE ZONE OF TANGIER.

Dear Mr. Grew:

The two fundamental points to be borne in mind in considering the action to be taken with respect to the statute of Tangier are:

1. The necessity for a comprehensive definition of the term "economic equality" used in Article 7 of the Convention;

2. The necessity for the establishment in some central authority of international responsibility for acts or omissions of the zone administration in violation of rights of this Government or its nationals (See pages 34 and 35 of this office's memorandum dated February 13, 1924).

Points of secondary importance are:

(a) Opportunity for this Government to pass upon the codes and regulations before they are actually promulgated.

(b)

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(b) Proper representation on the Mixed Court to be established.

(c) Provision for avoiding the possibility that the presiding judge and one of the two associate judges in a civil case may be of the same nationality as one of the litigants (See discussions on pages 31 and 32 of memorandum dated February 13, 1924).

(d) Additional representation in the Legislative Assembly.

(e) Representation in the international administration provided for in Article 35 of the Convention. This Government has no representation under the present arrangement (Page 21 of memorandum of February 13, 1924).

(f) An understanding regarding diplomatic representation in Morocco.

(g) A better understanding regarding landing rights for American cable companies.

This office considers that this Government will have to insist upon points 1 and 2 mentioned above. It will

be

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SOLICITOR

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be difficult, however, to insist upon the second point if this Government participates in the governmental activities of Tangier. In that event this Government would become jointly responsible, in theory at least, for any wrongful act or omission in the administration of affairs which might give rise to a right to international reclamation and it might therefore find itself on both sides of a controversy. This Government probably would not want to take joint responsibility for the proper administration of the zone with the limited voice which it would have in such administration under the arrangement as presented.

It may, therefore, be desirable to consider whether this Government's interests and prestige may not suffer from the acceptance of a less important rôle in the affairs of Tangier than it now has - whether it should take that which has been parceled out to it by the three powers, which have assumed to control the situation, or whether it should insist upon equal participation or decline any part in the administration of the
port

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THE SOLICITOR

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port.

Codes and Regulations:

It would be desirable for this Government to review the codes and regulations provided it is given the right to suggest changes and modifications. It might be said, however, that since the codes and regulations which may be prepared will apply equally to all foreigners, including British, French, and Spanish, which far outnumber American nationals, there may not be any very cogent reasons for apprehension that they will not be acceptable to this Government.

Courts:

The statement with respect to the codes and regulations is true in large measure with respect to the courts. It would be most desirable to have the privilege, whether it be exercised or not, of representation on the Mixed Courts, as we have in Egypt. If, however, this is not found to be practicable it is doubted whether from the practical point of view American interests will greatly suffer. The standards maintained by the British and French Judiciary are such as to afford reasonable assurance of the administration of justice by judges of those countries. The Spanish Judiciary is not so free from criticism but there will be

but

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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but one Spanish judge on the Mixed Court. Further assurance is also to be found in the right to have associate judges in civil cases and a jury of nationals in criminal cases. These latter rights could be reserved without the necessity for participation by this Government in the administration of Tangier.

Legislative Assembly:

One additional member of the Legislative Assembly would not be of any assistance in legislative matters since that would give the United States only two members as compared with four French, four Spanish, three British, and nine Moroccan subjects, who would doubtless be dominated by the French. This would give France thirteen of the twenty-six members with the possible addition of the Belgian member.

International Administration:

The present arrangement does not contemplate that this Government shall have any representation on the board for the "international administration" of the statute of Tangier, at least during the first six years.

Whether it may participate after that time will depend

upon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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upon the action of the Legislative Assembly which will make the nominations (See page 21, memorandum February 13, 1924). With the Legislative Assembly organized as now proposed this Government cannot hope for representation on this board at any time.

Supervision Committee:

This is the only organization under the statute in which this Government is to be given equal representation. The committee is to be composed of Consuls of Career and is to be charged with the duty of causing the observance of the regime of economic equality and of the provisions of the convention. In this respect it will be a rather important organization.

If this Government cannot obtain equal representation in the Legislative Assembly, in the international administration, proper representation on the Mixed Courts, as well as a voice in the promulgation of the codes and regulations it might be considered desirable to insist upon the first two points mentioned at the outset of this memorandum and to decline to participate in any way in
the

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SOLICITOR

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the administration of the statute, and to disclaim all responsibility therefor, or it might be represented alone on the Supervision Committee by the Consul. It seems to be obvious that the representation which has been allotted to this Government under the convention as concluded, save as to the Supervision Committee, will not be of any appreciable benefit in shaping the affairs of the international zone. It would be desirable definitely to ascertain what concessions it will be possible to obtain on each of the points mentioned above since when the question of adhering to the convention is presented to the Senate that body will doubtless desire to know what compensatory advantages this Government is offered in exchange for the privileges which it is asked to surrender.

P. S.

Since the foregoing was written Mr. Rand's despatch

No.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SOLICITOR

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1937
No. 252 of June 7, 1924, has been brought to the attention of this office.

As to the suggestion on page 6 of the despatch that treaty rights should not be definitely surrendered, reference is made to page 39 of this office's memorandum dated February 13, 1924, suggesting that this Government might "suspend" its treaty rights, as was done in the case of Egypt, "to the extent that such rights are safeguarded by the new regime". It has at no time been thought proper to make an outright surrender of rights.

The suggestion on page 10 of the despatch with reference to schools and colleges might be included with the points mentioned in this memorandum as of secondary importance.

The suggestion on the same page of the despatch with respect to protection of semsars could be taken care of in the form of a reservation if this Government decides to submit to the proposed new state of affairs.

The suggestion contained on page 11 with respect to representation on the Legislative Assembly does not

appear

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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to be of great importance since, if this arrangement becomes effective, it is not likely that any change in the present proportion of interests and numerical force of the various foreign "colonies" (presumably countries) will be favorable to the United States.

The suggestion on page 13 of the despatch that the American Consul be authorized to sit as an associate judge in cases where an American litigant is before the court would be a desirable arrangement since in this way this Government could, by selecting as consul a man possessing legal qualifications, thereby obtain judicial representation far superior to that which would be possible if it is required to select an associate judge from among non-official American residents. If this could be arranged, there would be less reason for other representation on the Mixed Court referred to on pages two and four above.

The suggestions at the top of page 14 of the despatch regarding the use of English in court proceedings when an American citizen is involved, and that cases in
which

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SOLICITOR

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which the plaintiff is a foreigner and the defendant a native should be cognizable in the Mixed Tribunal are worthy of consideration and may be included among the points for discussion referred to above as of secondary importance.

A large, stylized handwritten signature, possibly reading "G.H.H.", written in dark ink.A handwritten signature, possibly reading "Concur G.H.H.", written in dark ink.

So GHH:DIR:SS

INDEX
AUG 16 1925
DEPT OF STATE

THEODORE W. HOLMES
1431 Q STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 14 1925-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 18 1925
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Hon Frank B. Kellogg
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:-

Please grant me per-
mission to sail for
Morocco.

I want to help the
Riffs make their Country
"Safe for Democracy"

SEP 18 1925
Filed
8/11/25

INDEX BUREAU
831.00/1129

SEP 18 1925 A
FTR ED

I was too young to
fight in the World War,
therefore I am sure that
I will get a "kick" out
of this. (fighting)

I thank you very
kindly, I am, my
dear Mr. Secretary

Very Sincerely

John W. Holmes

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881.00/1129

PTT ED
SEP 18 1925 A


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SOLICITOR'S OFFICE
AUG 19 1925
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SO

How do the laws read
on this sort of thing?

Can we refuse him a
passport or are we ob-
liged to use reasonable
means to prevent him
from joining the forces of
a military leader who
is in armed opposition
to a friendly power?



Aug 18th

~~David~~ any record of
appln

Have you



the application from
be transferred from the
border to the attached letter
nonec. app.
2 yrs. 9/15

9171

September 18, 1925.

In reply refer to
PC 881.00/1129

Mr. Theodore W. Holmes,

1431 Q Street, N. W.,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In reply to your letter of August 14, 1925, you are informed that if you desire to obtain a passport you should execute a formal application therefor before the Passport Agent of the Department of State, Room 177, Washington, D. C. You should be prepared to submit to the Agent duplicate photographs of yourself, the execution fee of one dollar, the passport fee of nine dollars, and evidence of your American citizenship.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

G. L. Brist
Chief, Division of Passport Control.



No. 145

INDEX BUREAU
AUG 18 1925
DEPT. OF STATE
AMERICAN CONSULATE.

Cadiz, Spain, July 28, 1925 ✓

Confidential

SUBJECT: Morocco

Morocco

DEPT. OF STATE

AUG 20 1925

Division of Foreign Service Administration

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUG 19 1925

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Copy in WE.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to inform the Department that the Italian cruisers "Pisa" flag-ship 10,000 tons, with a crew of 850 men, and the "Francesco Ferruccio" with 560, arrived in the harbor of Cadiz Friday evening (July 24) under command of Vice Admiral Ernesto Burzali and Captain C. Valli.

These ships are expected to remain in the harbor several days, and both will take on coal here. It has not been possible by discreet inquiry to learn the definite object of the visit.

On June 21, 1925 the French cruiser "Jeanne d'Arc" arrived at Cadiz under command of Admiral de Bourdoncle de Saint Salvi and remained five days. The French consular agent informed me that the Admiral had instructions from the French Government to make every effort to cultivate cordial relations with the local authorities and leading citizens and the agent had instructions to lend all possible aid to the Admiral with that end in view. A small banquet in the leading hotel for the Admiral and officers of the

ship

881.00/1130

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ship was arranged by the consular agent, and the Admiral held a reception on board, both of which functions were attended by the writer, who was directly opposite the Admiral at the dinner in his honor.

It is customary when a foreign war-ship visits Cadiz, for our Royal Cadiz Tennis Club (a very exclusive social organization) to entertain the personal of the ship at a tea party or dance, paid for by subscription of the members. In this case however the consular agent was told by the club authorities that very few members of the club would attend, which meant that they would not pay the expenses. Thereupon the consular agent, Mr. Huart said that he would pay for it himself. He did and there was a full attendance. The band from the flag-ship furnished the music.

The visit of the "Jeanne d'Arc" was in connection with the co-operation of the Spanish and French activities in and around Morocco.

Two American vessels called at Cadiz recently; the Coast Guard School Ship "Alexander Hamilton" July 21-24 and the "Annapolis" July 7-13. These two vessels were merely on a practice cruise for the cadets.

The following is a translation of the proclamation issued by the then Captain of the Port of Cadiz. He was retired July 26, and Captain Eduardo Pasquin y Reynoso assumed charge. Captain Seris-Granier had completed the prescribed six years of service in the position.

SURVEILLANCE

SURVEILLANCE OF THE MOROCCAN COAST

EDICT

"Don Ubaldo Seris-Granier y Blanco, Captain in the Navy, Marine Commander of this Province, Captain of the Port and local director of Navigation and sea-fisheries,

4 Makes known:-that in accordance with the orders of the Military Directorate under date of July 2, 1925 relative to surveillance of the coast of Morocco the following provisions are set forth:

With the view of preventing all illicit commerce along the coast of Morocco the Spanish and French Governments have decided to have their war-ships co-operate in watching the territory along the north and west coasts of Africa west of long. 2° W and north of lat. 27° N.

The limits within which merchant vessels may be boarded and searched if suspected of transporting arms, munitions and material for war purposes, or proceeding toward ports or natural anchorages of the coast not open to commerce are as follows:

In the sectors which comprise ports open to commerce or crossed by commercial routes surveillance is limited to the six miles of territorial waters, with the right of pursuit beyond this limit.

In the other sectors vigilance will be extended to the particular limits described below:

1st. ATLANTIC.- Sector included between Cape Ghir and Cape Noun. Surveillance will be exercised east of a line joining two points six miles West of these two capes.

2nd. MEDITERRANEAN.- Sector comprised between Cape Tres Forcas and Cape Negro (North of Tetuan). Surveillance will be exercised south of a line connecting these two capes. Furthermore since the presence and organizations of rebels along the coast make commercial navigation, and the operation and control of war-ships near the coast difficult and even dangerous the territorial waters of this sector to a limit of six miles will be closed to navigation between Cape Mazari (south of Tetuan) and Cape Noun or Afran (east of Alhucemas).

Consequently all merchant vessels found by war-ships in the prohibited zone without being able to justify their presence there will be delivered to the competent authorities.

(Notice number 719, July 4, 1925)

I make

I make this public for general information.


Cadiz, July 22, 1925"

Signed (Ubaldo Seris)

There are many references in the local press to the conferences held between the Spanish and French representatives on the subject of Morocco but the Department will be fully informed of these proceedings, direct from other sources.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant

A large, flowing handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Lucien N. Sullivan". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large loop at the end.

LUCIEN N. SULLIVAN
American Consul

In reply refer to
PA 881.00/1130

August 25, 1925.

~~CONFIDENTIAL.~~

The Honorable

The Secretary of Commerce.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose for your confidential information a copy of a despatch from the Consul at Cadix, embodying a translation of an edict of the Captain of the Port in regard to the surveillance of the Moroccan coast by French and Spanish naval forces, and the limits within which merchant vessels may be boarded and searched, which may be of interest to your Department.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:

J. BUTLER WRIGHT

Assistant Secretary.

Enclosure:

From Cadix, No. 145,
confidential, July 28,
1925.

PA:PWE:HWC:SS

HCH.

CB
AUG 24 1925 pm

WE

A true copy of
the signed original.

881.00/1130

In reply refer to
PA 881.00/1130

August 25, 1925.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Honorable

The Secretary of the Navy.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose, for the Office of Naval Intelligence, a copy of a confidential despatch from the Consul at Cadiz, in regard to the recent visits of American and other foreign public vessels to that port, and the surveillance of the Moroccan coast by French and Spanish naval forces.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:

J. BUTLER WRIGHT

Assistant Secretary.

Enclosure:

From Cadiz, No. 145,
confidential,
July 28, 1925.

PA:PWE:EBA:SS

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Wright

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seu
Aug 24 1925

A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal.

881.00/1130

In reply refer to
FA 881.00/1130

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 25, 1925.

The Honorable

The Secretary of the Treasury.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a confidential despatch from the Consul at Cadiz, in regard to the recent visits made to that port by American and other public vessels, including the Coast Guard School Ship ALEXANDER HAMILTON, and the surveillance of the Moroccan coast by French and Spanish naval forces.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:

J. BUTLER WRIGHT

Assistant Secretary.

Enclosure:

From Cadiz, No. 145,
confidential, July 28, 1925.

FA:PWE:EBA:SS

HCH.

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WBY

A true copy of
the signed original.

OR
Aug 24 1925 pm

881.00/1130

In reply refer to
FA 881.00/1130

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 25, 1925.

The Honorable

The Secretary of War.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose, for the Military Information Division, a copy of a confidential despatch from the Consul at Cadix, in regard to the recent visits of American and other foreign public vessels to that port, and the surveillance of the Moroccan coast by French and Spanish naval forces.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:

J. BUTLER WRIGHT

Assistant Secretary.

Enclosure:

From Cadix, No. 145,
confidential,
July 28, 1925.

FA:PWE:HWC:SS

HCB

WE

CB
Aug 24 1925 pm

A true copy of
the signed original.

881.00/1130



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 653.

San Sebastián, July 28, 1925.



Copy in WL.



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

S i r:

I have the honor to report that Count Romanones, "old-regimist", ex-President of the Council of Ministers, ex-Minister of State, and Liberal leader, gave an interview expressing his views on the Hispano-French collaboration conference and the Moroccan problem which, published in EL LIBERAL (Madrid) on July 24th, has created considerable interest because of the boldness of certain statements made in criticism of the Military Directorate. The censorship permitted publication of the interview but required that it be accompanied.....

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accompanied by a note in the nature of a rejoinder on the part of the Directorate. Practically all the newspapers in the capital, and doubtless a majority of the important dailies throughout Spain, have prominently reprinted the interview and note. Clippings of the matter as originally appearing in EL LIBERAL, with Embassy's translation, are transmitted herewith.

In the first place, Romanones attempts to defend himself by stating that he was always in favor of Franco-Spanish collaboration. He characterizes the Spanish withdrawal of 1924 from interior Moroccan posts to the present "Primo de Rivera line" as a "disaster", "the most serious suffered by Spain", and brackets it with the admitted disaster of Annual. He contends that June 1924, "before the retreat from Sheshaun", was the time when cooperation should have been effected; not now. He decries "Franco-Spanish collaboration without a parliament, without a press, without knowledge on the part of the public"; he decries costly new military ventures in Morocco; and he decries "encouraging in the French false illusions that cannot be realized". As to the "old regime", displaced by the Directorate, he contends that "after all the criticisms that have been made, it has not been demonstrated that there are other men capable of excelling our methods".

The Directorate's rejoinder defends the 1924 withdrawal, charges that Romanones' statement that said withdrawal caused France's present difficulties is a matter approaching, if not actually falling under, the Code section defining and punishing.....

punishing treason, and finally, repudiates - as the Directorate has so often done before - the "politicians of the old regime, however 'experienced' they may be".

One Madrid paper, particularly hostile to Romanones, derides him as being "more francophile than Poincaré" and quotes Poincaré as follows in justification of Spain's 1924 Moroccan withdrawal:

"Without any doubt, when Spain found herself faced with a permanent and general rebellion of exceptionally warlike tribes, entrenched in an almost inaccessible region, and when she saw herself by force majeure prevented from expanding and later under the necessity of restricting her occupied territory, she did not intend to repudiate the Treaty of 1912 and, in fact, did not repudiate it. Because of circumstances independent of her will, she simply saw herself in the physical impossibility of fulfilling it. No Frenchman of good faith can reproach her in the slightest".

It should perhaps be added that Count Romanones is the most conspicuous, if not indeed the most active, of the "old regime" politicians, and this is not the first occasion on which he has sought to justify himself and his group and discredit, within the limits of the censorship, the Directorate. It is seldom that the censor has permitted publication of matter so hostile.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,



Alexander P. Moore.

Enclosure:

Text and translation of a statement by Count Romanones.

From EL LIBERAL (Madrid),

July 24, 1925.

LA COLABORACIÓN HABLANDO DE

Entusiasta de la política
hoy ofrece, según pr

HOY HABLA A NUESTROS
ADMIRABLE NOS HA EXPUESTO
SU FONDO Y MATIZ, DE LA AC
CONTINUACION LOS INTERESA

—¿...?
—Yo siempre he sido partidario de la cooperación francoespañola. He sido el primero que en España habló de la necesidad de esa inteligencia. Cuando nadie hablaba ni quería hablar de ello, preconicé dicha política, que se ha tardado tantos años en llevar a la realidad. No creo que nadie abrigue duda sobre esta actitud mía, que los hechos corroboran. Yo mismo la propuse en diferentes ocasiones a políticos y gobernantes franceses, y sin duda por ser yo el que hablaba—hay que expresarse con claridad—no se prestó oídos a aquellas iniciativas mías, a las cuales se ha llegado al cabo de los años, y en condiciones diferentes, que luego explicaré.

—¿...?
—Bastaba mirar el mapa de Marruecos para convencerse de que la colaboración era necesaria. Lo ocurrido fué que por la época en que yo la propuse, Francia se hallaba en otras condiciones estratégicas en Marruecos; que no se nos tomó en cuenta como factor de esa colaboración, que encontraba resistencia también entre algunos sectores de nuestro país. Ahí están mis discursos, el del Ateneo de Sevilla, entre otros, en el que fui bien claro y explícito.

—¿...?
—Lo que ocurre es que surgió el desastre de Annual y posteriormente el del 24, que es el más grave, a mi juicio, de los sufridos por España, y esto, además de rebajar nuestra importancia como factor considerable en Marruecos, permitía a Francia desenvolver su hasta entonces fácil política en Marruecos. Mientras Abd-el-Krim se volvía contra nosotros, Francia tenía libres sus manos para realizar su obra de protectorado, con arreglo al plan por escalas, a varios años vista, según sus previsiones. Francia había caminado de triunfo en triunfo en los campos africanos, y esto, naturalmente, la llevaba a escuchar distraída los propósitos de colaboración por el lado español. Sería larga la tarea de enumerar siquiera las diferentes fases de esos éxitos, militares y políticos. Recordemos la labor de Gouraud, Mangin, d'Amade y Lyautey entre otros. Con esta confianza en sí misma, confirmada por los hechos, llegó junio de 1924. Abd-el-Krim se revolvió otra vez contra nosotros, y Francia en tanto realizó las operaciones del Uarga.

—¿...?
—Entonces era la ocasión de haber realizado la cooperación entre los dos países, sin necesidad de protocolos, convenios ni conferencias. En aquel momento, al surgir las dificultades guerreras, el general Primo de Rivera debió coger el vapor, marchar a Casablanca y entrevistarse inmediatamente con el mariscal Lyautey, quien bien lo merecía, por su alta autoridad y experiencia, y desde aquel momento dar comienzo a la colaboración francoespañola. ¿Por qué no se hizo? ¿Es que entonces no se era francófilo y un año después sí?

—¿...?
—Entonces debió hacerse, y ahora, no. Esta es la novedad de mi actitud. Yo, francófilo de siempre, entusiasta partidario de esa inteligencia, amigo de Francia, digo que hace un año si se debió llegar a la cooperación; hoy, no.

—¿...?
—Hace un año y antes de la retirada de Xauen, si; antes de la rectificación de nuestra línea y de dejar reducida la zona ocupada por nosotros a diez o catorce mil kilómetros cuadrados. Nosotros debíamos haber permanecido en Xauen, porque uno de los principios de la colaboración estaba en permanecer fieles a lo que nos obliga nuestra condición de vecinos de Francia en Marruecos y de colaboradores; porque para que uno de los ocupantes de una de dos casas vecinas abandone ésta y la derribe, es necesario que tenga en cuenta la pared medianera. Al derribar la medianería puede muy bien dar ocasión al derrumbamiento de la casa de al lado. Y aquello trajo esto. El abandono de Xauen fué la causa de cuanto sobrevino después y lamentamos ahora. Así que colaboración para volver a Xauen o a otros lugares de los abandonados o para desembarcar en Alhucemas, o sea, para rehacer lo deshecho y que realizado estaba, no. Entonces era la ocasión de haber colaborado, evitando de aquel modo inútiles derramamientos de sangre al país y nuevos sacrificios económicos.

—¿...?
—Porque no basta declararse a sí mismo responsable de una política. A mí y al país eso no nos basta, porque después de que se hayan sacrificado nuevas vidas y ocasionado nuevos gastos, ¿con qué se indemniza a éste, con qué se le paga? Ni la responsabilidad ni la vida de un gobernante pueden

compensar de los daños irreparables que se nos produzcan, que es lo que hay que evitar precisamente.

—¿...?

—Colaboración francoespañola sin Parlamento, sin Prensa, sin que la opinión esté informada, a espaldas suyas, no. A la luz del día, de modo que el pueblo español pueda medir la cuantía y la proporción del compromiso que contrae, dar su aquiescencia o su reprobación, sí. Porque hoy nos encontramos con que es preciso realizar un nuevo esfuerzo, para que esa pared medianera que se derribó tan ligeramente sea reconstruida. Y esto es lo que asusta. Llevar a cabo nuevas operaciones, como la de Alhucemas, que pueden costar al país miles de brjas, no. De una pequeña gota de sangre que se derrame será responsable en el porvenir quien pacte sin conocimiento y consentimiento del país. Alimentando engañosas ilusiones del pueblo francés que no podrán cumplirse y para causar luego una decepción, no.

—¿...?

—Yo estoy dispuesto a proclamar esto muy alto, cueste lo que cueste, a trueque de los más grandes sacrificios personales, porque sé por experiencia, desgraciadamente (y el conde de Romanones pronuncia estas

palabras con voz velada por la emoción) lo que es dar la vida de los hijos, como lo viene haciendo el pueblo español. Si mi existencia fuera precisa por proclamar estas verdades, ante un ambiente de indiferencia que descorazona, lo haría.

—¿...?

—Una obra de esa importancia, después de lo que viene ocurriendo en Marruecos desde 1924 acá, requería, repito, el concurso de la opinión, del Parlamento, de la Prensa y de los hombres que hemos gobernado. Aunque sólo fuera por nuestra responsabilidad—cuidado que echo por delante nuestra responsabilidad, ya que no nuestra experiencia—se nos ha debido escuchar sólo por este título. Hemos gobernado, y después de todas las críticas que se quiera, no se ha demostrado que haya otros hombres capaces de superar nuestra actuación.

—¿...?

—Otro aspecto del problema: después de haber variado las circunstancias hasta el

extremo que expuesto queda, como en todo negocio en que intervienen dos personas, es preciso calcular lo que va a perder y a ganar cada uno. Es indudable que uno puede exponer mucho menos que otro y ganar más. A Francia, con una zona de protectorado que llega a 500.000 kilómetros cuadrados, fronteriza de Argelia, lo máspreciado de su imperio colonial, la colaboración representa infinitamente más que para nosotros, después del abandono de Xauen. Mermada hasta la extensión actual de nuestra línea, y con la creación del Estado del Rif, ¿qué nos quedaría? Un reducido "hinterland" y nuestras plazas fuertes.

Esto tuvo la amabilidad de manifestarnos el conde de Romanones en términos calurosos, vehementísimos, reveladores de una irreductible energía y de un estado de ánimo resuelto y convencido, y con palabras desde luego más elocuentes que las nuestras.

JUAN GUIXE

From EL LIBERAL (Madrid),

July 24, 1925.

UNA NOTA DE LA CENSURA

REPLICA DEL PRESIDENTE DEL DIRECTORIO

Las preinsertas declaraciones fueron presentadas a la censura por EL LIBERAL. Su gravedad e importancia nos indujeron a detener su publicación hasta saber si el conde de Romanones lo deseaba así. Ausente éste de Madrid, y sin contestar al telegrama que hace cuarenta y ocho horas se le ha dirigido a tal fin, el presidente del Directorio ha autorizado la publicación, siguiéndolas del comentario que ellas requieren para poner las cosas en su lugar.

Aduce el declarante haber sido siempre partidario de la cooperación francoespañola en Marruecos y trata de justificar su aserto con sus discursos de Sevilla y otros, siendo de lamentar que no lo justifique con algún acto de gobierno, ni como presidente ni como ministro de Estado, cuyas funciones ejerció tanto tiempo.

Dice luego que el "desastre" del 24 ha sido el más grave de los sufridos por España, con lo que quiere decir que fué más grave que el de Annual. En ese "calificado" desastre del 24 se han salvado más de cien guarniciones, se abrió la comunicación cortada con Tánger y con Xauen, manteniéndola a viva fuerza cuarenta y siete días, hasta evacuar el último enfermo, el último hombre, el último caballo y el último cañón, salvo un cortísimo número inutilizados, sin más episodio adverso, pero también con logro del objetivo, que el producido el 19 de noviembre por un fortísimo temporal, unido a la desgracia de la muerte del general jefe de la columna, que a las veinticuatro horas se enterraba piadosamente en Tetuán. ¿Para qué recordar los días trágicos de Annual con sus 7.000 cadáveres insepultos, los generales, jefes y oficiales sin recoger, muertos o heridos del campo de batalla; los cien cañones perdidos, Monte Arruit y Zeluán entregados a sus escasos medios hasta perecer? Nos parece "algo apasionado" el conde de Romanones en la comparación. Los 29.000 soldados licenciados a los tres meses de tomar el mando el general Primo de Rivera y los 26.000 repatriados tres meses después son cifras más elocuentes que las apreciaciones del conde de Romanones.

Respecto a si el 6 de septiembre debió el presidente del Directorio acudir a Casablanca a solicitar allí, en aquel momento de ahogo, la colaboración francesa o ir a Tetuán, encontró más eficaz y más digno esto último y ponerse al frente del Ejército, realizando con él el glorioso esfuerzo que admiran todos los españoles y muchos extranjeros, menos el conde de Romanones, lamentando esta diferencia de juicio que de él le separa.

Para obrar de un modo u otro, no había para qué tener en cuenta sentimientos de francofilia, tan extemporánea o imprudentemente sacados a cuento; había sólo que inspirarse en el bien y la dignidad del país. El presidente fué aliadófilo en los días más difíciles y amargos de Francia; pero es ahora jefe del Gobierno español, y no tiene ni manifiesta otros sentimientos que los que al país convienen.

Afirmar en estos momentos, con la pretendida autoridad del conde de Romanones, que España es la causante, por el repliegue de su línea, tantas veces preconizado por tantas autoridades en la materia, de las dificultades actuales de Francia, es un caso que

entra, o por lo menos bordea, el título del Código que define y pesa el delito de traición a la patria.

Para abreviar el comentario, acaso ya excesivo. En cuanto al concurso o audiencia que añora el conde de Romanones de los hombres que han gobernado, es de repatriar una vez más que ni para éste ni para ningún otro asunto será solicitado mientras gobierne el Directorio.

El fracaso contundente de la gestión de ellos en todo, pero principalmente en Marruecos, los excluye de voz y de voto, y el pueblo español rechazaría y aun despreciaría al Directorio, si le viese acudir a tal consejo. ¡Tal es el justo descrédito político en que cayeron! Si España pasara por situaciones difíciles—gracias a Dios, no pueden ser más felices y despejados los días actuales—acudiríamos en consulta a una asamblea de catedráticos, de magistrados, de representantes de fuerzas vivas, de todo menos de políticos del viejo régimen, ya "experimentados".

From EL LIBERAL (Madrid),

July 24, 1925.

Franco - Spanish Collaboration

. . .

Interview with Count Romanones.

. . .

An enthusiastic supporter of a friendly policy with France, his present attitude, according to his own confession, presents a new phase.

Today Count Romanones addresses our readers, giving his opinion with admirable completeness. Although differing on certain points in nature and trend from the well known attitude of EL LIBERAL, publication is given to the interesting views of Count Romanones.

"I have always been a supporter of Franco-Spanish cooperation. I was the first person in Spain to speak of the necessity of such understanding. When no one spoke or wished to speak of it I anticipated that policy which has taken so many years to carry into effect. I think no one will have any doubt concerning my position, that facts entirely corroborate. I myself proposed it on different occasions to French statesmen and governments, and doubtless because it was I who spoke - I must speak plainly - no heed was paid to these initiatives on my part, which have been accepted after many years and under different conditions as I shall shortly explain".

"It was enough to look at the map of Morocco to be convinced that collaboration was necessary. It happens that at the time I proposed it France occupied a different strategic position in Morocco: that she did not take us into consideration as a factor in that collaboration which also encountered opposition in certain parts of our country. I refer to my speeches, that in the Atheneum at Seville, among others, in which I spoke clearly and explicitly.

"What happened was the disaster of Annual, and later that of '24, which, in my opinion, is the most serious suffered by Spain, and this, besides lessening our importance as a factor for consideration in Morocco, permitted France to develop her previously easy policy in Morocco. While Abd-el-Krim revolted against us, France had a free hand to carry on her protectorate task, in conformity with a schedule drawn up for a series of years. France had gone from success to success in the African field, and this, naturally, led her to give little heed to the

proposals.....

proposals of collaboration on the part of Spain. It would be a great task to enumerate the different phases of events, both military and political. We recall the work of Gouraud, Mangin d'Amade, and Lyautey, among others. With this confidence in itself, confirmed by events, June, 1924 arrived - Abd-el-Krim revolted against us once more, and France, in the meantime, undertook the Uarga operations.

"That was the time to have effected cooperation between the two countries, without the necessity for protocols, conventions or conferences. At that time, on the breaking out of the trouble, General Primo de Rivera should have taken ship, gone to Casablanca and conferred directly with Marshal Lyautey, whose opinion was valuable by reason of his authority and experience, and from that moment have started Franco-Spanish collaboration. Why did he not do it? Is it that at that time, he was not francophile, and a year later, he was?

"It should have been done then, but now, no. That is the new phase in my position. I, always francophile, an enthusiastic supporter of an understanding, a friend of France, - say that a year ago, cooperation should have been effected, but now, no.

"A year ago, and before the retreat from Sheshuan, yes; before the rectification of our line and the reduction by from 10,000 to 14,000 square kilometers of the zone occupied by us. We should have remained at Sheshuan because one of the principles of collaboration was in remaining faithful to the obligation entailed by our being neighbors and collaborators of France in Morocco: because in order that one of the occupants of two adjoining houses may abandon and tear down his house, he must take into account the party wall. In tearing down the party wall, he may possibly cause the demolition of the house next door. That is what happened in this case. The retirement from Sheshuan was the cause of much that happened later and now we are lamenting. So, collaboration for returning to Sheshuan or any other of the abandoned posts, or for making a landing at Alhucemas, or, rather, for repairing a recognized mistake - (No) - That was the time for collaboration, avoiding thereby useless bloodshed by the nation and new economic sacrifices.

"For it is not enough to declare oneself responsible for a policy. This does not suffice for me or for the nation, for after more lives have been sacrificed and new expenditures occasioned, with what will indemnification and payment be made?

Neither.....

Neither the responsibility nor the life of the governing authority can make compensation for the irreparable harm they are causing us, and which is the main thing to be prevented.

"Franco - Spanish collaboration without a Parliament, without a Press, without knowledge on the part of the public, on their own responsibility - no. In the light of day, so that the Spanish nation may gauge the extent and proportion of the engagements contracted, may acquiesce or refuse, - yes. For now we find that it is necessary to undertake a new enterprise, in order that the party wall that was so lightly torn down, may be rebuilt. And that is where the trouble lies. To execute new operations, like that of Alhucemas, that may cost the country thousands of casualties, no. Whosoever enters into a compact without the knowledge and consent of the nation will be hereafter responsible for every drop of blood shed. Encouraging in the French false illusions that cannot be realized and that, therefore, give rise to deception, no.

"I am inclined to proclaim this loudly, cost what it may, even at the greatest personal sacrifice, for I know by experience (and Count Romanones spoke these words with a voice shaken by emotion) what it is to give the life of sons as the Spanish people have been doing. Were my life the forfeit for proclaiming these verities in the disheartening atmosphere of indifference, I should do it.

"A work of such importance, since the events in Morocco from 1924, needs, I repeat, the support of public opinion, of Parliament, of the Press and the men that we have ruled. Although it might be only on account of our responsibility - mind you, I emphasize our responsibility and not our experience - we should be heard on that account if no other. We have governed and after all the criticisms that have been made, it has not been demonstrated that there are other men capable of excelling our methods.

"Another aspect of the problem: since the change in conditions to the extreme I have indicated, as in any business enterprise in which two persons are engaged, it is necessary to calculate what each is going to lose and gain. It is manifest that one may risk much less than the other and gain more. For France, with a protectorate area amounting to 500,000 square kilometers with its frontier on Algiers - the most valuable part of its colonial empire - collaboration means infinitely more than for us, since the abandonment of Sheshuan. Reduced to the present extent of our line, and with the creation of the Riffian State, what would be left us? A reduced 'hinterland' and our forts".

(Note of the Censor. The foregoing statements were submitted to the censor by EL LIBERAL. Their gravity and importance led us to withhold them from publication until it was known whether Count Romanones desired it. As he was absent from Madrid and no reply was made to the telegram addressed him on the subject forty-eight hours ago, the President of the Directorate has authorized publication, together with comment requisite to present the matter in its proper light.)

. . . .

Reply of the President of the Directorate.

"The author of the statement declares himself to have always been a supporter of Franco - Spanish cooperation in Morocco, and endeavors to prove his assertion by his speeches at Seville and elsewhere, though it is to be regretted that he gave no evidence thereof by any governmental action, either as president or Minister of State, which functions he exercised so long.

"He then says that the 'disaster' of '24 was the most serious sustained by Spain, apparently meaning that it was more serious than that of Annual. In this so-called 'disaster' of '24, more than 100 garrisons were relieved, communication opened between Tetuan and Sheshuan, maintaining it by main force for forty-seven days until the last wounded man, the last soldier, the last horse, and the last gun - except a few useless ones - were evacuated, without other adverse incident (but with complete success) than that caused by a severe storm on November 19, together with the unfortunate death of the general-in-chief of the column who, within twenty-four hours was solemnly interred at Tetuan.

"Why recall the tragic days of Annual, with its 7,000 unburied corpses, the generals, chiefs and officers left dead or wounded on the battlefield; the 100 guns lost, Mount Arruit and Zeluan abandoned with their limited resources to perish? Count Romanones seems somewhat extreme (algo apasionado) in his comparison. The 29,000 soldiers mustered out within three months of General Primo de Rivera's taking over command, and the 26,000 repatriated three months later, are more eloquent figures than the valuations of Count Romanones.

"As to whether on September 6 the President of the Directorate should have gone to Casablanca to solicit French collaboration at that moment of trial, or have gone to Tetuan,

he.....

he regarded as more desirable and fit that he should place himself at the head of the army, sharing in its glorious effort, that all Spaniards and many foreigners have praised, with the exception of Count Romanones, regretting the difference of opinion that separates us.

"To do one thing or the other, it was not a question of Francophile sentiment, so suddenly or imprudently appealed to: only the welfare and dignity of the nation were to be regarded. The President was an allied supporter in the hardest and bitterest days of France; but now he is head of the Spanish government and must show no other sentiment than such as may be for the good of the nation.

"To assert at this time, with the assumed authority of Count Romanones, that Spain, by the withdrawal of her line - many times taken under consideration by many authorities in the matter - is the cause of the present difficulties of France, is a matter that comes under, or at least approaches, that section of the Code that defines and punishes the crime of treason to the nation.

"In order to shorten a comment already too extended: As to the assistance or hearing that Count Romanones bespeaks for men who have governed, it may be repeated once more that neither for this nor for any other matter will it be asked while the Directorate rules.

"The distressing fiasco of their policy in everything, but especially in Morocco, excludes them from hearing or vote and the Spanish nation would ridicule and even despise the Directorate if it were to apply for such advice. Such is the just political discredit into which they have fallen. If Spain is to pass through difficult situations - and thank God the present could not be happier or more serene - we shall consult a gathering of learned men, of magistrates, of representatives of real power, but not politicians of the old regime, however 'experienced' they may be".


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
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
SOLICITOR'S OFFICE
AUG 27 1925
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 654

San Sebastián, July 28, 1925.



The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.



Copy in W.E.A.

INDEX BUREAU
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FIT ED
AUG 31 1925

S i r:

I have the honor to report the termination on the 25th instant of the sessions of the Franco-Spanish Conference held in Madrid to arrange for collaboration between the Spanish and French governments in dealing with the acute situation in Morocco. The conference held its initial session on June 17th; thus its duration was five and a half weeks. The plenary sessions numbered about a dozen, their labor being mostly consideration and ratification of the detailed work and formulas of the mixed technical sub-committees. No important matters were, however, concluded without, it would.....

would seem, previous direct reference to the home offices of the two countries concerned, and there was considerable delay on the part of the French due to the necessity of referring certain questions to their officials in Morocco.

In connection with the following general review of the conference I beg leave to invite attention to my telegrams numbers 32¹⁰⁶² of June 16, 4 p.m., 40¹⁰⁷⁷ of June 27, 3¹⁰⁸² p.m., and 42¹¹¹⁰ of July 3, 6 p.m., to my despatches numbers 622¹⁰¹² of June 29th and 630¹¹¹⁰ of July 3rd, and especially to the Embassy's regular weekly reports on political conditions commencing with despatch No. 606²⁵²⁰² of June 15th, to date.

As the Department is aware, the experience of Spain in its protectorate in Morocco has for years been tragic and costly and the people of this country have therefore but one desire in the premises: a definite solution of what they term "the Moroccan problem". The Military Directorate's program of action contains this as its first and foremost item. It may be said that anything facilitating that solution would receive a favorable public reception, and thus the announcement in early June of intention to hold the conference was generally welcomed.

General Francisco Gómez Jordana, one of the ten members constituting the Directorate and chief of the Morocco Bureau, headed the Spanish delegation of six and was president of the conference. M. Malvy, who undertook the preliminary negotiations for the conference, was technically head of the French delegation of five but passed only a very short time in.....

in Madrid and for the most part the ranking delegate was Count Peretti della Rocca, French Ambassador to Spain, a man who, it is said, was appointed to the Madrid post because of his excellent knowledge of the north African situation. The French delegation received every mark of cordial social attention while in Madrid.

The deliberations, especially of the technical committees, were long and exhaustive and their results sometimes delayed. This gave rise to rumors of dissensions, which were vigorously denied in official utterances.

In short the accomplishments of the conference were these: (1) an agreement for Franco-Spanish collaboration in a strict "maritime vigilance" along the Spanish and French littoral of north and west Africa between the 2nd meridian West Longitude (Greenwich) and the 27th parallel of North Latitude, this aiming at a maritime blockade of the rebel coast; (2) an agreement for Franco-Spanish collaboration in "land vigilance", in order to blockade the rebels by land and also to prevent the spread of their propaganda among adjoining submissive tribes; (3) an agreement for Franco-Spanish "political collaboration" in regard to questions of rather a political than military character, questions involving the present and near-future attitude of the respective governments toward their Moroccan protectorates, especially in settling the present difficulties precipitated by the late Riffian attack on the French; (4) an agreement for joint Franco.....

Franco-Spanish action in securing strict observance of the Tangier Statute, so as to prevent the international zone being, what it is claimed to be, a point of origin of rebellion and propaganda and supply of contraband greatly helpful to the Riffians and the Yebala dissidents; (5) a mutual favorable attitude toward immediately concluding peace with Abd-el-Krim, though it is insisted the initiative should come from him; (6) as a part of the "political collaboration" agreement Spain and France will not make peace separately; (7) a clarification of certain obscurities relative to the Franco-Spanish frontier in the Wergha region, obscurities due to vague wording in the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1912 and which, considering the present military operations in that region, needed to be clarified; (8) as a part of the military collaboration scheme, provision for the establishment of liaison bureaux, for conferences between the heads of the Spanish and French military and naval forces operating in Morocco, and for a temporary reciprocal right of pursuit and aerial passage over each other's protectorate territory.

While it is true that there are, especially among the "old-regimists" who were thrown out of political power on the advent of the Directorate in 1923, persons who express doubts (guardedly because of the censorship) on the final outcome of the conference and collaboration, and even intimate that Spain has "let herself in" for severe things to come out of these various agreements, it seems clear that the greater number of Spaniards are hopeful that the end of this Moroccan nightmare.....

nightmare is in sight. Primo de Rivera is quoted as having said on the eve of his return to Tetuan July 25th: "I hope that within a couple of months everything will be settled".

Of course there has been practically no newspaper comment in Spain that could be termed adverse. In this connection, however, reference should perhaps be made to the interview of Count Romanones, "old-regimist" and Liberal leader, published July 24th and reported on under separate despatch. Had there been no censorship presumably cleavages in view-point would have appeared in the press. Certainly there has been some pressure exerted to secure publication of the agreements, but the Directorate's reply has simply been that no publication can be made until an agreement is reached with the French government on what matters may properly be given publicity.

As already pointed out to the Department, the conference has precipitated one preoccupation in Spain, to wit: fear that Spain may, as collaborator, be drawn into a new military campaign costly in lives and money. For a time apparently the generality of people had hoped that the question could be settled without change in Spain's present position in Africa, that is, without change in her new "Primo de Rivera line" along the coast, established by the difficult and costly withdrawal of last year. Now it appears, and the Directorate has unmistakably so stated, that Spain may find herself in the necessity of joining with France in a new military campaign, though.....

though Primo de Rivera cautiously stated on the 25th that such a campaign would be "within the limits of what was of advantage to Spain". The eventuality of a new campaign depends on Abd-el-Krim's attitude toward immediately making peace. And confidential, reliable information has it that Spain and France are willing to be liberal and to grant the Riffians autonomy. Meanwhile newspaper editorials and press interviews with persons not of the Directorate show an insistence on the point that any military undertaking by Spain should only be proportionate to her small interests in Morocco and that on France, because of her interests in her enormous African north-west empire, rests the major part of the burden. One senses an uneasiness, an uncertainty as to how far Spain's late commitments may carry her.

Perhaps it should be pointed out that with special emphasis Spanish officials, in order to rectify rumors published abroad, have indicated that the conference has neither undertaken to reopen the Tangier question nor sought to modify the existing Tangier Statute; it has only sought to secure strict fulfilment of the Statute and to make the international zone neutral in more than name only. And it is understood that the Franco-Spanish understanding on Tangier is to be followed by other diplomatic negotiations, since Spain and France are not the only two countries interested in the international zone.

General Gómez Jordana, immediately on termination of the conference, issued a long important statement to the press, reviewing the conference. He said that it had "entirely attained.....

attained its purpose" and that now a new task, devolving on Primo de Rivera and his coadjutors, was at hand: the execution of the agreements reached. The full text, with Embassy's translation, of that statement is enclosed herewith.

Information from Morocco indicates that the collaboration plan is well under way. Primo de Rivera returned to Tetuan from Madrid on July 25th. A failure of prompt results from the plan would be a severe blow to the prestige of Primo de Rivera and the Directorate. Besides, most of the important items on the political and economic agenda of the Directorate are conditioned on the prior solution of this Moroccan question.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Alexander P. Moore

Alexander P. Moore.

Enclosure:

Text and Embassy's translation of statement to the press
by General Gómez Jordana.

Copy to C. H. C., Paris.

From EL DEBATE (Madrid),

July 26, 1925.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL GOMEZ JORDANA

—Señores: Ha terminado la Conferencia. Ahora queda otra labor interesantísima, en la que desempeñan el principal papel el general en jefe y alto comisario, general Primo de Rivera, y cuantos le secundan en su labor, que son los que han de poner en práctica, de acuerdo con el alto mando francés, los convenios a que ambos Gobiernos han llegado como consecuencia de la Conferencia francoespañola. El viaje del mariscal Petain a Ceuta y Tetuán, que se realizará dentro de unos días, es uno de los primeros actos de importancia, revelador de nuestra franca colaboración.

Sería deseo del Gobierno poder dar a la publicidad todo lo concertado. No es posible hacerlo, sin embargo, por lo menos de momento, hasta llegar a un amistoso acuerdo entre ambos Gobiernos respecto a lo que estimen debe darse a la publicación por no tener un marcado carácter de reserva. Sin burlar estas protocolarias trabas, procuraré informar a ustedes, como presidente de esta Conferencia, en la forma más explícita posible. El solo anuncio de los asuntos tratados y concertados en la Conferencia que ustedes conocen demuestra el alcance y justifica la lentitud de su desarrollo, más si se tiene en cuenta que se han abarcado todos los detalles para que los llamados a ejecutar los acuerdos lo hagan en un campo exento de toda complicación de orden diplomático, ya que bastantes escollos ofrece la realidad; para dejar sin puntualizar lo que por previsto debe ser de antemano allanado. En la Conferencia se ha perseguido un solo ideal: llegar por todos los medios a la paz, tan necesaria para la obra de protectorado a que uno y otro país nos comprometimos, así como para asegurar la tranquilidad de dos poderosos países que no pueden seguir soportando una crónica perturbación de su vida interna, que tanto enerva y desgasta. Se ha llegado a ese ideal, procurando descartar exclusivismos y prejuicios, que, exagerados, hubieran imposibilitado una conjunción tan beneficiosa.

El primer acuerdo de la Conferencia está ya puesto en práctica y rinde beneficio positivo, pues al colaborar en un servicio que ya venía desempeñando nuestra Marina de manera eficiente y satisfactoria, la aparición de ambas banderas en ostensible conjunción es prueba fehaciente de nuestro estrecho acuerdo. Este convenio y el de contrabando terrestre persiguen un mismo fin: aislar la rebeldía interin persista y privar al enemigo de todo recurso que facilite su acción guerrera, así como evitar que gentes rebeldes puedan contaminar zonas sumisas al Majzén, y evitar el espectáculo de que en cualquiera de ambos países amigos se pueda laborar contra el otro por agentes sospechosos. En este acuerdo se ha llegado incluso al establecimiento de oficinas de enlace de cada país en la zona de protectorado vecina, a fin de que el servicio de vigilancia se desenvuelva en colaboración estrecha, íntima e indivisible. De este modo, el enemigo se verá reducido a sus propios re-

ursos, y ello ha de contribuir poderosamente a que ceda en su pertinaz e inexplicable rebeldía. También se ha llegado en este convenio, a un completo acuerdo en lo que se refiere a la vigilancia de Tánger, en forma de que la neutralidad preyista en el estatuto sea un hecho. No se trata en este acuerdo de nada que pueda rozar siquiera a lo estatuido, ni de difícil ejecución, sino de medidas previsoras para garantizar la seguridad de Tánger y evitar que siga siendo cuartel general de la rebeldía. Esas medidas no interesan exclusivamente a España, sino a todos los países, dado el carácter internacional de la zona. Por eso es de esperar que ninguna dificultad se oponga a la ejecución de esas medidas, que España y Francia juzgan necesarias, y que, por no depender de ellas exclusivamente ponerlas en práctica, gestionan la aquiescencia necesaria. He de advertir que a las autoridades locales de Tánger corresponde, apreciar la oportunidad y los detalles de las referidas medidas.

El detalle de estos convenios se limita al desarrollo de esas ideas primordiales en cláusulas que reglamentan aquellos servicios tan importantes, las cuales han de ser aún desenvueltas por los mandos francés y español de Marruecos.

El acuerdo de colaboración política establece las bases de conducta para lograr la paz. Es lo más fundamental de ese acuerdo el compromiso de no concertar la paz separadamente, evitándose el juego a que por parte del enemigo se prestaría otra norma de conducta. Por lo demás, el establecimiento de las bases referidas no implica, como gratuitamente se supone, que Francia y España hayan ofrecido ni vayan a ofrecer a los rebeldes la paz, sino que habrá de ser de ellos la iniciativa. Al establecerse este acuerdo no podía quedar sin concertar punto tan esencial para el caso de que esas bases hubieran de ponerse en práctica. Acerca de ellas sólo puedo decir que se inspiran en un amplio espíritu, atendiendo a tres puntos esenciales: respeto a los Tratados internacionales, garantías, en bien de todos, para que esa paz, si a ella se llegase, no fuera efímera, y respeto también al decoro nacional, a que tienen derecho países que tantos sacrificios han realizado, sin otro interés que llevar a Marruecos los beneficios indudables de la civilización. Difícil es concertar una acción conjunta de los dos países para lograr la pacificación de una rebeldía tan pertinaz como la que con asiento en el Rif tanto preocupa, sin pensar en la posibilidad, siquiera pudiera ser remota, de una colaboración militar, que no implica la tendencia imperialista que muchos suponen, y de la que el Directorio no puede resultar sospechoso. A un país que, como Francia, lucha en la actualidad con una rebeldía que tiene su foco principal en nuestra zona, no puede ponerse una barrera, tras la cual puede el enemigo cobijarse impunemente. Proceder así implicaría por nuestra parte un peligroso egoísmo, que nos resultaría también perjudicial. En el mismo caso podríamos encon-

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trarnos nosotros con respecto a la zona francesa. De ahí la facultad de *persecución* y de *sobrevuelo*, concedida con carácter de reciprocidad, y con adopción por una y otra parte de garantía para que esas acciones tengan un carácter completamente temporal, que excluya toda idea de posesión. Esto ha de resultar sumamente perjudicial para el enemigo, que, de otro modo, se encastillaría en una zona que, de hecho, resultaría neutral, si a ella no llegáramos nosotros porque no nos convenía ni Francia porque no la dejaban.

En cuanto a la colaboración a que venimos refiriéndonos, si a ella fuera menester llegar, sería estrecha en cuanto se refiere a la coordinación de esfuerzos; pero en el bien entendido de que nuestras obligaciones no han de exceder del límite impuesto por la política del Directorio, que ni en lo más mínimo se desvirtúa por los acuerdos adoptados, ni en sacrificios ni en orientaciones. Todo se ha compaginado para que así resulte. De otro modo no hubiéramos podido llegar con la felicidad que lo hemos hecho a un convenio cuya base de eficacia está precisamente en la coordinación de intereses, lo que evitará complicaciones de toda clase.

El Directorio tenía su plan trazado. No lo varía. Lo que hace es coordinarlo con el plan francés, con lo que sólo beneficios han de resultar para ambos países en relación con la rebeldía, que es la única a quien perjudica nuestro acuerdo.

Indispensable para poder aplicar todos los acuerdos a que vengo haciendo referencia es interpretar el Tratado de 1912 en lo que a fronteras entre las dos zonas del Protectorado se refiere. El trazado de dicha frontera tal como en el Tratado se establece resulta impreciso en extremo. Muchas veces se tocó este asunto, y yo mismo he intervenido en las varias discusiones sostenidas acerca de él, sin que se llegase a resolverlo. Ahora, llegado el momento en que necesariamente habían de precisarse tales límites, ante la imposibilidad de hacerlo con carácter definitivo por la escasa fijeza de los datos con que contamos uno y otro país, se ha llegado a una especie de *modus vivendi*, basado en el Tratado de 1912, que satisface todos los intereses y permite poner en práctica los acuerdos adoptados con toda desenvoltura. No he de terminar sin hacer un calurosísimo elogio de mis compañeros de Comisión, tanto de los delegados y expertos franceses, que han llegado al límite máximo en competencia, corrección, tacto y actividad, como de los españoles, que han puesto todo su empeño y relevantes cualidades en la obra. Los Gobiernos francés y español han extremado sus desvelos por que la Conferencia fuera coronada, como lo ha sido, por el más feliz éxito. Nada más puedo decirles, y ya es bastante lo que les he dicho.

La Conferencia ha llenado perfectamente su objeto, y ambos países pueden estar satisfechos de haber llegado, sin merma de sus intereses, a un acuerdo tan estrecho en todo. Sólo así será posible resolver el

problema de Marruecos con el menor esfuerzo, aunque sin poderse excluir dificultades ajenas a nuestra voluntad. Hagamos votos por que la eficacia de los acuerdos adoptados correspondan a la buena fe con que se estipularon y al elevadísimo ideal que a los dos países hermanos guía en bien de la civilización y de la humanidad.

From EL DEBATE (Madrid),

July 26, 1925.

Statement of General Gómez Jordana.

"Gentlemen: the Conference is ended. There is now another most interesting task to be performed in which the principal role devolves on the general-in-chief and High Commissioner, General Primo de Rivera, and those who are to aid him in his work which is to put into effect, in accord with the French High Command, the agreements reached by both governments as a consequence of the Franco-Spanish Conference. The journey of Marshal Petain to Ceuta and Tetuan which is to be made within a few days is one of the first acts of importance indicative of our frank collaboration.

"The government would like to give publicity to all that was agreed upon. It is not possible to do so, at least just now, until a friendly agreement has been reached between the two governments with regard to what they may consider advisable to give out as not being of a specially secret character. Without overstepping these limitations of protocol I shall, as President of the Conference, give you the information in the most explicit manner possible. The single statement of the matters discussed and settled in the Conference, which you are acquainted with, indicates the extent and justifies the slowness of the proceedings, especially if it be considered that they have embraced every detail so that those who are to execute the agreements may do so in a field cleared of any complication of a diplomatic character since the reality presents enough difficulties without emphasizing such things as may be previously adjusted by foresight. One ideal has been followed throughout the Conference: to achieve by every means that peace so necessary for the protectorate task in which both countries are engaged, as well as to assure the tranquillity of two powerful nations that cannot continue to endure a chronic disturbance of their internal affairs with its weakening and destructive effect. Such an ideal has been attained through the elimination of exclusive claims and prejudice which, if paramount, would have rendered impossible so beneficial a consolidation.

"The first agreement of the Conference has already been put into execution and is giving good results, for in co-operating in a service that our own navy had been carrying on efficiently and satisfactorily, the appearance of both flags in manifest unity is authentic evidence of our close accord. This agreement and that of land contraband have the same purpose: to isolate a revolt that is persistent for the time being, and to deprive the enemy of any resource that might facilitate his military action; also to prevent contamination by the rebels

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of areas submissive to the Majzin and the semblance of either of the friendly nations working against the other by means of suspicious agents. In this agreement has been included the establishment of liaison bureaux of each nation in the adjoining protectorate area, so that the vigilance service may be carried on in strict, intimate, and unified collaboration. By this means, the enemy will find itself reduced to its own resources and it will contribute enormously to the suppression of a stubborn and inexplicable revolt. In this agreement there has also been reached complete accord with reference to Tangier vigilance, in such form that the neutrality provided in the Statute may be a fact. Nothing is contained in the agreement that might interfere in the slightest degree with what had been established, nor that may render execution difficult; only anticipatory measures to guarantee the safety of Tangier and to stop its being the headquarters of rebellion. These measures are of interest not to Spain alone but to all countries, in view of the international character of the zone. It is therefore to be hoped that there will be no opposition to the execution of the measures that Spain and France consider necessary, and that - as their application does not devolve on them exclusively - the requisite acquiescence will be procured. It may be stated that the local Tangier authorities will be enabled to pass on the fitness and the details of the said measures.

The details of the agreements are confined to developing the original ideas into regulations for the services of such importance which are to be yet evolved by the French and Spanish commands in Morocco.

The agreement on political collaboration fixes the bases of action to bring about peace. The most fundamental point of this agreement is the engagement not to arrange peace separately, thus depriving the enemy of an opportunity that any other rule of conduct would afford. Furthermore, the fixing of the said bases does not imply - as is inferred with no foundation - that France and Spain have offered or are going to offer peace to the rebels, since the latter must take the initiative to that end. In reaching this agreement it was not possible to leave unsettled a point so important as to how these bases should be carried into effect. In regard to that, I can only say that they were inspired by a broad minded attention to three essential points: respect for international treaties; guarantees for the benefit of all, that this peace, if arranged, should not be ephemeral; and respect, also, for national honor, as is due for nations that have made so many sacrifices without other interest than to give to Morocco the unquestioned benefits of civilization. It is difficult for the two countries to unite in action that will suppress a rebellion so obstinate as that of the Riff without considering the possibility, however, remote, of military cooperation, which does not imply the imperialistic tendency as many fancy and of which the Directorate could entertain

no.....

no suspicion. To a country which, like France, is at present fighting a rebellion that has its principal center in our zone, a barrier could not be placed behind which the enemy might take refuge with impunity. Such a course of action on our part would involve a dangerous selfishness that might also have a harmful result for us. We might find ourselves in the same position as regards the French zone. Hence, the authorization for pursuit and for aerial passage, conceded reciprocally and with guarantees on both sides that these arrangements shall have an entirely temporary character, thus excluding any idea of possession. This will have an extremely harmful effect for the enemy who, otherwise, might fortify themselves in a zone which actually would be neutral territory if we were not there through motives of expediency, nor the French because we had not allowed it.

As to the collaboration just referred to, if it shall be necessary to apply it, it will be close as regards coordination of action: but it is well understood that our obligations must not exceed the limitations imposed by the policy of the Directorate, which has not been weakened in the slightest degree by the agreements adopted, neither as to sacrifices made nor general direction. Everything has been arranged to this end. In no other way could we have reached, as satisfactorily as we have done, an agreement whose effectiveness relies necessarily on the coordination of interests, so as to avoid complications of any kind.

The Directorate had its plan drawn up. It did not change it. What was done was to coordinate it with the French plan so that only beneficial results might ensue for both nations in regard to the revolt, which is the only matter affected by our agreement.

An indispensable condition for the application of all the agreements to which I have been referring is the interpretation of the Treaty of 1912 with reference to the boundaries between the two Protectorate zones. The tracing of the frontier line as fixed in the Treaty is extremely uncertain. This matter was touched on many times and I, personally, took part in many discussions on the subject without its being settled. So, when the time arrived when it was necessary to decide on these boundaries, in view of the impossibility of doing so in a definitive manner because of the lack of adequate data on which either country could rely, a species of modus vivendi was arranged, based on the Treaty of 1912 to the satisfaction of all interested parties and which admitted of the free execution of all the agreements adopted.

I cannot close without warm praise for my associates on the Commission, both the French delegates and experts who were competent, correct, tactful and industrious to the highest degree, and the Spaniards who displayed all their skill

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and eminent qualities in the task. The French and Spanish governments were extremely desirous that the Conference should be successful, as it has been. I can say nothing more, and I think that is enough.

The Conference has entirely attained its purpose, and both nations may be content in having reached, without sacrifice of interests, an agreement so close in every particular. Only by this means will it be possible to adjust the Morocco problem with the least effort, though without being able to avoid difficulties foreign to our purpose. We sincerely hope that the effectiveness of the agreements adopted will correspond with the good faith in which they were drawn up and the lofty purpose guiding both nations for the welfare of civilization and humanity.

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AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Casablanca, Morocco, July 21, 1925

SUBJECT: Political and Military Developments in French Morocco

(Strictly Confidential)

1-1055

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,


WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No.180 of July 6, 1925, File No.800-820, especially to that portion dealing with ominous reports from the Marrakech district.

One of the American samsars residing in the city of Marrakech called at the Consulate on the 20th inst., and more or less confirmed the reports in question.

He states, as has been hinted several times in the newspapers lately, that the French troops have been absolutely withdrawn. The Foreign Legion that was in garrison there until recently has been sent north to the Riff country, as has been admitted in the local press, and apparently no troops have been sent in their place. The samsar reports that as a consequence the French civil authorities in the city and district are straining every nerve to keep matters quiet and have turned over the real power to Hadj Thami Glaoui, the Pacha of Marrakech. This Moorish official is today said to be as all-powerful as he was in the first doubtful days of the French Protectorate. It is notorious that he has always feared and hated the French, and his loyalty to them now may well be considered as more than doubtful. As yet he has apparently made no move and is evidently marking



CONFIDENTIAL FILE

AUG 24 1925
T.T. ED

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time and waiting for developments.

I learned yesterday from other sources that his business agent in Casablanca had been urging him to come here for several urgent business transactions but that the Pacha had refused to come. It is quite apparent that he does not desire to put himself in the hands of the French authorities who might decide to hold him as a hostage as was done in the case of the powerful Caïd of Agadir, who has been in Casablanca for some time, living under surveillance, unable to leave the city.

Hamoud Glaoui, the brother of the Pacha, is still in the mountains back of Marrakech, and has refused repeated requests of the French authorities to come to Marrakech, alleging illness. He also is reported to have flatly refused the French request for a "harka" (contingent of Moorish troops) without giving any excuse. The French have so far made no attempt to raise a "harka" in the Marrakech district proper, perhaps being discouraged by their experience with Hamoud.

In connection with the "harkas," I am considerably apprehensive of the recently adopted policy of raising and arming them, whether for use at the front or for patrol or guard duty behind the lines. I consider the loyalty of these native contingents as extremely doubtful, and, with arms in their hands and emboldened by any reverse that the French might suffer, they might quite presumably turn on the latter. It seems to me a desperate move and dictated by lack of troops.

Our semsar also reports that ~~that~~ the Caïd Goundafi has indeed left Marrakech and is supposed to be at his home about sixty miles from Marrakech in the direction of Agadir.

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This man is the most influential leader in the Sous district which has never been pacified by the French, and he has a deep grudge against the latter for depriving him of his title as CAID. This deprivation did not affect his power and popularity as a great feudal leader.

My Marrakech informant reports that the anti-French sentiment of the population of the city is rapidly becoming dangerous. Any decided move by any one of the three great southern leaders, especially either of the Glaoui, would probably produce an explosion. He states that reports are current in Marrakech (and I give them merely as such, having no other confirmation as yet) that there have been serious uprisings in the city and district of Tadla, along the foot of the Atlas range northeast of Marrakech, in the course of which a number of French civilians and soldiers have been killed. I am inclined to believe that the rumors may have a foundation at least of fact, for the Tadla region was only pacified in part about a year ago and has always been considered one of the greatest danger points in the military zone, and it is known that the forces of occupation have been scaled down to a minimum to reinforce the troops in the North.

What is fully as serious is the fact that communications between Marrakech and Demnat in the Atlas foothills south of the former city have been cut and automobiles attacked and civilians killed. Demnat is in the district of Hamoud Glaoui. This Caid has also driven out from Asni, a point on the road from Demnat to Marrakech, a party of French engineers and workers who were engaged in the construction of a tourist hotel for the French Alpine Club. This latter incident was previously reported to this office by Clerk Moise Laredo who knew and had

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seen the engineer in charge of the work.

Uneasiness among the Moors is growing all over the country. A native American citizen well known to this office, who is engaged in buying grain directly from the natives for exportation and who speaks Arabic well, reported to me three or four days ago that there was a decided reluctance on the part of the native farmers to sell more of their surplus than was actually necessary to meet living expenses in spite of the fact that high prices were offered. This attitude was decidedly different from that of a year ago. The farmers on being pressed for reasons give non-committal answers, usually to the effect that they do not want to have their capital invested in the paper franc currency. The report of this American citizen has been verified by the grain market reports which indicate only small entries, far inferior in amount to last year and far less than the inferior sized crop warrants. Whenever trouble is brewing, the Moorish farmer always stores his grain, trusting to its stability of value under all circumstances.

It is the intention of the undersigned to make a trip to Marrakech the latter part of this week with the samsar above mentioned, and I hope to be able to see and hear a number of things of interest with regard to the political situation. I shall immediately report the results of the trip to the Department. At the present moment the conditions in Southern Morocco constitute the most menacing feature of the situation in the Protectorate.

General MAULIN, the new military commander, arrived this morning at Casablanca from Marseille by sea, and Marshal PETAIN reached Rabat three days ago from Toulouse by aeroplane. It is officially stated that the latter has come to look over

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the situation and instal General Naulin in his new functions, and that he will stay as long as the situation warrants. That much discouragement over the situation has existed is practically admitted in yesterday morning's papers which hailed the arrival of the Marshal and of the General as "creating a renewal of confidence."

It is officially stated that there are now 125,000 troops in French Morocco, in addition to the native auxiliaries. A large majority is composed of Senegalese, with large detachments of Annamites and Madagascar troops. The white forces consist largely of Algerian colonials, though there is also the Foreign Legion as well as troops from France.

It is the general opinion among the well-informed both here and in France that there must be a successful smashing offensive conducted against Abd-El-Krim before the fall rains set in in middle or latter part of October. If the rebel leader is not paralysed, at least temporarily, by that time for farther resistance, the conditions of the roads will make a withdrawal of the French troops necessary so that they may be in contact with their supply bases. Such a withdrawal would inevitably be interpreted by the natives as a confession of weakness, would encourage the Riffs to a another trial of arms in the spring, and would be apt to be the spark that would light the powder magazine of the Atlas and Sous tribes. With the growing strength of the anti-war sentiment as regards Morocco in France, as emphasized by the increase in power of the *Partel des Gauches* in the Cantonal elections two days ago, a campaign next spring might well be prevented by the forcing of the French Government's hand.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,
H. Earle Russell
H. EARLE RUSSELL
American Consul.

NO. 185

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Casablanca, Morocco, July 24, 1925

SUBJECT: Improvement in Military Situation in Northern
French Morocco.

1-1035



THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON

~~(Confidential)~~

copy to Mr. [unclear]



SIR:

I have the honor to report that it appears from various sources that the situation in Northern French Morocco is improving from a military standpoint. At several points the Riffs seem to have met serious reverses and to be retreating northward. Although the new military commander has scarcely arrived, the coming of General Naulin and of Marshal Petain seems to have inspired fresh confidence and put new zeal and dash in the French forces.

AUG 24 1925
F.T. RD

Large reinforcements are constantly arriving both of troops and equipment. The first detachments of the famous Moroccan division from the Ruhr have arrived at Oudjda and are pushing westward along the great highway towards Taza and Fez. The 61st Moroccan Tirailleurs, or rather the first detachments, arrived in Casablanca yesterday from Marseille. The day before another good-sized squadron of light tanks were landed here, equipped partly with 37 millimeter guns and partly with machine guns.

This morning I had a conversation with the English manager of the Vacuum Oil Company who had just returned from a business trip in Northern French Morocco. He made the trip to Oudjda and reported that all was quiet and traffic now normal on this important route--a vast improvement over a few days ago. He also

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went into the OUEZZAN district, nearly to the city, and reports everything quiet in that vicinity. The civil population, which was evacuated from Ouezzan some weeks ago, have not been permitted as yet to return, but it is expected that this will be allowed shortly if the military situation in that vicinity continues to improve.

Current rumors are to the effect that the French general offensive will be commenced late in August, and a determined effort made to push the Riffs completely out of the territory of the Protectorate. It is also stated that just as intensive an effort will be made in the matter of road construction behind the advancing armies, so that the troops may be able to hold all advanced positions when the autumn rains begin.

No further reports have been received from the southern part of Morocco. If the French win decisively in the North, it is probable that the Great Caids of the South will abstain from declaring against them. Their present policy seems to be one of marking time and watching the course of events before taking a decisive step.

I am leaving this afternoon for Marrakech in an endeavor to learn something of conditions in that region, and will report to the Department the results of my visit immediately upon my return.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

H. Earle Russell
H. EARLE RUSSELL
American Consul.

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AGENCY AT TANGIER.

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NO. 186

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Casablanca, Morocco, July 28, 1925.

SUBJECT: Political Developments in Southern French Morocco

1-1055

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON

SIR:

copy to Mr. [unclear] [unclear]



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INDEX BUREAU

I have the honor to refer to my confidential despatches No. 180, 182 and 183 of July 6, July 21 and July 24, 1925, respectively, all of File No. 800-820, with special reference to conditions in the southern part of the French Protectorate. During the past week end I made a trip to Marrakech and the district south of that city nearly to the Atlas foothills, in order to obtain, if possible, more information concerning the present situation.

In brief, it may be said that the situation is still grave, but is much less so than a few days ago, and everything depends on developments in the North. My trip south of Marrakech took me into the district of HAMOUD GLAOUI, the brother of the Pacha of Marrakech. I was informed by one of our semsars residing in this district that orders have been circulated by Hamoud among his tribesmen to be ready for immediate mobilization, and that this would occur "if and when Abd-El-Krim should again approach Fes." That Hamoud has been sending large sums of money to the Riff leader for some time is he

(secret

secret in Marrakech. By an irony of fate, much of this money has until recently come from the French, who have been endeavoring to purchase the GLAOUI'S friendship for a long time and have been sending him large subsidies.

That the Pacha of Marrakech himself is also only waiting to see how developments take their course before declaring himself one way or the other is also quite apparent. He is more than suspected also of heavily subsidizing Abd-El-Krim. He, as well as his bolder brother, has refused the French request made in the last few days for the raising of a "harka" in his district.

As stated in a previous despatch, the French authorities are doing everything possible to hold the Pacha's friendship, such as it is. Since the first of the present month the Protectorate Government at Rabat has granted him greatly increased powers, and he has become the real ruler of the city and district for the first time since the occupation began. The French police have been withdrawn from street duty and replaced by Moors, except in the European suburb of QUELIZ. Coincident with the increase in powers of the Pacha he has also been allowed to maintain a detachment of the Sultan's bodyguard, the first time these have been seen in Marrakech since the Protectorate was established as the entourage of a representative of the Sultan.

Nothing has been heard recently of the activities of the ex-Caid Goundafi, although, while I was in Marrakech, reports were being freely circulated that the inhabitants of the

(Sous

Sous region had openly repudiated Sultan Moulay Youssef and had proclaimed Abd-El-Krim as Sultan of Morocco. If this report is true, it is possible that Goundafi may have had a hand in the movement, for he has much influence in that part of the country. As the French have never occupied the Sous, it is hard to say what effect, if any, the foregoing news, if true, would have on the course of events. The Sous is one of the richest and most populous sections of Morocco, but its potentialities as to fighting power and the possibilities of its participation in an active way in the present troubles are problematical. Personally, I do not believe that the effect would be more than moral.

Within the last week a few contingents of troops have been placed in the vicinity of Marrakech to take the place of the Foreign Legion. Most of them are Senegalese, though there are also a few Algerian and Moorish colonials. Their presence is probably more for moral effect, for they are far too few in number to stand a chance if the population of the city, assisted by the neighboring tribes, should rise.

The French in Marrakech are fully aware of the delicate situation, and I must say that the manner in which they approach it is most admirable and calculated to impress the natives. Both soldiers and civilians give the impression that everything is normal and go about their occupations and amusements in the same manner as though they

(were

were unquestioned masters of the situation.

It was this same mixture of coolness, bluff and almost effrontery which saved Morocco for the French during the World War. Characteristics of this kind are a mystery to the average Oriental, and give him the impression that his opponent has some hidden advantage.

Added to the calmness of the French population (only about 1,500 in a population of 150,000) is the fact that M. Charrie, the French Controleur Civil or adviser to the Pacha, bears among the natives the highest reputation for justice and comprehension of the Moorish character of any French civil official in Morocco. This reputation and his confident, assured attitude toward the Moorish officials stand the French cause in good stead now.

I am of the opinion that these factors are going to prevent any general trouble in the Marrakech district, provided that the French suffer no serious reverses in the North.

While in Marrakech I ascertained that the report as to the cutting of communications with Demnat (in the Hamoud Glaoui district) was true. Whether it was the work of the followers of the Glaoui or of irresponsible bandits seemed uncertain. It would probably be represented as the latter in case of ultimate French success. With regard to the reports from Tadla, it would appear that they have been exaggerated somewhat. It seems that there has been no general uprising, but there has been a series of cases of assassination of French civilians and soldiers, which have caused

(great

great uneasiness and apprehension, for the district has been pacified so recently that the work cannot be said to be fully completed.

Unless something unforeseen occurs, I am of the opinion that the French will soon have matters well in hand again in Morocco. The Moors have clearly shown their inability to work together as yet, and the also the fact that their tribal jealousies can still surmount their patriotism. It is extremely doubtful whether they will ever again have such a chance to throw off French domination as they have had in the last two and a half or three months. If the South had risen when Abd-El-Krim was close to Fez and the morale of the French forces was low, it is doubtful whether the latter would have stood the strain. Now I believe that the moment for a successful blow is definitely past.

The news from the North indicates that Fez and Taza are now quite out of danger, and that, although Ouezzan is threatened, it seems probable that the Riff thrust will be checked. Moreover, there will be more or less cooperation with the Spanish in their zone.

The local press of this morning indicates that the policy of forming native "harkas" has been suspended, because French reinforcements are rapidly coming to the front. The latter statement is no doubt true, but it would appear that the real reason is that the disloyalty of the harkas has already been shown by numerous desertions. The first harka to be sent to the front was one from the Settat district of

(the

the Region of Chaouia (about 45 miles south of Casablanca), numbering about 500 men. The native guards attached to this Consulate are also from this district, and are personally acquainted with many of the men that were members of the contingent. They report that these persons were quite openly saying among themselves that, when an opportunity came, they would desert to Abd-El-Krim's forces. Since the arrival of this harka at the front, it is stated that none of the families of the men making the above statements have heard from them.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

H. Earle Russell

H. EARLE RUSSELL
American Consul.

IN QUINTUPLICATE;
ADDITIONAL COPY TO
DIPLOMATIC AGENCY
AT TANGIER

800-820

HER:R



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 659.

SAN SEBASTIAN, August 3, 1925.



Copy in WE.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir :

881.00
Pursuant to the Department's telegraphic Instruction No. 43, of July 31st last, I have the honor to transmit herewith, in quintuplicate, Note No. 362, of today's date, which I have addressed to the Foreign Office informing it that the Government of the United States does not recognize the right of either the Spanish or the French Government to interfere with American vessels outside of the three-mile limit, as recognized by International Law, nor does it recognize the right to interfere with such vessels within the three-mile limit, except in the manner provided for under the Act of Algeciras.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Alexander P. Moore.

Enclosure:
As stated above.

INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1136

AUG 21 1925

No. 362.

SAN SEBASTIAN, August 3, 1925.

Excellency:

Acting under instructions from my Government,

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that in connection with the maritime vigilance along the Moroccan littoral, the Government of the United States does not recognize the right of either the Spanish or French Governments to interfere with American vessels outside of the three mile limit as recognized by International Law, nor does it recognize the right to interfere with such vessels within the three mile limit except in the manner provided for under the Act of Algeciras.

Dr.....

His Excellency

The Marquis of Estella,

President of the Military Directorate,

Ministry of State,

M a d r i d.

In communicating the foregoing to Your Excellency's Government, I avail myself of the opportunity to renew the assurances of my highest consideration.

(signed) Alexander P. Moore.

BT

Pelican Ice Company, Limited

MEMBERS OF N. O. ASSOCIATION OF COMMERCE

CHAS. H. BEHRE, PRESIDENT
THEO. S. BEHRE, SECT'Y & TREAS.

ALL AGREEMENTS ARE CONTINGENT UPON STRIKES AND OTHER DELAYS
UNAVOIDABLE OR BEYOND OUR CONTROL. QUOTATIONS ARE
SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE

OFFICE AND FACTORY
1550 ST. LOUIS ST.

SHIPPING TELEPHONE MAIN 1280
OFFICE TELEPHONE MAIN 1559



New Orleans, La., August 29, 1925

To The Honorable Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

September 14,



I am attaching hereto a clipping from the New Orleans papers showing that Americans with full notice to the world are going over to fight in the Riffian War.

I cannot believe that the Government will stand idly by and let citizens of this country make war with people with whom we are in friendly relationship. When we consider that the Riffians after all are trying to do what we many years ago ourselves undertook to carry out, it seems that the least that our Government should do would be to keep the American citizens from mixing up in a condition in which he is not interested and which is intended for no other purpose than to keep people inhabiting their own country from everlasting servitude.

I trust you will pardon me for calling your attention to this matter, but if we stand for anything in United States, it should be to liberate people rather than subjugate as is now contemplated by the French Government.

I am attaching also a clipping from the papers showing that the Government has attached ammunition going into Mexico. If this was good policy for one, why not for the other?

I am quite sure as an American Citizen you will appreciate the fact that we are looking to our Government in leading the best example by courageous cooperation and that these various people should have as much right as we to independence and fair treatment, -so in the spirit that said service which I am presenting will have your faithful consideration, I am

Respectfully yours,

Chas H Behre

881.00/1137

SEP 15 1925
FIT RD

Ammunition Is Seized From Ship Going to Mexico

Two thousand rounds of American-made pistol ammunition were seized by New Orleans customs officers at the gang plank of the French steamer "Rollon," as she cleared for Progreso, Mexico, Tuesday night, it became known Wednesday.

The ammunition was concealed in a suit case, partially filled with clothing, which Charles Cortez was taking aboard as baggage. In the glare of the dock lights Customs Guard Georgy tumbled out the articles of wearing apparel and at the bottom of the suit case found the cartridges.

Papers of the "Rollo" disclosed she was cleared for Progreso and Cortez was arrested for violating the proclamation of President Coolidge, prohibiting the export of arms and ammunition to Mexico. He was turned over to federal department of justice agents, who began an investigation.

Officials will investigate to determine whether the smuggling attempt was an isolated incident, it was said, or evidence of the operations of an ammunition running ring supplying war materials through the port of New Orleans.

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America First

Not merely in matters material, but in things of the spirit.

Not merely in science, inventions, motors, and skyscrapers,
but also in ideals, principles, character.

Not merely in the calm assertion of rights, but in the glad
assumption of duties.

Not flaunting her strength as a giant, but bending in help-
fulness over a sick and wounded world like a Good Samaritan.

Not in splendid isolation, but in courageous coöperation.

Not in pride, arrogance, and disdain of other races and
peoples, but in sympathy, love, and understanding.

Not in treading again the old, worn, bloody pathway
which ends inevitably in chaos and disaster, but in blazing
a new trail, along which, please God, other nations will fol-
low, into the new Jerusalem where wars shall be no more.

Some day some nation must take that path—unless we are
to lapse once again into utter barbarism—and that honor
I covet for my beloved America.


And so, in that spirit and with these hopes, I say with all
my heart and soul, "AMERICA FIRST."



From a Sermon by BISHOP G. ASHTON OLDHAM
in Washington, D. C., September 7, 1924

881.02 / 1137

POST CARD



25

"AMERICA FIRST"—Poster, 12 1-2 x 19 in.

For indoor hanging. Printed in red and black. Cross or shield design. \$10 per 100, \$1 for 10, 15c. each, postpaid.

Card (4 x 7 in.) and envelope to match. Wedding bristol. Printed in red and black. Cross or shield. Choice and dignified for mailing. \$8 per 100, \$1 for 12, 10c. each, postpaid.

Postcard, 3 1-2 x 6 in. Printed in red and black. Shield design only. \$8 per 1,000, \$1 per 100, 1c. each.

NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PREVENTION OF WAR

532 SEVENTEENTH ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SOLICITOR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SEP 4 1925

DIVISION OF

WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

September 3, 1925

INDEX BUREAU
Rec'd

SEP 15 1925

Dept. of State:

With reference to the question raised in the attached letter it may be stated that provision has been made by law for preventing American citizens from enlisting in the United States for service in foreign countries. "Section 5282 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (Section 10, Criminal Code, Amended) provides that "Every person who, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains another person to enter himself, or to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, as a soldier, or as a marine or seaman, on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer, shall be deemed guilty of high misdemeanor, and shall be fined not more than \$1,000, and imprisoned not more than three years; * * * "


Your attention is also called to Section 4090 of the Revised Statutes of the United States respecting the jurisdiction of Ministers in extraterritorial countries, wherein it is provided that " * * * every such Minister may issue

all

all manner of writs, to prevent the citizens of the United States from enlisting into the military or naval service of either of the said (extraterritorial) countries, to make war upon any foreign power with whom the United States are at peace, or in the service of one portion of the people against any other portion of the same people; and he may carry out this power by a resort to such force belonging to the United States as may at the time be within his reach."

If evidence could be obtained with respect to American citizens enlisting in the United States for service in Morocco, such evidence might properly be laid before the Attorney General. If evidence could be obtained that citizens in the United States in Morocco are enlisted, the matter could properly be brought to the attention of our Diplomatic Agent and Consul General ~~at~~ⁱⁿ that country. If Americans outside of the United States and not within the territory of Morocco enlist for service in Morocco, this Government would have no jurisdiction to prevent such acts.

SO:FMA:VMM:SS


881.00/1137

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF
COORDINATION AND REVIEW

50
—

~~Mr. Anderson~~
Dear Mr. Anderson!

Don't you think
the concluding para-
graph serves to pick
up the loose ends?

If you do, please
initial. This seems
really a legal
matter.

N.S.

Sept 14

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

CR.

I do not agree with the suggestion. If people want to go to the Attorney General they may but in a case of this one I see no reason whatever for referring the man to Justice.

Walter
Grua

WHE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SOLICITOR

September 9, 1925.

WE:

My dear Mr. Carter:

It appears to me that the second paragraph of the attached letter hangs in the air. Your third paragraph appears to be tied down by the last paragraph. I would like to suggest that immediately following the second paragraph something like this should be stated:

"Any evidence with respect to American citizens enlisting in the United States for service in Morocco should properly be brought to the attention of the Attorney General of the United States."

881.00/1137

FMA:GEM SS



September 14, 1925.

In reply refer to
WE:881.00/1137

Mr. Charles H. Behre, President,
Pelican Ice Company, Limited,
1550 St. Louis St.,
New Orleans, La.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of August 29, 1925, protesting against the participation of American citizens in the disturbances in Morocco.

You are informed that Section 5282 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (Section 10, Criminal Code, Annotated) provides that "Every person who, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains another person to enter himself, or to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, as a soldier, or as a marine or seaman, on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer, shall be deemed guilty of high misdemeanor, and shall be fined not more than \$1,000, and imprisoned not more than three years; *****"

Furthermore, Section 4090 of the Revised Statutes

of

881.00/1137

of the United States respecting the jurisdiction of Ministers in extraterritorial countries provides that "***** every such Minister may issue all manner of writs, to prevent the citizens of the United States from enlisting into the military or naval service of either of the said (extraterritorial) countries, to make war upon any foreign power with whom the United States are at peace, or in the service of one portion of the people against any other portion of the same people; and he may carry out this power by a resort to such force belonging to the United States as may at the time be within his reach."

The Department has directed the American Agent and Consul General at Tangier, Morocco, to call the attention of American citizens in Morocco to the provisions of law cited above.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr., Chief,
Division of Western European Affairs.


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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 677.



San Sebastián, August 20, 1925.

Substitution

INDEX BUREAU

SEP 8 1925

Copy in WE.

INDEX BUREAU

SEP 8 1925

Copy in WE.

INDEX BUREAU

SEP 8 1925

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

S i r:

In connection with what would seem to be the definite failure of the hope of peace negotiations with Abd-el-Krim and his rebel Moroccans, I have the honor to transmit herewith, as of interest, the full text, with translation, of an official note given to the press by the Spanish Directory on the 15th instant.

The Spanish Government's explanation follows the public announcement lately made by the French Government on the same matter and it, together with several communiqués and oral statements recently made by officials, commencing with the long official note of July 10th (see weekly report, despatch....

852.00 / 1511

- 2 -

despatch No. 638, July 11th), must be understood to be a preparation of the general public for what was hoped might be avoided, namely, a new Spanish military campaign costly in men and money.

Abd-el-Krim's extreme demands, with "absolute and unconditional independence of the Riff" as the starting point, made negotiations in the Directory's view impossible, notwithstanding the earnest desire of Spain and France to end the fighting and settle the problem on the basis of "an autonomy most ample and liberal" under the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan whose delegate in the Spanish zone is the Caliph. The burden of this latest Spanish note is to prove to the country that Spain and France have done their best; that they have shown their wish for peace on a basis that would comport with their treaty obligations and would prevent an international re-opening of the whole Moroccan problem; and that the responsibility for further warfare is squarely on Abd-el-Krim.

"A.B.C." (Madrid) terms the French and Spanish notes "most important and opportune" and LA EPOCA (Madrid) says that really "they were not necessary" because "both nations are more than sufficiently known to have, so far as Morocco is concerned, no intention whatever of conquest for the mere purpose of domination". "A.B.C." adds that "the latest Spanish official declarations mark out a program, stated to the public clearly, as was never before done, not even by the most liberal governments or by the outspoken Cortes".

With.....

With peace prospects forestalled for the present preparations go on for military action. . Whatever may be the general feeling - and there is reason to believe there is public disappointment at the prospect of renewed warfare - the press on the whole says little that is not innocuous, because of the censorship. As reported last week new battalions, perhaps aggregating 25,000 men all told, are said to be destined to proceed from the peninsula to Morocco. The Consul at Malaga reports that on the 16th the first troop contingent, 700 men, left that port.

When the campaign will actually start it is difficult to say, for there is little precise information at hand and the officials familiar with the plan are guarding the utmost reserve. Certainly whatever is done will be done along the lines of collaboration with the French and probably in conjunction with a French advance from the south. In short the situation is coming to a focus: the French are well along with their preparations, the Spaniards too; Spain has finally and reluctantly admitted the necessity of a renewal of warfare; and there are the press declarations of Primo de Rivera and Painlevé that early autumn will see the problem solved.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,



Alexander P. Moore.

Enclosure:

Full text, with translation, of official note given to the press by Spanish Directory on the 15th instant.

From EL DEBATE (Madrid),

August 16, 1925.

El Directorio habla de la paz

En la Presidencia del Directorio facilitaron ayer tarde la siguiente nota:

«El Gobierno español, que, fiel cumplidor de cuanto se ha concertado en la Conferencia de Madrid, marcha de perfecto acuerdo con Francia en cuanto se refiere al problema de Marruecos, se cree obligado a orientar, del mismo modo que lo ha hecho el Gobierno francés, a la opinión pública, con respecto a las negociaciones de paz con los rebeldes.

El Directorio, que siempre aspiró y sigue aspirando al ideal de reducir las cargas que tal problema impone al país al límite mínimo, no omitió ni omite medio para lograr una paz que permitiese cumplir nuestra misión de Protectorado, sin otros sacrificios que los pecuniarios indispensables, y a ese fin, las varias veces que Abd-el-Krim vino a nosotros en demanda de esa paz, encontró cuantas facilidades podíamos ofrecerle, dentro de los compromisos internacionales, que limitaban nuestra libertad de acción. Todos esos intentos fracasaron, porque el cabecilla rebelde, que hacía esas gestiones, sin duda, en la idea de ganar tiempo para recoger cosechas, para ultimar preparativos y ofensivas alevosas que alterasen el orden, o para atenuar los efectos de nuestra acción ofensiva, siempre limitada a lo indispensable para lograr esa paz, basaba toda negociación en pretensiones tan absurdas cuales eran la independencia absoluta e incondicional del Rif, la entrega por nuestra parte de copioso y moderno material de guerra, incluso aeroplanos, y la de cuantiosas sumas como indemnización, sin duda, a sus crímenes del año 21, sin que a cambio de tan inadmisibles pretensiones ofreciese garantía alguna de que esa paz, imposible de concertar, había de ser duradera y eficaz.

No era posible entrar en negociación ante exigencias que sólo caben en quien, como Abd-el-Krim, no quiere la paz, porque medra y vive a costa de la guerra. Concertados con Francia, y deseosos los dos países de agotar los medios pacíficos, porque su acción protectora es obra de civilización y de humanidad, y no de guerra, convinieron unas bases, en las que se llegaba en las concesiones a límites de generosidad extraordinaria, pues se concedía a la zona rebelde una amplísima y liberal autonomía, bajo la soberanía nominal del Sultán, con delegación en el Jálifa, en zona española, dando todo género de facilidades para que las zonas, hoy rebeldes del Rif y de Yebala, pudieran gozar las ventajas de la civilización, aunque ello obligase a ambos países a sacrificios de orden económico, que demostrarían una vez más, ante el mundo, el desinterés que les guía en esa obra de Protectorado que les ha sido encomendada.

Aunque no haya mediado negociación alguna, porque no podía mediar sin que partiera la iniciativa del rebelde a la autoridad del Sultán, que es la legal, ambos Gobiernos tienen la certeza de que Abd-el-Krim conoce esas bases, como la tienen también de que insiste en su idea de no admitir nada que no sea el reconocimiento del estado independiente del Rif.

En estas condiciones, como ha dicho muy bien el ilustre presidente del Gobierno francés, no es posible negociar, porque esa condición es contraria a los Tratados y a los compromisos internacionales, de los cuales Francia y España no podrían separarse, sino exponiéndose a plantear de nuevo, inmediatamente, y arrojando gravísimos peligros, el problema marroquí; ello, aparte de que el atraso de la zona rebelde no permite arrostrar el peligro de concederle semejante personalidad sin tutela ni garantía alguna.

Ambos Gobiernos, como ha indicado tan acertadamente el señor Poincaré, tienen la tranquilidad de haber interpretado el sentir de los respectivos países, agotando los medios para ahorrir la sangre de sus soldados. Pero no podemos traspasar, con nuestra generosidad, límites que conduci-

rían a peligros mayores que los que tratamos de prevenir.

Dentro de las condiciones razonables por nosotros concertadas, en las que no pueden dejar de tomarse garantías que aseguren una paz duradera y que no se reduzca a una añagaza por parte de los rebeldes para mejorar de situación, nuestros brazos están abiertos para acoger a los que a aquellas se avengan.

No somos nosotros los que queremos continuar la guerra; nuestros anhelos son de paz y concordia. Son los secuaces del fanático Abd-el-Krim y éste los que, contra todo principio de humanidad, llevan a su pueblo a una absurda guerra, que sólo ha de conducirle a su aniquilamiento, pues al fin y al cabo resultarán vencidos por el Majzen, al que amparan las dos poderosas naciones, que, por un santo ideal de civilización y desinteresadamente, actúan en Marruecos. ¡Dios lleve la razón a los alucinados que conducen a su pueblo a la ruina! De ellos depende la paz, a la que dentro de régimen autónomo, modelo de desinterés y liberalidad, se avendría el Majzen, autorizado por los dos países protectores, y a ellos cabría exclusivamente la responsabilidad de una guerra que nadie quiere y que habrá de intensificarse lo necesario para lograr a toda costa esa paz y evitar que eternamente prosiga este estado de cosas, que enerva países que necesitan dedicar todas sus energías y desvelos a su propio desenvolvimiento.»

As printed in EL DEBATE (Madrid),

August 16, 1925.

TRANSLATION

"The Spanish government, which, in faithful compliance with the conditions agreed upon in the Madrid Conference is acting in perfect accord with France with respect to the Morocco problem, feels the necessity of setting public opinion aright - as has been done by the French government - regarding peace negotiations with the rebels.

"The Directory, which has always sought (and continues to seek) to reduce to a minimum the costs imposed on the country by such a problem, has neglected no means to secure a peace permitting us to fulfill our Protectorate mission without other sacrifices than the indispensable financial ones, and, to this end, on the various occasions when Abd-el-Krim came to us seeking peace, he was met with all the facilities we could offer him within the terms of such international obligations as limited our liberty of action. All these efforts failed because the rebel leader, - who doubtless made those moves with the idea of gaining time to harvest crops, of completing preparations and treacherous offensives that would change conditions, or of undermining the effect of our offensive action, confined always to what was indispensable for the attainment of that peace, - based all negotiation upon such absurd claims as the absolute and unconditional independence of the Riff, the surrender by us of extensive and modern war material, including airplanes, and large sums as indemnity, doubtless for their crimes of 1921, without, in exchange for such inadmissible claims, offering any guaranty that such a peace, impossible of agreeing upon, would be lasting and effective.

"It was not possible to commence negotiations in the face of demands such as could only be made by a person like Abd-el-Krim who does not want peace because he thrives and lives on war. In concert with France - both countries being desirous of using pacific measures, since their protectorate action is a work of civilization and humanity and not of war - certain bases were agreed upon wherein concessions were carried to the limit of extraordinary generosity, considering that an autonomy most ample and liberal would be granted the rebel zone, under the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan whose delegate in the Spanish zone is the Caliph, every facility being afforded whereby the zones of the Riff and Yebala now in revolt might enjoy the benefits of civilization, notwithstanding the sacrifices of an economic sort that might result for both countries because of this concession, which has once more demonstrated to the world the disinterestedness animating them in the Protectorate work committed to them.

"Although no negotiations whatever have been undertaken - since it was impossible to negotiate unless the initiative came from the one who was rebelling against the Sultan's authority, which is the legal authority - both governments are

certain.....

certain that Abd-el-Krim is informed of these bases and are also certain that he persists in his idea of accepting nothing short of recognition of an independent Riffian State.

"In these circumstances, as the illustrious President of the French government has very well said, it is not possible to negotiate, for that condition is opposed to Treaties and international engagements from which France and Spain cannot depart without exposing the Moroccan problem to being immediately taken up anew and encountering most serious dangers; all this apart from the fact that the backwardness of the rebel zone does not justify facing the danger of handing it over to such a person under neither tutelage nor guaranty.

"Both governments, as M. Painlevé has so plainly stated, feel confident of having interpreted the sentiment of their respective countries in exhausting all measures so as to prevent shedding the blood of their soldiers. But we could not, in our generosity, go beyond limits that would lead us into greater perils than those we are trying to prevent.

"Within the reasonable conditions agreed upon by us, wherein we must secure guarantees assuring that the peace will be lasting and that it will not be reduced to a ruse on the part of the rebels to improve their situation, our arms are open to receive any who come to them.

"It is not we who seek to continue war: our desire is for peace and concord. It is the followers of the fanatic Abd-el-Krim, and those who, contrary to every principle of humanity, lead their people in an absurd war which can only end in their annihilation, since in the end they will be defeated by the Majzen which is protected by the two powerful nations that because of a sacred ideal of civilization and disinterestedness are operating in Morocco. May God grant reason to these deluded men who are leading their people to ruin! Upon them peace depends so that under a regime of autonomy, a model of disinterestedness and liberality, they may be converted to the Majzen, acting under authority of the two protectorate nations; and upon them will fall exclusively the responsibility for a war that no one wants and which will have to be carried on with rigor so as to attain peace at any cost and prevent the continuance eternally of the present state of things which weakens nations that need to devote all their energies and attention to their own development."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AFFAIRS

SEP 10 1925

September 4, 1925.

DIVISION OF

WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

INDEX BUREAU
RECEIVED
SEP 13 1925
DEPT. OF STATE

Mr. Castle:

You will recall that Blake's recent letter to me deplored the fact of American enlistments for service against the Riffs and said that it had caused considerable question ^{as to} ~~upon~~ the neutrality of this Government in the present disturbances. There have been two or three complaints made to the Department in this connection and there has been unfavorable comment in Egypt.

The French are obviously trying to exploit the presence of American soldiers of fortune at the front and are doubtless featuring it in their propaganda, particularly among the tribes.

Blake, in his letter, did not seem to believe that he had any power in the matter. I am therefore calling his attention to the applicable enactments of law as with that basis he will doubtless be able to put our position in the matter in the proper light.

INDEX BUREAU
881.00/1139
FILED
SEP 10 1925 A

WE:EC:JDD

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT.

Department of State

Washington,

September 5, 1925.

AMLEGATION

TANGIER (MOROCCO)

In order to remove any misapprehensions which may have been caused by the reported enlistments of American citizens in the Sultan's Army, it is suggested that you may consider the advisability of taking measures to invite the attention of American citizens in Morocco to the provisions of Sections 5282 and 4090, Revised Statutes of the United States.

ACTING

DISTRIBUTED

WEH:JDD

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Sept. 5, 1925

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SEP 5 1925 4 07 PM

TELEGRAPH

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Assistant Secretary
of State
SEP 23 1925
MR. HARRISON
absent

Office of Economic Affairs
SEP 23 1925
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEP 23 1925
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FE 909

WE

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR
(MR. EMILE DAESCHNER) SEPTEMBER 21, 1925.

1139

The French Ambassador wanted to know about a statement published in the press about a telegram we had sent to our Consul in Morocco about Americans. I called in Mr. Hugh Wilson who gave the Ambassador the substance of it. Mr. Wilson said that he had already informed Mr. Remy of the Havas Agency.

INDEX BUREAU
881.00/1139

INDEX BUREAU
SEP 23 1925
Dept. of State

S FBK:WHB:ACS

original filed in S.

SEP 23 1925
RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SOLICITOR

October 21, 1925.

881.00
WE:

Mr. Carter:

Perhaps the following might be used as a concise statement of the situation which caused the telegram to Blake, September 5, 1925:

"Several weeks ago letters were received by the Department stating that American citizens were reported to be enlisting in the army of the Sultan of Morocco for service in Morocco. These letters expressed apprehension concerning the situation and appeared to consider that the matter should receive the attention of the Department. The Department, realizing that the misapprehension might also exist in Morocco, believed it advisable and proper to inform its officer in Morocco of the laws with respect to the enlistment of Americans in foreign military forces. It, therefore, sent a telegram to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier stating that in order to avoid any misapprehension which might be caused in Morocco by the reports of alleged enlistment of American citizens in the Sultan's army, it was suggested that he might care to consider the advisability of calling to the attention of American citizens in Morocco the

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SOLICITOR

-2-

provisions of Sections 5282 and 4090 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. These statutes read as follows:

R. S. 5282 (Section 10 of the United States Criminal Code)

'Whoever, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains another person to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, as a soldier, or as a marine or seaman, on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer shall be fined not more than a thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than three years, * * *'

R. S. 4090 reads as follows:

'Capital cases for murder or insurrection against the Government of either of the countries hereinabove mentioned (extraterritorial countries), by citizens of the United States, or for offences against the public peace amounting to felony under the laws of the United States, may be tried before the Minister of the United States in the country where the offense is committed if allowed jurisdiction; and every such Minister may issue all manner of writs, to prevent the citizens of the United States from enlisting in the military or naval service of either of the said countries, to ~~make~~ war upon any foreign power with whom the United States are at peace, or in the service of one portion of the people against any other portion of the same people; and he may carry out this power by a resort to such force belonging to the United States, as may at the time be within his reach.'

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SOLICITOR

-3-

as to whether
The Department has no evidence ~~that~~ the aviators
in question have or have not enlisted in the Army of the
Sultan of Morocco ~~or~~ *nor has it* information as to what is the nature
of their connection with the armed forces in Morocco. The
Department, however, felt it to be its duty to call the
attention of American citizens in Morocco to the laws of
the United States designed to prevent and make unlawful
the enlistment, in the United States or in countries where
we enjoy extraterritorial privileges, of American citizens
for service in foreign armed forces."

SO:

FMA:MEB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

McL

FROM Green.


San Sebastian.

Dated September 9, 1925.

UNION PATRON
RECEIVED

9 1925

Dep't. of State



Secretary of State,
Washington.

55, September 9, 11 A. M.

Copy to Mr. B
9/9/25

Spaniards succeeded in landing Alhucemas yesterday noon, claiming only fifty casualties. Operation which is considered great victory will be followed up by combined French-Spanish attack on Axdir about September 15th.

MOORE.


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INDEX BUREAU
881.22/140

FTT:ED
SEP 10 1925 A

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Casablanca, Morocco, August 10, 1925



SUBJECT: Reported Impending Resignation of Marshal Lyautey

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON


SIR:

I have the honor to report that the resignation of Marshal Lyautey as COMMISSAIRE RESIDENT GENERAL OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC IN MOROCCO appears imminent. Articles appearing in the French press following the return to France and report to the Government of Marshal Petain and information coming in a confidential way from officials at the Residency at Rabat seem to confirm this report.

That much dissatisfaction has for some time been reigning in Morocco, even among the French, over the conduct of affairs by the Resident General is no secret, and that his incapacity to handle the present military situation has been clearly shown is illustrated by the recent transfer of his military functions to General Naulin. The Marshal remains as nominal commander-in-chief of military operations, but the complete shearing away of his real powers in this direction is clearly shown by the fact that the intelligence service for the whole northern half of Morocco has been removed from Rabat to Fez, the headquarters of General Naulin.

It is quite generally believed now that no changes will be

(made



September 13, 1925

FILED
SEP 21 1925

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made until the results of the present campaign are known. There is probably a natural desire on the part of the French Government not to humiliate the old Marshal, but to give him a chance to resign "on account of ill health" (a well-founded ground, as a matter of fact), when the crisis is past. Moreover, there may also be an apprehension, founded upon much previous clever advertising of the Marshal by the clique surrounding him, whether well-grounded or not, that his abrupt departure might upset the results of his "Grand Caïd" policy in the South and provoke uprisings there which his personality now holds in check.

Two persons have been suggested as his possible successor: M. Albert Serraut, several times in the French Ministry but best known as Minister of Colonies, and Marshal Petain. The chances favor the latter, as a military man is probably better for Morocco under present conditions, and for the effect it would have on the natives.

Reports of the resignation of Marshal Lyautey have become almost a yearly affair since 1916, but up to date have never materialized, owing to his many supporters in both the right and left groups of parties in the French parliament, and to the powerful propaganda emanating from the Residency at Rabat and tending to show the difficulties that would arise without his presence here.


I am of the opinion that a change after the present crisis would be most beneficial to the prestige of the French regime in Morocco. In the thirteen years that have elapsed

(since the

since the present government has been established, a regular "court" has grown up at Rabat, full of intrigue and underground workings, frequented by the officeholders and hangers-on of a most bureaucratic form of government, and in which some most astonishing examples of the power of bribery and corruption have flourished. This entourage of the Marshal has set an example that has unfortunately been followed in too many instances by minor officials to the detriment of good government and even-handed justice, for which very purposes the Protectorate Government is supposed to be instituted. It is this clique that has everything to lose by a change and that is opposing it in every possible way. A new Resident General, especially a man like Marshal Petain, would be quite likely to enact the proverbial part of the new broom and sweep out a number of present officeholders, so that the new administration would be really effective. Such a new administration might adopt a very different attitude towards foreign interests that would tend to smooth out many existing difficulties.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,


H. EARLE RUSSELL
American Consul.

IN QUINTUPLICATE


COPY TO DIPLOMATIC AGENCY AT TANGIER

800

HER:R

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Casablanca, Morocco, August 12, 1925.



SUBJECT: Arrival of American Aviators with French Army in Morocco.

1-1055

(CONFIDENTIAL)

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to inform the Department that the much-heralded American aviators coming to join the French forces in Morocco in the campaign against Abd-El-Krim have at last arrived, one contingent at Casablanca by way of sea day before yesterday and the rest by air at Rabat yesterday.

As the Department is aware, The French Government officials and press have been making much of the enlistment of these American citizens in what is termed by the former "the struggle of France for civilization." It is not too much to say that a deliberate attempt has been made to impress the Moors with the idea that the action of these persons has had the sanction of the United States Government, without actually making a flat statement to that effect. Certainly, many of the Moors have received that impression, and numerous questions have been addressed to members of the staff of this office on the subject. I always have answered and instructed my subordinates to answer that the action of the American aviators is a purely personal one without the sanction of the United States Government, being similar to that of the international adventurers serving with Abd-El-Krim.

I am sorry to say that, according to the local press(I

(can not

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SEP 22 1925 A

FIT, ED

881.00/1142

can not vouch for it myself as I have not seen any of the aviators), although they are wearing a French uniform as flying officers, they wear a "U.S." on the jackets above the ensignia (the wings), and also on their caps above the vizors. This is apt to lead to and continue the deception that they are actually in service with the ensignia and consequent assent of the United States Government.

Incidentally, I might add that it is apparent that there ~~are~~ a number of American citizens serving in the Foreign Legion of the French Army in Morocco. At the present writing at least six are known to this office, two of whom are wounded and in hospitals at Rabat, their injuries apparently not being serious.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,


H. EARLE RUSSELL
American Consul.

IN QUINTUPLICATE

COPY TO TANGIER

820

HER:R

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Casablanca, Morocco, August 19, 1925

SUBJECT: Military Developments in French Morocco

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Copy in WE.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to inform the Department that General Naulin has just completed the reorganization of the French army in Morocco. All of the units, comprizing eighty-four battalions, have been formed into seven divisions, each consisting of two mixed brigades, each of which comprise two regiments of three battalions and two groups of artillery. Each division will thus be composed to go into battle with its own means. The division in Morocco will therefore consist of twelve battalions of infantry instead of nine as in France, the change being on account of the peculiar type of fighting here.

It is stated officially that the General Staff has been occupied in drawing up a plan of campaign for these units, which has been presented by General Naulin to Marshal Lyautey (doubtless as a matter of courtesy only) and accepted by the latter, and it is believed that it will also be accepted by Marshal Petain who is expected in Morocco in a few days. The plan itself is most peculiar in view of the past declarations of the French government and military authorities. It is based on the idea of "disarming the Riff but not of accupying a territory full of ambushades." It is based on this middle course, "be-

(cause

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SEP 24 925A

FIVE PD

881.80/1143

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
GENERAL AFFAIRS
7/16/25
Copy in WE.

RECEIVED
SEP 25 1925
DEPT. OF STATE

cause the conquest of the Riff is rendered impossible by international treaties, by the instructions of the French Government and by a winter campaign that would weigh too heavily on the budget," and the plan seems to be "to guarantee French Morocco against a new aggression similar to that of which it has been the victim."

Heretofore, the official statements have all insisted on a campaign to end only with the complete submission of Abd-El-Krim to the Sultan. Now the attitude seems to be that a campaign that will disarm the Riff but not involving occupation, will be sufficient.

From all that I can gather, no campaign ending in anything short of effectual occupation by either French or Spanish troops and a hunting down of the Riff leaders will ever put an end to the menace now threatening the dominion of both France and Spain in Morocco. It is ridiculous to say that international treaties stand in the way of a complete conquest of the Riff, as the only two nations directly interested are France and Spain, which are supposed to have a complete understanding in the matter, while Great Britain and Italy, the only other Powers even indirectly interested, will put no obstacles in the way of a campaign of the kind.

It would seem, therefore, that the instructions of the French Government and the expenses of a winter campaign are the real obstacles in the path of carrying out the earlier declarations of French leaders. It may be inferred from this and from recent articles in the local and French press that the winter campaign, which was much discussed a few days ago, is either not to materialize at all or will consist of attempts

(to hold

to hold advanced posts attained before the fall rains, and that the present operations, which began a few days ago, have to do only with the re-establishing of the former French Moroccan frontier and the dislodging of the Riffs from the territory of the French Zone.

These operations have been mainly carried out in the East and West sectors of the line, with the double purpose of freeing the Taza district (thus relieving the menace to the Fez-Oudjda road) and the Ouezzan district and of making an encircling movement which would cause a Riff retirement in the center (north and west of Fez) towards the frontier of the Spanish Zone. They have apparently been very successful so far.

I am very apprehensive, as I have stated in previous despatches, of the effect on the Moors generally and of the Atlas and Sous tribes in particular, if the present campaign is not pushed to a finish at an early date regardless of difficulties and expense. If a definite decision is not reached this fall, the French are apt to find in the spring a crop of "Abd-El-Krims" arising among the restless Berber tribes of the mountains, and to find the unrest spreading all throughout Morocco and in fact all Northern Africa.

I have the honor, to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

H. Earle Russell

H. EARLE RUSSELL
American Consul.

IN QUINTUPLICATE

COPY TO TANGIER

820

HER:R

FP
AP

H. Earle Russell, Esquire,
American Consul,
Casablanca, Morocco.

September 19, 1925.

Sir:

The Department has received your despatches Nos. 191, of August 10, 1925, of August 12, and 198, of August 19, 1925, commenting on the various phases of the political and military situation in French Morocco.

The Department has read these despatches with great interest and wishes to commend you thereon.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State;

JOSEPH C. GREW

881.00/1143

WE: 881.00/1143-2-3

FP
RDS

SEPT 17 1925
CR

Final

NO. 199

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Casablanca, Morocco, August 19, 1925

SUBJECT: French Jealousy of Anglo-American Investments in Morocco.

1-1085

(CONFIDENTIAL)

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to inform the Department that the local newspapers of the 19th inst. have published a news item from Berlin to the effect that the German enterprise known as the MANNESSMAN COMPANY is negotiating with an Anglo-American consortium for the sale of its extensive agricultural and mining interests in the Spanish Zone of Morocco and especially in the Riff country. The item further states that the American members of the consortium are contenting themselves with financing the affair in part and with reserving to themselves the direction of the exploitation of the properties.

Whether the news be true or false (and I give it as a report only) it has been sufficient to put the local press in a ferment. The report goes on to say, after asking whether this financial operation has in view political objects, that "it is said that at the moment of negotiations with the Riffs the English group would be aided by its government which would have thus a pretext to demand the right to maintain police forces in the Riff."

The attitude of the French press (and the strongest article is in the Government's inspired journal) is interesting from three

(points

SEP 19 1925

September 18, 1925

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881.00/1144

SEP 22 1925

points of view. It illustrates the extreme jealousy with which the entrance in general of foreign capital, except in the form of loans, is viewed by the French in Morocco. It also indicates that the French have in the back of their mind the idea that sooner or later the Spanish Zone will come under their control, as otherwise there would be no reason for their interest and concern. Lastly, it shows a recrudescence of the unfortunate Anti-American and anti-English feeling that has appeared from time to time in Morocco, even during the World War. The English have been under fire continually since the establishment of the French Protectorate, so that this is not an especially new manifestation as regards them, but it is the first real manifestation of anti-American sentiment that has appeared in a year and a half or two years.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,


H. EARLE RUSSELL
American Consul.

IN QUINTUPLICATE

COPY TO TANGIER

800

HER:R

September 18, 1925.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In reply refer to
WE:881.00/1144

The Honorable

The Secretary of Commerce.

Sir:

With reference to the Department's letter of September 11, 1925, concerning the reported purchase of the Kannesmann concessions by a group of American financiers, I have the honor to transmit herewith, for your information and for such comment as you may desire to make, copy of a report from the American Consul at Casablanca, Morocco, dated August 19, 1925.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:

Wilbur J. Carr


Assistant Secretary.

Enclosure:

Copy of report from
Casablanca, Morocco.


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


~~WE~~
~~EA~~
NE

American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General.

Tangier, Morocco, August 17th, 1925.

SUBJECT: Newspaper comments on Tangier Statutes.



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881.00 / 1145

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:-

I have the honor to transmit herewith cuttings from the issue of August 15th, 1925, of the Tangier English weekly publication "Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa and Tangier Gazette and Morocco," entitled: "The Balance Sheet" and "The Custom House," indicating some of the grounds on which the local population of Tangier express their dissatisfaction with the Statutes.

FILED
SEP 18 1925

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Maxwell Blake', written in dark ink.

Maxwell Blake.
American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul-General.

THE BALANCE SHEET.

Politics and business rarely make a very happy combination even when some of the politicians are business men.

It is like imagination and will, imagination wins hands down when opposed to will, at least so say the psychologists.

It is the same with business and politics the latter always wins, the intrigues and wire pulling which are inseparable from politics always exercise more influence than the business side of the question can.

It was fairly clear from the start that business would have no say in the political intrigues that culminated in the present Statute.

It is interesting at the present juncture to draw up a balance sheet showing Tangier's liabilities and assets as provided by the Statute.

To take the liabilities first. Tangier is to pay her share of the Morocco loans of 1904 and 1910, and what precisely she got out of these loans is a problem that we are unable to solve.

She has no harbour no railway and no public buildings so the money can not have been spent on these.

The payment of her share of the Tangier-Fez railway and the payment for the construction of a Port are further liabilities as well as any portion of the duty on tobacco in excess of the amount consumed in Tangier.

All these liabilities are a first charge on the Customs and in order to see that they shall be met as far as the Customs receipts are equal to the task that Service is placed outside the Control of the Administration.

So much for our liabilities, which we didn't incur and about which we never had a word to say.

Now let us see what we get in return for these liabilities on the Assets side of our balance sheet.

We have the sea and the sea shore when the Port Company have satisfied their claims and we may put that down as valueless.

We have the revenues from the Fisheries which judging by the price of fish must be very handsome.

We have the loan of the roads to Tetuan, Larache, Cape Spartel the road from the railway to the port and the public country roads, but not mark you for nothing.

There is a special tax which is earmarked for the upkeep of the roads to Tetuan, Larache and Cape Spartel—and after having used them carefully and spent our revenues in their upkeep they are only a loan and unless the Statute is renewed they go back to the Shereefian State.

We are entitled to administer the public and private lands of the Shereefian State on condition that we don't sell any of them and keep them in good order.

A twelve years' lease of lands nominally belonging to the government but actually of doubtful title is hardly a valuable asset, and effectually prevents any serious exploitation by any one who is not able to secure his tenure by arrangement with the Shereefian Government.

The forests and the mines in the Tangier Zone when they have been discovered are another valuable asset, to say nothing of the dry water courses which become rivers during the rains.

Reserved however from this generous gift or loan of property from the Shereefian State are the Kasbah the Sultan's Palace the former German Legation and various barracks.

These however are reserved for public offices which the Shereefian State, not the Tangier Administration, will possess in Tangier.

On the whole the liabilities are far in excess of the assets and if we were a business community we should say we were bankrupt before we commenced business.

This was apparently recognised as the assets and liabilities so far described by no means comprise every thing.

We come now to what might be described as the Profit and Loss Account.

Our liabilities on this account comprise the expenses of the Administration and its numerous functionaries, no light matter, the Administration of Justice and the maintenance of a corps of police and gendarmerie which is not inconsiderable, sanitation, &c., &c.

On the side of receipts we have to look to the food tax, the house tax, and minor taxes in abundance in the way of stamps on every conceivable thing, besides the land transfer tax only applicable at present to the adherents to the Statute.

Whether the taxes as at present prescribed will be able to meet all the obligations incurred in we should think doubtful.

The compilers of the Statute were not wholly deficient in humour as we note that in the event of the obligations resting on the Customs not being met by the receipts of that Service the deficit becomes a charge on the general revenues of the Zone, and if those prove insufficient on the Reserve Funds.



This we really think must have been intended as a huge jest. How did these good people imagine a reserve was ever to be accumulated. Was it from the enormous impetus to be given by the Statute to a New State, without funds, without resources, and burdened with liabilities that are calculated to crush it!

On the whole the Balance Sheet appears to show that the only concern likely to benefit is the Shereefian State.

We are given nothing except, by another flash of humour, the most extended legislative and administrative powers subject to a few trifling reserves such as the Customs the Harbour the Railway and volumes of Dahirs dealing with taxation but we have unlimited powers in regulat-

ing the number of times a road shall be watered and such like valuable privileges.

Viewed from the aspect of a business transaction shareholders would be inclined to consider that they were not getting fair treatment.

Our next liability will be a loan of which we shall have the sole benefit but we shall probably be told that it is quite unnecessary that, our revenues are not sufficient to pay its charges and in short we shall be told that it is impossible and we must go bankrupt with all the disagreeable incidents of that condition. Where lies redemption. We are unable to supply an answer.



The Custom House.

The Customs Service was, for some inscrutable reason, perhaps because it was the principal source of revenue, perhaps with some other motive, detached from the general administration of Tangier.

The now defunct Administration of the «Contrôle de la Dette», if you can say that an administration which preserves all the rights privileges and obligations which it holds under the Convention of 21st March 1910, is really defunct, in its death throes asked the Shereefian Government to appoint a chief of the service of the Customs who shall be under the orders of the Administration of the Morocco Customs.

Why?

There is no very apparent reason why the budget and administration of the Customs should be put in the hands of the Shereefian Government and there are a thousand and one reasons why it should not be divorced from the General Administration of Tangier.

In the first place it is very embarrassing to have the source of your principal revenue placed, as it were, out of your reach.

Secondly although the Customs have to submit their budget to the approval of the Assembly how can that body form any opinion as to whether it is reasonable or not, how can they point out that certain items are too high or that such and such a functionary is not necessary—clearly their approval except in the case of some glaring piece of extravagance is bound to be rather perfunctory.

Thirdly to have a set of functionaries who are only responsible to a Foreign Government is eminently undesirable.

Fourthly. Admitting that certain charges were specifically allocated as direct obligations of the Customs it puts the Director of Finance in a very invidious and disagreeable position when he is advised at the end of the year that the Revenue is only sufficient to pay its direct obligations and there is no balance to hand over, whilst he has no control or practically none over the expenditure of money by the Administration of the Customs.

Diplomatists are not selected for their business acumen and yet they are allowed to draw up a Convention which is largely a matter of business.

It is true that business men offered their services in an advisory capacity but they were told to mind their own business.

Under those circumstances it is not

surprising that men of business of complaint of the Statute.

The unfortunate part of the whole business is that there appears to be no appeal.

The rights of the Community and their grievances are wrecked on the rocks of official indifference.

«The Powers have spoken», appears to be a sufficient answer to any and every complaint.

We hear vaguely that there is to be a revision but time passes and we still have to submit to inequalities of taxation and to embarrassing disagreement as regards the construction of the Statute but until we can find some one independent enough and rich enough to submit some of the flagrant cases of injustice to the Court of Arbitration at the Hague we see no hope of change.

Copy to Mr. S. W.

AMERICAN AVIATORS IN MOROCCO.



Summary of Newspaper Article)

From: C. B. Curtis,
American Consul General.

Munich, Germany, August 22, 1925.

The "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten" of August 20, 1925, publishes in the first column on its front page a brief article by a General von Mierka in which, after stigmatizing aerial warfare in Morocco as a degradation from what it was in the world-war, and after mentioning that seven American aviators are assisting the French officers, it is stated that "the participation of American flying officers in this campaign raises several very interesting and complicated questions of international law. America, which shows at all times such a deep antipathy to the taking of any interest in European questions, permits a representative part of its army, even though consisting only of adventure-loving officers, to take part in the fighting against Abd el Krim. What becomes of neutrality, what will be the consequences if an American officer is taken prisoner by the Kabyles? Will the American Government simply show no interest in his fate?..... The participation of American aviators in the fighting in Morocco consequently draws their Government also into this conflict."

C. B. Curtis,
American Consul General.

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CBC/ez


INDEX BUREAU
Rec'd
SEP 19 1925
Dept of State

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SEP 23 1925 A

881.00/1146

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NO. 203



AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Casablanca, Morecco, August 24, 1925.


SUBJECT: American Aviators with French Army in Morecco

1-1055

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,



SIR:

I have the honor to refer to my confidential despatch No. 196 of August 12, 1925, regarding the arrival of certain American aviators with the French army in Morecco, and especially to the report that they were wearing a "U.S." on jackets and caps.

I am glad to be able to set at rest this rumor. I have had a conversation with two of these Americans, who came to the office in uniform. It appears that an attempt was made to persuade them to wear such described insignia, but that they flatly refused to do so. As the uniform now appears, there is absolutely nothing to identify them from it as Americans.

The two aviators with whom I have conversed informed me that most of their unit has been residing for some time in France. They fully realized the embarrassment that might result from their action, and therefore had done everything to keep the matter quiet and strongly disapproved of the publicity given to them by the French press.

The entire unit has been in Casablanca for some days, making trial trips with machines at the local aerodrome. Part of the squad leaves tomorrow for the front.

That the enlistment of these Americans has caused much at-

(tention

INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1147

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SEP 24 1925

tention and comment among the Moors is shown by the fact that nearly all the members of the unit have received one or more threatening letters. One of these was shown to me this morning. It was clearly native work from the facts that it was written in very poor and characteristically native-attempted French, was expressed in phrases characteristically Moorish and signed in Arabic.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

H. Earle Russell

H. EARLE RUSSELL
American Consul.

IN QUINTUPLICATE

COPY TO TANGIER

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MER:R

No. 16.



American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General.

Tangier, Morocco, September 4th, 1925.

881.00

CONFIDENTIAL.

SUBJECT: The Tangier Convention; Present History and the Future; ~~Our Problems and Policy.~~



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SEP 23 1925
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
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INDEX BUREAU

october 20, 1925.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:-

Before proceeding to an examination of the political questions involved in the recently instituted Statutes of Tangier, to what extent our treaty rights may be affected or compromised thereby, and under what form, our protests or policy may be best expressed, I have the honor to inaugurate my observations by a reference to certain local disturbances, requiring

explanation,

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explanation, which occurred in Tangier in the month of July last. (See my Telegram No. 12 dated July 2nd, 1925, 4 p. m).

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The questions to be asked in this connection are:-

Were the explosions and public protests, which took place against the Statute, on that occasion, merely episodic, ebullitions of an evanescent character, representing nothing more than the vicissitudes of a fretful and impatient opinion, which will veer round, when a more normal atmosphere has been created, and when compensating gains over old conditions are better understood, or, was it an evidence that an embittered struggle is taking place over the right of Tangier to survive? In other terms, have the Statutes failed to mitigate the risks of international discord in Tangier? Are they a hybrid creation, which has already proved sterile of results, and have they failed in their major purpose, no less than in their secondary tasks and objectives? Do they represent, in reality an international government, or are they, in fact, but a three Power condominium control, disguised under an international title?

Corrollary and cognate to these subjects of curious controversy, the further questions pose themselves, as to whether the rights of the signatories to the Act of Algeciras have been invaded and curtailed by the introduction of this Code, and are the non-adhering Powers justified in abstaining from all co-operation in the new enterprise?

So

So far as concerns the position to be taken by the United States—if the gloomiest apprehensions are to be fulfilled and the old legacy of bitterness is to continue—should we be tempted, by any considerations, to associate ourselves with an unworkable experiment, which may totter and collapse, at any moment, with all the disruptive consequences, which this failure would involve? Finally, if a revision does take place, and none seek to evade their responsibilities, would there be anything contrary to our traditional foreign policy, if we entered into this local association of Powers for the protection of our interests, providing that the necessary assurances, properly given, could be previously obtained from the sponsors of the present organization, and in such event, what should be the nature and extent of our requirements?

For the purpose of an intelligent understanding of these points, it will be of advantage to revert to a brief retrospect of the conditions, which gave birth to the much discussed Tangier Convention of 1923.

Without entering into the fascinating, rather than the formidable, speculation concerning the considerations which induced three Powers—for over ten years at hopeless variance, regarding the basic principles of their negotiations—suddenly to become of one accord in 1923, Great Britain stumbling into capitulation, Spain anxious under insurrectionary distress, and France transported by the efflorescence of a
triumphant

triumphant diplomacy, (too brilliant for brief description), I desire, first of all, strongly to emphasize from what a wrong angle, and under what wrong conditions, the whole subject of the Statute of Tangier was approached by the three Powers, who have assumed responsibility for its origin.

The problem involved a situation, in which, a variety of racial, religious and conflicting political interests were seeking local accommodation, and was further complicated by certain treaties and international conventions, to which the United States, as well as various other governments, were signatory. France, Great Britain and Spain, however, accepting no advice or discussion, much less judicious co-operation, sat down, and without other consultation, arbitrarily drew up among themselves a constitution, which they somewhat pedantically substituted for existing conditions, and left to other Powers no alternative, but a flat acceptance or rejection of what they chose to describe, in the sonorous but inappropriate term, of International Rule.

This declination of even the most informal discussion with other Powers, concerning any modification of treaties, to which they were all co-equal parties, cannot be dismissed, under the plea of extenuating circumstances, for it is no secret that the procedure followed was premeditated from the beginning, as it was taken for granted that the governments excluded from the Conference would hasten to accept a "fait accompli," by taking up
their

their position as postulants, before the gates of the so-called international city, their entrance into the hallowed precincts of which, was to be greeted with the cordiality of indifference, if not with gestures of levity and sarcasm.

If my remarks, therefore, are thus initiated by all lack of eulogy over the conduct of the negotiations, which gave rise to the Tangier Statute, and, if my criticism, later, is to be directed against the sequel of these labors, I would like to offer the Department, what I trust will be the unnecessary assurance, that nothing, that I may say, implies the slightest hostility towards any sincere endeavor, that may have been made to settle a problem, which has long agitated the concern of international public opinion in Europe.

Whether the efforts made, however, were false or sincere, there is not the slightest doubt that the actual state of affairs, which the introduction of the new Statutes has brought about, is now admitted to be impracticable, and even the Statutes themselves are being defamed by some of those, who participated in their creation, for signs are not lacking that the economist was entirely lost in the politician, and results are in accordance with these causes.

As to the organic "Dahirs" and bodies of laws, which constitute the Statutes, as now applied, these may be briefly described as a long sequence of clauses, which often have not, apparently, even the merit of

conveying

conveying the intentions of the Authors. The constitution is full of profound contradictions, and clearly represents a bewildering confusion of conflicting political motives and principles. With these observations, it will be apparent that I am not overburden with belief in their future, as now devised, nor have I seen anything in their operation, which could tempt me to give them the slightest defence.

If the question is abruptly put, here, whether the Statutes have already failed, it might be contended, by their supporters, that sufficient time has not yet elapsed to put them to the test, but on the other hand, it cannot be denied that, as soon as they were applied, an immediate revision in certain fundamental particulars was clamoured for, by local public opinion, and at once conceded, to meet obvious transitional requirements. It is pertinent to observe, in this connection, that these changes were introduced (just as other provisions of the Statutes were left unapplied) with the same casual collaboration—France, Great Britain and Spain—which had been responsible for the drawing up of this Code of government and the unseasonable—if not indecent—haste, with which it had been applied. In other words—to be scrupulously exact—the alleged international character of Tangier, at this early stage, showed itself to be no less a farce in operation, than it was a fiction in name and origin.

However

However unpleasant, therefore, it may be to face the facts, it becomes—as has been implied—everywhere more generally admitted—even by those, who accepted the Statutes, with a predisposition to believe in their powers—that this delicate experiment, which is still in a fluid state, seems already to have proven that the external political requirements of three Powers—the professed object of whose negotiations was the welfare and good government of the city—were allowed to overbalance the internal economic interests of the new municipality. Furthermore, it also becomes more apparent, with the flux of time, that the rights of the non-adhering Powers are not to be as easily brushed aside, as had been at first supposed, and the expectation diminishes, from day to day, that their attitude of detachment will be changed, in view of the growing dissatisfaction of those neutral Powers, who were inveigled into an early adherence to the Statutes, in the form first presented.

We may now address ourselves, not without profit, to an analysis of the motives explaining the failure of Portugal and Italy to adhere to the Tangier Convention, the two Powers, which, in addition to ourselves, continue to remain in a state of peaceful isolation.

With regard to the former Power, it is believed that her delayed acceptance is without political significance, and that Portugal will be, either coerced or cajoled, at the opportune moment, by Great Britain,
into

into a torpid acquiescence.

The position of Italy is entirely different, but this Power is not indisposed to waive material considerations involved in the settlement of the Tangier question, providing France, Great Britain and Spain will agree to allow her to be associated with them, as one of the presenting Powers or sponsors of the Tangier régime, if and when a revision of the Statutes takes place, for, under these circumstances, Italy's "amour propre" would be placated, and a precedent created for the recognition of her title, in the future, to be present on all questions affecting the Mediterranean.

To enforce respect for this attitude, Italy holds in her hand, a weapon, that she will not hesitate to use, if compelled to do so, by the force of circumstances; I refer to the possibility of that Power contending, before the International Tribunal of The Hague, that the new Tangier government, as devised by the three Powers, constitutes a violation of the Act of Algeciras, and under this apprehension, Italy's present abstention is a factor, which is found less congenial to France, Great Britain and Spain, than would be publicly admitted.

It will be evident, from the above, that the motives restraining our own adhesion to the Tangier Convention—~~which are exclusively economic—are entirely~~ different from those actuating the other Powers, who hold out for ~~purely political considerations, for,~~ should they attain their political objectives, they may be
prepared

prepared to sacrifice the economic and other general rights, hitherto the common property of all signatories of the Act of Algeciras.

Seen from this converse angle, our abstention, therefore, undoubtedly constitutes one of the greatest sources of weakness to the new régime, for, although we do not wish to advance any proprietary claims, or to put forward any demands for a privileged situation—either of an actual character here, or of a theoretical nature elsewhere—it becomes realized, by the authors of the Statute, that the consent of our co-operation can only follow a proper acknowledgment of our treaty rights, as well as due assurances for their preservation, and, in this regard, our position is based on foundations of indisputable value.

Furthermore, in thinking and acting for ourselves, and by our not having accepted everything and anything that has been offered, there is not the slightest doubt, that we are helping rather than hindering the cause of good government in Tangier.

Referring to an exchange of Notes between the Department and the Governments of France, Great Britain and Spain, on the eve of the application of the Statutes, it will be remembered that we had the temerity, on that occasion, to ask the parent Powers, in a perfectly courteous manner, for explanations and assurances, on certain fundamental points, but these enquiries were finally dismissed, in a spirit of boredom if not of discourtesy,

discourtesy, and the Department has been left no alternative, but to suspend the grant of that liberal measure of sympathetic co-operation, which it had shown a disposition to accord to the new Tangier Administration, at the beginning.

The demand for assurances that the maintenance of our treaty rights in Morocco would not be impaired, by the innovations of the Tangier Convention, would have been justified, even if this Convention could claim to embody a scheme, intransigently perfect, as an instrument of local government, but, although the framers of the Tangier Convention put forward, as its principal object, the harmonizing of hitherto conflicting nationalistic interests and aspirations, it is obvious, to the most casual observer, that the strife for predominance between France and Spain, in the Tangier Zone, continues, as before, to be reflected in the intrigues attending the manipulation of the local organisms, issuing from the Convention. At this point, before proceeding to take up, in more detail, a subject hitherto viewed from a high perspective, I desire to explain that I do not propose, in dealing with the contemporary problem of Tangier, to play the role of overanxious critic, by entering into a discussion covering the merits, Article by Article, of the Tangier Statutes, for, after the broad grounds, on which my observations will alone be defended, this task might prove to be one of superficial importance, if not actually of delusive value.

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The difficulties involved and to be overcome in the introduction—especially in an unhomogeneous population—of new forms of government, must be spontaneously admitted, and no unprejudiced mind, would expect that a scheme of control could suddenly spring forth, free from all defects and blemishes in its contents, and craftsmanship.

For these reasons, it would be captious to magnify the minute disqualifications, which are obviously inherent in these hastily devised Statutes. Regardless of the fact, therefore, whether we are able ultimately to assimilate our position with the existing organization or not, it will be freely conceded, that the efforts necessary for an ethical settlement of the Tangier question, are far from being of contemptuous proportions. Consequently, however abundantly the Statutes may be furnished with ambiguities, however poor they may be in their faculties of conveyance, however vexatious may be the methods of their application, and the multiple embarrassments of their petty restraints on trade, or the uneconomic basis of their taxation, so costly of collection, the criticisms, that are now to follow, will be of a nature transcending the results of accidents, and none but points of momentous importance will be admitted for consideration, in influencing our decision.

Actuated by this spirit, in attempting to obtain the requisite common sense grasp of existing conditions,

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we will now briefly refer, among other matters, to the precarious nature of the financial resources provided, in the Statutes, for the support of Tangier; to what extent commercial possibilities are being restricted by the difficulties and restraints imposed upon private trade, and how far the judicial régime, which has been set up, conforms to the standards of international expectation; for, when all deductions are made, these are the three cardinal points upon which intentions are to be judged and realizations measured.

With regard to the fiscal régime, upon which the success or failure of the whole scheme must ultimately depend, Article 20 of the Convention provides that "the Tangier Customs shall levy duties and taxes only on goods destined exclusively for consumption in the Zone."

In discussing this important point, it should be borne in mind that the exiguity of the confines of the Tangier Zone, preclude the possibility of any appreciable amount of local production, and that the economic and commercial prosperity of Tangier was built up and has always depended upon its transit trade. It is the natural maritime entrepot supplying an extensive hinterland, stretching over a large area of the Spanish Zone, and no Customs barriers had been erected against its trade throughout Morocco, until the introduction of the Statutes, and goods, once paying Customs duty on their entrance at Tangier, were freely transported by land or by sea, to any point within the Shereefian Empire.

Under

Under Article 20 of the Statutes, these natural rights are taken away from Tangier, and henceforth, this enclave of territory is to be forced to subsist on the Customs revenues, derived from that small proportion of its trade, representing the actual amount of goods consumed, by a limited population of about 70,000 people, the majority of whom belong to the indigent classes. It is difficult to conceive how, under such conditions, it can be possible for Tangier—hitherto dependent almost exclusively on its Customs receipts—to meet the burdens, even of the simplest and most elementary of municipal organizations, much less those of the elaborate and complex régime, weighted down as it is, with a heavy civil list, and a hoard of small functionaries, which has been imposed upon the city.

Article 20 cuts down, to almost a vanishing point, the Customs revenues of the new municipality, but notwithstanding this paring process, its Customs receipts are still expected to provide 75 per cent of the operating expenses of the municipality, besides first charges for Customs Administration, for the Moroccan loans, and for the expenses on the Port Concession.

The enforcement of the principle of Article 20 will also entail administrative measures which cannot fail—in view of the vexatious delays, formalities and discouragements incidental to the transaction of business—to impair the normal current of trade, and still further depreciate the limited sources of revenue, which

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are now counted upon to support the municipality. But we cannot enter into this technical phase of the question, in this place, without leading ourselves astray from the limited objectives, which this Despatch has in view. The question, however, cannot be entirely dismissed, without the explanation that these limitations to the expansion of Tangier trade, are measures, which appear to have been deliberately devised, to eliminate the normal competition of Tangier, with the ports of the French and Spanish Zones.

One need be neither a scientific economist nor a prophet of failure to predict that a ship, put to sea, under such conditions as these, is bound ultimately to drift upon the rocks.

As for the existing judicial régime, a few days previous to the date June 1st last, upon which it was proposed to enforce the Statutes, the British Foreign Office telegraphed to the two British Judges on the International Tribunal, for their opinion. They replied that as there were no police, no prisons, no Court House, no Court Library, no published Codes, they declined all responsibility in regard to the consequences of the implantation of the Statutes under such conditions, but if, nevertheless, the governments concerned decided to enforce the Statute on the date indicated, the Judges would make the best of a bad job, and do all in their power to render their department efficient.

The Statute has been in operation now for three months,

months, and practically the same chaos continues to exist. The Codes are still unprinted, except the Code laying down the forms of Court procedure. The college of stipendiary Judges is still incomplete; the Spanish Judge having resigned, after taking his oath of office, on the plea of the inadequacy of his emoluments, and he has not, as yet, been replaced, while the French member, after appointment and oath, was promoted to a higher Court in the French Service, and though, ostensibly now on leave of absence, it is believed that he is considered as detached from his assignment here.

These brief generalizations are believed to be sufficient, at least as first examples, to establish the fact that the Tangier Statutes appear to have been drawn, with a rigidity of purpose, seeking to accommodate political exigencies only, and in defiance of both economic law and common reality.

In presenting the material embodied in this report, I find myself, at each successive step, confronted with the difficulty of surmounting—if indeed I have the audacity to presume I have surmounted—the obstacles incidental to a satisfactory elucidation of a question, possessing such possibilities for fruitful disputation, as the Statutes of Tangier, with all the intangible contributive causes which explain their creation.

I have, however, with the sole purpose of dispelling the illusions, which either a superficial or

a sophisticated point of view may tend to create, endeavored, with an unprejudiced mind, to look beneath the reticence and reserve, characterizing the Diplomatic Circulars addressed to the Department of State, by the interested governments, on this question.

If in the relation of facts, I have been compelled to point out faults, this has been solely with the view of demonstrating, by exemplification, that there are two sides to the question of our acceptance of the Statutes presented, and that it is not an issue devoid of counterarguments, as has been heretofore, assumed—with somewhat undue presumption—by the three Powers.

Up to this point, having criticized, with all the freedom consistent with courtesy, the political and practical aspects of the Tangier Convention, we will now give consideration to the nature of the answer which is to be made to the three Powers, who have asked us to suspend our treaties and to annul our jurisdiction throughout the region, where they have set up this new organization. But before offering suggestions on this interesting and important question, let me first proceed to a brief recapitulation of the points which have preceded.

First, it has been shown that the creation of the Municipal Government of Tangier was neither a non-political nor an International Act, and this statement is made, without prejudice to any of the special rights

or

or mandates, accorded to the creating Powers, under the Act of Algeciras.

Next, the inference will have been clearly drawn that, under the Tangier Convention, we are asked to suspend the operation of treaties, which we now hold, and in exchange for such voluntary limitations, which we shall thereby place upon our future position in Tangier, we are expected, ipso facto, to consent to an enlargement of the rights of three particular Powers, who have formerly enjoyed no privileges, here, superior to our own.

It has been further implied, in terms of vague probabilities—it is true—rather than of dogmatic certainties, that the Convention of Tangier, in its present form, is unworkable, and if it is to last longer than twelve months and a day, both revision, as well as full, frank, and friendly international co-operation will be necessary.

If it is logical to ask, in this place, whether, owing to its pecuniary limitations, or because of the policies of complex political strangulation, menacing it, there is a possibility, under any conditions, to set up a workable organization in Tangier, that can ever actually possess a career—or even so much as earn, in the annals of posterity, the distinction of bare existence—I would be inclined to reply by an emphatic affirmative, providing the corrosive influences, which have hitherto been working against its existence, are removed, and
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proper international agencies are set at work for effecting the required modifications. There is, in fact, nothing irremediable in the situation, if there is both good will and good accord; the hypothecation of Tangier finances can be relieved, the embarrassments to its trade could be easily lifted, and its judicial régime set in order without international disturbance.

If a revision of the Tangier Statute is to take place, as now seems inevitable—unless the Powers which have created it are content to assist at, if they do not actually prefer to officiate over its extinction—what should constitute the program of our requirements, in the event of our being consulted, and would there be anything contrary to our traditional foreign policy, if we accepted a participation in the revised organization, under a waiver of political responsibilities, identical in terms, with that which the Senate attached to the Act of Algeciras upon its ratification. My own conviction leads me to the conclusion that acceptance, with such qualification, would not involve us politically, either in our domestic or our foreign policies, under the development of a plan which springs from a treaty to which we are already signatories.

After all, acceptance would be influenced by, and based upon, material and practical considerations.

The importance, which Tangier must eventually derive from its geographical situation, cannot be definitely obscured, and it is believed that its natural advantages,

advantages, as a port of transshipment, as a fuelling station, as a link in cable connection, as a travel centre, at the junction of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, will in the long run, break down the limitations with which political strife may temporarily seek to cramp its development. The United States now possesses rights therein, equal to those of any other Power, and in the participation of whatever advantages Tangier may be able to offer, we cannot afford, in the interest of the future development and expansion of American trade, to assume any local position here, which would tend to reduce our influence, or accentuate our inferiority, as a party concerned.

Assuming that the aforementioned general principles have been accommodated and complied with, what in detail, are we to put forward, as the conditions of our co-operation in a scheme of government in Tangier?

In addition to the points put forward by the Department's Note to the three Powers, it is suggested that consideration be given to the measures, discussed below, if they be deemed essential conditions to our co-operation in the new order of government, which has been set up:-

1. If our prospective association, in the Tangier Government, is to be an active rather than a passive one, and if we are to assume, in any measure, the role of full membership, on its International Council, no pledge of co-operation should be given, if Tangier is

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to be considered and operated, politically, as merely a condominium government, and if we are to sit as nominal participants, but expected to play the role of dumb spectators, and to act as handmaids in carrying out the dictates of any one, two or three Powers, even when they may be in a state of accidental agreement.

2. The Department should be convinced that there is a bona fide intention on the part of France, Great Britain and Spain not to shackle the natural economic development of Tangier with restrictions deemed expedient for their particular political ends in Europe, or their economic pretensions in Morocco.

In this connection, although we make no pretension to be the instrument of Providence, in establishing good government throughout the world, we ought not to be expected to associate ourselves with a régime—if the truth is to be expressed—having all the appearances of having been framed, in an oblique way, solely to meet the extraneous requirements of certain Powers.

3. It is obvious that, under a judicial organization which lays claim to possessing a truly international character, no privilege should be reserved to three Powers to nominate each two Judges out of a total of six. It is axiomatic that the judicial régime, above all other departments of the new government, should be above the remotest suspicion of political domination, if it is to deserve a proper measure of confidence. It

would

would certainly be more convincing, if six Judges are the minimum necessity, that six Powers should be called upon, each to appoint one Magistrate, or, better still, that some independent authority, such as the International Tribunal of The Hague, should be entrusted with the selection of Judges; and finally, it is suggested that a much simpler and more economical system of judicature could be devised by deferring litigants of different nationalities to a Tribunal presided over by Judges of neutral nationality. However, in any contingency, the Department's present suggestion of having an American Consular Officer of career to sit, clothed with a due measure of authority, with the stipendiary Judge, on cases involving American litigants, would be acceptable.

4. Having in view that Article 14 of the Convention is susceptible of an interpretation limiting the rights of the American Government or its nationals to land cables or operate cable stations in Tangier, and in view of similar objections to Article 12, dealing with the more remote interest of the establishment of scholastic or eleemosinary institutions, and, for the purpose of further establishing the principle of equality, it is recommended that the Department should require a general undertaking to the effect that no rights—except those which have been legally acquired under the form of an internationally recognized monopoly, prior to the promulgation of the Tangier Conven-

Convention—

Convention—shall at any time, in the future, be denied to the nationals of the United States.

5. There should be an explicit understanding that, in the event of the collapse of the organization, provided by the Statute, the United States shall, at its discretion, be free to revert, purely and simply, to the full exercise of its rights and authority, as existing under pre-Convention treaties, including the Act of Algeciras.

Such provision should be made equally to apply, in the event that the Tangier Convention is not renewed at the expiration of the stipulated term of its existence, providing, in the interim, the United States has not negotiated new treaties, superseding the Act of Algeciras and the other Conventions and treaties, which it now holds with Morocco.

In my Despatch No. 4 entitled: "Peace Formulas for the Settlement of the Moroccan Question," sent to the Department under date of July 16th, 1925, it was remarked, that France and her associates had agreed to do everything within their power, during the interlude, to prevent the Tangier régime from ever again becoming a subject of open international discussion, and this represents to-day no less than, on the date indicated, their collective determination.

When the time for revision is deemed opportune, therefore, there is little doubt that efforts will be made to introduce amendments, by cautious substitution,

rather

rather than through the more cosmopolitan agency of a formal Conference, and in this we find another proof of the closed preserve.

The instrumentalities resorted to, or the ways and means adopted, to bring about changes, would not appear to possess for us, anything more than an academic interest, since our principal concern is to see such modifications made to the Statutes as will render them a rational and practical scheme of government, simultaneously favoring the normal development of the economic position of Tangier, and the security and growth of American interests in this port.

Form however—under the new style of diplomacy in Italy—being sacrosanct, and substance, possibly subsidiary to the considerations of political permutations or eventualities in that country, it is frankly debatable whether this Power will accept changes, reached through any process, but that of a Conference.

If therefore the demands of Italy, as to form of treatment, are to be a sine qua non of her ultimate acceptance of any modified Statutes, and if it is seen that she will not discard her treaty rights, without compliance with the conditions which she imposes, such an attitude, on her part, if persisted in, may force an open Conference; but, in no eventuality, is it likely that such a Conference would embrace a discussion affecting parts of Morocco, outside the International Zone.

This is not the time, nor the place, to exploit

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the rich field of surmise as to who should take up the mantle of Elijah, in the probable eventuality that Spain will be forced to retire from North Morocco, nor to enter into a discussion of the question, which would be opened up, by the remote, but not impossible contingency, of a relaxation of French hold throughout Morocco, as a consequence of serious reverses in the French campaign against Abdelkrim. These considerations are for the present, at least, beyond the scope of a Despatch specifically dealing with the Statutes of Tangier. It is true that the aspects of this question might undoubtedly be profoundly modified by such occurrences as these in the neighboring zones, but leaving such influences out of account, it has been shown that, agitation for the amendment of conditions in Tangier, has already been provoked by local grievances, and that satisfaction cannot be long deferred, and, consequently, I now suggest that the Department prepare instructions, as to the line of conduct, which should be followed by me, in the discussions involved, should the United States under the circumstances, consent to participate in the informal negotiations, which are anticipated to take place, in the near future, either in Tangier or elsewhere.

With the preceding paragraph this Despatch should terminate, but without marching in advance of events, except for the purposes of reconnoitering all contingencies, which may be reasonably foreseen, let us examine

examine before concluding, what should be the attitude of the United States Government, in the event that we are unable to secure the amendments or assurances, that we deem an essential prerequisite to our co-operation, in the new régime proposed for the government of the city of Tangier.

In these circumstances, a situation will arise, in which we alone, will possess the right to cast the final vote, and we should feel ourselves both free and justified—after the illuminating proofs of our experiences—to cling tenaciously to the primary advantages embodied in our treaty rights, which are now unquestioned and undisputed, even by the parties who are asking us to relinquish them.

If history has made anything plain, it is that the past of Morocco has been characterized by a course of disturbed and erratic political rotation, and it would be dissembling the truth to deny that there are signs, intangible, and vague perhaps, but none the less real, indicating that the final chapter of the political vicissitudes of this country has yet to be written.


If our requirements therefore are deemed now to be irreconcilable with the pretensions of other Powers, some time or other, this situation must ultimately be cleared up, and if in the meantime, we find it more convenient to swim against the current rather than with it, there need not be anything disquieting in our action or clandestine in our motives, should we refuse, under

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the force of circumstances, to allow difficulties yet to be solved in this country, to disturb or deflect our ultimate policy. And although we would not expect the creation of a special elysium for our habitation, surely it would constitute neither an anomaly nor a novelty, if we elect to wait, until an appeasement of the chronically disturbed state of equilibrium in this country will permit the Powers, claiming the political direction of its destinies, to offer, with due regard to our treaty rights, and to our position as a world Power, accommodation in the economy of its control, for the free and unhampered development of our legitimate activities.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,


Maxwell Blake,
American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul-General.

October 20, 1925.

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Maxwell Blake, Esquire,

American Diplomatic Agent and Consul General,
Tangier.

Sir:

The Department has received your confidential despatch No. 16, of September 4, 1925, and has read with interest your recapitulation of conditions and recommendations concerning the problems and policy of this Government with reference to the Statute of Tangier.

Your suggestions will be borne in mind but it is believed that conditions are too unsettled in Morocco at the present moment to make it possible for this Government to formulate any plan of action to be followed in case a new conference should be called.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:

WE:JTH:NNB

WE: 884.00/1148

OCT 12 1925 PM
OCT 15 1925

LELAND HARRISON

So
much
[Signature]

A [Signature]

884.00/1148

881.00
CONFIDENTIAL.



REPORT ON POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN THE MALAGA CONSULAR DISTRICT.

From Austin C. Brady American Consul.
Austin C. Brady

Malaga, Spain. Date of preparation Sept. 9, 1925.
Date of mailing Sept. 10, 1925.

Prepared in accordance with Circular No. 230 E, dated April 16, 1919, from the American Embassy, Madrid.

Floyd Gibbons, war correspondent of the Chicago Tribune, came to Malaga today to file news dispatches covering the bombardment of the Riffian position at Alhucemas bay and the landing of Spanish troops there. He made the trip from Ceuta to Alhucemas on a Spanish troop ship. He confirms the official statement of the landing of Spanish troops at the headland known as Morro Nuevo at the western end of Alhucemas bay, and expresses the opinion that the Spanish casualties did not exceed fifty. The landing was made with but little resistance on the part of the Riffians.

Mr. Gibbons states that troop ships carrying 16,000 Spanish soldiers left Ceuta Saturday night and Melilla

881.00/1149
FIT ED
SEP 29 1925 A.M.

Melilla Sunday, and that they were accompanied by 40 to 50 of the steel motor scows, commonly known as "beetle boats", which were used by the British at Gallipoli, and which were purchased by the Spanish government in anticipation of the landing at Alhucemas. For more than 48 hours the vessels cruised along the Riffian coast, and demonstrations were made by Spanish and French naval vessels near the mouth of the Rio Martin, at the mouth of the Rio Uad Lau, at Cabo Quilates, and at other points, with the apparent object of deceiving the Riffians as to the proposed landing point. Shells were thrown into Alhucemas on Sunday and Monday, but the continuous bombardment did not start until Tuesday morning. The French war vessels PARIS and STRASBURG and the Spanish cruisers ALFONSO XIII and REINA VICTORIA EUGENIA took part in the bombardment, using long-range guns, and scores of Spanish and French airplanes dropped bombs on Alhucemas and Axdir. The cliffs above Alhucemas bay were torn by the terrific bombardment, and the correspondent says that he did not see or hear a shot fired from the batteries on shore. However, when the Spanish troops started to land there was some machine-gun and rifle fire.

Mr. Gibbons describes the superiority of the attacking forces and their equipment as "overwhelming", and calls the expedition "one that might be sent to take Gibraltar." Almost every device used in modern warfare was in evidence, he says, including an observation balloon, tanks, and radio. The troops landed carried, in addition to rifles and ammunition, gunny sacks to be filled with sand, picks and shovels

for trench digging, and barbed wire and posts for entanglements. It was planned to intrench at Morro Nuevo and fortify that position, and advance from there on the Riffian stronghold at the bay and on Axdir, the Riffian headquarters a few miles distant. The taking of Alhucemas and Axdir was expected, aside from other results, seriously to affect the prestige of Abd-el-Krim among the rebel tribes.

One woman, an American, witnessed the bombardment and landing. She is Miss Rose Marie Drachman, of Tucson, Arizona, who has been in Europe writing for McCall's Magazine, and who recently went to Morocco for war experience. She obtained permission to accompany sixteen other correspondents on a troop ship to Alhucemas, and Mr. Gibbons states that she has been a center of interest there. When binoculars were not trained on the Riffian stronghold and the landing party they were often levelled in her direction.

According to the American correspondent, official estimates place the number of Spanish and French prisoners held at Alhucemas and Axdir at 2,000. The fate of these prisoners appears to be in doubt. Some reports are to the effect that they were removed to interior points.

Mr. Gibbons states that a concentrated attack by the Riffians on the new Spanish line in the western zone, where there has been some pressure recently, is regarded as a possibility. He asserts that there is a great quantity of war materials and other supplies along this line, and that a Riffian victory would provide them with munitions for a long period. All

manner of supplies have been purchased, he declares, "from embroidered bed sheets to individual ice-making machines." He further asserts that the rebels are passing convoys of munitions and provisions from Tangier through the two lines of Spanish blockhouses at frequent intervals. It is done, he explains, by sending a force of about 200 men to engage the troops in the nearest blockhouse long enough to permit the convoy to pass through into rebel territory.


Mr. Gibbons says: "In the Riff they are attempting to shave with a threshing machine instead of a safety razor. They are employing modern warfare instead of tactics similar to those used against the Moros in the Philippines."

The American correspondent will leave tonight for Melilla on his return to Alhucemas.

It is announced here that an attempt will be made to use hydroplanes to transport the most seriously wounded from Alhucemas to Malaga. The new emergency hospital recently established here has been provided with 150 beds, and arrangements have been made to care for wounded in the military and other local hospitals. Two hospital ships left this port last week, one for Melilla and the other for Ceuta, and a third hospital ship left here today for Alhucemas.

On last Sunday a battalion of the Borbon regiment, composed principally of Malaga troops and numbering more than 700 men, embarked at this port for Ceuta.

800.



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

SECRETARY OF STATE
SEP 25 1925

FROM

2po. wm. 34 nl

MF San Francisco, Calif Sept 24, 1925

Hon. Frank B. Kellogg,

Secy of State, Washington.

Hearty commendations on your warning to American Mercenaries
operating against Riffians in their gallant fight for freedom
stop Real Americans remember Hessian Mercenaries and recognize
the ilk in every land and generation cordially yours.

Knights of the Red Branch.

6:07 a.m. 25th.

WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

881.00 / 1150

FILED
SEP 26 1925

RECEIVED
SEP 25 1925
Dept. of State

A. PIATT ANDREW
SIXTH DISTRICT
OF
MASSACHUSETTS
COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

INDEX BUREAU
OCT 9 1925
DEPT. OF STATE

221 Essex St.,
Salem, Mass., October 7, 1925.

SOLICITOR'S OFFICE
OCT 22 1925
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ERNEST INGERSOLL
SECRETARY
GEORGE E. LEVESQUE
ASSISTANT

Oct-10/16/25
DEPT. OF STATE
OCT 9 1925
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
file

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have received a letter from one of my constituents, Mr. Henry Copley Greene (Tavern Club, 4 Boylston Place, Boston, Mass) in which he asks the following questions:--

1. What is the date of the law recently discovered by the State Department under which the American aviators serving with French troops in support of the Sultan of Morocco were declared subject to penalization?
2. If this law is dated earlier than 1915, could not many Americans, formerly members of the French Foreign Legion during the World War, or many members of the Lafayette Escadrille be subjected to similar fine or imprisonment?
3. Does the State Department intend to bring action against the Americans serving with the French Army in the World War before our entrance in the war?
4. As the American aviators now in Morocco have not abandoned that service, is it the intention of the State Department to seek their penalization?

I shall appreciate such a reply to these questions as will allow me to inform my constituent.

Hon. Frank B. Kellogg,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sincerely yours,

A. Piatt Andrew

881.00/1151
FBI
OCT 22 1925

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

October 21, 1925

Mr. Secretary:

This letter has been rewritten in the sense of Mr. Anderson's Memorandum which I believe he discussed with you.

The quotation of the war time proviso has been left in as Mr. Andrew's letter specifically raises the question therein involved.

WE:EC

October 21, 1925.

In reply refer to
WE: 881.00/1151

The Honorable

A. Piatt Andrew,

221 Essex Street,

Salem, Massachusetts.

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of October 7, 1925, concerning the inquiries addressed to you by Mr. Henry Copley Greene, regarding certain questions raised by the reported enlistment of American citizens in the army forces of the Sultan of Morocco.

It is believed that the following statement of the facts in the matter will be of interest to you and will cover the points raised by your constituent:

Several weeks ago letters were received by the Department stating that American citizens were reported to be enlisting in the army of the Sultan of

Morocco

881.00 / 1151

Morocco for service in Morocco. These letters expressed apprehension concerning the situation and appeared to consider that the matter should receive the attention of the Department. The Department, realizing that the misapprehension might also exist in Morocco, believed it advisable and proper to inform its officer in Morocco of the laws with respect to the enlistment of Americans in foreign military forces. It, therefore, sent a telegram to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier stating that in order to avoid any misapprehension which might be caused in Morocco by the reports of alleged enlistment of American citizens in the Sultan's army, it was suggested that he might care to consider the advisability of calling to the attention of American citizens in Morocco the provisions of Section 5282 and 4090 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. These statutes read as follows:

R. S. 5282 (Section 10 of the United States Criminal Code)

"Whoever, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains another person to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the limits

limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, as a soldier, or as a marine or seaman, on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer shall be fined not more than a thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than three years, * * *

to which was added on May 7, 1917, the following proviso which ceased to have effect at the termination of the late war:

"Provided, That this Section shall not apply to citizens or subjects of any country engaged in war with a country with which the United States is at war, unless such citizen or subject of such foreign country shall hire or solicit a citizen of the United States to enlist or enter the service of a foreign country. Enlistment under this proviso shall be under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War."

R. S. 4090 reads as follows:

"Capital cases for murder or insurrection against the Government of either of the countries hereinabove mentioned (extraterritorial countries), by citizens of the United States, or for offences against the public peace amounting to felony under the laws of the United States, may be tried before the Minister of the United States in the country where the offense is committed if allowed jurisdiction; and every such Minister may issue all manner of writs, to prevent the citizens of the United States from enlisting in the military or naval service of either of the said countries, to make war upon any foreign power with whom the United States are at peace, or in the service of one portion of the people against any other portion of the same people; and he may carry out this power by a resort to such force belonging to the United States, as may at the time be within his reach."

No

The Department has no evidence as to whether the aviators in question have or have not enlisted in the Army of the Sultan of Morocco nor has it information as to the nature of their connection with the armed forces in Morocco. The Department, however, felt it to be its duty to call the attention of American citizens in Morocco to the laws of the United States designed to prevent and make unlawful the enlistment, in the United States or in countries where we enjoy extraterritorial privileges, of American citizens for service in foreign armed forces.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

FRANK B. KELLOGG

WE:HC:NNB

C. E. G.
66-22224-111

[Handwritten signature]

No. 140

Copy in file
S H

80

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Madrid, Spain.

September 18th, 1925.

INDEX BUREAU
OCT 1 1925

SUBJECT: MOROCCAN WAR. (Spanish Editorial Comment)

SOLICITOR'S OFFICE
OCT 14 1925
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 9 1925
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

881.00/1152

INDEX BUREAU

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose a translation of an article on Morocco by Armand Guerra, military editor of El Debate (Conservative), published in the September 17th issue of that paper, which it is believed will be of interest to the Department.

It may be well to say that Armand Guerra is notoriously anti-French and was so during the World War, and that the editorial enclosed appears to have been inspired by an article of Reginald Kann in Le Temps of Paris, casting aspersions on Spanish military capacity.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Augustin W. Ferrin

AUGUSTIN WM. FERRIN
American Consul.

AWF:T
800

Enclosure: "Moroccan Questions"
Editorial, as above.

FILED
OCT 16 1925

MOROCCAN QUESTIONS

Translation of an article by Armand Guerra in
El Debate of Madrid, September 17, 1925, made by

AUGUSTIN WM. FERRIN, American
Consul, Madrid, Spain.

For some time French writers have been saying what Reginald Kann said yesterday and other things more savory. In a work often cited by me, published in 1913 by "Lieutenant Kuntz" and entitled "Souvenirs of Campaigns in Morocco", he speaks of our incapacity and suggests the idea of leaving us only, and at the most, Ceuta and Melilla "because Morocco cannot be the prize of two rivals"; and he foresees, it is just to admit, that some day the French would have to ask the right to pursue the Morros to the north of the Uarga. Read pages 449 to 460, which I cannot copy, and in which, if he chastises us, he tells us truths like knife thrusts. I am so; I admire the truth wherever I find it. But in this work, which Kann has forgotten, is said also what I am going to translate literally from page 465, "The Arab and the negro are marvellous elements for what we call cannon food". And on page 467, "France will be able to throw the decisive weight of 200,000 Arabs (remember this was published in 1913) into the balance in which the interests of the world are weighed." "Germany, in leaving us Morocco, has given us Alsace, perhaps without suspecting it, and even also perhaps the left bank of the Rhine" - a paragraph which, as you see, is in accord with this other published yesterday and pronounced by Painleve, president of the French Council of Ministers, "And do not forget, in short, that in this soil of Morocco which today fights for having

Moroccan questions, 2.

France on its side, is assured a precious collaborator for tomorrow," - words which confirm those which Lyautey pronounced in the Liceo of Oran on the 12th of July, 1907, "This Africa is for our race what the Far West is for America, the field par excellence of energy, rejuvenation, and fecundity."


Is it, therefore, in the interest of Spain, as Kann said yesterday, that France fights at our side? If the force of Abd-el-krim continues increasing and makes itself lord of Morocco, adios Algeria and Tunis! adios army of 200,000 Arabs! adios army of Senegalese! for, prestige lost in Morocco, very soon the fire of the north will spread to the south and to lose a stocking it is necessary for only one thread to break. Given this adios to Arabs and negroes and in view of what Kann, Kunts, Painleve, and Lyautey have said, will there not come, in addition, other farewells? Is it Spain or is it France who above all is interested in the extinction of the Moroccan fire as soon as possible? Spain! The Spaniards have already forgotten the innocence (I am amiable in calling it that) of those who wished to grind us with the millstone that our zone was necessary to us, to protect our hearth; now we know that what abounds in Morocco is lice; we do not give a fig if there are or are not mines in our zone; we do not dream of armies of Arabs and negroes and our hearts beat in unison with that of General Primo de Rivera when he had the courage to speak as he spoke in Cadiz and in the Spanish Senate". (This last sentence refers to Primo de Rivera's proposal to abandon the Spanish Protectorate.AWF.)

No. 26


American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General.

Tangier, Morocco, September 24th, 1925.

CONFIDENTIAL.



SUBJECT: American aviators in Morocco—Press propaganda and politics.



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:-

I have the honor to enclose herewith cuttings from the issues of September 22nd and 23rd 1925 of the "Presse Marocaine" a daily paper published in Casablanca, Morocco, reflecting upon an action attributed

to



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INDEX BUREAU
OCT 7 1925

to the Department of State, in regard to the American aviators, serving with the French forces operating against the Riff.

The appearance of these comments in the local press came as a complete surprise to me, in view of the fact that, upon receipt of the Department's telegram No. 9 of September 5th, 1925, I decided, after careful consideration, to refrain from giving effect to the discretionary instructions transmitted. It appeared to me, under the circumstances, that the harm which had been done, might rather be rectified by the silence, which was gathering over the waning glamour, with which the French Authorities had sought to surround the co-operation of the American aviators.

Although the publicity which has accidentally been given to the attitude of the Department in this matter, may not have failed to serve a useful purpose, it is however regrettable that a leakage has occurred, in regard to instructions from the Department concerning action contemplated but yet in the stages of consideration, and I respectfully suggest that the Department may desire to investigate the origin of the leakage, which certainly did not occur in Morocco.

Reverting to the newspaper articles under discussion, it is suggested that the title of the article of September 22nd, 1925, "Insidious Campaign Against the American Aviators in Morocco" might more

appropriately

appropriately and truthfully have been expressed as "Frustration of French Attempts to Implicate America in the Moroccan Embroglio," for there is not a question of a doubt but that the press campaign surrounding the enlistment of the American aviators was undertaken, and the spectacular reception of the latter by the Sultan was staged, for the purpose of creating, both in European and native minds, the impression that the United States was associated with France in her military aggressions and political risks in Morocco.

By a perusal of these articles, the Department will not fail to observe that their most objectionable features are to be found in the suggestive titles under which they are printed.

"Le Riff intéresserait-il les Américains?" (Have the Americans perhaps an interest in the Riff?) is an interrogative, which undoubtedly contains a covert reference to the news, recently published, in regard to the transfer of mining and other concessions of the Mannesman Brothers, in the Riff, to an Anglo-American financial group, in which a prominent American banker is supposed to be interested. Incidentally it may be said that this allusion is in line with the general trend of French and Franco-Moroccan newspaper comment upon the reported transaction, expressing unconcealed resentment at the supposed acquisition of mining rights in the Riff, by American interests. If such transaction has actually taken place, and is concerned with mining concessions


*This was
denied
by Otto
Kalam*

concessions legitimately acquired by the Mannesman consortium, and passed upon by the International Commission which adjudicated mining claims filed, prior to the promulgation of the Moroccan Mining Laws, the American interest therein will eventually deserve protection. If, on the other hand, the concessions in question are unsupported by regular title, the Anglo-American acquirers will accordingly suffer the consequences. But whatever may be the case, there is no cause for the outcry which has arisen in the French and Moroccan press against the attempt, which may be indicated by the transaction referred to, on the part of Americans, to interest themselves in the mining possibilities of the Riff.

It is, however, interesting to note that such press comments are symptomatic of the direction in which French policy is travelling, as a consequence of the complications, which have arisen from the resistance of Abdelkrim, the Riff leader. So long as the Spanish control of North Morocco appeared to be unchallenged, French interests affected the completest indifference to the fate of the Riff mines, but now that there is a possibility, in French opinion, that an adjustment of the political situation, to their advantage, may result from the issue of the present conflict, French politicians view with reluctance the prospect that any of the Riff mineral wealth may escape their control.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,


Maxwell Blake,
American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul-General.

Enclosures:
As above stated.

"LA PRESSE MAROCAINE."

Casablanca, Morocco, September 22nd, 1925.



Le Riff intéresserait-il les Américains ?

UNE CAMPAGNE INSIDIEUSE CONTRE LES AVIATEURS AMERICAINS AU MAROC

PARIS, 21 septembre. — Selon le **Temps** le Gouvernement américain a mis les aviateurs américains de l'escadrille La Fayette en demeure ou bien d'interrompre immédiatement leur service ou de renoncer à leur nationalité américaine.

Le Consul général des Etats-Unis à Tanger a été prié par son Gouvernement d'informer les membres de l'escadrille qu'ils sont passibles de poursuites aux termes de la loi américaine, qui interdit aux citoyens américains de prendre part à des opérations militaires contre une puissance amie et qu'ils peuvent être condamnés de ce fait à une amende de mille dollars, et à un emprisonnement de trois années.

Le correspondant du **Daily Mail** à New-York télégraphie à ce sujet qu'au point de vue droit, les aviateurs américains sont au service du Sultan du Maroc, mais placés sous les ordres de chefs français.

Malgré cela la France n'a pas reçu de protestations de M. Kellogg.

UNE DEMARCHE DE WASHINGTON

WASHINGTON, 21 septembre. — On annonce de source autorisée que le Département d'Etat a télégraphié au Consul général des Etats-Unis à Tanger en le priant simplement d'attirer l'attention des aviateurs américains engagés au Maroc sur les lois fédérales interdisant cet acte.

Le Département d'Etat n'envisagerait aucune autre action et les aviateurs américains auront à décider eux-mêmes de leur attitude.

TRANSLATION.

HAVE THE AMERICANS PERHAPS AN INTEREST IN THE RIFF?

An insidious campaign against the American
Aviators in Morocco.

Paris, September 21. According to the "Temps" the American Government has called upon the American Aviators of the La Fayette squadron immediately to suspend their service or to renounce their American nationality.

The Consul General of the United States in Tangier has been instructed by his Government to inform the members of the squadron that they are liable to prosecution under the terms of the American law, forbidding American citizens to take part in military operations against a friendly Power, and that they may be condemned, on such account, to pay a fine of one thousand dollars, and to imprisonment for three years.

The correspondent of "The Daily Mail" in New York telegraphs, in this connection, that from a legal point of view, the American aviators are in the service of the Sultan of Morocco, but placed under the orders of French Chiefs.

Nevertheless France has received no protest from Mr. Kellogg.


AN ACTION FROM WASHINGTON.

Washington, September 21. It is announced from an authoritative source that the State Department telegraphed to the Consul General of the United States at Tangier requesting him simply to draw the attention of the American aviators serving in Morocco, to the federal laws prohibiting such activities.

The State Department does not contemplate any further action and the American aviators will have to decide for themselves as to their attitude.

"LA PRESSE MAROCAINE."

Casablanca, Morocco, September 23rd, 1925.



La menace contre les aviateurs américains

WASHINGTON, 22 septembre. — L'attitude de M. Kellogg, menaçant de sévir contre les aviateurs américains, qui servaient sur le front du Maroc est vivement critiquée dans tous les milieux.

On est étonné que cette mesure soit prise au moment où vont commencer les négociations financières.

On rappelle que pendant la grande guerre des milliers d'Américains servirent chez les alliés alors que les Etats-Unis n'étaient pas en guerre avec l'Allemagne.

TRANSLATION.

THE THREAT AGAINST THE AMERICAN AVIATORS.

Washington, September 22. The attitude of Mr. Kellogg, in threatening to proceed against the American aviators, serving on the Moroccan front, is severely criticized in all circles. Astonishment is expressed that this measure should be taken at the moment when the financial negotiations are about to commence.

It is recalled that during the Great War, thousands of Americans served with the allies at a time when the United States was not at war with Germany.

881.00/1153

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JANE ADDAMS

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U. S. Section, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

1403 H St., N. W., Washington, D. C.

Telephone Franklin 8218

Cable Wilus

INDEX BUREAU

Rec'd

OCT 17 1925

Dept. of State

October 15, 1925.

The Honorable Frank B. Kellogg
Secretary of State
State Department
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

We have been deeply concerned over the
presence of American volunteers in the Riff war.

We are happy to read in the papers that the
Department of State is taking up the matter.

May we ask (1) what, so far as known, are
the numbers of Americans engaged on either side, (2)
what is their legal status and (3) what action, if
any, has been taken or is proposed in this connection?

Respectfully yours,

Hannah Clothier Hull

Hannah Clothier Hull

National Chairman.

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OCT 17 1925

Dep't. of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 17 1925


DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPE AFFAIRS

88-00/1154

NOV 9 1925

HCH:MLM

NATIONAL
ARCHIVES



INDEX BUREAU
OCT 8 1925

Tangier, Morocco,

September 16th, 1925.

My Dear Castle:-

I have just received your Note of August 28th, enclosing a copy of a communication from the "American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic," protesting against the use of the American flag by the American aviation corps, which has recently joined the French Army in Morocco, operating against the Riff.

I should, naturally, have made the appropriate protest, couched in very vigorous terms, if I had had the slightest occasion to suspect such misuse of the flag, but there have been no grounds for this complaint.

I have made very searching enquiries in regard to the American aviators operating with the French Army of occupation, in view of the rumors and reports which had reached me to the effect that American Army badges were

William R. Castle, Jr., Esquire,
Chief of Division of Western
European Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

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FILED
OCT 8 1925

were being displayed on their uniforms, but I am satisfied that the above mentioned rumors and reports were unfounded, and that there is nothing in the present uniform or equipment of these American aviators to distinguish them from the French forces with which they are incorporated.

In this connection I would also draw your attention to Despatch No. 203 of August 24th, 1925, from Russell, our Consul at Casablanca, who has been in personal touch with several of the American aviators in question.

I do not think there is any likelihood that abuses of the character indicated by Mr. Grady will occur.

Confidentially, there is no doubt that the French would be pleased, for the purposes of propaganda, to identify American efforts with their own, as they have already attempted to do by the wide international publicity, and ceremonious receptions given to the American flying corps. There is no doubt that when the aviators arrived, they were wearing on their uniforms, small U.S. letters, but before their official reception, by the Sultan took place, these identifications were removed.

Wyth

Wyth Williams of "The Saturday Evening Post" is preparing three articles on Morocco, and I have a suspicion this incident may be referred to by him, but in any event I suggest that you have Carter on the lookout for the issues of that paper containing the Moroccan articles.

Very sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "William F. Buckley Jr.", written in a cursive style.

August 28, 1925.

Dear Blake:

We never answer letters from the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic. The copy of the letter recently received from a Mr. Grady has, however, nothing to do with the Irish Republic and, although I am not going to answer it, I should like to have a word from you sometime as to the question asked in the letter. Of course, if Americans want to enlist in the Foreign Legion there is nothing we can do to prevent it. I have seen nothing, on the other hand, in the papers about any use of the American flag and cannot imagine that the flag will be freely used. I think that if it should be, and it is always possible that any group of Americans might want to fly under their own flag, pretty vigorous protest should be made.

If you hear any rumors about this possible
situation

Maxwell Blake, Esquire,
American Consul General,
Tangier.

situation, I should be grateful if you would let me know.

Very sincerely,



No.

5597


EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, October 9, 1925.



Adm's Paris

October 28, 1925.



For Distribution	☒

881.00/1576
INDEX BUREAU

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit for the Department's information a general outline of the opening phases of the Moroccan war. The present time seems opportune for such a review of events, since the resignation of Marshal Lyautey during the past week, the announcement today of the appointment of M. Steeg in his place, the recent attainment of all its preliminary objectives by the French Army, and the good fortune crowning the hazardous effort of the Spanish Army to occupy Alhucemas Bay and to destroy Ajdir, the "capital" of the Riffi, have closed the first chapter of the history of the joint Franco-Spanish operations.

The . . .

FILED
NOV 8 1925

The offensive action of the Riffi irregulars began, it will be recalled, early in April of this year in certain territories near the Ouerqa river, which had been occupied by the French troops at the end of the preceding autumn. This occupation and the retreat of the Spanish Armies to the "Primo de Rivera Line" in the Spanish zone furnished Abd el Krim with the pretext and the opportunity for opening his offensive in the French zone. After the French occupation of the Ouerqa valley Marshal Lyautey brought urgently to the attention of the French Government the possibility, if not probability, of just such action on the part of Abd el Krim.

The TEMPS reported at the beginning of the month that Marshal Lyautey had taken measures to protect the frontiers and to guarantee the territories of the submissive tribes in the Ouerqa valley. Abd el Krim, however, succeeded in arousing some tribes in this region and launched them against the entire French front, supporting them by Riffi contingents. During the first part of May, the position of the French troops on the Fez-Taza road had become critical and continued so. In spite of the optimistic statement of Premier Painlevé, who informed the Press on May 12th that "the situation was stabilized," the gravity of the menace to Fez and Taza was indicated by the somewhat humiliating necessity of despatching former Minister Malvy to Spain to pave the way for an agreement providing for joint French and Spanish action. M. Briand pointed out at the end of the month that "it was the duty of France and Spain to go hand in hand." Socialist disapproval of the handling of the Moroccan situation became increasingly evident, and the Government was accused of having disregarded all the efforts of Abd el Krim towards conciliation.

Premier . . .

Premier Painlevé denied this and quoted Marshal Lyautey who stated that the Riff chieftain "had made no attempt to come to an understanding, although he once sent an emissary who was told that French action would not be exercised outside of French territory which was put under French protection by the Treaty." At this stage resolutions were passed by the Permanent Administrative Committee of the Socialist Party expressing concern over news reported from Morocco and the ignorance in which the public had been kept as to the exact scope of military operations. One of the resolutions provided for immediate contact between the Committee and the Socialist parliamentary group which would be charged to interpellate the Government on its intentions and "to proclaim from the rostrum the pacific sentiments of the Socialist party and of the proletariat." During the course of the parliamentary debate on the Moroccan situation, Marshal Lyautey was attacked and former Minister of War Maginot was obliged to defend him by stating that he himself had authorized the Marshal to occupy the Ouergha line. The Prime Minister declared that there was no question of a war of conquest but that France could not allow tribes under her protection to be plundered and pointed out that if she recoiled from her responsibilities it would mean abandoning all "trans-Mediterranean France." He denied that the French Government had ever thought of trespassing upon territories attributed to Spain.

About the first of June, it was decided to send a delegation of the Chamber Army Committee to Morocco and to open negotiations with the Spanish Government with a view to deciding upon common action. Toward the middle of the month Prime Minister Painlevé made a visit of inspection to Morocco

and . . .

and the delegation appointed by the Chamber Army Committee proceeded to Rabat. At about this time a letter written by the Chief of the Civil Cabinet of Marshal Lyautey to the Marshal's son in France was intercepted, fell into the hands of Communist Deputy Doriot and was published in L'HUMANITE, causing a great sensation and rendering the task of the Government still more difficult in meeting the exigencies of the military situation. The report of the Military Commission as published indicated merely minor faults in the military administration, but it was learned on good authority that the Committee was deeply dissatisfied with the conduct of affairs by Marshal Lyautey.

Meanwhile, the negotiations with Spain were proceeding in an apparently satisfactory manner. The French Ambassador to Madrid, Peretti de la Rocca, is well known as one of the most eminent authorities on Moroccan affairs and on June 29th Malvy left again for Madrid. Early in July, a decision was reached in the Council of Ministers to appoint General Naulin as supreme commander of the troops in Morocco. While the Premier explained that the decision to create this new post had been made in accord with Marshal Lyautey and that General Naulin would be technically under the orders of the Marshal, it became evident that the Government did not consider Marshal Lyautey, whether by reason of his advancing years or as a result of an unfavorable report of the Parliamentary Committee, as equal to the military task before him, and the Socialist agitation against the "Moroccan adventure" continued on an increasing scale.

On July 9th, the Moroccan credits, amounting to 183 millions of francs, requested by the Government and approved by the Finance Committee, were voted in the Chamber.

Anxiety was expressed by Socialist Deputy Renaudel about the manner in which military operations were being conducted. Premier Painlevé appealed to the Chamber "to remain calm in the presence of facts incident to colonial warfare" and gave assurance that peace would be made when a proper agreement could be signed. On the 14th of the month, Marshal Lyautey issued a statement to the effect that the worst was over and that, with the new effectives provided, the French would remain masters of the situation. The Chamber rejected a bill authorizing the calling up of reservists in 1925, in spite of the fact that the bill had been approved by the Under Secretary of State for War and by the Finance Committee. About the middle of July it was decided to send Marshal Petain on a special mission to Morocco. This decision, among other things, made more apparent the waning prestige of Marshal Lyautey, in spite of the fact that an official communiqué stated that Marshal Petain was being sent "to confer with Marshal Lyautey on provisions and measures to be taken." Toward the end of July, it was announced that the Franco-Spanish Conference at Madrid had reached an agreement regarding operations in Morocco. The agreement was kept secret but it became known that among its provisions were: (1) neither country was to conclude a separate peace; (2) measures were to be taken to prevent the Tangier zone from becoming the headquarters of rebels; (3) cooperation of the French and Spanish Armies and Navies; (4) arrangements for the French troops temporarily to enter the Spanish zone; (5) peace terms to Abd el Krim were determined upon and were to be made accessible to him but no official emissary was to be sent to the Riff.

Premier . . .

Premier Painlevé reported early in August that the Government had not lost one moment in preparing the conditions for a lasting, equitable and generous peace, but that, on the other hand, it had lost no time in preparing strong measures which would be adopted if these peace conditions were not accepted. Some days later, the Prime Minister defined the relation between Marshal Lyautey and General Naulin, stating that the Resident General represented the Government while General Naulin was in command of operations. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated early in August that Abd el Krim had so far avoided contact with the unofficial Franco-Spanish delegates. On August 10th the Presidency of the Council published a communiqué stating: "A telegram from General Primo de Rivera announced that an emissary who claims, and seems to have a mandate from Abd el Krim declared to the General that Abd el Krim will enter into negotiations only if the independence of the Riff is previously recognized." Early in August it was generally understood that the peace conditions proposed to Abd el Krim were:

- (1) recognition by Abd el Krim of the "religious sovereignty" of the Sultan of Morocco;
- (2) France and Spain to recognize the administrative autonomy of the Riff and to permit the organization of an adequate Riff "police force", the officers of which were to be supplied by France.

The return of Marshal Petain to Morocco was announced by the Prime Minister on August 19th. M. Painlevé also stated that the Marshal would visit Algeciras to discuss with General Primo de Rivera the cooperation between French and Spanish forces. The result of this Conference was an understanding between the two commanders that their respective forces would take simultaneous action and the programs of both armies were

to . . .

to be interdependent. The French were to advance to the limits of the French zone, the Spaniards were to occupy Alhucemas Bay, capture Ajdir, open communications between this town and Melilla by land, and furthermore to advance from Alcazar to Chechouen. Subject to the successful carrying out of the first part of the Spanish program, Marshal Petain agreed to further advances by the French troops (after they should have reached the boundary of the French zone) towards Ajdir from Taza and towards Chechouen from Wezzan to join the Spanish troops in the Spanish zone.

Towards the end of the month Marshal Lyautey returned to France to confer with the Premier, and it was rumored in Paris that an agreement had been made by certain influential politicians to the effect that the Marshal (attacked by the Parliamentary Left and supported by the Right) would be permitted to remain in Morocco on condition that General Sarraill (known in Paris as a "political general" and attacked by the Right and supported by the Left) should be permitted to retain command in Syria. Some surprise was therefore felt when early in September it was announced that Marshal Petain would be given full command of the military operations in Morocco and that Marshal Lyautey would act as Resident for administrative affairs, exercising necessary influence over tribal questions and "in contact with Marshal Petain." In the middle of September the Premier made the formal promise that soldiers in Morocco would be liberated on the very day that their term of 18 month's service came to an end, and shortly afterwards a decree was issued on the proposition of the Minister of War providing for a system of choosing by lot among the classes (called to the colors in the normal course of events in France)

those . . .

those men who were to be sent to North Africa. It was thus evident that the Government was fully aware of the anxiety prevailing among families and was sparing no efforts to disarm the growing criticism.

At the end of September Marshal Lyautey resigned his post. This resignation had been expected in several quarters since the appointment of Marshal Petain which involved a great diminution in the powers of Lyautey who had up to that time been technically commander of the troops in Morocco. The appointment of Petain, however, was considered essential in order to bring to an end the friction between the respective staffs of Marshal Lyautey and General Naulin. Apropos of Lyautey's resignation the GAULOIS stated: "The Government has accepted the resignation of Marshal Lyautey. Everyone is aware that if left no stone unturned to bring the High Commissioner of Morocco to this decision. M. Painlevé has given out a statement to the Press designed to hide the truth, which is neither to the honor of the Cabinet over which he presides, nor to that of the democracy which he represents."

The Radical enemies of Marshal Lyautey were, of course, highly pleased with his resignation. They maintain that the Marshal had paid little attention to the desires of the French Government, but had followed a more or less personal policy in the Riff campaign and that he had, by the occupation of the Ouerga valley, stung Abd el Krim into action and, by taking a most serious risk, had placed his Government in such a dangerous position that it had no choice but to send him the effectives he had long demanded; that he cherished the ambition of adding the Spanish zone, or a large part of it, to the French Protectorate; that he was self-opinionated, superannuated, and that he was unable to brook criticism, opposition or contradiction. His friends, on the other hand,

maintain . . .

maintain that he was the greatest pro-consul of France; that his action in occupying the Ouerga valley was an "offensive defensive", entirely preventative in its nature, and was due to his clairvoyance as a strategist who foresaw the imminence of an attack by Abd el Krim; that it had saved Fez when the attack came; and that the politicians in the Government, in refusing to send additional troops when the Marshal first requested them, had jeopardized, for petty and personal reasons, the safety of the French forces in Morocco. Somewhere between these two positions the truth lies, but it is as yet too soon to make an accurate estimate in the premises.

It was announced in today's Press that M. Steeg, former Governor General of Algeria, would be appointed to replace Marshal Lyautey as French Resident General in Morocco. This will slightly strengthen the Government's position when Parliament is convened as the appointment meets one objection raised by elements of the Left who oppose "military government" in the Protectorate. M. Steeg is a civilian of great colonial experience and apparently of outstanding ability. He has expressed his intention of following one policy established by Marshal Lyautey with signal success: the government of Morocco through the Sultan and the great Caids, with the utmost respect for native traditions and institutions.

At the present time the military situation has developed most favorably for the French and Spanish armies. The French have carried out the first part of the plan agreed upon between Marshal Petain and General Primo de Rivera and now occupy strong positions approximately along the boundary line of the French Protectorate. The Spaniards are at last in possession of Alhucemas Bay and Ajdir, after having remained

for . . .

for some time in a most precarious position upon the coast. Nevertheless, it appears doubtful whether the remainder of the program agreed upon between the two commanders can be carried out this year. Latest advices from Morocco indicate that the rains have begun, and the necessity of proceeding with the utmost care on such difficult terrain and in the face of an alert, brave and extremely mobile enemy, necessitates a very gradual progress. Communications must be made safe, roads must be built, and numerous bases established, adequately fortified and well victualled, to serve as starting points for mobile columns which will probably be used in the spring campaign for the complete occupation of the Riff. It is believed that the policy to be followed by the French armies during the winter will be to hold such positions as they may reach before the weather renders further advances impossible, and then to construct bases as indicated above. It appears to be part of the French plan to push forward a vigorous political campaign during the winter among the tribes of the occupied territory and those in contact with the French troops, to bring about the unqualified submission of rebellious elements and to stabilize conditions in the Protectorate. If there is no substantial opposition to such a plan of campaign in Parliament, if adequate credits are voted, and if public opinion in France remains favorable, it is confidently expected by the military authorities that Abd el Krim will be decisively and finally defeated by midsummer of next year.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,


Sheldon Whitehouse,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

In quintuplicate.
Copy to E. I. C.

1740

October 28, 1925.

The Honorable

Myron T. Herrick,

American Ambassador,

Paris.

Sir:

The Department has received your despatch No. 5597 of October 9, 1925, giving a review of the situation in Morocco. This despatch presents a useful summary of events in that country and the Department desires to commend the Embassy for the excellent way in which the facts have been presented.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:


JOSEPH C. GREW

881.00/1156

WE:FLB:BFP:SS

C.R.

OCT 26 1925 PM



No. 64

Copy from
Commercial Office (A/C)
To *Tangier*

DEPT. OF STATE
OCT 22 1925
DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

VICE
AMERICAN/CONSULATE,

Bushire, Persia.

SUBJECT: Persians Anxious to Help Riffians.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to inform the Department that all Persians in Bushire with whom I have talked, express the keenest sympathy in the struggle of Abd-el-Kerim against France. They are constantly inquiring as to the latest news. No support has yet been given him, but I am informed that this is only because he has sent no representative to Persia, and that if some one came from the Riff country considerable sums would be subscribed.

This sentiment is based on religious sympathy and in a vague feeling of fellowship with any nation struggling for independence against a European Power.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant.

George Gregg Fuller
George Gregg Fuller,
American Vice Consul

File No; 800.

GGF/AAR.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 22 1925
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

INDEX BUREAU

OCT 30 1925

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CLARENCE H. MACKAY, PRESIDENT.

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LCO WHITE HOUSE 435

WASHINGTON

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OCT 23 1925
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EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

PTT
OCT 24 1925

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OCT 3 1925
Dep't. of State

OCT 20 1925
noted
JHK

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W

SAN SEBASTIAN, October 21, 1925.

INDEX BUREAU
Rec'd

OCT 22 1925

Dept. of State

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I know you will be interested in the war in Morocco. It really looks as if the French and Spanish will eventually win this conflict, but it is not an easy matter. As an evidence of the desperateness of the fighting, I might say to you that the Riffians actually jump on the armored tanks with knives and try to kill the men inside. When the French and Spanish rush at them with hand-grenades, the Riffians desperately try to catch them with their hands. They don't seem to know what fear is.

The warfare is similar to our Indian warfare, so you will understand the difficulties the French and Spaniards are working under.

The Spaniards are very anxious to press forward as soon as possible for the reason that they fear that, when the French Chamber of Deputies meets, the Socialist members may dominate it and compell the withdrawal of the French troops. Confidentially, Marshal Pétain and other French officers fear this also, so it is to be expected that quite a drive will be made within the next few weeks.

According to confidential information which I have received, the French are not sure of their Government. As an instance of this, the King and Queen of Spain have not crossed the Border this year as has been the custom in past summers, when the King was in the habit of going over to Biarritz to play polo.

The Honorable
Frank B. Kellogg,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

DEPT. OF STATE
OCT 20 1925
7:00
7:15
RECEIVED
OCT 20 1925
7:15
JHK

INDEX BUREAU

88.00/1159

OCT 22 1925
F.T.P.

In speaking to me the other day, he told me the reason he was not going over this year was that the French had informed him that they could not guarantee him protection, and intimated to him that, on account of the great number of Socialists in their Parliament, if any extraordinary measures were taken to protect him, it might cause them some embarrassment and a protest would probably be made.

I hope you are well.

Please remember me kindly to Mrs. Kellogg, and, with all good wishes, believe me, as always,

Very sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Arthur", with a long horizontal flourish underneath.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 26 1925
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

~~40~~
DR WE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR

Index Subject (M. EMILE DAESCHNER) OCTOBER 22, 1925.

RECEIVED

OCT 23 1925

Dep't of State The French Ambassador called in relation to a note of his Government to me and my reply about condition of affairs in Morocco. I asked him to take the matter up with Mr. Olds, of the Department, who is considering it.

File wpl
Assistant Secretary
of State
OCT 26 1925
Mr. Olds

881.00/1160
INTELLIGENCE

S FBK:WHB:ACS

Original filed in S.

PRR MD
OCT 29 1925



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The Hague, Netherlands.
October 17, 1925.

WE
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No. 564

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1925
DEPT. OF S.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 2 1925
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SOLICITOR'S OFFICE
NOV 10 1925
DEPT. OF S.

For Distribution

881.00/1161

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform the Department that the Official Journal of the Netherlands (No. 406, October 15, 1925) contains the proclamation of the Decree of October 5, 1925, whereby the Netherlands adhere to the Convention Relative to the Organization of the Statute of the Tangier Zone concluded on December 18, 1923, between France, Great Britain and Spain. By this Decree the Netherlands adhere to all the articles of the Convention with the exception of Article 9.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Richard M. Tobin
Richard M. Tobin.

Copy to E.I.C.,
Paris.

Transmitted in
quadruplicate.

NOV 20 1925

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Nov 4, 1925

Memo.

A reply to the letter of October 15 was drafted October 22, enclosing a copy of the Department's letter to Congressman Andrew. It was decided by Mr. Grew that the present form of acknowledgment was preferable and the letter was returned to WE for redrafting on November 2.

A handwritten signature or set of initials, possibly 'H', written in dark ink. It consists of a large, sweeping horizontal stroke with a small vertical mark above it.

INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT
JANE ADDAMS

NATIONAL OFFICERS

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
WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE

U. S. Section, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

1403 H St., N. W., Washington, D. C.

Telephone Franklin 8218

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October 30th, 1925.



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35

The Honorable Frank G. Kellogg
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

On October 15th we wrote you of our deep concern over the presence of American volunteers in the Riff war. We have had no answer to our letter up to the present time.

May we ask again (1) what, so far as known, are the numbers of Americans engaged on either side, (2) what is their legal status and (3) what action, if any, has been taken or is proposed in this connection?

Respectfully yours,

Hannah Clothier Hull

Hannah Clothier Hull.

National Chairman.

HCH:MLM

NOV 9 1925

PTT

In reply refer to
WE: 881.00/1162

Mrs. Hannah Clothier Hull,
National Chairman, Women's
International League,
1403 H Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

November 7, 1925.

Madam:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
October 30, 1925, concerning the reported activities
of American aviators in Morocco.

It is believed that the following statement of
the facts in the matter will be of interest to you:

Several weeks ago letters were received by the
Department stating that American citizens were re-
ported to be enlisting in the army of the Sultan of
Morocco for service in Morocco. These letters ex-
pressed apprehension concerning the situation and
appeared to consider that the matter should receive
the attention of the Department. The Department,
realizing that the misapprehension might also exist

in

881.00/1162

in Morocco, believed it advisable and proper to inform its officer in Morocco of the laws with respect to the enlistment of Americans in foreign military forces. It, therefore, sent a telegram to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier stating that in order to avoid any misapprehension which might be caused in Morocco by the reports of alleged enlistment of American citizens in the Sultan's army, it was suggested that he might care to consider the advisability of calling to the attention of American citizens in Morocco the provisions of Sections 5282 and 4090 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. These statutes read as follows:

R. S. 5282 (Section 10 of the United States Criminal Code)-

"Whoever, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains another person to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, as a soldier, or as a marine or seaman, on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque,
or

or privateer, shall be fined not more than a thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than three years, * * *

to which was added on May 7, 1917, the following proviso which ceased to have effect at the termination of the late war:

"Provided, that this Section shall not apply to citizens or subjects of any country engaged in war with a country with which the United States is at war, unless such citizen or subject of such foreign country shall hire or solicit a citizen of the United States to enlist or enter the service of a foreign country. Enlistment under this proviso shall be under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War."

R. S. 4090 reads as follows:

"Capital cases for murder or insurrection against the Government of either of the countries hereinabove mentioned (extraterritorial countries), by citizens of the United States, or for offences against the public peace amounting to felony under the laws of the United States, may be tried before the Minister of the United States in the country where the offense is committed if allowed jurisdiction; and every such Minister may issue all manner of writs, to prevent the citizens of the United States from enlisting in the military or naval service of either of the said countries, to make war upon any foreign power with whom the United States are at peace, or in the service of one portion of the people against any other portion of the same people; and he may carry out this power by a resort to such force belonging to the United States, as may at the time be within his reach."

The Department has no evidence as to whether the

aviators

aviators in question have or have not enlisted in the Army of the Sultan of Morocco nor has it information as to the nature of their connection with the armed forces in Morocco. The Department, however, felt it to be its duty to call the attention of American citizens in Morocco to the laws of the United States designed to prevent and make unlawful the enlistment, in the United States or in countries where we enjoy extraterritorial privileges, of American citizens for service in foreign armed forces.

In reply to your inquiry as to the number of Americans engaged in military service in the Riff, you are informed that the Department has no official information upon this point but that the number is not believed to exceed 20.

I am, Madam,

Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:


JOSEPH C. GREW

Under Secretary.

WE:EC:NNB

DR

CR
NOV 5, 1925



AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

Madrid, Spain.

October 20, 1925

WE

Henry C. Carter, Esquire,

Western European Division,

Department of State, Washington.



My dear Carter:

The newspapers this morning, October 20th, publish a two-column letter to Primo de Rivera from former-Minister Francisco Cambo, probably the leading man of Cataluña, in which he argues very ably for the abandonment of the Moroccan Protectorate. This action, he believes, can now be taken without loss of prestige as a result of the recent victories at Alhucemas and Axdir.

With Señor Cambo's letter is published a comment by Primo de Rivera in which he praises the patriotism and wisdom of Señor Cambo but states that he cannot reply at once to a suggestion of such magnitude. He adds that as soon as possible he will communicate at length with Señor Cambo and will permit him to publish the letter.

Very sincerely yours,

Augustin W. Ferrin

AWF:T
800

AUGUSTIN WM. FERRIN
American Consul

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881.00/1163

NOV 7 1925

INDEX BUREAU
881.00
NOV 2 1925

BARCELONA 19.—"La Veu de Catalunya" publicará mañana la siguiente carta del ex ministro regionalista D. Francisco Cambó:

"Excemo. Sr. D. Miguel Primo de Rivera.

Mi querido amigo: Es ésta la primera vez que me dirijo a usted desde que el golpe de Estado de 13 de septiembre de 1923 le puso al frente de los destinos de España.

Retirado, desde mucho antes, de la política por incompatibilidad con el régimen derribado y separado del régimen instaurado por usted por motivos que, por notorios, es inútil recordar, mi abstención ha sido tan completa que no he querido interrumpirla (a pesar de las reiteradas solicitudes que se me han hecho) ni con un comentario relativo a los acontecimientos que se han producido en España últimamente.

Y dicho esto a modo de preámbulo, entro en materia.

Los recientes acontecimientos de Marruecos, por los cuales tantas felicitaciones ha recibido usted, vuelven a poner a España en situación favorable para resolver el problema que constituye la preocupación y la pesadilla de gobernantes y gobernados. Y como la ocasión es pasajera y decisiva, de tal suerte que la resolución que se tome ha de ejercer influencia evidente durante muchos años, entiendo que los que como yo abrigamos convicciones profundas y definidas no tenemos derecho a callar, ni el Gobierno lo tiene a impedir que exponamos nuestro criterio.

Por lo que a mí toca creo que mi abstención política (en la que persisto) no me despoja de los derechos ni me exonera de los deberes que todo ciudadano tiene, ante el momento excepcional en que se ventilan intereses permanentes del país, y confío en que usted hará respetar mi pensamiento.

Por una de aquellas aparentes paradojas que se dan en la vida pública, usted y yo sostuvimos que España tenía que limitar al grado mínimo su acción en Marruecos, y ambos hemos tenido que rectificar en los dos momentos en que mayor cantidad de hombres y dinero ha habido que enviar a Marruecos.

Y es que tanto usted como yo hubimos de rendirnos a la evidencia de que un Estado sin prestigio y un Ejército sin honor no pueden vivir. Y a ambos no nos consentía ese sentimiento hacer otra cosa; yo, después del desastre de Anual en 1922; usted, después del desastre del

Lau de 1924, que emprender una acción bélica ofensiva, culminada ahora con el desembarco de Alhucemas y la ocupación del poblado de Axdir. Ni para usted ni para mí podía ser obstáculo a este deber inexcusable nuestras particulares opiniones sobre el problema de Marruecos.

Pero una vez salvado el prestigio de España y el honor de su Ejército con el éxito indiscutible de esta reacción militar ofensiva, el Gobierno puede y debe examinar el problema con toda libertad de acción, y los gobernantes tienen el derecho y el deber de aplicar sus personales con-

viciones encaminadas a la solución definitiva del problema.

En uso de ese derecho y de ese deber me opuse yo en 1922 a la prosecución innecesaria de una acción bélica que no podía servir de otra cosa ni tener otro resultado que mantener a España comprometida en una empresa superior a sus fuerzas, y que, por razones en que usted y yo hemos coincidido, no pueden ofrecer al país ninguna compensación moral ni material.

Y fueron esas mismas razones las que me impelieron a sostener dentro del Gobierno, en 1922, que debía aprovecharse la favorable situación en que nos colocaron los éxitos militares de entonces para reducir nuestra acción al mínimo posible. Y entiendo que hoy el Gobierno que preside usted se encuentra en la misma situación ventajosa, y puede y debe poner término decoroso a la desventura que cayó sobre España el día que tuvo la desdichada idea de aceptar el encargo de establecer un protectorado en la zona más estéril y belicosa de Marruecos.

Encaminar nuestra acción a la reducción de fuerzas no sería hoy, como no lo era en 1922, una confesión de impotencia, sino la gallarda manifestación de que España inspira su política exterior no en sugerencias o intereses ajenos, sino en el principio del sagrado egoísmo nacional, norma de todos los pueblos libres y fuertes que en los últimos años hemos visto subordinaban a él toda otra consideración, incluyendo a potencias de primer orden, como Italia, Estados Unidos, Francia e Inglaterra.

Continuar en nuestra empresa de querer "pacificar" (eufemismo diplomático que encierra el concepto de dominar) la zona que los Tratados internacionales nos asignaron, significaría mantener y ampliar una acción militar indefinida, que acaso no pudiese sobrellevar el país, y que, de todas suertes, había de retrasar la restauración interior, que tanto necesita España, y la resolución de todos los problemas económicos y materiales que hoy la agobian, y cuya falta de resolución impide que alcancemos el rango internacional a que por la extensión de nuestro territorio y por nuestras condiciones tenemos derecho.

Continuar en Marruecos significaría persistir en el déficit del presupuesto (cuando los países, aislados por la gran guerra, han alcanzado ya o están próximos a alcanzar la nivelación efectiva) y renunciar a toda obra de reconstrucción interior.

Continuar en Marruecos significaría mantener en el pueblo la preocupación constante, con alternativas de depresión de ánimo y entusiasmo que le distrae de sus

intereses y del cuidado del solar peninsular, en cuyo fomento y atención podrá únicamente basarse la grandeza futura de España.

A un espíritu tan perspicaz como usted no le habrá pasado inadvertido que la política colonial está en baja. Son actualmente los países que no tienen ni siquiera

colonias los que más alta cotización internacional alcanzan, mientras que los territorios colonizados son motivo constante de preocupación y debilidad de los pueblos que los poseen, y especialmente los que pertenecen a la religión musulmana, movidos hoy por la formidable agitación islámica, que se acentúa de día en día.

Es su política internacional lo que impide a Francia engrandecerse, y es también la causa de que los Estados Unidos se muevan con ella intransigentes para el cobro de las deudas de guerra. Y ahí está el ejemplo de Inglaterra concediendo la autonomía a las Indias y aprestándose con la organización de su formidable partido político a conceder la independencia total.

Y ante el problema del Mosul, Inglaterra acepta el arbitraje de la Sociedad de Naciones, y casi todas sus fuerzas políticas apoyan la renuncia al Vilayeto de Mosul, y aun a la renuncia en breve de los mandatos concedidos por los Tratados internacionales sobre territorios de África.

Y cuando los Estados especialmente colonizadores se ven perturbados por causa de las colonias, sería fatal anacronismo que España, que sólo desastres y quebrantos cosechó en sus empresas coloniales, prosiguiera en empeños que la realidad habría de condenar inexorablemente.

Continuar en Marruecos significa abrir una indefinida acción militar, con todos los riesgos y sorpresas que tan bien conocemos.

No dominaremos jamás otro territorio que el que ocupen nuestros soldados. La animadversión (tan natural y lógica) de los naturales del país acechará en todo momento por debajo de las aparentes sumisiones la ocasión propicia para atacar implacablemente a nuestros soldados.

Lo ocurrido ahora en la zona francesa supongo que habrá servido para disipar las últimas ilusiones de los que creían que una acción hábil, persistente y generosa podría ganar la adhesión inalterable de las cabillas sometidas.

Allí se han visto cabillas que durante muchos años gozaron de la acción colonizadora de Lyautey, que al ser invitadas por Abd-el-Krim para atacar a los franceses no tardaron en decidirse más tiempo que el necesario para comprobar la existencia de una probabilidad de triunfo, y atacaron vigorosamente, sin tener en cuenta las escuelas creadas por los franceses, a las que iban sus propios hijos, ni las instituciones benéficas en que numerosas familias moras recibían socorros ni los médicos que les asistían en sus enfermedades, ni las carreteras, ni los ferrocarriles franceses que triplicaron el valor de las cosechas y de los ganados. Todo lo subordinaron al odio de raza y religión.

Y supongo que ni usted ni nadie creerá que nosotros podemos superar el admirable Protectorado francés ni que las cabillas nuestras sean de mejor pasta y más asecul-

bles y sugestionables que las francesas.

Las experiencias de la gran guerra, quebrantando por igual a vencidos y vencedores, han enseñado a los pueblos que toda movilización y aparato militar no trae más que ruinas para todos, pudiendo aplicarse

aquí la maldición de "pleitos tengas y los ganes".

Y es por eso por lo que hoy todos los pueblos no desean sino paz y todos los Gobiernos encaminan su afán a conseguir este anhelo unánime.

Los glorias guerreras no entusiasman ya a los pueblos que han visto la ruina y los estragos que dejan tras sí su brillo aparatoso y fugaz...

Sería lamentable que este éxito último no se aprovechara para salir dignamente de una empresa ruada, en la que España nunca debió entrar. Y si así ocurriera, se demostraría, una vez más, que la historia nuestra es una constante lucha entre la Providencia, empeñada en salvar a España, y los españoles en hundirla, y no pasaría mucho tiempo sin que estos éxitos de ahora, que tanto júbilo producen, fueran maldecidos por el pueblo y se juzgaran más funestos que los más tremendos desastres.

Al Gobierno siempre, y especialmente al que, como el actual, disfruta de excepcionales prerrogativas, corresponde la responsabilidad de conducir al país por caminos de salvación. No puede usted haber olvidado aquellos momentos de su juventud, en que unas explosiones patrióticas nos llevaron al desastre de 1898.

A que las naturales expansiones jubilosas de estos días no influyan en el Gobierno que usted preside, y no produzcan daños más graves, va encaminada esta carta, que públicamente le dirige su afectísimo amigo s. s., q. e. s. m.—Francisco de A. Cambó.

Barcelona, 16 octubre 1925."

Comentario del general Primo de Rivera

"Ha de merecer en seguida de mi parte amplia contestación la carta abierta con que me favorece el Sr. Cambó; pero al hacerse pública como luminoso documento orientador de la política de España en Marruecos, que estimo muy de agradecer, me corresponde defender a la Censura de la sospecha de que hubiera impedido la publicación de trabajo tan interesante.

La mentalidad del Sr. Cambó, tanto más robusta y clara cuanto más amplio es el cuadro que enfoca, sólo alguna vez ligeramente oscurecida por visiones locales minúsculas para su gran entendimiento, no puede tomarse largas vacaciones sin notorio daño para España, para la España grande que ama y respeta, a la que puede prestar tan grandes servicios.


Por eso el Directorio, que no puede confundir a los que tienen la política por arte de enredos y habilidades con los que la ennoblecen poniendo a su servicio estudios y preocupaciones ciudadanas, abre amplia puerta en ésta como en ocasiones semejantes a ideas que además son las adecuadas por su esencia y por su serena exposición para guiar al pueblo desde las columnas de la Prensa.

Tan pronto el tiempo disponible me lo permita yo especificaré en mi contestación al Sr. Cambó las ligeras diferencias en la apreciación del problema que de él me separan; y si él cree mi contestación digna de ser conocida, queda autorizado para darla a la publicidad, seguro de que me atemperaré en el fondo y en la forma a las exigencias de la Censura, que es tanto como decir a las que me dicte mi propio criterio, para evitar que mi pluma sea nunca causa de daño para mi patria."

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

Madrid, Spain.

October 16, 1925



Henry C. Carter, Esquire,
Index Bureau
RECEIVED Western European Division,
NO 6 1925


Dept. of State

Department of State, Washington.

My dear Carter:

The capture of Axdir and the evasion of Abdel-krim have so strengthened the Directorate that, barring unforeseen events, politics are likely to remain for the rest of this year "sin novedad", like the situation in the Protectorate.

As I have reported in a dispatch to the Department on October 6, Primo de Rivera has announced that the Directorate will continue at least until 1928, that henceforth he will be hard on his enemies, and that he is considering a decree to provide for the confiscation of the goods of persistent propagandists against the government. The enclosed cartoon shows how quickly this last statement was interpreted as a veiled menace to Romanones who, more devoted to his ducats than to the constitution, has retired



MAR 15 1926
FRT 127

October 16, 1925

retired to his threatened estates. The other relics of the old regime are still as the Sphinx and the Directorate's promise of permanence in power seems no idle boast.

The newspapers of the almost silenced opposition confine themselves to cartoons sufficiently "graciosas" to appeal to the censor's somewhat limited sense of humor and to debates on such superficially innocuous subjects as whether Felipe II, whose fourth centenary is to be celebrated in 1926, was or was not a tyrant. This last pastime may soon be denied them, however, since a Royal Order of October 14, 1925, forbids any interpretation of history which is not endorsed by the Directorate, though so far the Order applies only to professors and teachers in the public schools and universities.

I assume that you have received through the Consulate General or the Embassy the text of this Order; nevertheless I enclose a translation.

The periodicals of the "Left" comment very guardedly on the Order, but another enclosed cartoon shows how it appeals to them. The organs of the "Right"

hail

October 16, 1925

hail it with glee, the Debate of October 16, 1925, saying:

"AN ACHIEVEMENT OF THE DIRECTORATE. - The Royal Order published in the Gaceta of yesterday against the dissolvent propaganda exercised from the professorial chair is a just and necessary disposition, which undoubtedly has to be very well received.... The discredit in which the famous liberal principles of the XIX century have fallen and the greater peril in which the social order finds itself have obliged many countries to defend themselves from all subversive propaganda. The circular of De Monzie has been opportunely commented upon in these columns. As it treats of France, toward which our 'intellectuals' look with humid eyes of love, the case has greater interest as an example. Italy, establishing the state examination, and conceding to the Church the inspection of religious teaching is another case. Bavaria admits equal inspection in its schools, and, besides, the persons nominated by the Faculties of Theology must deserve the confidence of the bishop. And cannot be forgotten the recent case of Professor Scopes, condemned in the United States for teaching materialistic and anti-christian doctrines."


The purpose of the Directorate appears, from the Order and Primo de Rivera's recent interviews and statements, to be to suppress immediately any evidence of dissatisfaction and the means at its disposal are believed sufficient to accomplish this purpose, at least temporarily. Spain, therefore, probably will present for some time to come an aspect of tranquillity and content.

The

October 16, 1925

The main interest in Morocco now seems to be less in what Abd-el-krim may be planning in his mountain stronghold, Targust, former den of Raisuli, than in the action of the French Parliament when it meets at the end of this month. Despite the declarations of his over-enthusiastic supporters that the war is over, General Primo de Rivera is considering the spring campaign which, without full support from France, may bring unpleasant incidents.

Very sincerely yours,



AUGUSTIN WM. FERRIN
American Consul

AWF:T

800

Enclosures:

Two Cartoons

Translation of Royal Order.

ROYAL ORDER

To the Sub-Secretary of Public Instruction:

Excellentísimo Señor; It is the first duty of the State to attend to its own preservation, and in such sense every government which prides itself on fulfilling its mission must realize that in preference to any thing else, exacting for it the obligatory cooperation of all citizens, more especially that of public functionaries who, on accepting their charges, and enjoying the advantages which the State concedes to them, contract implicitly the duty of serving it loyally all the moments of their life.

To that honorable class of society belong the masters of the national schools, all professors of public instruction who because of the delicate mission which the State confides to them in handing over the education of the new generation must give a clear example of civic virtues within and without the halls and lead their students along the path of good and social order as much in the lessons which they teach as in the life which they themselves practice.

So the vast majority of the Spanish professorate
realizes;

realizes; but there are some, a few, who think that, their daily labor of teaching having ended, there is no relation between them and the State and that they have complete liberty to dedicate themselves, with a fatal example to their students, to propaganda (more or less covert) against the unity of the country, or against institutions which, like the family, property, religion, or the nation, constitute the base upon which the life of the nation rests.

Some, although very few, - but not for that less pernicious - even pretend to introduce surreptitiously their nefarious doctrines in the souls of their students, omitting certain essential facts in the exposition of geography or history or giving them ambiguous explanations, or asking questions of an equivocal significance, which bring to the souls of their students doubts and vacillations toward truths which ought to remain indelibly engraved in their souls; and these cases being among those provided for and punished in Article 170 of the law of September 9, 1857:

1. That by the rectors of the Universities as well as the inspectors of all centers of public instruction in their jurisdiction, and by the inspectors of primary education, care-

full

Royal Order, 3.

full watch should be made regarding the anti-social doctrines or teachings against the unity of the country which may be expounded by any professor or teacher within their classes, proceeding with the greatest rigor to the formation of the opportune action, with previous suspension of employment and half salary, if there are sufficient indications of guilt.

2. Inspectors of primary education in their visits will examine the textbooks and if they are not written in Spain, or contain doctrines or tendencies contrary to the unity of the country or against the bases which constitute the foundation of the social regime, they will withdraw them immediately and proceed to form an action against the master, suspending him from employment and half salary and giving account to your Excellency.

3. Likewise they will proceed to the closure of the private schools in which they have found books which expound the said doctrines or tendencies, giving account in the same manner to your Excellency.

4. Also they will examine the children on the instruction which they may have received in these matters and observing any fault or negligence they will proceed with the greatest rigor.

5. In the said visits the inspectors will inform themselves of the conduct which the masters observe and if it be of a pernicious example in the locality or if they prove that the master dedicates himself to propaganda which is anti-patriotic or destructive of the established social order, they will proceed to form the opportune action.

6. Inspectors will be personally responsible for the fulfillment of the foregoing dispositions and negligence on their part will be considered a very grave fault.

Royal Order, 4.

7. To equal responsibility will be held other academic authorities to which the inspection function belongs for faults of this class which the professors under them commit if they do not correct them as soon as they know them or do not give account to your Excellency immediately.

I communicate the Royal Order to your Excellency for your action. God keep your Excellency many years.

(Signed)

PRIMO DE RIVERA

Madrid, October 13, 1925.

CAMBIAN LOS TIEMPOS, por Bagaría

The times do not change.



¿por qué se quejan. Yo tampoco he tenido libertad de enseñanza y estoy tan a
don't know why they complain. (Prohibida la reproducción)
also have had liberty of instruction, and I
so pleased.

881.00

AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AGENCY AND CONSULATE
TANGIER, MOROCCO.



INDEX BUREAU
Rec'd

September 25th, 1925.

NOV 6 1925

Dept. of State

My Dear Mr. Castle:-

By now you will perhaps have received my No.26 dated September 24th, entitled "American Aviators in Morocco -- Press Propaganda and Politics." This I sent off in great haste and it went by Pouch from Madrid Embassy in lieu of by open mail from Tangier, as our next pouch is not due to leave here for another week. In the interval papers are arriving from Paris, "Chicago Tribune" and "New York Herald" showing the usual desperate efforts of our press always to create sensations, if not to embarrass the action of their own Government.

Personally I am highly delighted with the attitude of the Department, and with the means by which it has been made public, as the atmosphere has been clarified without any compromise, and we are now on record, in public opinion as being officially disassociated with the action of the American Aviators in Morocco.

To

William R. Castle, Jr. Esquire,
Chief of Division of Western
European Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

INDEX BUREAU
881.00/1725

NOV 6 1925

To begin with, no issue would have arisen if these aviators in their search for adventure, had come out to Morocco and quietly enlisted in the Army of the Sultan as soldiers of fortune, but it is obvious that this kind of reticence did not appeal to their sense of vanity and perhaps to their desire for a kind of cheap melodramatic publicity in their own country and elsewhere, over an enterprise involving minimum risks, fighting ^{against} half naked tribesmen without equipment for aerial defence. I felt all along that if anybody wanted to help, hospitals and medical supplies and nurses and Doctors would have been our best form of expression, rather than bombs.

What disturbed me however was the speech of Painlevé made before them prior to their departure for Morocco, in which he is reported to have said:-

"No doubt the action of the new volunteers cannot have the same import as the entry of the United States into the world war, but it will have a profound effect upon the world. Western civilization is in contention with the civilization of Islam, which seeks to throw back the advance of our culture. We have no thoughts of revenge but the white man alone can guide this planet on the march of progress, and the defence of this cause is entrusted to us".

(Here Painlevé forgets the Senegalese negroes comprising the major portion of the army putting through the white man's plan in Morocco).

You have undoubtedly seen this address,—affecting the character of an emotional frenzy,—but in reality designed to carry a certain political significance throughout the Islamic world, and certainly we were not expected to be such dullards as not to be able to read between the lines. If ministerial statements of this character can be


put

put over on us, we would certainly be asleep at the switch.

So much for this phase of the question. But what about another point almost equally as vital —the aerial bombing of undefended centers of population— It appears to me that there was once a Hague or a Geneva Convention, or some kind of an obligation prohibiting warfare of this character, and I indistinctly recall an outpouring of wrath and vituperation during the last war against the violation of these international moral ordinances. The point I put up to you here is this. This practice that is going on today in Morocco of bombarding straw huts will have its reaction, some time at ^a later date, and the precedents created ^{here} will one day be quoted against France. In this regard it was all the more important (since our aviators were to be sent out on expeditions of this character, after the speech of Mr. Painlevé,) and consequently, not to have made some kind of a protest would have been a fatal error.

I realized that any publicity from me, after enlistment might have produced a complication which would have impaired the usefulness of the purpose it was designed to serve, but I was still disturbed over the situation, feeling that some action should have been taken, and in this regard, I found the leakage, whether intentional or not, a distinct relief, and I consider that the matter has been very skilfully handled in Washington.

Very sincerely yours

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Raymond B. Vance". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal flourish extending from the bottom of the name.

No. 154


AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Madrid, Spain.

October 24, 1925



SUBJECT: SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY AND MOROCCO -
PRIMO de RIVERA - CAMBO CORRESPONDENCE



WASHINGTON.

Sir:


I have the honor to transmit herewith translated copies of an important open letter from former Finance Minister Cambo of Barcelona on the subject of Morocco and a reply thereto by General Primo de Rivera which have excited the greatest possible attention in Spain.

Francisco Cambo, besides having been Finance Minister of Spain and an influential factor in two cabinets, is perhaps the leading man in Cataluña with especially high standing in commercial and financial circles.

In his letter to Primo de Rivera Sr. Cambo advocates, with interesting arguments the abandonment of the Moroccan Protectorate which, he believes, can be accomplished now without loss of prestige as a result of the Alhucemas victories.

Primo de Rivera, while accepting some of Sr. Cambo's arguments, replies that the international obligations of Spain do not permit abandonment but rather require continuation, in company with France, of the castigation of

Abd-el-krim



FILED
NOV 18 1925

NOV 13 1925

Abd-el-krim and the forcible pacification of the Protectorate which, he estimates, will take two years.

Some disappointment is shown by the Madrid press commenting on the Director's negative attitude, especially as in his commentary which accompanied the publication of Sr. Cambo's letter he praised the patriotism and wisdom of the writer and said: "Our differences of opinion are slight", which led to an expectation that the formal reply might forecast an arrangement with France and the Moors to withdraw from the Riff.

Many believe, however, that the correspondence between Sr. Cambo and General Primo de Rivera was prearranged, as a "ballon d'essai," and that the Director is awaiting the reaction of France and of the Spanish public. It would be obviously undiplomatic to talk officially of withdrawal, without French consent, in the moment in which Abd-el-krim is reported to be renewing his attack on the French lines, and unwise from the standpoint of Spain's military interests since such an announcement, without previous agreement with Abd-el-krim, would mean only increased Moorish hostility, like that which accompanied the withdrawal from Xauen last year.

It

It is not believed, therefore, that the Director's reply to Sr. Cambo closes the incident, nor that the prediction of another two years of active military operations in Morocco is exclusive of a possible early change of policy.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Augustin W. Ferrin

AUGUSTIN WM. FERRIN
American Consul.

AWF:T

File No. 800

Enclosures:

Translations of Sr. Cambo's letter
and General Primo de Rivera's.

LETTER FROM FRANCISCO DE A. CAMBO TO

GENERAL PRIMO DE RIVERA

(Dated October 16, 1925, published in El Debate and other morning newspapers in Madrid, Spain, on October 20, 1925.)

Excelentísimo Señor don Miguel Primo de Rivera:

My dear friend: This is the first time that I have directed myself to you since the coup d'etat of September 13, 1923, placed you at the forefront of the destinies of Spain.

Withdrawn since many years from politics through incompatibility with the deposed regime and separated from the regime inaugurated by you through motives, which, though notorious, it is useless to recall, my abstencion has been so complete that I have not wished to interrupt it (inspite of the reiterated solicitations which have been made me) nor with a comment relative to the events which have occurred in Spain recently.

This is said by way of a preamble; I plunge into the subject.

The recent events in Morocco, for which you have received so many felicitations, once more place Spain in a situation favorable for resolving the problem which constitutes the preoccupation and the nightmare of governing and governed. And since the occasion is transitory and decisive, of such a kind that the resolution which is taken has to exercise influence

during

during many years, believing that those who, as I, cherish profound and definite convictions do not have the right to be silent nor has the government the right to obstruct the exposition of our criticism.

As for that which touches me, I believe that my political retirement (in which I persist) does not deprive me of the rights nor absolve me of the duties which every citizen has in that exceptional moment in which the permanent interests of the country are aired, and I trust that you will have respect for my opinions.

Through one of those apparent paradoxes which exhibit themselves in public life, you and I maintained that Spain had to limit to the minimum her action in Morocco, and both of us have had to correct (our estimates) in the two events in which she has had to send to Morocco the greatest quantity of men and money.

You as well as I had to surrender ourselves to the evidence that a State without prestige and an Army without honor cannot endure. To both that feeling did not permit us to do any other thing - I, after the disaster of Annual in 1922, you, after the disaster of Lau in 1924 - but to undertake an offensive war-like action, which has culminated now with the disembarking at Alhucemas and the occupation of the village of Axdir. Neither for you nor for me could our private opinions concerning the problem of Morocco be an obstacle to this inexcusable duty.

However,

However, the prestige of Spain and the honor of her Army once saved by the unquestionable outcome of this military offensive, the Government can and should examine the problem with all liberty of action, and the governors have the right and the duty to apply their personal convictions guided towards a definitive solution of the problem.

In the exercise of that right and of that duty, I opposed in 1922 the unnecessary prosecution of a belligerent action which could not serve any other thing nor have any other result than to maintain Spain bound in an undertaking superior to her forces and which, through reasons in which you and I have agreed, cannot offer to the country any compensation, either moral or material.

And those were the same reasons which, maintained within the Government in 1922, demand that the favorable situation in which we find ourselves should be improved above all else for reducing our action to the least possible minimum. Believing that today the Government over which you preside finds itself in the same advantageous situation, it can and should put a becoming end to the misadventure which befell Spain the day she had the unfortunate idea of accepting the obligation of establishing a protectorate in the most steril and belligerent Moroccan zone.

To lead

To lead our action toward the reduction of our forces would not be today, as it would have been in 1922, a confession of impotence, but a generous manifestation that Spain bases her foreign policy not on foreign suggestions or interests but on the principle of sacred national egotism, the standard of all the free and strong people who in the last years, as we have seen, subordinate to it all other considerations, including those powers of the first order, such as Italy, the United States, France, and England.

To continue in our undertaking of desiring to "pacify" (a diplomatic euphemism which conceals the concept of dominating) the zone which the international treaties assigned to us, would mean to maintain and to develop an indefinite military action which perhaps the country could not endure and which, in all manner, had to delay the interior restoration which Spain needs so much and the solution of all the problems, economic and material, which today oppress her, the lack of solution of which prevents our attaining the international rank to which the extension of our territory and our conditions entitle us.

To continue in Morocco would mean to persist in the deficit in the state budget (when the countries destroyed by the great war have already attained or are near to attaining the effective balancing) and to renounce all work of interior reconstruction.

To continue

To continue in Morocco would mean to maintain in the people that constant preoccupation, with alternatives of depression of spirit and enthusiasm, which distracts the people from its interests and its cares of the solar peninsula in the development of which alone can be founded the future greatness of Spain.

To a spirit as perspicacious as you, it will not have passed unnoticed that colonial politics are in an unfortunate plight. The countries which have very few colonies are the ones which attain the highest international quotation, while the colonized territories are a constant motive for preoccupation and weakness for those people who possess them, and especially those which belong to the musulman religion, moved now by a formidable Islamic agitation, which increases from day to day.

It is her international politics which impedes France in improving herself and it is also the cause why the United States shows herself so irreconcilable with her in the collection of the war debts. And there is the example of England conceding autonomy to India and preparing herself with the organization of its formidable political party to concede total independence.

And in the problem of Mossul, England accepted the arbitration of the League of Nations and almost all her political forces favor the renunciation of the province of
Mossul

Mossul and even the renouncing of the mandates conceded by the International Treaties over the African territories.

When States, which are colonizers par excellence, see themselves embarrassed because of their colonies, it would be a fatal anachronism for Spain, who has reaped only disasters and calamities from her colonial enterprises, to persevere in desires which reality would have to condemn inexorably.

To continue in Morocco means to open an indefinite military action, with all the risks and surprises which we already know so well.

We will never dominate other territory than that which our soldiers occupy. The animadversion (so natural and logical) of the natives of the country will lie in wait every moment, despite the apparent submission, for the appropriate occasion to attack implacably our soldiers.

The present occurrences in the French zone I suppose will have served to dissipate the last illusions of those who believe that an able, persistent, and generous action will be able to gain the unswerving adherence of the subdued tribes.

There have been seen tribes who during many years enjoyed the colonial administration of Lyautey, on being invited by Abd-el-krim to attack the French, did not delay in making up their minds longer than was necessary to verify the existence of a probability of triumph and they attacked vigorously, without taking into account

the

the schools created by the French, to which their own sons went, nor the beneficent institutions in which numerous Moroccan families receive aid, nor the doctors who help them in their sickness, nor the roads, nor the French railroads which triple the value of the crops and the cattle. They subordinated all to the hate of race and religion.

I suppose that neither you nor anyone will believe that we can surpass the admirable French protectorate, nor that our tribes are of better stuff and more amenable and more suggestible than the French.

The experiences of the great war, bankrupting equally the victors and the vanquished, has taught people that all mobilization and military show brings only ruin for all, the ill-saying that "nobody wins a lawsuit" being applicable here.

It is for that reason that today all people desire only peace and all governments are directing their interests toward pursuing this unanimous desire.

The glories of war do not arouse enthusiasm in people who have seen the ruin and ravages which their showy and fleeting brilliance leave behind them.

It would be lamentable if this recent accomplishment were not improved to put a dignified end to an

stupid

stupid undertaking in which Spain never should have entered. And if such should occur, it would demonstrate once more that our history is a constant fight between Providence, pledged to save Spain, and the Spaniards in ruining her, and not much time would pass before these present accomplishments, which produce such jubilation, would be cursed by the people and judged more dismal than the more tremendous disasters.

To the Government always, and especially to that which, as the present government, profits by such exceptional prerogatives, belongs the responsibility of leading the country along the road of salvation. You cannot have forgotten those moments of your youth in which some patriotic explosions carried us to the disaster of 1898.

To the end that the natural jubilant expansions of these days may not influence the Government over which you preside, and may not produce more grave damage, is directed this letter which, publicly, your affectionate friend sends you.

(Signed) FRANCISCO de A. CAMBO

LETTER FROM GENERAL PRIMO DE RIVERA

IN ANSWER TO ONE RECEIVED

FROM SEÑOR FRANCISCO CAMBO

(Dated October 21, 1925, published in El Debate and other morning papers of Madrid, Spain, on October 23, 1925.)

Excelentísimo Señor don Francisco de A. Cambo:

My distinguished friend: I fulfill my engagement to reply promptly to your letter of the 16th, leaving aside all comment directed to those lynx-eyed folk who, incapable of seeing things in the right light, already conjure up political schemes preparatory to alliance or war with all the pleasures of fantasy.

I am going to answer very succinctly for the sake of clarity and brevity, and because I wish to avoid comparisons, which would be quite disadvantageous to me, in respect to the literary value of our two letters.

First: I repeat that you, having made public your opinion upon a question so important as that of Morocco, from a detached point of view, lend to the country a signal service.

Second: Although you do not confound, as others, the operations of Lau (June to September of 1924) and those of aid, liberation, and the doubling of
garrisons

garrisons (September to December of the same year), I find the censure of the disaster, which is applicable to the former)although they were certainly a grave military calamity), exaggerated. The latter operations (the doubling) I will always consider the most politic, the most difficult, and the best executed (in this I took a minimum part) which have been known since we commenced military operations in Morocco.

Third: You judge that the circumstances in which you demanded the suspension of operations in the year 1922 are the same as those at the present time, but I do not believe so; and besides, I held then that that suspension was premature and prejudicial, without sufficiently punishing nor putting an end to the job, and for that reason the sickness was able to return soon and acutely. It was necessary then to arrive at the heart (Axdir) or at least to the place most afflicted by the disaster (Anual). Now we have arrived at the first, and perhaps we should arrive quickly at the second; I am not sure that the enemy is entirely dead, but that he still retains a little force which an able move could extinguish entirely. The tribe of Metalza alone has handed over to us already 650 guns which are in our parks in Melilla, together with as many others taken from the enemy at Alhucemas and Kudia Tahar.

Fourth: I should agree that the diplomatic move that entangled us in the Moroccan undertaking
was

was neither fortunate nor wise, especially in leaving Tangier , from which so many difficulties have come, outside of the rule of the Protectorate. But such was the intent and I do the men who agreed to those pacts the justice of affirming that they were moved by patriotism or by patriotic zeal, which sometimes takes the place of patriotism. It might have been modified - and I predicted as much - during the years of the great war, but later, no, for all the powers have today justified the fear of disturbing the status quo of the Mediterranean, which in 1917 was, as everything else, in the balance.

If the powers principally interested cannot agree on rectifications in the treaties, how and where do you see, my good friend, the end of this embroglio?

There is still more. Not even can the Riffs or the Yebalas agree among themselves (I know this from good authority); if they should see us withdrawing to places where our sovereignty is secure, they would fight us fiercely and later these places would be the object of their attacks; and as the zones of the Protectorate, marked by the amendment to the canon of 1860, are not defended today, not even from the attack of guns, and they have artillery, life in the towns of Ceuta and Melilla would be impossible and the liberty of allowing the Moors or their friends to establish themselves in districts such as that of Alhucemas, exceedingly

ceedingly dangerous. Therefore the occupation of that place, which was so fortunately accomplished on September 8, could not be deferred, not even for weeks.

Fifth: How could the hinterland of sovereignty be increased in these places? You will find in the archives of the Ministry of State how much the Directorate has done in this matter (and how fruitless have been its efforts) in searching anxiously for a peaceful and economic solution of the problem for the country.

Sixth. I would entirely agree now, and all my life (including the time when I was witnessing the problems of Cuba and the Philippines) that all imperialistic colonization which does not have as its end the gaining of the affection, culture, and the commerce of other people is ruinous. It is sufficient to look superficially at the history of the world to realize the moral that the weight of colonies destroyed the greatest of ancient peoples and will destroy some new nations. But not Spain, for already proof of this has been produced, for our race and our people surpass all others in resistance and life. But I do not believe that any Spaniard thinks that the 20,000 square kilometers of arid ground of the Riffs and the Yebalans are a future colony. It is in another light that one should consider the value of the coastal zone of northern Morocco

Morocco which represents our Protectorate.

Seventh: I should agree also that the native of Morocco never will be willing to take a lower status than our own and that the greatest victory of a people is that of wiping out war.

Eighth: Neither has the Directorate been held back, I can assure you, in the search for and adoption of solutions by the fear of foreign opinion, inasmuch as the Directorate reclaimed the government to govern and gives ear to opinions only to understand, listening attentively and calmly when the opinion is calmly, patriotically, and disinterestedly expressed; but a decision taken, it executes it with resolution and firmness, because, however modest we may be, we do not consider ourselves less capable nor, of course, less well-intentioned, than anyone who has exercised power in or out of Spain. Besides, we daily take the pulse of true and dispassionate opinion and even now it may be called unanimous because, for me, the two or three thousand disgruntled people (perhaps I exaggerate the number), who wander around here with dispeptic countenances, do not exist.

Ninth: After all that has been sketched in the foregoing, you will perhaps be on the point of believing that I have not found a solution for the very grave Moroccan problem. If that were so I should not write to you from the office of the Presidency of the Government.

Government. I have found it, although it was not easy. It is the following:

a). To continue, united with France, the program of dominating and disarming the natives with firmness but with prudence, for any reversal would set us back much in the way gained in September and October.

b). To increase the search for political connivings and contraband, making it difficult for Abdel-krim to receive money, personal direction and aid from outside.

c). Constant political action, more of segregation of the rebels than of attraction to us, disarming when possible.

d). The "Majzeniana" organization of the country and to ally to ourselves, through material interests, the "caides" whom we designate, leaving them only with arms sufficient to impose their authority, so that they will count for little in case of rebellion, which is quite probable.

e). A policy of interlocking interests between the Spaniards and the loyal natives, the "Tercio" and the voluntaries, until reaching the suppression of all peninsular expeditionary unity.

All this can be realized in my judgment, progressively, in a couple of years, in which the problem should

be

be simpler and less expensive each month than the previous (barring all military failure and change of situation). But it is much time? So it seems to me also. But it is dear? Quite evidently. A matter costing now some 25 to 30 millions a month, it will be reduced reaching only 10 to 12 millions. It is the high price, but the minimum, of the brace with which the country has to bind the hernia of Morocco; but be assured that the Directorate or whatever government follows us will find it every day less expensive. I could even give some hope in this matter now; but I do not wish to feed the people with illusions but with stern realities.

Tenth and last: Someone will say that if it is not convenient now for the powers interested to review this matter, no one can oblige us to carry it out against our own judgment and convenience. I invite reflection upon what this would represent and what "here stand I" would mean - (for the consequences) of which few would accept responsibility.

Bad business, in truth, this of Morocco, my friend. It is the business of all of us to better it as much as possible, as a weight which historic fate placed upon the men of the noble Spain of today, which never responded ficklely, and which perhaps would not be so heavy if some or others would stop arousing feelings, permitting the whole attention and whole
national

national energy to concentrate on this problem, with the least damage to the vital and cultural forces, economy and progress, which are irreplaceable and justified. Not so are other fictions of inspiring passion or pride in those to whom you, as in the matter of Morocco, on intervening on so lofty a level, give such a patriotic example of prudence and citizenship, showing yourself far above some who, believing they interpret it, without doubt lacking in comprehension, disfigure the high thought of one who always placed above everything his patriotism.

I was always grateful for having cultivated your friendship, which increases now that you confirm it by giving an exposition of your views which have so greatly illumined the mind of your affectionate friend, who shakes your hand.

(Signed) MIGUEL PRIMO de RIVERA

El Debate, Madrid, Spain

Una carta de Cambó sobre Marruecos

October 20, 1925

Breve réplica de Primo de Rivera

El ex ministro señor Cambó ha dirigido al general Primo de Rivera la siguiente carta:

«Excelentísimo señor don Miguel Primo de Rivera.

Mi querido amigo: Es esta la primera vez que me dirijo a usted desde que el golpe de Estado de 13 de septiembre de 1923 le puso al frente de los destinos de España.

Retirado desde mucho antes de la política por incompatibilidad con el régimen derribado y separado del régimen instaurado por usted por motivos que, por notorios, es inútil recordar, mi abstención ha sido tan completa que no he querido interrumpirla (a pesar de las reiteradas sollicitaciones que se me han hecho) ni con un comentario relativo a los acontecimientos que se han producido en España últimamente.

Y dicho esto a modo de preámbulo, entro en materia.

Los recientes acontecimientos de Marruecos, por los cuales tantas felicitaciones ha recibido usted, vuelven a poner a España en situación favorable para resolver el problema que constituye la preocupación y la pesadilla de gobernantes y gobernados. Y como la ocasión es pasajera y decisiva, de tal suerte que la resolución que se tome ha de ejercer influencia evidente durante muchos años, entiendo que los que como yo abrigamos convicciones profundas y definidas no tenemos derecho a callar, ni el Gobierno lo tiene a impedir que exponamos nuestro criterio.

Por lo que a mí toca creo que mi abstención política (en la que persisto) no me despoja de los derechos ni me exonera de los deberes que todo ciudadano ante el momento excepcional en que se ventilan intereses permanentes del país, y confío en que usted hará respetar mi pensamiento.

Por una de aquellas aparentes paradojas que se dan en la vida pública, usted y yo sostuvimos que España tenía que limitar al grado mínimo su acción en Marruecos, y ambos hemos tenido que rectificar en los dos momentos en que mayor cantidad de hombres y dinero ha habido que enviar a Marruecos.

Y es que tanto usted como yo hubimos de rendirnos a la evidencia de que un Estado sin prestigio y un Ejército sin honor no pueden vivir. Y a ambos no nos consentía ese sentimiento hacer otra cosa. Yo, después del desastre de Annual en el año 1922; usted, después del desastre de Lala de 1924, que emprender una acción bélica ofensiva, culminada ahora con el desembarco de Alhucemas y la ocupación del poblado de Axdir. Ni para usted ni para mí podía ser obstáculo a este deber inexcusable nuestras particulares opiniones sobre el problema de Marruecos.

Pero una vez salvado el prestigio de España y el honor de su Ejército con el éxito indiscutible de esta reacción militar ofensiva, el Gobierno puede y debe examinar el problema con toda libertad de acción, y los gobernantes tienen el derecho y el deber de aplicar sus personales convicciones encaminadas a la solución definitiva del problema.

En uso de ese derecho y de ese deber me opuse yo en 1922 a la prosecución in-

inexcusable nuestras particulares opinio-
nes sobre el problema de Marruecos.

Pero una vez salvado el prestigio de España y el honor de su Ejército con el éxito indiscutible de esta reacción militar ofensiva, el Gobierno puede y debe examinar el problema con toda libertad de acción, y los gobernantes tienen el derecho y el deber de aplicar sus personales convicciones encaminadas a la solución definitiva del problema.

En uso de ese derecho y de ese deber me opuse yo en 1922 a la prosecución innecesaria de una acción bélica que no podía servir de otra cosa ni tener otro resultado que mantener a España comprometida en una empresa superior a sus fuerzas, y que, por razones en que usted y yo hemos coincidido, no pueden ofrecer al país ninguna compensación moral ni material.

Y fueron esas mismas razones las que que impelieron a sostener dentro del Gobierno, en 1922, que debía aprovecharse la favorable situación en que nos colocaron los éxitos militares de entonces para reducir nuestra acción al mínimo posible. Y entiendo que hoy el Gobierno que preside usted se encuentra en la misma situación ventajosa, y puede y debe poner término decoroso a la desventura que cayó sobre España el día que tuvo la desdichada idea de aceptar el encargo de establecer un protectorado en la zona más estéril y belicosa de Marruecos.

Encaminar nuestra acción a la reducción de fuerzas no sería hoy, como no lo era en 1922, una confesión de impotencia, sino la gallarda manifestación de que España inspira su política exterior no en sugerencias o intereses ajenos, sino en el principio del sagrado egoísmo nacional, norma de todos los pueblos libres y fuertes, que en los últimos años hemos visto subordinaban a él toda otra consideración, incluyendo a potencias de primer orden, como Italia, Estados Unidos, Francia e Inglaterra.

Continuar en nuestra empresa de querer «pacificar» (eufemismo diplomático que encierra el concepto de dominar) la zona que los Tratados internacionales nos asignaron, significaría mantener y ampliar una acción militar indefinida, que acaso no pudiese sobrellevar el país y que, de todas suertes, había de retrasar la restauración interior que tanto necesita España y la resolución de todos los problemas económicos y materiales que hoy la agobian y cuya falta de resolución impide que alcancemos el rango internacional a que por la extensión de nuestro territorio y por nuestras condiciones tenemos derecho.

Continuar en Marruecos significaría persistir en el déficit del presupuesto (cuando los países, asolados por la gran guerra, han alcanzado ya o están próximos a alcanzar la nivelación efectiva) y renunciar a toda obra de reconstrucción interior.

Continuar en Marruecos significaría mantener en el pueblo la preocupación constante, con alternativas de depresión de ánimo y entusiasmo que le distrae de sus intereses y del cuidado del solar peninsular, en cuyo fomento y atención podrá únicamente basarse la grandeza futura de España.

A un espíritu tan perspicaz como usted no le habrá pasado inadvertido que la política colonial está en baja. Son actualmente los países que no tienen ni siquiera colonias los que más alta cotización internacional alcanzan, mientras que los territorios colonizados son motivo constante de preocupaciones y debilidad de los pueblos que los poseen, y especialmente los que pertenecen a la religión musulmana, movidos hoy por la formidable agitación islámica, que se acentúa de día en día.

Es su política internacional lo que impide a Francia engrandecerse, y es también la causa de que los Estados Unidos se mues-

TE

EGIATA, 7. Teléfonos 365 M. y 398 M.

El Debate, Madrid, Spain

El presidente contesta a la carta de Cambó.

October 23, 1925.

Ni el abandono sin contar con las potencias ni el repliegue son posibles

Se gestionó, sin éxito, el aumento del «hinterland» de soberanía de las plazas

Problema para dos años, haciéndolo más simple y económico cada mes

Unión con Francia.—Desarme.—Supresión del contrabando.—Organización majzeniana

SOLO TERCIO E INDIGENAS

En la Presidencia facilitaron ayer la contestación del presidente al señor Cambó, en carta que dice:

«Madrid, 21-10-25.

Excelentísimo señor don Francisco de A. Cambó.

Mi distinguido amigo: Cumplo mi ofrecimiento de contestar pronto su carta del 16, dejando a un lado todo comentario dedicado a los linceos, que, incapaces de ver las cosas a luz diáfana, ya conjeturan sobre maniobras políticas preparatorias de alianza o lucha, que para todos los gustos da la fantasía.

UN SERVICIO A LA PATRIA

Y voy a contestar muy en síntesis, en gracia a la claridad y brevedad, y porque quiero evitar comparaciones, que desventajosas para mí serían, respecto al valor literario de nuestras dos cartas:

Primero. Reitero que usted, haciendo público su juicio sobre cuestión tan importante como la de Marruecos, desde punto de vista elevado, presta un señalado servicio al país.

Segundo. Aunque usted no confunde, como otros, las operaciones del Lau (junio a septiembre del 24) y las de socorro, liberación y repliegue de guarniciones (septiembre a diciembre del mismo año), encuentro exagerada la calificación de desastre que a las primeras aplica, aunque fueron ciertamente un grave contratiempo militar. Las segundas (el repliegue) las tendré siempre por la operación más política, más difícil y mejor ejecutada (en esto tomé mínima parte) que se ha conocido desde que en Marruecos actuamos militarmente.

Tercero. Si usted juzga que las circunstancias en que usted demandó la suspensión de operaciones el año 22 son iguales a las de ahora, yo no lo creo así, y además, tuvo entonces por prematura y perjudicial aquella suspensión, sin castigo suficiente ni remate de la obra, por lo que ha podido volver tan pronto y tan agudamente el recrudecimiento de la enfermedad. Falta entonces llegar al corazón (Axdir) o siquiera al lugar más dolorido del desastre (Anual). Ahora hemos llegado al primero y acaso lleguemos pronto al segundo, y aun así no estoy cierto de que lá fiera muera del todo, pero sí de que quedará con pocos bríos, que una política hábil podrá apagar totalmente. Sólo la cabila de Metalza nos ha entregado ya 650 fusiles, que están en nuestros parques de Melilla, unidos a otros tantos tomados al ene-

recrudescimiento de la enfermedad. Faltó entonces llegar al corazón (Axdir) o siquiera al lugar más dolorido del desastre (Anual). Ahora hemos llegado al primero y acaso lleguemos pronto al segundo, y aun así no estoy cierto de que la fiera muera del todo, pero sí de que quedará con pocos bríos, que una política hábil podrá apagar totalmente. Sólo la cabila de Metalza nos ha entregado ya 650 fusiles, que están en nuestros parques de Melilla, unidos a otros tantos tomados al enemigo en Alhucemas y Kudia Tahar.

EL REPLIEGUE, IMPOSIBLE

Cuarto. Conforme en que no fué venturoso ni sagaz el éxito diplomático que nos enredó en la empresa de Marruecos, máxime dejando a Tánger, de donde tantas dificultades habían de venir, fuera del régimen de Protectorado. Pero tal era el ambiente, y hago a los hombres que aquellos pactos concertaron la justicia de afirmar que les movió el patriotismo o la pasión patriótica, que en ocasiones lo sustituye. Ello pudo tener enmienda—y bien la prediqué—los años de la gran guerra, pero luego no, porque todas las potencias tienen hoy justificado temor a comulicar el *statu quo* del Mediterráneo, que el 17 estaba, como todo, en pleno saldo.

Y si las potencias principalmente interesadas no se avienen a rectificar los tratados, ¿cómo y por dónde ve usted, mi buen amigo, la salida de este *embroglio*?

Y aún hay más. Que tampoco se avienen los rifeños y yebalas (lo sé de buena tinta); que si nos vieran replegarnos hacia las plazas de soberanía nos hostilizarían fieramente, y luego las harían objeto de sus ataques; y como las zonas de Protectorado, marcadas por el alcance de cañón del año 60, no defienden hoy ni del tiro de fusil siquiera y ellos tienen artillería, la vida en las plazas de Ceuta y Melilla sería imposible, y la libertad de instalarse los moros o sus amigos en bahías como la de Alhucemas, peligrosísima. Por esto no se podía diferir ni semanas el ocupar ésta, como tan afortunadamente se hizo el 8 de septiembre.

GESTION INFRUCTUOSA

Quinto. ¿Qué se podía aumentar el *hinterland* de soberanía de estas plazas? Usted encontrará en los archivos del ministerio de Estado cuánto y cuán infructuosamente ha hecho el Directorio en este sentido, anheloso de buscar al problema una solución tranquilizadora y económica para el país.

Sexto. Absolutamente conforme ahora y de toda mi vida (incluso cuando viví los problemas de Cuba y Filipinas) en que toda colonización imperialista que no sea la de ganar el afecto, la cultura y el mercado de otros pueblos es ruinosa. Basta conocer someramente la Historia Universal para recoger la enseñanza de que el peso de las colonias hundió a los más grandes pueblos antiguos y hundirá a algunos nuevos. No a España, que ya posó por la prueba; porque nuestra raza y nuestro pueblo superan a todos en resistencia y vida. Pero no creo que ningún español piense que los 20.000 kilómetros cuadrados de terrenos áridos del Rif y de Yebala sean una futura colonia. Es otro el concepto en que se debe considerar el valor de la faja costera del Norte de Marruecos que representa nuestro Protectorado.

Séptimo. También conforme en que jamás el indígena de Marruecos se nos sometera de grado y en que la mejor victoria de un pueblo es la que evita una guerra.

Octavo. Tampoco cohibe al Directorio, puedo asegurárselo a usted, en la busca e implantación de soluciones, el temor de las apreciaciones ajenas, puesto que reclamó el Gobierno para gobernar y sólo da audiencia a la opinión para aprender, es-

881.00

A STATEMENT.



The Emergency Foreign Policy Conference believes that the United States government should at once tender its friendly offices as mediator in an effort to terminate the war now waging between the Riffians and European powers in North Africa."

The United States materially assisted by its mediation in bringing to a close the war between Japan and Russia. In the World War the United States early endeavored to find a common ground of agreement between the belligerents; if more vigorously pushed these efforts might have brought the war to a close prior to the entrance of the United States at a time and on terms which would have greatly benefited the entire world, the victors as well as the vanquished.

The Riffian leaders have recently indicated a desire to reach a ground of common agreement with the powers with whom they are at war. The greatest obstacles to such an agreement appear to lie in the prestige of nations and of political parties within nations. The real interests of the European peoples directly involved as of the Riffians favor an immediate settlement based on recognition of those principles of self-determination of peoples and international co-operation for which the World War was ostensibly fought and for which the Emergency Foreign Policy Conference now stands.

The fact that the Riff is not a great power, but is inhabited by a sparse independence-loving population never entirely dominated by any European nation raises no less an issue of principle. International justice applies equally to small countries as to great, as the world's attitude toward Belgium proves. The World War should also have demonstrated sufficiently that a small war in a remote section of the earth may spread quickly and unexpectedly. The war in North Africa has already aroused the jealousies and ambitions of other powers than those at first directly involved. The United States cannot afford to omit any effort, apart even from considerations of humanity and justice, to put out the flame before it spreads, if only from the point of view of American self-interest and America's stake in European stability and prosperity.

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT.

Department of State

Washington,

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

November 9, 1925.

APPROVED
RECEIVED

NOV 9 1925 12 40

AMEMBASSY

PARIS (FRANCE)

*415.
For your information.*

A news story has appeared in this country purporting to emanate from Lieutenant Colonel Charles Kerwood and the NEW YORK HERALD-TRIBUNE correspondent in Paris to the effect that you had sent to the American aviators in Morocco a message saying that if you were only young enough you would be delighted to join them in the work they were doing.

~~The Department would appreciate your comments as to the accuracy of this report~~

Kearney

WE:EC:NNB

WE: 881.00 ~~Kearney, Herbert~~

DISTRIBUTED

NOV 6 1925
NOV 9 1925

Enciphered by *PT*

Sent by operator *M.*, 19

881.00/11672

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

~~this cable~~
~~was received~~
in the Depart-Paris.

McL

Index Bureau
RECEIVED

NOV 10 1925

Dep't. of State


FROM
ments Confiden-
tial Code

Dated November 10, 1925.

It should be
closely para-
phrased before
being communica-
ted to anyone

Received 11.55 A. M.

Secretary of State,
Washington.




557, November 10, 2 P. M.

I sent neither the message you quote in your 415,
November 9, 1 P. M, nor any other message to the American
aviators and if Colonel Kerwood or the NEW YORK HERALD-
TRIBUNE correspondent say so on their own responsibility
you may, if you desire, publicly announce for me that they
are liars. November 10, 3 P. M.

HERRICK.

MCL



NOV 13 1925
FILED

INDEX BUREAU
881.00/1168

881.00

Oct. 8, 1925; 1925.

INDEX BUREAU

To the Department of State; November

A discussion has taken place in our Modern History class of the Downers Grove High School as to whether the Department of State is justified in recalling the American aviators who are fighting for France in the Riffian War. The pupils wondered why you have taken this action. They are to be the future citizens of America, and I believe they should know the answer to this question.

As their representative, I make this request and ask you to please send the desired information to

INDEX BUREAU

NOV 7 1925
Dept. of State

Charles Schrager. Downers Grove, Ill.
Forest Ave. R.F.D.-1.

OCT 12 1925
file
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FILED
NOV 8 1925

In reply refer to

WE:

881.00

November 7, 1925.

Mr. Karl Schrager,

Forest Avenue, R. F. D. 1,

Downers Grove, Illinois.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of October 8, 1925, concerning the reported activities of American aviators in Morocco.

It is believed that the following statement of the facts in the matter will be of interest to you:

Several weeks ago letters were received by the Department stating that American citizens were reported to be enlisting in the army of the Sultan of Morocco for service in Morocco. These letters expressed apprehension concerning the situation and appeared to consider that the matter should receive the attention of the Department. The Department, realizing

881.00 / 1169

realizing that the misapprehension might also exist in Morocco, believed it advisable and proper to inform its officer in Morocco of the laws with respect to the enlistment of Americans in foreign military forces. It, therefore, sent a telegram to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier stating that in order to avoid any misapprehension which might be caused in Morocco by the reports of alleged enlistment of American citizens in the Sultan's army, it was suggested that he might care to consider the advisability of calling to the attention of American citizens in Morocco the provisions of Sections 5282 and 4090 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. These statutes read as follows:

R.S. 5282 (Section 10 of the United States Criminal Code),

"Whoever, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains another person to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, as a soldier, or as a marine or seaman, on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer, shall be fined not more than a thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than three years. * * * "

to

to which was added on May 7, 1917, the following proviso which ceased to have effect at the termination of the late war:

"Provided, That this Section shall not apply to citizens or subjects of any country engaged in war with a country with which the United States is at war, unless such citizen or subject of such foreign country shall hire or solicit a citizen of the United States to enlist or enter the service of a foreign country. Enlistment under this proviso shall be under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War."

R. S. 4090 reads as follows:

"Capital cases for murder or insurrection against the Government of either of the countries hereinabove mentioned (extraterritorial countries), by citizens of the United States, or for offences against the public peace amounting to felony under the laws of the United States, may be tried before the Minister of the United States in the country where the offense is committed if allowed jurisdiction; and every such Minister may issue all manner of writs, to prevent the citizens of the United States from enlisting in the military or naval service of either of the said countries, to make war upon any foreign power with whom the United States are at peace, or in the service of one portion of the people against any other portion of the same people; and he may carry out this power by a resort to such force belonging to the United States, as may at the time be within his reach."

The Department has no evidence as to whether the aviators in question have or have not enlisted in the

Army

Army of the Sultan of Morocco nor has it information as to the nature of their connection with the armed forces in Morocco. The Department, however, felt it to be its duty to call the attention of American citizens in Morocco to the laws of the United States designed to prevent and make unlawful the enlistment, in the United States or in countries where we enjoy extraterritorial privileges, of American citizens for service in foreign armed forces.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:

D. R.

Dorsey Richardson, Acting Chief,
Division of Western European Affairs.

¹⁰
~~WB:EC:NNB~~

CR
NOV 5, 1925 ✓



PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT.

Department of State

Washington,

November 20, 1925

AMEMBASSY

PARIS (FRANCE)

421 Department's, 415, November 9, 1 p.m.

You are informed, that the attitude, of this Government, with respect to, American citizens, serving, in the, armed forces in Morocco, is based, upon the, spirit, of the laws, of the United States, regarding, foreign, enlistment, notably, Sections, 5282 and, 4090, of the Revised Statutes, of the United States. Therefore, no official recognition should be, extended, to any, American citizens, who have been, or who still, are, connected with the, armed forces, in Morocco, other than, that which, would, ordinarily be, extended, to any, private, citizen of, American nationality, in Spain.

Please inform, Consulates.

WE:HC:JDD

50
Jma

Approved by the Secretary

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

19

WE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

McL

Index Bureau
RECEIVED
NOV 12 1925
Dep't. of State

was received
in the Depart-
ments Confidential Code
Paris.

Dated November 12, 1925.

It should be
closely para- Received 2.23 P. M.
phrased before
being communica-
ted to anyone

Secretary of State,
Washington.

NOV 12 1925
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

559, November 12, 1 P. M.

881.00/1169A

Your 421, November 11, 5 P. M.

Cable by telegram

11/12/25

881.00/1170
INDEX BUREAU

I have always perfectly understood my Government's
attitude regarding American citizens serving in the
armed forces in Morocco, and I have been governed accord-
ingly. I have never had any communication of any kind with
them nor has there been any question at any time of any
official recognition. In fact I do not understand the cause
of your #21.

HERRICK.

FTT ED
NOV 13 1925

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

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Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT.

Department of State

Washington,

November 12, 1925.

AMEMBASSY

PARIS (FRANCE)

4/24 Your 559, November 12, 1 p.m.

The Department's 421 was sent in the belief that it would be a useful addition to the permanent files of the Embassy and in order that the Consulates in France might be appropriately instructed before the aviators returned. There was no intention of reflecting upon your understanding of the situation or upon your attitude.

Kerry

OR
NOV 12, 1925
m 14

WE: JDD
WE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

✓ PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department

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Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT.

Department of State

Washington,

RECEIVED

November 9, 1925.

NOV 9 1925

5 54 PM

AMEMBASSY

MADRID (SPAIN)

61 The press reports that the Ambassador is visiting
Morocco in the company of Primo de Rivera.

Press further states that he will visit the American
flying squadron.

Please report by cable as to the accuracy of these
statements. If true, he should be advised to return to
Madrid at once.

INDEXED
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DISTRIBUTED

WE:PO:JDD

WE

NOV 9 1925 5 P

Enciphered by WJP

Sent by operator M., 1925

881.00

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT.

Collect
Charge Department

OR

Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

APPROVED

November 11, 1925

AMEMBASSY

MADRID (SPAIN)

1/2
NOV 11 1925 11 51 AM

63

The Department does not understand why it has not received a reply to its 61 of November 9, 6 p.m.

Please answer immediately.

Kellogg
J.S.

881.00/11708

CR
NOV 11, 1925

WE:HC:JDD

DISPATCHED

Enciphered by PT

Sent by operator M., 1925

81-00
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

file
12/8/32 7
November 10, 1925

Mr. Castle:

Mr. Grew:

NOTED IN PD SUBJECT FILE
12/8/32
SOLICITOR'S OFFICE

NOV 10 1925

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The press reports that the American squadron in Morocco is returning to France, presumably for demobilization, on the 15th. As they will doubtless pass through Spain as they did on their way to Morocco, attempts will be made to fête them there as well as in France.

In view of our attitude it seems well to notify our diplomatic and consular officers to have nothing to do with them.

WE:HC

Remitted to
view of SC.
K

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT.

Department of State

Washington,

November 10, 1925.

AMEMBASSY

MADRID (SPAIN)

64 Department's, 61, November 9, 1925.

You are informed, that the attitude of this Government, with respect to American citizens, serving in the armed forces in Morocco, is based upon the spirit of the laws of the United States, regarding foreign enlistment, notably Sections 5282, and 4090 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. Therefore, no official recognition should be extended to any American citizens, who have been, or who still are, connected with the armed forces in Morocco other than that which would ordinarily be extended to any private citizen of American nationality in Spain.

Please inform Consulates.

NOV 10 1925

WE:HC:JDD

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SOLICITOR

November 10, 1925.

WE

Mr. Carter:

I fear that your telegrams to Madrid and Paris, hereto attached, may raise the implication that the American aviators serving in the armed forces in Morocco have violated a provision of the United States Statutes. There is no evidence before the Department that any statutes of the United States have been violated by these aviators.

It is suggested that some such statement might be used: "In view of the fact that the American citizens serving in the armed forces of Morocco, by entering into the armed forces of Morocco abroad, have taken an action contrary to the spirit of the Revised Statutes of the United States, 5282 and 4090, ~~as~~ such action could not be taken legally in the United States ^{on} and Morocco, it is the desire of the Department that no diplomatic or consular officer attend any function given in ~~their~~ ^{of the aviators} honor, or extend ^{them} any recognition other than would be extended to any American citizen in Spain or France."

Though these aviators, by their action, may have forfeited the right to the protection of their Government for any difficulties they may have encountered in Morocco,

it

it is conceivable that they still have the right to apply for American protection and assistance in proper cases in Spain and France, and it might be well to avoid possible interpretation by diplomatic officers and consuls in Spain and France that these aviators should not be accorded any assistance or recognition under any circumstances that might arise.

SO:FMA:EBA:SS

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Jma'.

NATIONAL
ARCHIVE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WE

BC

FROM

Green

Madrid.

Dated November 12, 1925.

Index Bureau
RECEIVED
NOV 13 1925
Dep't. of State



4:45 PM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

67 November 12 noon.

Department's 63 November 11, 1 P.M. Surprised that Department should take seriously newspaper reports originating in Spain. I did not accompany Primo de Rivera to Tetuan nor did I attend any official ceremonies. I went to Tangier, visited Diplomatic Agent Blake for three days, motored to Tetuan and stayed there one and one half days.

I did not know Department objected to my going to Tetuan; in fact I thought it my duty to go on account of so many conflicting rumors and I did secure valuable information.

As to visiting discredited aviators there are not now nor have there ever been any American aviators located in Spanish Morocco. Even if there had been I would not have permitted myself to call on them or them to call on me, knowing the Secretary's ruling in the matter. I cannot account for this rumor except that it might be confused with the fact that a portion of the American naval squadron has been in Spanish waters and I was reported as intending visiting it.

MOORE

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

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Charge to

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TELEGRAM SENT.

Department of State

Washington,

RECEIVED

November 12, 1925.

NOV 12 035 2 59 PM

INDEX BUREAU
TELEGRAPH SECTION

AMEMBASSY

MADRID (SPAIN)

For Dockweiler.

The Department is concerned by the Embassy's failure to reply to the Department's 61, November 9, 6 p.m., and 63, November 11, 1 p.m. If the Ambassador is absent from Madrid you should answer them at once in your own name also informing the Department whether the press is correct in stating that the Ambassador attended the installation of the new Khalifa in the Spanish sphere of influence in Morocco in company with Primo de Rivera and Major Hodges.

INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1171a

7 K...

NOV 12, 1925
MT/K

WE:HC:JDD
WE:123M785/53a

DISTRIBUTED

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

HENRY W. LAWRENCE President & Gen. Mgr.

WE
The
CLAYPOOL HOTEL
INDIANAPOLIS

NOV

9 1925

Telegram to Emb. Paris.
11/6/25-J.C. NNB-



Nov. 12/25

Secretary of State
Mr. Kellogg
Washington, D. C.

November 11, 1925.

November 11, 1925.

Dear Mr. Kellogg,

According to a press
dispatch in this week's Literary
Digest Ambassador Herrick is
quoted as congratulating the
American fleet in Mexico, while
your administration certainly
did not so heartily approve of
that venture, and how public
opinion thinks of that affair
is strikingly disclosed by the collection
of editorials offered in the same
number, much more remarkable
even than in favor of the American

INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1172

NOV 11 1925

The
CLAYPOOL HOTEL
INDIANAPOLIS



Since the Literary Digest had nothing to quote than their own self testimony. How sensible their comparison of the Riff leader with a street robber is, disclosed a further article in the same number of the L.D. that gives the qualities and reasons of this man better justice.

Their action now terminated by climatic conditions and happily back in France, I only hope they will not look for more opportunity for heroic deeds in Demerits and perhaps again to be complimented by the Ambassador of the U.S.A.

The Blackstone
Manhattan Beach
New York City.

Very respectfully yours,
Herbert Kaler

LITERARY DIGEST

October 31.

"Lt. Col. Chas Kerwood, second in command of the American Air Squadron, says the Americans are volunteers in the guard of the Sultan of Morocco and the officer asserts that the members of the squadron have never received official news or even official intimation that their activities were against the policy of the American Government. On the contrary, Col. Kerwood says that they have received constant assurances that their participation in the Moroccan campaign was being well received by the people at home. He recites that Ambassador Herrick had sent the Americans a message saying that if he were only young enough he would be delighted to join them in the work they were doing.

The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOL. XLIV

NEW YORK, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1925

NUMBER 569

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The Week

THE day after the Locarno agreements were signed Mr. Coolidge permitted it to be announced that the time when he could call his long contemplated disarmament conference appeared to be approaching. But on the day following the skies darkened and the administration apparently decided that for a while longer Europe must be permitted to stew in her own juice without the benefit of any American seasoning. If true and permanent, it was a wise decision. Land disarmament is a European problem whose successful handling is a matter in part of difficult and delicate technical negotiations and in part of political reconciliation among the European states. The United States would do well not to interfere. They have refused to assume political responsibilities in Europe; and this refusal would make any proposal which looked towards the reduction of armies by the American government a futile impertinence. The foreign ministers of European states would dig up probably sound reasons why they should decline the suggested invitation. It

is apparently no longer necessary for Americans to take so much trouble to save Europe. The European peoples still have their troubles, but they are doing fairly well without American moral or other leadership. If the administration has any moral leadership left after it has finished with the reduction of the super-taxes, it can profitably use the commodity in China.

THERE is a certain unreality about any agreement among nations of the northern hemisphere which excludes Russia. This statement applied to the Washington treaties of four years ago. It applies to the Locarno treaties of today. It is clear that Russian diplomacy received a severe check in its failure to prevent the rapprochement between Germany and the Western powers. But it is by no means clear that she does not still hold the keys to war and peace. A falling out between Russia and Poland—and a quarrel with the Poles can be had by anyone, at any time, on any ground—would bring the casus foederis between France and Poland into operation, and the French army into Germany. Whether Germany could excuse this violation of her neutrality, even though granted absolution by the League of Nations, is doubtful; that her people could not endure seeing their country made a thoroughfare for the armies that so lately crucified the Ruhr is certain. The exact terms of the agreement by which France is allowed to carry out her obligations of alliance with Poland are not announced; but they must be at the expense of Germany, physically and spiritually. This being the case, Russia has it in her power to bring a strain upon the Locarno agreement at its weakest point.

THE Democratic party in Congress under the leadership of Representative Garner and Senator Swanson has cooked up a plan for tax revision which differs materially from that of the Republicans. They do not propose to contest a reduction in the super-taxes on large incomes, but they would like to spread the payment of the debt over two generations instead of one, and they would like by this means to make room for diminishing Federal taxation by \$600,000,000 instead of less than \$300,000,000. Then they will propose to get rid of a large part of this additional \$300,000,000 by

exempting all incomes below \$5,000 a year from federal taxation. This plan is, as it seems to us, worse than that of Mr. Mellon. It would be deplorable in view of the probable future responsibility of the federal government not to take advantage of the present prosperity of the country in order to reduce the debt by just as much as the country can afford. The Democratic proposal to postpone the payment of the debt is thoroughly unsound, and no less unsound is the proposal to exempt incomes smaller than \$5,000. The present exemption might be increased somewhat, for it comes very close at present to what ought to be an income sufficient to maintain an American standard of living, but not by more than \$500. Incomes of more than \$2,500 should as a matter of fair distribution of the national burden pay a small tax. It is just as desirable on grounds of social policy that the small but sufficient incomes should contribute something as that the larger incomes should contribute progressively more.

THE situation as regards British trade is clarified by Mr. Walter T. Layton, editor of *The Economist*, in an article in *The Boston Transcript*. His conclusions, while not highly optimistic, afford at least some relief from the extreme pessimism which prevailed during the summer. He points out that the adverse balance of trade has been improving since last winter, and that, with some notable exceptions, most industries of the country are contributing to this improvement. The most important exception is the mining industry. According to Mr. Layton the total unemployment among men in Great Britain at the end of August was 1,140,749 or 181,022 more than a year ago. The unemployed among miners numbered 288,892 or 184,000 more than a year ago, enough to account for a little more than the total increase. Similarly British exports for the past nine months were valued at £579,000,000 against £590,000,000 in the corresponding period of 1924, and £566,000,000 in 1923. But excluding coal the figures are £541,000,000 in 1925, £534,000,000 in 1924, and £491,000,000 in 1923. The effect of this analysis seems to be to locate British industrial sickness in the coal mines. The high point in the export of coal before the War, 70,000,000 tons in 1913, has been reached since the War only in one year (1923) and that in consequence of the occupation of the Ruhr. Other large industries showing a decline in exports from pre-war standards, ship building, steel, machinery and cotton goods are confronting hopeful conditions in the immediate future. Only the British mining industry seems sick unto death.

MR. Edgar A. Mowrer in an article recently reviewed in the *New Republic*, remarks on the childish disposition of our diplomats to identify themselves with the politics as well as the social preju-

dices of the countries to which they are sent. We had a singularly painful instance of this tendency in the career of Mr. Walter Hines Page at the Court of Saint James. An Ambassador of Mr. Page's calibre as a diplomat is Mr. Myron T. Herrick at Paris. Mr. Herrick is represented, and only too plausibly, as greeting a member of the Escadrille Lafayette who had returned from dropping bombs on Riffian villages with the words: "If I were younger I would go to fight in Morocco, too." Now Mr. Herrick should not be ignorant of the fact that the participation of the Escadrille Lafayette in the war against the Riffi is contrary to United States and international law, and is bringing disgrace and hatred upon the American name throughout the Moslem world. So far from praising this adventure, I should be the first to discourage it. The State department has already made public its disapproval, and has doubtless made representations to the French authorities in Morocco. Mr. Herrick, following the tactics of Mr. Page in London, has done his best to discount in advance such representations. In an excess of complacency toward the French he has dissociated himself personally from the policy of his government and done his best to embarrass it.

THINGS are changing so fast in Turkey that a slow moving country like ours has difficulty in keeping up with the news. First we heard that the fez was out, or off, for good, and we saw photographs of the new national Truly Warner headgear. Now it appears that a decoration more ancient and honorable even than the fez, the turban, is also slated for disappearance. At any rate those who wish to wear it must be licensed, the licenses are difficult to obtain, only a very few turbans in all will be allowed. Do the fiery Turks object? Do they show their spirit by wholesale revolt? Do they live up to the reputation they have made in all foreign imaginations by refusing, with passionate dignity, to forswear a symbol of their glorious past? Of course they object to the licensing. But for what reason? Alas, not for any of the reasons we had expected. They object to taking off their turbans on the ground "that they are sure to catch cold."

Is It a New Europe?

IN estimating the work of the Locarno conference, one is tempted to use large words which may or may not be subsequently justified by the event. One is tempted to say that by beginning the outlawing of war it introduces into the European system a new principle which promises to be as much of an improvement upon its predecessor as the system established by the Treaty of Westphalia improved upon the Europe of the religious wars. The Treaty of Westphalia wrote into public law the principle of state sovereignty and state re-

November 11, 1925.

In reply refer to
WE:881.00-Kahn, Herbert.

Mr. Herbert Kahn,
The Blackstone,
Manhattan Beach,
New York City.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
November 1, 1925, concerning a report published in the
LITERARY DIGEST of October 31, 1925, in which Ambassador
Herriek is quoted as having congratulated the American
aviators who have been serving in Morocco.

You are informed that when this report was brought
to the Ambassador's attention he stated to the Depart-
ment that he had sent no message whatsoever to the
American aviators and desired to characterize the re-
port in question as being totally without foundation.

I am, Sir,


Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr., Chief,
Division of Western European Affairs.

~~RECEIVED~~ JDD

CR
NOV 11 1925



881.00/1172

INDEX
OCT 28 1925

WE
ack-11/4/25-
JAC-MNB-

San Francisco, October 18th

Secretary Tully

Dear Sir
I saw recently that you had sent
a message to Marodes for the boys to
come home they are still there
What is the reason for the delay

Sincerely Yours

1650

Gay pt

E. F. Thompson

RECEIVED
OCT 27 1925
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

INDEX BUREAU
881.00/1173

PT. ED
NOV 7 1925

881.00

San Francisco Nov 7th

Secretary Kellogg



Dear Sir

I'm ordered our boys home from
the Briggs Mines. This country
is not fighting them. France wants
some minerals Copper is one I trust
you will attend to it. Thinking people
want them brought home

Respectfully Ours

Mrs E. J. Thompson

1630 Clay Street

Manufacturers
connections?

881.00 - Thompson, E. J.

NOV 12 1925
P.T.T. (M)

In reply refer to
WE: 881.00/- Thompson, E.F.

Mr. E. F. Thompson,

San Francisco, California, November 7, 1925.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of October 18, 1925, concerning the reported activities of American aviators in Morocco.

It is believed that the following statement of the facts in the matter will be of interest to you:

Several weeks ago letters were received by the Department stating that American citizens were reported to be enlisting in the army of the Sultan of Morocco for service in Morocco. These letters expressed apprehension concerning the situation and appeared to consider that the matter should receive the attention of the Department. The Department, realizing that the misapprehension might also exist in Morocco, believed it advisable and proper to inform

881.00/1173

form its officer in Morocco of the laws with respect to the enlistment of Americans in foreign military forces. It, therefore, sent a telegram to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier stating that in order to avoid any misapprehension which might be caused in Morocco by the reports of alleged enlistment of American citizens in the Sultan's army, it was suggested that he might care to consider the advisability of calling to the attention of American citizens in Morocco the provisions of Sections 5282 and 4090 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. These statutes read as follows:

R. S. 5282 (Section 10 of the United States Criminal Code)

"Whoever, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains another person to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, as a soldier, or as a Marine or seaman, on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer, shall be fined not more than a thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than three years, *** "

to

to which was added on May 7, 1917, the following proviso which ceased to have effect at the termination of the late war:

"Provided, that this Section shall not apply to citizens or subjects of any country engaged in war with a country with which the United States is at war, unless such citizen or subject of such foreign country shall hire or solicit a citizen of the United States to enlist or enter the service of a foreign country. Enlistment under this proviso shall be under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War."

R. S. 4090 reads as follows:

"Capital cases for murder or insurrection against the Government of either of the countries hereinabove mentioned (extraterritorial countries), by citizens of the United States, or for offences against the public peace amounting to felony under the laws of the United States, may be tried before the Minister of the United States in the country where the offense is committed if allowed jurisdiction; and every such Minister may issue all manner of writs, to prevent the citizens of the United States from enlisting in the military or naval service of either of the said countries, to make war upon any foreign power with whom the United States are at peace, or in the service of one portion of the people against any other portion of the same people; and he may carry out this power by a resort to such force belonging to the United States, as may at the time be within his reach."

The Department has no evidence as to whether the aviators in question have or have not enlisted in the

Army

Army of the Sultan of Morocco nor has it information as to the nature of their connection with the armed forces in Morocco. The Department, however, felt it to be its duty to call the attention of American citizens in Morocco to the laws of the United States designed to prevent and make unlawful the enlistment in the United States or in countries where we enjoy extraterritorial privileges, of American citizens for service in foreign armed forces.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,


For the Secretary of State:

JOSEPH C. GREW

Under Secretary.

WE:HC:ENE

CR
NOV 5, 1910 P.M.



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WE

RML

Index Bureau
RECEIVED
NOV 13 1925
Dep't. of State

FROM Green
Madrid

Dated Nov. 13, 1925.

Rec'd 1.37 P.M.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

68, November 13, 1 P.M.

Department's 65, November 12, 3 P.M. Dockweiler
replies "Department's 61, November 9, 6 P.M. arrived
morning 10th and was immediately forwarded to Amba-
sador at American Legation Tangier for reply. Depart-
ment's 63, November 11, 1 P.M. arrived morning 12th and
was answered Ambassador's telegram 67, of same day.

MOORE

PT



INDEX BUREAU

DEC 15 1926

881.000
State
TRANSMISSION BUREAU
TRANSMISSION.
NOV 14 1925
Dept. of State

AG - WIE
Berlin, October 16, 1925.

710
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 16 1925
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

To the President of the United States
Washington.

The brutality with which the American citizens shown
in the attached picture are participating in the murder
of a liberty loving people horrifies millions of
liberty loving persons throughout the world.

This kind of sport sullies the American honor,
so much the more as the enemies of these people are
not in possession of similar weapons.

In the eyes of the whole world these Americans are
murderers. It is their endeavor to kill adherents
of the principle of the self-determination of peoples,
for which America ostensibly entered the World War.

It is to be hoped that there is some philanthropist
who will increase the price set on the heads of these
Americans to \$100,000, if the American Government cannot
compel these people to return to America.

Very respectfully,

(SIGNED) (?)


TR:BHL:NSS:SS

881.000/1175
INDEX BUREAU
NOV 18 1925
F.T.T.

WELTCHRONIK

5000 Dollar pro Kopf: Abd-el-Krim hat diese Prämie auf die Ergreifung eines jeden Offiziers des amerikanischen Fliegerkorps in Marokko ausgesetzt

Der Krieg in Marokko: spanische Artillerie nach der Landung schießt sich auf die feindliche Stellung ein



*State
Trans.*

Berlin, 16. X. 1925.

An den

Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten
von Amerika

Washington.

Die Rohheit, mit der die in der Anlage abgebildeten amerikanischen Bürger sich an der Ermordung eines freiheitliebenden Volkes beteiligen, entsetzt Millionen freiheitliebender Menschen der Welt.

Diese Art Sport befleckt die amerikanische Ehre umso mehr, als die Gegner dieser Leute über gleichartige Waffen nicht verfügen.

In den Augen der ganzen Welt sind diese Amerikaner Mörder. Sie sind bemüht, Anhänger der Idee des Selbstbestimmungsrechts der Völker zu töten, derselben Idee, für welche Amerika angeblich in den Weltkrieg gegangen ist.


Hoffentlich findet sich ein Philantrop, welcher den auf diese Amerikaner ausgesetzten Kopfpfeis um 100.000 Dollar erhöht,

b.w.

wenn schon die amerikanische Regierung diese Leute nicht zur Rück-
reise nach Amerika bewegen kann.

Mit ausgezeichneter Hochachtung

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Prof. Dr. Schuler", followed by a horizontal line and a small flourish.



1/B
File

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR
(M. EMILE DAESCHNER) OCTOBER 26, 1925.

SSA. 881.00/1175-1/2
The French Ambassador called and I explained to him that the terms of the Secretary's note, dated October 12, 1925, had reference to the peculiar situation in Morocco arising from the existence of three distinct zones in Morocco with separate administrative regulations. I told him that we had recently received from the Spanish Government a notice somewhat similar to that received from the French Government and that our reply had been along the same lines. The Ambassador seemed to understand and agree that in the circumstances we could hardly admit the right of the French Government to visa passports for all Morocco.

* * *


A-O REO:WPC

FEB 12 1937

FILED

FP

No. 32




881.00 American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General.

Tangier, Morocco, October 22nd, 1925. *File*



SUBJECT: The Statutes of Tangier.



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:-

I have the honor to transmit herewith newspaper cuttings from the issue of October 17th, 1925, of the local English weekly publication "Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa" containing a discussion concerning the validity of the Statutes, which is recommended for the Department's perusal.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Maxwell Blake

Maxwell Blake,
American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul-General.

RECEIVED
NOV 21 1925



THE VALIDITY OF THE STATUTE

Sufficient time has now passed for the public to acquaint itself with the provisions of the Statute, and enquiries are being made in various quarters as to whether the Statute is valid.

The question is vital, since if it is not a valid document, it follows as a matter of course that every act performed by the Administration, every enactment made by the Assembly is open to question.

The Statute was drawn up, undoubtedly, on the supposition that those Nations, who were not represented at the Conference, would accept it, and the first point that endangers its validity is the fact that three Nations have refused to accept it, preferring to stand on their Treaty rights as laid down in the Act of Algeciras and other treaties.

Can a Statute be enforced which applies to only a portion of the population.

We are advised that it is clearly not a valid document, but that its validity can only be questioned by the signatories.

We confess that this seems somewhat of a paradox.

If three partners in a partnership of nine people can come to an agreement on a matter concerning the whole nine, can it be argued that only by one of the three contracting parties can its validity be questioned.

With all due respect for the Authorities on International Law, we submit that any of the partners can ask for revocation, as a clear infringement of their rights.

That the framers of the Statute realised this, seems to us to be indicated by the fact that Article 7 of the Statute expressly lays down that «The Tangier Zone shall respect all treaties in force.

«Economic equality among Nations resulting from such treaties shall continue to be observed in Tangier, even if the said treaties are subsequently abrogated or modified.»

This clause seems to us to strike at the very foundations of the Statute, and it may be that its framers realised this fact when they passed article 55.

Article 55 lays down that, «All clauses of previous treaties, conventions or agreements which may be contrary to the provisions of the present Statute are abrogated.»

This seems to be a direct negation of Article 7 but it is argued that Article 7 is a provision of the Statute, how then can it be abrogated, and if not abrogated whence does the Statute acquire validity.


If treaty rights remain in force, then we no longer have the question of non-adherent nations but of those which have accepted the Statute.

The whole fabric falls, do we return to the status quo ante?

The Committee of Control is charged with the duty of seeing that the provisions of the Statute are carried out, and particularly, that the Régime of Economic equality is observed, how can it perform such a duty when it is clear that if the provisions of the Statute are carried out in accordance with Article 7 the Statute stultifies itself.

We are not criticising the Statute with any view of wrecking it, but we are desirous of pointing out its shortcomings in order that a remedy may be applied, and such modifications made as will enable the Statute to fulfil the intentions with which it was conceived, a really International Government with equal rights for all Nations.

881. 50
No. 34




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WE
ZA
SD
10/2



American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General.

Tangier, Morocco, October 24th 1925.



SUBJECT: The Tangier Statutes.

For Distribution

Commerce
Tangier
Law

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

INDEX BUREAU
881.00/1177

NOV 16 1925



Sir:-

I have the honor to enclose ~~for your~~ *for your* cuttings from the issue of October 24th, 1925 of the "Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa," the local weekly English newspaper, commenting upon the arbitrary and illegal procedure of the Administrator of the Tangier Zone, in connection with the contemplated suppression of "Hassani" currency.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Maxwell Blake
Maxwell Blake,
American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul-General.

NOV 27 1925

Tangier, Morocco, October 24th, 1925.

A GRAVE POSITION.

Some months ago the Administrator deposited a *projet de loi* dealing with the suppression of Hassani currency.

The matter was referred to the Finance Commission of the Assembly who reported unfavourably, and further consideration was postponed until October.

A week or so ago the Administration availed itself of its powers over the tenants of stalls in the market and obliged them to cease from quoting prices in Hassani.

The Administration was within its rights, although perhaps exercising them without sufficient motive.

Up to this point we have nothing seriously to complain of. We disagree totally, not with the argument, for none has been put forward, but with the policy of ignoring native customs and native opinion.

On Tuesday, soldiers instructed by the Mendoub went round to the Moorish shops and merchants forbidding them to deal in Hassani currency—this order caused considerable consternation amongst the natives.

We are informed that the Administrator on being questioned asserted his right or the right of the Mendoub to do what he liked in such matters, as far as Native subjects were concerned.

We shall be interested to know under what article of the Statute the Administrator claims this right.

Article 31 of the Annexe is very precise on this point. "The Administrator has no independent power; he executes the decisions of the Assembly."

It is fairly clear that the Administrator has no power except such as is delegated to him by the Assembly.

Is it suggested that the Mendoub has powers over the subjects of the Sultan other than those delegated by the Assembly?

The Mendoub is charged with the duty of exercising the powers of Administration and justice which belong in the French Zone to the Caids and Pachas.

We have yet to learn that any Caid or Pasha has authority to forbid the use of coinage, on his own initiative and the Mendoub has no greater power—his authority depends on the Assembly over which he presides.

Entirely apart from these considerations is the question of administrative action in defiance of the Assembly.

Either the Assembly is a validly constituted body with legislative powers or it may as well resign at once.

The Administrator deposits the draft of

a law, it is referred to a Commission of the Assembly charged with the study of financial measures.

Whilst this is still under consideration he arbitrarily exercises a power for which he has no sanction.

It seems to us in any case that if the Finance Commission have any self respect they must resign as their mission becomes a farce, and why did the Administrator think it necessary to have a law on the subject if he is able to dictate to three quarters of the population.

There is we need hardly point out another solution to the matter.

The question involves such far reaching consequences and touches so closely the rights of all of us that an explanation is required without delay.



881.00
No. 212.

WIE
Acc
(Confidential.)

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Casablanca, Morocco,

October 20, 1925.


RECEIVED
NOV 19 1925
DEPT. OF STATE
1-1055
SUBJECT: Change of Commissioners Residents General of
the French Republic in Morocco.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON

SIR:



Copy in 1055

881.00/1141

I have the honor to refer to Despatch No. 191 from this consulate, under date of August 10, 1925, concerning the impending resignation of Marshal Lyautey, as Commissioner Resident General of the French Republic in Morocco, and to the recent appointment of Mr. Theodor Steeg to succeed him.

881.00/1178
L. D. & BUREAU

Marshall Lyautey made more or less of a tour of the Protectorate in order to take his leave. During it he received the respects and homage of the less distinguished "residents" in Morocco. In Casablanca, on Wednesday, October 7, 1925, he received at the Residency the different groups of authorities, civil and military, the Casablanca Consular Corps included, and various private organizations and deputations. Among the most significant was a British one, headed by Gerald H. Selous, Esquire, H. B. M. Consul in Casablanca, who, in the name of the British colony in Morocco, presented the Marshal with a solid silver tray. Mr. Selous expressed the regret which the British Colony felt over the departure of "the man of action, the man of creative power, the builder of modern Morocco" and of its admiration for him. The Marshal in reply said that "he had always not only realized but congratulated himself upon the loyal cooperation which British officials and residents had always afforded him," particularly on the part of H. B. M. Consuls

NOV 25 1925
FRT PM

Consuls at Casablanca and Fez during the first days of the Protectorate, and that he appreciated the choice of the spokesman for the occasion inasmuch as he (Mr. Se-lous) was in Fez (as a subordinate consular officer) during the trying time of 1912 and had since witnessed all of the Marshal's work in Morocco.

On the following Saturday, October 10, 1925, amid the acclamations of the populace, the Marshal took final leave of the local authorities and people of note, assembled on the quay, embarked on the French S. S. ANFA, received the Grand Vizier, who represented the Sultan for the occasion, then, his labors at an end, sailed home to enjoy the remainder of his life in well-merited rest.

The choice of his successor, Mr. Theodor Steeg, former Governor-General of Algeria and Minister of Justice in the Painlevé Cabinet, seems to have met with the general approval. I have not heard or read of one dissenting voice. Mr. Steeg has granted several interviews, all of which have been commented upon favorably by the press. As Governor-General of Algeria he attended two conferences of the heads of each of France's possessions in North Africa, so he is not unfamiliar with Morocco. On the contrary, he has shown his grasp of the situation in saying that he will sponsor neither the "Tunisification nor the Algerianization" of Morocco, that he knows all its "differences of origin, history, temperament, interests, and organization, both political and social."

Furthermore,

Furthermore, Mr. Steeg, in his first prepared interview, said he intended in no way to upset the situation, but that he would continue the work of Marshal Lyautey. That does not mean, however, that there will not be some changes, for, said Mr. Steeg, "If some retouching appears necessary, the process will be carried out; if circumstances make new plans in order, they will be studied." Undoubtedly some of the abuses mentioned in despatch No. 191 will cease forthwith.

Basing my opinion on Mr. Steeg's attitude as expressed in his interviews and on the attitude taken toward him as Governor-General of Algeria, which I observed while stationed in Algiers, I believe that Morocco, under his guidance, will take on added importance, not only as the work of Frenchmen but as a country of economic worth.

There are two other points of interest in the situation, Mr. Steeg's title and his civil status. At the time of his nomination, some of the Paris newspapers gave him the title of "Resident Superior of Morocco." This was compared to the situation in French Indo-China, where there are three "Residents Superior," all of whom are under the authority of the Governor-General of Indo-China; and it was taken as a presage to the unification of French North Africa, under one head, a question which has been open for some time. The subsequent action of the French Government in giving Mr. Steeg exactly the same title as that held by Marshal

shal

shal Lyantev, however, put the idea at rest, at least for the time being.

As to the fact that Mr. Steeg is not a military man, it was thought in some quarters that the new Resident General would lack prestige on that account, as the native Mohammedans are much impressed by a uniform as signifying a warrior, and one Paris newspaper, LE GAULOIS, called the appointment of a civilian Resident General during wartime a "paradox."

It would now appear that the French Government, having appointed a civilian, wishes to mitigate somewhat the possible effect of its action by sending Mr. Steeg to Morocco on a warship, the VOLTAIRE, which is to arrive in Casablanca next week.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,


D. C. Elkington,

American Vice Consul in charge.

In quintuplicate.
Copy for:

Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General, Tangier.

800
DCE:E



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WE
NE

No. 5701

Paris, November 10, 1925.

881.00

NOV 23 1925
DEPT. OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 27 1925
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 23 1925
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Copy in WE.

881.00/1179
INDEX BUREAU

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Washington.

Sir:-

I have the honor to report that, on November 6th, the Paris press announced that the American aviators, who volunteered their services to the French and Moroccan governments in the middle of July of this year, will be disbanded November 15th in Morocco and will return to France.

The membership of this squadron was reported to consist

of:-

Col. Charles Sweeney, head of the volunteer American
air squadron (who had served in the
French Foreign Legion)

Maj. Granville Pollock, aviator

Lieut-Col. Charles Kerwood, aviator

Capt. R. H. Weller

Capt. Graham Bullen

Capt. Lansing Holden

Paul Rockwell, of Atlanta, Ga., (veteran of the Lafayette
Escadrille)

James Mustain

Capt. Donald McGibeny

Capt. James V. Sparks (surgeon)

Major Baer (veteran of the Lafayette Squadron)

Maj. William Rogers, of Pittsburgh, Pa., (a Lafayette pilot)

Col. Austin Parker (veteran of the Lafayette Escadrille)

Joseph Stehlin, of Brooklyn, N.Y. (veteran of the Lafayette
Escadrille)

2 newspapermen

When the French authorities were informed of the intention of these men to offer their services to the War Department, the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs immediately took up the problem of deciding whether the enlistment of foreigners was likely to provoke international difficulties owing to the political status of Morocco, technically governed by its Sultan but under the protection of France. It early became apparent that, if entering the Sultan's army, even for a limited period, required a formal recognition of the Sultan as a potentate, any American volunteer accepting such a pledge would forfeit his American citizenship; however, on the 19th of July, the press announced that the aeroplane contingent would be permitted to leave Paris within 48 hours to offer its services to the Sultan of Morocco at Rabat, stating that the French military authorities had been assured from Morocco that the Americans would not be required to take any oath of fidelity which would endanger their American citizenship, and that as a special favor the oath of fidelity to Moslemism, which would require certain traditional rites to be observed were Christians to be converted to

the

the faith of the Sultan, would also be waived. It was further stated that the entry of the aviators into the Riffian forces would be facilitated by the French authorities, uniforms would be provided, messing arrangements concluded and a small, but satisfactory daily stipend allowed, the unit to remain intact for aviation purposes.

Several receptions, banquets and luncheons were tendered the American fliers during the period from their announced intention to volunteer their services to their departure from Paris. At the reception given at the Gerole Volney on July 29th Mr. Jusserand, former French Ambassador at Washington, made an address, and the following day a luncheon was given the volunteers at the Union Interallie at which addresses were made by M. Briand, Minister of Foreign Affairs; M. Laurent-Eynac, Commissioner-General for Aeronautics; M. Franklin-Bouillon; General Jacquemot; Col. Féquent, Chief of the French Aviation Service; and Marcel Knecht, editor of "LE MATIN".

The first contingent of the aviators above mentioned left Paris on August 5th for Rabat via Marseilles, Barcelona, Malaga, making the journey in planes driven by French pilots. At Rabat they were welcomed on August 11th by a group of French aviators who had come expressly from Fez, and General Hoesch, former Marshal Lyantey's Chief of Staff. At a luncheon given in the officers' mess of the 37th Aviation Corps to which the American squadron was attached, the Presidential decree on the uniform to be worn was read; khaki, stripes on sleeves and dark-blue cap. As a distinctive mark the American aviators were given a five-pointed star between two wings on the lapels of their tunic and their cap, this being the emblem of the Sultan of Morocco.

On August 17th, Colonel Sweeney submitted to General Naulin, the French Commander-in-Chief, his program - the departure

by

by the end of the week of nine aviators, in groups of three, flying to the army zones of Wezzan, Fez and Taza, working alternately, and reassembling at Fez on Sept. 2nd. The entire contingent of American volunteers (including some French volunteers) was received in special audience, accompanied by former Marshal Lyautey and his General Staff, by the Sultan of Morocco at the Palace at Rabat on August 21st, at which his Majesty was presented an emblem of the American squadron - a gold medal - similar to one already accepted by former Marshal Lyautey. Immediately after the presentation at the Palace, the American fliers returned to Fez to be definitively incorporated to the Sultan's army (August 21st).

No news of any sort as to particular actions of the French air forces, participated in by the Americans, has been published in any of the Paris papers nor have any casualties been reported, with the exception of Lieut-Col. Charles W. Kerwood, who sustained slight injuries at Casablanca in making a bad landing during a trial flight late in August.


NE
French papers did not comment as extensively on the formation and actions of the squadron as might have been expected, but their attitude was uniformly laudatory, although several papers later published news of the receipt by the American Legation in Cairo of a long petition, protesting against the Americans taking this step, and stated that the Egyptian Nationalist Press was extremely bitter in its comment. On September 22nd L'HUMANITE (the Communist organ) commented on Secretary of State Kellogg's reported advice relative to American aviators in Morocco, as follows: "It would not be unsafe to say that this is only America's first step against the imperialist French plans of a conquest of the Rif".

The reported plans for the disbanding of the aviators have received little or no comment in the press of Paris.

There were several other comments - See N.Y. Times.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, likely of Myron T. Herrick, written over a horizontal line. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long, sweeping underline that extends downwards and to the left.

Myron T. Herrick

In quintuplicate.

No. 159

AMERICAN CONSULATE,
Madrid, Spain.

WE
SOLICITORS OFFICE
DEC 2 1925
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 6, 1925
So
Acc



SUBJECT: FURTHER CAMBO CORRESPONDENCE RE.
ABANDONMENT OF SPANISH MOROCCAN PROTECTORATE

UNDER SECRETARY,

NOV 30 1925

DEPT. OF STATE,


THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

DEC 3 1925

Dept. of State

WASHINGTON.



Copy in WE.

SIR: Copy to DP-Sig Sub

681.00 / 1180
INDEX BUREAU

I have the honor to refer to my despatch of October 24, 1925, (No.154), transmitting translations of correspondence between former Minister Francisco Cambo and General Primo de Rivera on the subject of Morocco.

El Debate of Madrid and La Veu of Barcelona published yesterday morning, November 5, simultaneously, a supplementary statement by Sr. Cambo, expanding his arguments for the abandonment of the Moroccan Protectorate. It is so long that I will only summarize its contents, though enclosing the full Spanish text.

Beginning with the assertion that all are in accord that Morocco cannot be considered as a colony for Spain, Sr. Cambo attacks the argument that it is a military asset, declaring that it only creates two new frontiers, one maritime and the other terrestrial, increasing the vulnerability of the peninsula. If Spain, in agreement with France, should go to war with England, her communications with Morocco would be cut at once, isolating and inutilizing the Spanish army and military material in Morocco. If Spain should,

with

with England, war on France, Morocco would constitute another frontier with France which the British fleet could not defend. The problem of frontiers, that is of invulnerability of frontiers, therefore, counsels Spain to abandon the Protectorate. General Primo de Rivera, Sr. Cambo alleges, does not consider and never has considered Morocco as a Spanish frontier, as shown by his famous speech in the Senate in 1921.

The solution proposed by Primo de Rivera in his answer to Cambo's first letter is, according to Sr. Cambo, the same, with slight discrepancies, as that of all the governments of Spain from 1912 onward, and the President of the Directorate must achieve it with the same materials with which the previous governments disposed. To do so his permanence in power, however long it may last, would not be long enough.

Sr. Cambo then adverts to the "formidable fermentation in which all the Musulman world finds itself today", stating that the "brain and motive power of the Islamic movement, the University of Cairo" is interested in the war in Morocco and in all the corners of the Musulman world, to "the miserable huts of the Bedouins of the desert of Syria, in which are found traces of subscriptions in favor of Abd-el-krim".

Referring to the question of international prestige, he says:

"For

"For some years I have passed the greater part of my time outside of Spain. By private and business relations, I treat with politicians, diplomats, and financiers of the principal countries of Europe. I can then affirm, without being in anything unfaithful to the truth, that I have not found one - and among them figure great friends of Spain - who does not consider inexplicable the insistence of Spain in sustaining in Morocco an effort for which they see no compensation; I have not found one who does not think it would be an immense fortune for Spain to get rid of Morocco.."

He suggests that the Spanish diplomatic corps abroad be instructed to sound out the Chancellries on the abandonment of the Protectorate, adding that he is sure that if Primo de Rivera should ask the best qualified persons of the diplomatic service, not in official form, "to which they always respond by making the greatest effort to say nothing", but privately and unofficially, for a candid report, he would be agreeably surprised to find that the fear of renouncing the Protectorate because it might debilitate the prestige of Spain abroad is a pure fancy of those who never have taken the trouble of informing themselves of what is thought abroad about the affairs of Spain. Retirement from Morocco, he believes, would be received as a success of foreign politics, comparable with the retirement of Prim from Mexico in 1866.

Sr. Cambo explains his change of attitude since 1914 when, as a member of the Ministry, he opposed abandonment by the fact that the European war which he feared might be fought over Morocco has since occurred on a different pretext, and that now nobody wants Morocco badly enough

to

to challenge the peace of Europe. He dwells particularly on the present friendly relations between France and England, which he believes would not now consider Morocco a bone of contention justifying a general combat.

"The end of the Spanish action in Morocco", Sr. Cambo adds, "would produce immediately the international re-valuation of the peseta for it would signify the balancing of the budget and the vigorization of the Spanish economy".

As to military perils of retirement, of pursuit of the Spanish army by Riffians and Yebalas, Sr. Cambo believes the President of the Directorate has been unduly modest in appreciating the importance of the Alhucemas victories. He believes that Abd-el-krim's power was shattered by the recent actions and that his ability to harass the retreat has been greatly over-estimated.

Sr. Cambo's solution exacts previous agreement with the powers which imposed the Protectorate on Spain in a conference in which Spain shall frankly expose her decision to renounce all effort in Morocco, using her undeniable right, and fulfilling the sacred duty of serving her best interests, putting herself in accord with France and England as to how and when the renunciation shall be effectively accomplished. "It has been believed too much in Spain", he says, "that by amiability and complacency the esteem of foreign governments is obtained, when, in reality, it is conquered only by defending our interests
with

with the same entirety with which the others are accustomed to defend theirs."

Renouncing the zone of the Protectorate, by means of negotiation, the problem of giving a "hinterland" to the places of sovereignty (Melilla, Ceuta, Tetuan, et al) would not present the difficulty which impeded the success of the negotiations of which Primo de Rivera spoke in his answer to the first Cambo letter. Maintaining the status quo all alteration is an insuperable difficulty; changing the status quo these difficulties are removed. And if they persisted, the simple announcement of the decision of Spain to retire also from the places of sovereignty, if necessary, would be sufficient to banish them.

"And at bottom", says Sr. Cambo in conclusion, "this problem has little importance. The day in which Spain abandons its zone of Protectorate, some power willing to receive the sacrifice which now weighs on Spain - France or England - would take our succession. And in any of the two hypotheses - the only ones possible (war with France against England, or with England against France) - the defense of our places of sovereignty could have interest in only one eventuality, and for this eventuality I believe it preferable that we should not have conditions of defense. If some day Spain had the misfortune to be at war with France or with England, no one need have the illusion that we can defend these places; and if England and France should go to war with each other, having these places strongly armed would only augment the perils that Spain could not preserve her neutrality."

Primo de Rivera's Comment

The comment of Primo de Rivera on Sr. Cambo's letter follows:

"Through

"Through the censorship I have known in advance of its publication the new work relative to Morocco which Sr. Cambo makes public in El Debate, and as my comment has to be very brief and I am on the eve of departing (for Morocco), I wish to answer it before doing so.

"The present moments, in which we have to reap the fruit of the victory of Alhucemas, do not permit me to disclose the actions which the Directorate is making in international politics, as in the domestic politics of Morocco, and therefore everything counsels me not to add a word more to what I judged necessary to orientate public opinion in this matter, leaving, then (in his first answer to Cambo's first letter) indicated, though veiled, that the Directorate was not 'exclusivista' in the criterion which circumstances were making as most convenient to the Spanish interest.

"What I must make clear is that the defense of the places of sovereignty, of which I spoke in my previous letter, was that of the land fronts, which would have no influence in the hypothesis of a war with another European nation, as Sr. Cambo appears to indicate in the last paragraph of his article. For this I pointed out the necessity of a greater fortifiable exterior field for the cited places.

"For my part, and believing that I have said as much as I ought, in this controversy, and solicited by other attentions, I cease to intervene in it, hoping that soon real and satisfactory deeds may demonstrate that the government has a solution, worthy and sensible, for this problem."

It is considered significant that of the Madrid newspapers only El Debate, a strong supporter of the Directorate, and later La Nacion, the Directorate's official organ, published Sr. Cambo's article in full. This fact, with the somewhat cryptic comment of General Primo de Rivera, tend to confirm the impression caused by the previous correspondence between these two

illustrious

illustrious individuals, that the Directorate is not disposed to a revision of the Moroccan situation which will relieve the country of the burden of the Protectorate.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Augustin W. Ferrin

AUGUSTIN WM. FERRIN
American Consul

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✓
Enclosures:

Newspaper clippings of
Sr. Cambo's letter and
Primo de Rivera's reply.

El artículo

En su edición de esta mañana ha publicado en Barcelona "La Veu de Catalunya" el siguiente artículo de D. Francisco Cambó:

Marruecos no es colonia de España

"La acogida extremadamente benévola que el presidente del Directorio y la mayor parte de la Prensa (salvando excepciones bien explicables) han dado a mi carta, me estimula a precisar todavía más mi pensamiento sobre la política que le convenga a España seguir en Marruecos.

A las precisiones del presidente del Directorio—exponiendo con una claridad que hasta los más distantes de sus afirmaciones han de reconocer y aplaudir—quiere corresponder con toda la precisión de que sea capaz.

Tanto en mi carta al general Primo de Rivera como siempre que me he ocupado de este problema, he afirmado que Marruecos no debía ni podía considerarse como una colonia para España. Como en este punto el acuerdo es unánime, no vale la pena de insistir.

Pero si todos están de acuerdo en que Marruecos no se ha de mirar como una colonia, conviene que de una vez procuremos ponernos del acuerdo sobre lo que es o puede ser Marruecos para España; que sólo así sabremos hasta dónde España puede tener interés en continuar el sacrificio que le cuesta mantener su protectorado sobre Marruecos.

Tampoco es nuestra frontera

Fué moda un tiempo decir que Marruecos era para España una frontera. Yo creía que nadie sostenía ya esta tesis; pero estos días, como un fantasma que reaparece, la he visto mantenida por el diario que fué órgano oficial del partido conservador. Hablemos de ello.

Todos los problemas de fronteras—todos los que enumera "La Epoca" y muchos más de que se podría hablar—, todos tienen por causa el deseo de un Estado de dar a sus fronteras una mayor invulnerabilidad, ya acortándolas, ya haciéndolas coincidir con un obstáculo natural que facilite la defensa en caso de invasión: el mar, una gran río o una cadena de montañas. Pues bien: yo afirmo que basta con mirar el mapa para ver que España, extendiendo su soberanía a una parte de Marruecos, no fortalece, sino que debilita considerablemente sus fronteras en caso de una guerra. Extendiendo España a Marruecos no suprime ninguno de los puntos vulnerables que puedan tener sus fronteras peninsulares: la frontera sur, la que mira a Marruecos, estará igualmente abierta a quien tenga el dominio del mar, tanto si España domina como si no domina una parte de la otra orilla del Estrecho. En cambio, el poseer territorios en el norte de África crea para España dos nuevas fronteras, una marítima y otra terrestre, con el aumento natural de vulnerabilidad, y, por tanto, de debilitamiento estratégico que de ello resulta.

Para caso de guerra

Para caso de guerra se han de examinar dos hipótesis: la de que España vaya de acuerdo con Francia y contra Inglaterra, y la de que España vaya de acuerdo con Inglaterra y contra Francia. Si va de acuerdo con las dos, no hay problema. Si va de acuerdo con Inglaterra y está en lucha con Francia, España resultará debilitada militarmente por razón de su posición en Marruecos, porque tendrá con Francia una nueva frontera terrestre, que las escuadras británicas no podrán defender, lo que obligará a España a distraer en Marruecos una parte de su Ejército y de su material, con considerable debilitamiento de la potencia militar de España en la Península. Si entra en lucha con Inglaterra, desde el primer momento tendría España cortadas las comunicaciones con su zona de Marruecos, y el ejército y el material que España tuviera en Marruecos resultarían perdidos para ella.

Es tan evidente que el problema de fronteras—es decir, de invulnerabilidad de fronteras—aconseja a España renunciar a la zona de Protectorado de Marruecos, que se explica tan sólo que se hable de este problema en sentido contrario por la curiosa persistencia que tienen en la opinión las fórmulas simples... cuando vienen a dar una explicación a lo que en el fondo no tiene ninguna.

El general Primo de Rivera no cree que Marruecos sea para España una frontera. No lo ha creído nunca, y en un discurso memorable que pronunció en el Senado a fines de 1921 impugnó esta tesis con argumentos de una fuerza incontrovertible.

Marruecos es para España lo que con una claridad que todos debemos aplaudir dijo el general Primo de Rivera: "Mal asunto, en verdad, éste de Marruecos, amigo mío; nos toca a todos mejorarlo, en cuanto sea posible, como carga que el sino histórico puso sobre los hombros del noble pueblo español."

Los planes del general

En los diferentes párrafos del apartado nueve de su carta expone todo un plan, no para resolver, sino para atenuar el problema de Marruecos, para disminuir la pesada carga con que va gravitando sobre España.

Reconozco que, de seguir en Marruecos, no se puede hacer otra cosa. He de añadir que las soluciones que patrocina el general Primo de Rivera son las mismas que, con ligerísimas discrepancias, han expuesto, como propósito, como programa, todos los Gobiernos de España desde 1912 en adelante. De la manera como se tradujeron en la práctica aquellos propósitos vale más no hablar. Para juzgar cómo se traducirán en la práctica los propósitos del general Primo de Rivera, sólo tengo que consignar que tendrá éste que valerse para la acción española en Marruecos de los mismos elementos de que se valieron los anteriores Gobiernos. Y si cree que estos mismos elementos darán, por el impulso de su acción personal, un resultado distinto del que antes dieron, habré de decirle que el éxito de una política que ha de desarrollarse en muchos años no se puede cifrar en la permanencia en el Poder de un hombre cuya vida material está en las manos de Dios y cuya permanencia en el Poder, por larga que sea, no lo será nunca tanto como reclamaria la ejecución total de su política marroquí.

Todos los cálculos que, con indudable

todavía, sangrantes, las heridas que la guerra provocó. El prestigio y la eficacia que en estos últimos tiempos tiene la Liga de Naciones son hijos de este estado de espíritu que hoy reina en Europa.

Momento favorable al abandono

Pero es que ahora se produce un hecho excepcionalmente favorable para que España pueda plantear sin peligro su renuncia a Marruecos: es la cordialidad excepcional que reina hoy entre Francia e Inglaterra, las dos potencias que resultarían afectadas por nuestra renuncia. Nunca, desde que terminó la guerra, las relaciones entre Francia e Inglaterra habían sido tan efusivas como lo son hoy.

Y este hecho crea para España un momento excepcionalmente favorable para seguir sin peligros los dictados de su interés nacional. Yo señalo este momento a la atención y meditación del presidente del Directorio, y le recuerdo que la historia de los pueblos está hecha toda de momentos. ¡Y ay del pueblo que no sepa aprovechar el momento favorable que pasa por delante de su puerta!

El peligro de la retirada

Señala el general Primo de Rivera los peligros que correría el Ejército español, en caso de retirarse, de ser perseguido por los yebalás y rifeños. Yo creo que el presidente del Directorio es excesivamente modesto al apreciar la trascendencia de las últimas victorias del Ejército español. Ni tanto como algunos creen cuando piensan que después de los últimos éxitos militares el problema marroquí estaba resuelto, y que a las fuerzas de Abd-el-Krim no les quedaba ya potencia combativa, ni tampoco como, con excesiva modestia, cree quien tiene el mérito principal de aquellas victorias al no estimar que la fuerza de los yebalás y rifeños está hoy muy debilitada—más, acaso de lo que lo estará mañana—, y que sus ataques serían hoy inmensamente menos peligrosos de lo que lo fueron cuando después de la victoria alcanzada en el Lau—que marca el momento de la máxima fuerza de Abd-el-Krim—, el Ejército español emprendió la retirada de que con tanto orgullo habla el general Primo de Rivera.

Pero tanto cuando se hace este argumento como cuando se dice que España no puede resolver el problema de Marruecos con un "ahí queda eso", el general Primo de Rivera me atribuye algo de lo que hasta podría sentirme molesto si no hubiese recibido simultáneamente pruebas de tal consideración personal que suprimen todo propósito de molestia.

No; no he dicho ni he pensado nunca que España dijese al mundo un "ahí queda eso", ni que el Ejército español hubiese de emprender una retirada con todos los caracteres de una huida; el que eso dijese no merecería que nadie se tomase la molestia de constatarle.

La solución que yo patrocino exige una previa negociación con los países de acuerdo con los cuales se nos atribuyó el Protectorado de Marruecos. Exige una negociación, pero no una negociación en la que, como tantas veces, España no tenga pensamiento o le falte energía para sostenerlo: una negociación en la que España exponga su decisión de renunciar a todo esfuerzo en Marruecos, en uso de un derecho indiscutible y en cumplimiento del deber sagrado de servir su conveniencia, poniéndose de acuerdo con Inglaterra y Francia para fijar el cómo y el cuándo había de llevarse a efectividad la renuncia.

Puedo asegurar al general Primo de Rivera que con la energía en sostener el interés español, hasta cuando molesta o contraría a una gran potencia—cuando se tiene razón y se defiende un interés notorio—, ni España ni los que la representan pierden por eso la consideración y el respeto de aquellos a quienes se contradice, sino bien al contrario. Yo podría explicarle cómo sirviendo desde el Gobierno intereses españoles notorios, en frente de intereses de alguna gran potencia, gané la consideración y la estima de los políticos extranjeros con los cuales luché, y cómo después de haber provocado contra mí vivísimas campañas de Prensa..., en el Extranjero y en España me han considerado y estimado precisamente por haber sabido plantear aquellos intereses conforme al cumplimiento de mi deber.

Se cree demasiado en España que con amabilidades y complacencias se gana la consideración y la estima de los Gobiernos extranjeros, cuando en realidad sólo se conquistan éstas defendiendo los intereses que se representan con la misma entereza con que ellos están a veces a defenderlos.

Fermentación musulmana

Y yo quiero insistir todavía una vez más en el estado de fermentación formidable en que se encuentra hoy todo el mundo musulmán. Hasta hace pocos años, nuestra zona de Marruecos no mantenía relación de ninguna clase con el resto del mundo musulmán. Hoy la tiene y siente todas las convulsiones del mundo musulmán y recibe de éste impulsos morales y concursos materiales considerables. No hace muchos meses pude apreciar cómo el cerebro y motor actual del movimiento islámico—la Universidad de El Cairo—se interesaba por la guerra de Marruecos, y en los rincones más lejanos del mundo musulmán, hasta en las miserables barracas que tienen los beduinos en el desierto de Siria, encuentre rastros de las suscripciones a favor de Abd-el-Krim.

Si España tuviese que continuar en Marruecos por el "sino histórico", de que habla el general Primo de Rivera, creería yo que España tendría que resignarse a ello, procurando reducir el sacrificio en todo lo posible, aceptando por adelantado todos los contratiempos y calamidades a que está sujeta una empresa semejante. Pero creo que vale a pena de examinar si son una realidad los inconvenientes que en la renuncia al Protectorado encuentra el general Primo de Rivera para justificar la existencia del fatal sino histórico a que debe resignarse España.

La renuncia al Protectorado

Hace años que paso la mayor parte del tiempo fuera de España. Por relaciones particulares y de negocios trato particularmente con políticos, diplomáticos y financieros de los principales países de Europa. Pues bien; puedo afirmar, sin ser en nada infiel a la verdad, que no he encontrado uno solo—y entre ellos figuran grandes amigos de España—que no considerara inexplicable la insistencia de España sosteniendo en Marruecos un esfuerzo al que no ven ninguna compensación; no he encontrado uno solo que no estimase que sería para España una fortuna inmensa el poder desentenderse de Marruecos.

Nadie mejor situado para apreciar cómo se juzga en el Extranjero la acción de España en Marruecos y cómo sería juzgada su decisión de renunciar al Protectorado, que el Cuerpo diplomático que España tiene diseminado por el mundo. Hay en él hombres notables, que no están, como otros, alejados espiritualmente del ambiente en que se vive, sino que, por su talento y por sus relaciones, pueden dar al Gobierno de España una información ilustrada y sincera sobre aquellos puntos. Tengo la plena convicción de que si el general Primo de Rivera pidiese a las personas más calificadas y mejor situadas del personal diplomático español, no en forma protocolaria—a la que se responde siempre haciendo el máximo esfuerzo para no decir nada—, sino en forma verbal y privada, una leal información, tendría la agradable sorpresa de enterarse de que el temor de que la renuncia al Protectorado debilitaría el prestigio exterior de España es una pura fantasía de los que nunca se han tomado la molestia de enterarse de lo que en el Extranjero se piensa de las cosas de España.

Creo formalmente que el prestigio exterior de España saldría por eso fortalecido; estoy plenamente convencido de que el gesto de España renunciando al Protectorado sería recibido como una demostración de que España actúa como país plenamente independiente, que sigue en política exterior la política que su interés demanda. Sería para España un éxito de política exterior, como lo fué el gesto de Prim retirándose de Méjico.

El fin de la acción española en Marruecos produciría inmediatamente la revalorización internacional de la peseta, porque significaría la nivelación del Presupuesto y la vigorización de la economía española. Y yo no diré que hoy los factores económicos lo sean todo—creo, como el que más, en la fuerza de los factores morales cuando son una realidad y no un fantasma—; pero nadie negará que hoy los países que tienen una moneda sana, un presupuesto en equilibrio y una economía próspera, encuentran en estos he-

Las contradicciones de Cambó

Cuando en los años 19 y 20 la moneda española estaba más alta que todas las demás monedas, España tenía un prestigio exterior que yo pude apreciar con hechos muy concretos y tangibles y del que España no se dió bastante cuenta ni aprovechó como podía.

En 1914—en un discurso que me han exhumado ahora algunos diarios en la tarea infantil de buscar contradicciones... y del que estoy más satisfecho y orgulloso cada día—dije que sería, entonces, una imprudencia para España, renunciar al Protectorado de Marruecos; porque, dado el ambiente que se mascaba en Europa, poner en discusión el problema del equilibrio del Mediterráneo provocaría la guerra europea, y España, que la habría así motivado, no podría permanecer ausente de ella. Dos meses después de haber pronunciado yo aquellas palabras estallaba la guerra europea por un hecho mucho menos importante, en el orden internacional, que el equilibrio del Mediterráneo.

Sostiene el general Primo de Rivera que hoy, como en 1914, sería peligroso plantear el problema de equilibrio del Mediterráneo, y se lamenta de que no se aprovechara el período de la guerra, en que todo estaba en discusión, para que España hubiese salido de Marruecos.

Yo no creo que el que España plantease hoy su voluntad de renunciar al Protectorado sobre una parte de Marruecos crease el más leve peligro de provocar una guerra en la que se pudiese ver comprometida España.

Nuestra soberanía y la neutralidad

Al contestar a la objeción anterior va implícitamente contestada ésta que el general Primo de Rivera señala en el tercer párrafo del apartado cuarto de su respuesta. Renunciando a la zona de Protectorado, mediante una negociación, el problema de dar a las plazas de soberanía el "hinterland" absolutamente necesario para su defensa, o en soberanía o en Protectorado, no presentaría la dificultad que ha impedido el éxito de las negociaciones de que habla el presidente del Directorio. Manteniendo el "statu quo", toda alteración es una dificultad insuperable; cambiando el "statu quo", estas dificultades quedan allanadas. Y si todavía subsistiesen, crea el general Primo de Rivera que el solo anuncio de la decisión de España de retirarse también de las plazas de soberanía, si hiciese falta—nadie podría objetarnos nada..., y, de hacerse, bien poco perdería España—, este solo anuncio sería bastante para desvanecerlas.

Y en el fondo este problema tiene bien poca importancia. El día que España abandonase su zona de Protectorado sería porque alguna potencia a quien tuviese cuenta recibir el sacrificio que hoy pesa sobre España—Francia o Inglaterra—tomase nuestra sucesión. Y en cualquiera de las dos hipótesis—las únicas posibles—, la defensa de nuestras plazas de soberanía sólo podría tener interés en una eventualidad..., y para esa eventualidad creo sería preferible que no tuviesen condiciones de defensa. Si un día tuviese España la desgracia de entrar en guerra con Francia o con Inglaterra, no hay que hacerse ninguna ilusión de que pudiésemos mantener aquellas plazas; y si entrasen en guerra Inglaterra y Francia, el tenerlas fuertemente armadas sólo serviría para aumentar los peligros de que España no pudiese conservar su neutralidad.—Francisco Cambó."

La nota

El anterior artículo, que al mismo tiempo que "La Veu", publica "El Debate", ha merecido la siguiente nota del presidente del Directorio militar, general Primo de Rivera:

"Por la censura he conocido antes de su publicación el nuevo trabajo relativo a Marruecos que hace público el Sr. Cambó en "El Debate", y como mi comentario ha de ser brevísimo, y estoy en vísperas de ausentarme, quiero dejarlo consignado antes de hacerlo.

Los momentos actuales, en que hemos de recoger el fruto de la victoria de Alhucemas, no me permiten descubrir las gestiones que el Directorio hace, tanto en política internacional como en interior, de Marruecos, y, por lo tanto, todo me aconseja no añadir una palabra más a lo que juzgué preciso decir para orientar a la opinión en este asunto, dejando entonces apuntado, aunque veladamente, que el Directorio no era exclusivista en el criterio que las circunstancias le iban marcando como más conveniente al interés español.

Lo que sí debo aclarar es que la defensa de las plazas de soberanía, de que yo hablaba en mi carta anterior, eran las de los frentes de tierra, que nada influirían en las hipótesis de guerra con otra nación europea, según parece indicar el Sr. Cambó en el último párrafo del anterior artículo. Por eso señalaba la necesidad de un mayor campo exterior fortificable a las aludidas plazas.

Por mi parte, y creyendo haber dicho cuanto debo en esta controversia, y solicitando por otras atenciones, cese de intervenir en ella, esperando que pronto hechos reales y satisfactorios demuestren que el Gobierno tiene solución *digna y sensata* para este problema."





EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



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No. 5720

Paris, November 14, 1925



Copy in WE.

INDEX BUREAU
881.00/1181

The Honorable

The Secretary of State
Washington.

Sir:-

With reference to my despatch No. 5701 of
November 10, 1925, I have the honor to transmit
herewith the original and translation of an article
which appeared in LE TEMPS of today's issue.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

[Signature]
Myron T. Herrick

In quintuplicate

DEC 4 1925
FRT END

Translation of an Article Which Appeared in LE TEMPS

November 14, 1925.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE RIFFIAN SQUADRON

The Riffian squadron has been dissolved. The officers who composed it are returning to France. This squadron was made the object of the following appreciative citation, signed by Marshal Pétain, with reference to the brilliant services rendered by these volunteers on the Moroccan front:

"The squadron, brilliantly commanded by Colonel Sweeney and solidly composed of Colonel Kerwood, Majors Pollock and Sussan, Captains Holden, Butts, Mussain, Weller, McGibney, Sparks, Rockwell and Bullen, and Lieutenants Cousins, Bennington, Jibney and Day, desirous of devoting themselves to the cause of France, came to Morocco in a fine gesture of enthusiasm and solidarity with their comrades of the Great War.

"This unit, remarkable for the abnegation and the high moral value of its members, daily executed difficult missions and distant liaisons, and flights of reconnaissance and bombardment, accomplishing in six weeks more than 350 war missions and releasing more than forty tons of projectiles."

La dissolution de l'escadrille chérifienne

L'escadrille chérifienne a été dissoute. Les officiers qui la composaient rentrent en France. Cette escadrille a fait l'objet de la citation glorieuse suivante, de la part du maréchal Pétain, pour les brillants services que ses volontaires ont rendus sur le front marocain :

L'escadrille, brillamment commandée par le colonel Swcency et solidement encadrée par les officiers volontaires: colonel Kerwood, chefs de bataillon Pollack, Susan, capitaines Holden, Buts, Mussain, Weller, Macgibony, Sparks, Rockwell, Bullen, lieutenants Cousins, Bennington, Jibeney et Day, désireux de se dévouer à la cause française, qui sont venus au front du Maroc dans un beau mouvement d'enthousiasme et de solidarité envers leurs camarades de la grande guerre;

Cette unité, remarquable par l'entrain, l'abnégation et la haute valeur morale de ses équipages, exécuta journellement des missions difficiles et lointaines de liaison, de reconnaissance et de bombardement, accomplissant en six semaines plus de 350 missions de guerre et lançant plus de quarante tonnes de projectiles.

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 851.00/703 FOR #5724

FROM France (Herrick) DATED Nov. 19, 1925
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 GPO

881.00 / 1182
get INDEX BUREAU

REGARDING:

According to LE MATIN of November 15th, it is expected that aerial warfare will continue in Morocco throughout the winter.

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 852.00/1567 FOR #752

FROM Spain (Moore) DATED Nov. 16, 1925

TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Celebration of event of proclaiming Muley Hassan as the new
Caliph of the Spanish Zone of Morocco in Tetuan.

flw

925
851.00/1183

WEEKLY REPORT

In continuation of what was said on the subject last week, the new Caliph of the Spanish Zone of Morocco, His Imperial Highness Muley Hassan, was proclaimed as such with due solemnity in Tetuan on the 8th instant, and festivities in celebration of the event continued on into the 9th and 10th. Primo de Rivera and high Spanish officials attended; the exchanges of felicitations and public utterances generally were platitudes. Some newspaper comment has appeared touching the event, but nothing of particular importance. LA EPOCA (Madrid aristocratic daily) sums up as follows:

"The accord with France, the termination of a series of fortunate military operations, even the change of High Commissioners and ranking military officials in Ceuta and Melilla, all of this coinciding with the proclamation of the Caliph indicates that there is a desire to initiate a new stage in Spain's action in Morocco and that all the facts noted are indicia of the beginning thereof".

Primo de Rivera during the week visited the eastern zone in company with General Sanjurjo, new High Commissioner. He is again in Tetuan and is expected to return to the peninsula on the 26th or 28th, after visiting Arcila and Larache. Following visits to three or four important centers in Southern Spain he will come on to Madrid, arriving about the 7th.

Military conditions in the Spanish zone continue tranquil and without change.

.

Newspapers outside of Spain are publishing details of an alleged new attempt against the Directory fomented during.....

during the first few days of November. No Spanish papers have published a word on the subject, doubtless because of the censorship.

After sifting rank exaggeration it appears that among a certain military element there was fomented a plan of opposition against Primo de Rivera. Their discontent was based on the late promotions in Morocco, some of which were referred to in last week's report. As a result several retired army officers have been arrested and whatever plot was on foot has been effectually nipped in the bud. The Embassy learns that several days ago Admiral Magaz, President ad interim of the Directory made a statement to the Associated Press representative wherein he said that it could be authoritatively published that the plot was not of sufficient importance to give worry to the government, that it was started by a small minority of discontented persons not figuring on the active list of the army, and that the reports published have been both exaggerated and unfounded.

In this connection reference is made to the Embassy's telegram No. 69 of November 16, 11 a.m.

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 852.01/11 FOR Tel.74 5pm

FROM Spain (Moore) DATED December 3, 1925

TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Audience with the King in which he expressed desire that
Spain be permitted to police Tangier; thinks it would
help to solve Moroccan problem.

See copy attached.

re

INDEX NOTED
881.00/11 84

WP

GREEN

Madrid

Dated December 3, 1925

Rec'd 3:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

74, December 3, 5 p. m.

Supplementing my telegram of December 3, 1 a. m. In audience granted me today King spoke with confidence of new political arrangement and stated that for one year preparations had been made looking to this change but that conditions in Morocco had up to now prevented effecting it. He said Tangier being an international zone cost Spain twenty thousand soldiers to police boundary and prevent contraband. He said he did not ask that Tangier be turned over to ~~Spain~~ ^{Spain} but he believed that the powers should permit Spain to police it and that this would help to solve the Moroccan problem.

Spain is quite tranquil. The suddenness of the change has created much interest and it is believed to be a step toward normalcy.

MOORE

CSB

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE.....800.404/7.....FOR.....#5773.....

FROM.....France.....(Herrick).....DATED.....Nov.27, 1925.....
TO.....NAME.....

INDEX BUREAU
881.001/85

REGARDING* Transmitting article reporting presence in Germany of several leaders of the Inter-Islamic Movement, and Outlining their activities there. Refers to the Riff Situation.

Wh

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

881.00

SEE 816.00/570 FOR desp.915-G

FROM Salvador (Engert) DATED Nov.20,1925
_JO NAME 1-1127 GPO

881.00/187

-- REGARDING:

reporting press comments on warning
said to have been issued by Secretary
Kellogg to American aviators in
Morocco.

mg

(b) American Aviators in Morocco.

LA PRENSA of October 22, under the heading "A strange decision of Secretary Kellogg's" refers to the warning said to have been issued by the Department of State to the American aviators serving with the French forces in Morocco that they were violating the laws of the United States by fighting "against a friendly nation". After stating parenthetically that the American unit in question "is of absolutely no military value" and is used by the French merely for the moral effect, LA PRENSA expresses surprise that the American Government should suddenly have become so cautious when it was a well-known fact that thousands of Americans fought on the side of the

Allies

Allies long before the United States entered the war, and "there have always been some Americans fighting in the revolutionary armies of Latin America". The writer of the article also wonders why Secretary Kellogg should call Abdel-Krim's forces "a friendly nation" and why he should have chosen the eve of the arrival of the French Debt Commission for the publication of this warning. "The incident", the article continues, "is comparable in its inopportuneness to Mr. Kellogg's famous outburst against the Government of General Calles, and the Department of State has been severely criticised for it"


No. 40

American Agency and Consulate-General

Tangier, Morocco, November 24th. 1925.

*File ml
CRC T*

SUBJECT: The Tangier Statutes.



881.00/188
INDEX BUREAU

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:-

I have the honor to transmit herewith, in quintuplicate, newspaper cuttings from the issue of November 21st. 1925 of the local English weekly publication "Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa" in which dissatisfaction is expressed concerning the operation of the Tangier Statutes.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant

Maxwell Blake

Maxwell Blake.
American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul-General.

DEC 23 1925
FITZGERALD

THE INTERNATIONAL ZONE.

There is a tendency at the present moment, to realise that all is not well in the Tangier Zone.

The Chanceries of Europe and the Foreign Office, are seriously considering what steps can be taken to bring about an improvement.

There is at the same time, a feeling that even amongst the signatory nations, that harmony, which alone could make the position a possible one, is showing signs of discord.

We have been accused at times of criticising existing arrangements, without suggesting a method by which they could be improved.

Although we have before now made various suggestions, they have perhaps been forgotten and we return again to the task.

There is more than one way out of the difficulty, but the point to which we have to direct our attention, is to find the line of least resistance.

We can not help feeling that unless we can have real internationalism, and that is impossible without another Conference, and an entire re-construction of the Statute, which would probably result in nothing, there is only one solution of the difficulty which might content all parties.

The question of government under a mandate by the League of Nations, has, we believe, been discussed but not with the seriousness that the case demands.

When it was under discussion, the Statute had not been formulated, or if formulated had not taken actual bodily form, and it was dismissed with the idea that an international form of Government would be the best, that the Statute provided the necessary machinery, and that any defects in the machinery could be put to right afterwards.

As we know, only too well, the defects in the machinery are so serious, as to necessitate a new machine, or at all events, such an entire re-construction that it would be easier to make a new one.

It would be an easier matter to put the Government into the hands of the League of Nations, than to have a new Conference to which every one is opposed, and which, in any case, would be a lengthy business.

We first have to consider whether it would meet with much or any opposition from the interested Powers, and with the possible exception of France, we believe the suggestion would be well received.

Now, there are two ways by which the League of Nations governs at present, the first is by mandating the territory to one of the Powers, and this has grave disadvantages, which it is not necessary to discuss at the moment.

The second method of which Danzig presents a conspicuous example, is by the appointment of a High Commissioner who, with the assistance of a Municipal Council rules under the direct authority of the League.

If any principles of logic are to be applied, the only Power on whom a mandate could be conferred would be Spain.

The Tangier Zone is wedged in between two portions of the Spanish Zone, and it is only common sense to argue that Spain is clearly indicated, as the Power which should be predominant.

That, at the present moment, there would not only be violent opposition by France, but almost equally strong opposition by England, is not to be denied.

England, and probably other Powers, would at the present time assert that until the Riff War was ended, and the whole position of the Riff country, put on a satisfactory and unquestioned basis, it would be clearly impossible to have the neutrality of Tangier endangered, but assuming that the Riff country was settled on a secure basis, with satisfactory guarantees to prevent any interference with the neutrality of Tangier, is there any valid reason why an honest attempt should not be made to come to such an agreement.

We must not forget that, although the United States of America, Italy and Portugal were deliberately ignored, to say nothing of the other Powers who signed the Treaty of Algeciras, it is quite impossible to ignore them again, and further that without their concurrence, no re-construction is possible, on any lasting basis.

As regards a Mandate, if the necessary agreement of the other Powers, could not be obtained for that mandate being given to Spain, is there any possible objection to a High Commissioner.

Let us consider for a moment, what would be the effect on Tangier, if such a change could be made.

We should be able to trade freely, without frontiers, without let or hindrance, from end to end of the Spanish Zone.

We should get rid of all questions of defence, of all fiscal difficulties.

Capitalists who at the present time are holding back, would be willing to put money into Tangier and develop it.

That the arrangement would not suit everybody, is obvious but we believe it is beyond the wit of man to devise any scheme of government that would do that.

It would be easy to safeguard international interests, as far as Justice and Finance are concerned.

The existing Mixed Tribunal might be adhered to in principle, and some reservation with regard to finance might be necessary but we believe that these are matters of comparatively easy adjustment.


We desire to give a note of warning. Unless some change is made with the agreement of the Powers, a more radical change is likely to be brought about in spite of them, or of some of them.

Let the Authorities bear in mind, that if the Statute were challenged before the Tribunal of the Hague, and declared invalid they would have a much more difficult situation to deal with, than if they recognise at once that a change must be made.

881.00



DEC 24 1925



MILITARY

CONFIDENTIAL

FRENCH TROOPS - MOROCCAN CAMPAIGN

FROM WESLEY FROST,

American Consul.

Marseille, France.

November 30, 1925.

In October it was stated at Marseille that the 8th and 12th Regiments, T. C., 30th Infantry Division, were about to be returned from Morocco to their regular quarters at Toulon and Aix-en-Provence respectively. At the same time it was said that a battalion of the 4th R. T. C. was about to leave Toulon for the Syrian campaign.

Further arrivals of troops at Marseille from North Africa have been announced as follows:

November 22, one battalion of the 159th Infantry Regiment and one battalion (the 27th) of the Chasseurs Alpins from

Morocco

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Morocco, on board the S. S. SOUIRAH.

November 23, the 7th and 13th battalions of the Chasseurs Alpins, from Tunis, on board the S.S. GOUVERNEUR GENERAL GREVY.

November 25, a battalion of the 159th Infantry Regiment, from Morocco, on board the S.S. ONOLOFF.

November 28, two battalions of the 141st Infantry Regiment, and the 6th Battalion of Mitrailleurs, from Morocco, on board the S.S. IONIE.

November 29, the 15th and 23rd Battalions of the Chasseurs Alpins, from Morocco, on board the S.S. ANFA.

The 3rd Infantry Regiment and the Mountain Batteries of the 93rd and 94th Artillery Regiments are expected in the near future.

CONFIDENTIAL NOTE.

The local newspapers have been receiving letters of complaint from local relatives of the soldiers still in service in Morocco. It appears that the small "guitoune" tents now in use are not waterproof, so that the troops are suffering from the wet weather as well as from the low temperature. The PETIT PROVENCAL, organ of the Socialist Party, now in power, has judged it advisable to print an apology for this state of affairs, which it insists is not due to lack of ordinary foresight but to the unprecedented severity of the autumn weather. Wooden barracks are said to be under construction and nearing completion.


Wesley Frost,
American Consul.

WF/ach

820.

UNDER SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

December 21, 1925.

Mr. Castle:

I heard Major Peshkoff (?) of the French Foreign Legion speak after lunch on Saturday at Colonel Donovan's on the subject of Morocco. He talked for about forty-five minutes and showed a number of lantern slides.

I am told that he is here ostensibly to arrange the details of the visit of the American Legion to France in 1926 but actually his mission appears to be propaganda.

He presented the usual French case, namely, that it was the Riffs who had attacked France instead of France attacking the Riffs, and that if the Riffs would come to terms they could have peace at any ^{time} ~~term~~.

He ascribed Abd-el-Krim's power to a combination of circumstances--the weakness of Spain in Morocco, pan-Islamism, bolshevik money and propaganda, the intrigues of foreign concession hunters (Germans?) and the rivalry of the European Powers. However, he seemed inclined to believe that Abd-el-Krim's prestige was on the wane and that it was not impossible that his place as leader of the Riffs might pass to another chief.

He gave some very vivid pictures of the fighting and of the difficulties of the country. Airplanes, he said, had not been of much use except for reconnaissance, as there was nothing in the way of towns, rail stations, troop

concentrations,

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concentrations, etc., for them to bomb. He said that the Riffs were excellent marksmen and could bring down by rifle fire airplanes flying below six hundred meters. He did not refer in any way to the American aviators, and I think the omission was intentional.

He evaded questions as to the number of troops employed, merely stating that at one time the French had 130,000 men (the maximum was, I believe, over 200,000) and he said that the size of the Riff contingents was entirely dependent upon whether Abd-el-Krim was advancing or retreating.

He said that the Riffs killed and mutilated their prisoners and told of one sergeant who was captured and later found roasted (grillé). He said that no gas had ever been employed largely in deference to international public opinion, although he personally saw no reason why it should not have been used.

When asked about Spanish military collaboration, he was very vague and tended to belittle the Spanish effort.

The question was put to him "what would be the result if Morocco fell?" He replied that the first result would be the massacre of all Europeans, probably by the natives already pacified (a very significant comment on the French position in Morocco and one which Major Peshkoff may not have appreciated). Next would come Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli and Egypt, and there was no telling what would happen.

He

He talked at some length of the necessity of working out a new basis for relations between Europe and the East in general, as changed conditions had made the old basis no longer workable. This change was due, in part, he thought, to the increasing numbers of Orientals and Mohammedans who were getting their education in Europe.

He dwelt at length upon the physical improvements--roads, ports, etc., in the French protectorate and then put the rhetorical question "Would not France lose more by not fighting to protect her position and investment in Morocco than she is spending on the conduct of ^{the} war?" This in reply to the general criticism that had been made to the effect that France, in her present financial condition, should not waste money on colonial wars.

After the lecture he was heard to say that he was not a propagandist and also that he would have liked to tell more about the improvements in French Morocco, which confirmed my worst suspicions.

It is a little difficult to determine the exact purpose of his remarks but I imagine that they are not unconnected with the negotiation of the French debt settlement and that they are designed to offset the very considerable body of opinion adverse to France and her so-called "imperialism".

He impressed me as being a very cagy operator, particularly in the way in which he turned off questions that he did not want

to

to answer. At one time he professed not to remember the name of the present Governor General of Morocco, I think for the purpose of seeing if anyone present knew enough about Morocco to volunteer it, but as no one answered he recalled that it was Steeg, "a civilian".

Senator Wadsworth, Colonel Donovan, Colonel Winship and Mr. Dewey all took a leading part in putting questions. For obvious reasons I asked no questions and took no part in the discussion as I did not wish it to appear that the subject was⁺anything but ~~of~~ academic interest to me

WE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS



Mr. [unclear],

I think that these
letters will be of
interest to you.

It

Mr. Carter -
Many thanks. These
are intensely interesting.
Let me see more of
the same kind. Please
L.S.

INDEX BUREAU
DEC 28 1925
Dept. of State



Tangier, Morocco.

November 25th. 1925

My Dear Carter:-

In this letter I hope I may safely report the close of the last chapter of the Odyssey of the American Fliers in Morocco. They received a collective order of citation, and all left Morocco some ten days ago. For the purposes of identification and the completion of your Files on this subject, I give a translation of the order, reading as follows:- Rabat, Morocco, Nov, 14th. 1925.

Citation of the Shereefian Squadron.

Squadron brilliantly commanded by Colonel Sweeney and solidly composed of volunteer officers: Colonel Kerwood, Battalion Chiefs Pollack, Sussan, Captains Holden, Buts, Mussain, Weller, Macgibony, Sparks, Rockwell, Bullen, Lieutenants Cousins, Bennington, Jibeney and Day, desirous of devoting themselves to the French cause, who have come to the Moroccan front, in a fine movement of enthousiasm and of solidarity towards their comrades of the Great War.

This unit remarkable for the high spiritedness, the abnegation and high moral value of its crews, executing daily difficult and distant liaison, reconnoitring, and of bombing expeditions, carrying out, in six weeks more than 350 war missions and dropping more than 40 tons of projectiles.

(signed) Pétain.

On their way out of Morocco, one of the fliers, Edward Ferrand, whose name was not in the citation order came in, as a sort of chief delegate, to see me, and I had an extremely interesting and very satisfactory conversation with him. I explained to him the misunderstandings

Henry Carter, Esquire.

Department of State,

Washington.

FILED
DEC 28 1925

881.00/1191

misunderstandings that had been created by their action in enlisting as a body, and the unfortunate character of the publicity which was everywhere spread broadcast concerning their activities. I told him that public opinion in the United States had been unfavorably affected, and while there was no desire on any one's part to interfere with their personal liberty, it became imperative to disassociate the name of the American Government with their adventure in Morocco. I asked him very frankly whether or not, after his experiences in this country, he entertained any doubts, that the presence of the American aviators in Morocco, was not made use of principally for Press propaganda, and to affect native opinion and he replied with equal frankness that he was satisfied that this had been the case. He told me that none of the aviators had considered at all the political effects of their action, that they had enlisted simply as an adventure, and without other ulterior motives, adding however that they were now glad to leave the country, and in his opinion there was not the remotest likelihood of their return. He told me he was extremely grateful for the conversation he had had with me and for the spirit which actuated my explanations, and that he would fully report what I had told him to the other members of the corps.

I understand that Ferrand was about the best flier of the lot but apparently he was a dissident and did not fall under the favor of Colonel Sweeney. This may explain why his name was omitted from the citation order, and the strained relations with most of the fliers may be accounted for by some dark and suspicious shadows about his finger nails.

I am sending you attached to this letter paraphrase of telegram No. 11 which I find, from the Code Room, arrived in a garbled condition. The code text is being corrected and will be sent by next pouch, but the paraphrase is still readable matter, especially if the original message was not fully decipherable. I will take up various other matters with you in my next letter.

Frost arrived about a couple of weeks ago and reported for duty and of course it is needless for me to say that I am extremely pleased to have him. He has made the best of impressions everywhere. His manner is modest and he has an abundance of good will and he is eager to take over any character of work which is entrusted to him.

Very sincerely yours, and incidentally many thanks for your letter of October 30th. last.

Wm. B. Force

FP
Please
note

Paraphrase of Telegram No. 11 sent by the American Diplomatic Agency from Tangier, Morocco, to the Department of State on June 30th, 1925, 10 p. m., contents of which were indicated as Confidential. This message was garbled in delivery and corrections in Code text are being made and will follow by next Pouch.

-----:-----

Following the sojourn of the American Diplomatic Agent in Madrid, on his way to Morocco, it was ascertained that the primary purpose of the Conference in Madrid between the Spanish and French Governments was to find a formula upon which the two Powers might conjointly submit peace terms to the Riffian leader Abdelkrim.

From the beginning the French delegates made it obvious that any proposals which they might make would rest conditional upon a recognition of the sovereignty of the Sultan but at that time owing to the internal political situation in France, little else would have been exacted of the Riff leader than his solemn and formal pledge to loyally fulfil his engagements in this particular. In exchange for such a pledge, France would have consented to an extensive rectification of the Wergha frontier and she was not averse from agreeing even to pay an annual subsidy to Abdelkrim.

At the date of this telegram the danger was foreseen of formulating premature comments or of overemphasizing conditions which might be described as ephemeral in Morocco, but it seemed clear even at that time,

time, that the Conference would fail in its main objectives. There were many complications one of which was the Tangier problem and its wavering existence under a new political order in marked contrast to old creeds and past cultural conditions. The object of the telegram was purely informatory and was sent for supplying as much advance information as seemed possible under rapidly changing conditions and developments.

In the Franco-Spanish Conference the Spanish desiderata embraced as one of the principal essentials, the liberation of the Spanish prisoners in the Riff, but there was almost an insuperable difficulty over this point owing to the fact that the unfavorable military position of Spain in Morocco, was such that that Power was unable to offer Abdelkrim compensations equal in value to the conditions she asked to be complied with. At the time of this telegram, the point in question was left in abeyance and the delegates, next took up the question of an active military co-operation and alliance, but it soon appeared that public opinion, in neither France nor Spain would actively support measures of this character and less so in Spain where it was generally felt this would have been the most fatal step of all.

Fresh impediments were constantly encountered even with reference to blockading the Riffian coast. It was soon realized that to render a blockade effective

by

by sea, would have been tantamount to a joint declaration that the Riff leader was actually a belligerent and a statement of this character would have enormously enhanced Riffian prestige throughout Europe and the Mohammedan world.

On the other hand geographical conditions imposed themselves; the Moorish coast line is dangerous and indented and the enforcement of a blockade within the territorial waters of the Riff region would actually become an impossibility. A discussion then ensued as to whether it was likely that any of the European Powers would have consented to recognize the blockade and permit the search of their vessels in such highly frequented waters as the entrance to the Straits of Gibraltar, and along the littoral of the Western Mediterranean.

The question was next mooted of invoking the special treaties which the American Government had negotiated with certain Powers in respect of their liquor conventions, as establishing a precedent for the right of search beyond the maritime league or the three mile limit.

There were other points which the telegram mentioned not necessary for repetition in a paraphrase message, but the comment was made in a casual reference to the operation of the Statutes of Tangier and it was remarked that this institution might have been more virtuously endowed had it been conceived with more vision,

and

and there were sufficient indications, at that date, that its existence would perhaps be a somewhat abbreviated one and entirely devoid of glory. It was thought that, without any great flux of time, changes would become imperative and the likelihood of a Conference was not to be discounted, in which non adhering States might be asked to participate and even all of the Powers who were signatories to the General Act of Algeciras of 1906.



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WE
Recd 1/15/26
74 Kirkland St.,
Cambridge, Mass.
Jan. 11th, 1926.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN 13 1926

DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

The Honorable, The Secretary of State,
Washington, District of Columbia.

Dear Sir:

In studying the question of American citizenship and the status of Americans abroad who have enlisted their services, either in a foreign army or navy or in a Foreign Legion, here in the Harvard Law School, the more particular cases of the American aviators who have recently been in Morocco, become of keen interest and importance. Would it be possible, with such study in view, to get information from the Department as to their names, under what conditions they fought, what oaths they may have taken in the units in which they served, how their citizenship was affected and what their status, from the point of view of the State Department finally was. Any information the Department can supply, including statements issued at any time by the Department in regard to them, will be greatly appreciated. I am, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Eugene Le Baron, Jr.

Eugene Le Baron, Jr.

881.00/1193

JAN 23 1926

RECEIVED

INDEX BUREAU

In reply refer to
SO 881.00/1193

January 22, 1926.

Mr. Eugene Le Baron, Junior,
74 Kirkland Street,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Sir:

The Department has received your letter of January 11, 1926, in which you state that in connection with the study of American citizenship laws in the Harvard Law School, you are interested in the cases of the American aviators who were recently reported to be assisting the French forces in Morocco. You ask to be informed under what conditions these men fought, what were their names, what oaths they took in connection with their service, and how their citizenship was affected thereby.

Some months ago the Department received letters stating that American citizens were reported to be enlisting in the Army of the Sultan of Morocco for service in Morocco. These letters indicated some apprehension concerning the situation and called the Department's attention to the matter. The

Department

881.00/1193

Department, realizing that misapprehension might also exist in Morocco, considered it advisable to inform its officer in Morocco of the laws respecting the enlistment of Americans in foreign military forces. To this end a telegram was sent to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier, stating that in order to avoid any misapprehension as to the reported enlistment of American citizens in the Sultan's forces, he might care to consider the advisability of calling the attention of American citizens in Morocco to the provisions of Section 5282 and Section 4090 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which read as follows:

R. S. 5282 (Section 10 of the United States Criminal Code)

"Whoever, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains another person to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, as a soldier, or as a marine or seaman, on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer shall be fined not more than a thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than three years."

which was amended on May 7, 1917, by adding the following proviso, which became ineffective at the termination of the late war:

"Provided, That this Section shall not apply to citizens or subjects of any country engaged in war with a country with which the United States is at war, unless such citizen or subject of such foreign country shall hire or solicit a citizen
of

of the United States to enlist or enter the service of a foreign country. Enlistment under this proviso shall be under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War."

R. S. 4090

"Capital cases for murder or insurrection against the Government of either of the countries hereinabove mentioned (extraterritorial countries), by citizens of the United States, or for offences against the public peace amounting to felony under the laws of the United States, may be tried before the Minister of the United States in the country where the offense is committed if allowed jurisdiction; and every such Minister may issue all manner of writs, to prevent the citizens of the United States from enlisting in the military or naval service of either of the said countries, to make war upon any foreign power with whom the United States are at peace, or in the service of one portion of the people against any other portion of the same people; and he may carry out this power by a resort to such force belonging to the United States, as may at the time be within his reach."

The Department is not in a position to furnish you with the names of the American aviators who are reported to have enlisted in Morocco, nor has it any information that they took any oath of allegiance to a foreign Power in connection with their alleged service. In the absence of such an oath of allegiance, their military service would not cause the loss of their American citizenship. However, the Department felt it to be its duty to call the attention of American citizens in Morocco to the laws of the United States making unlawful the enlistment

listment in foreign armies of American citizens in the United States or in countries where we enjoy extra-territorial privileges.

I am, Sir,


Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:


JOSEPH O. GREW

Under Secretary.

R CR NS
Jan. 13, 1913 PM

W2 W2


SO:RTY:EH:SS

Pelican Ice Company, Limited

MEMBERS OF N. O. ASSOCIATION OF COMMERCE

CHAS. H. BEHRE, PRESIDENT
THEO. S. BEHRE, SECT'Y & TREAS.

ALL AGREEMENTS ARE CONTINGENT UPON STRIKES AND OTHER DELAYS
UNAVOIDABLE OR BEYOND OUR CONTROL. QUOTATIONS ARE
SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE

OFFICE AND FACTORY
1550 ST. LOUIS ST.

SHIPPING TELEPHONE MAIN 1280
OFFICE TELEPHONE MAIN 1559

New Orleans, La., Jan. 26, 1926

Hon. Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Secretary:

Will you kindly advise the writer if this picture at-
tached hereto, regarding the American citizens in violation
of all claim and fairness, should have made themselves too
to the French Nation to subjugate people with whom the
Government of this nation is in friendly touch with and return
to this country to be prized as heroes in such a damnable cause,
will be accepted by our Government without public criticism or
penalty!

My understanding was that this was absolutely forbidden
by the Government, and I was very much disturbed to see this
picture taken from one of our local papers as of January 24th.

Yours very truly,

Chas H Behre

FEB 4 1926

and

881.00/1194

881.00

WE

RECEIVED
FEB 2 1926
U.S. DEPT OF STATE
WEBB
PROPERTY AFFAIRS



MAY BECOME
QUEEN
The latest and one
most likely among
the choices as a
the Prince of
She is pictured
in a stroll in one of
the parks of Stockholm,
accompanying her moth-
er, Princess Ingeborg, and
her brother, Prince

—Kadel & Herbert.



AMERICANS OF THE ESCADRILLE HONORED

Our picture shows the six members of the American Escadrille who aided the French in their war against the Riffs in Morocco. Public commendation was shown them, as photographed, by General Gouraud. The six Americans shown in the foreground, front row, are Granville Pollock, James Sussan and Schuyler Cousins, and, in second row, Charles Sweeney, Charles M. Kerwood and Dr. V. Sparks. Pollock and Cousins have been credited to New Orleans.

—Wood





ALL DRESSED UP IN WOOLEN SKATING CAP AND LEATHER JERKIN

Henry Ford on his recent visit to Sudbury, Mass., dropped for the time being his role of propagandist of the "Old Time Dance" to try his skill on ice skates. On left we show a close-up of the famous Ford smile.

-Kadon & Herbert.

February 4, 1926.

In reply refer to
WE:881.00/1194

Mr. Charles H. Behre,
1550 St. Louis Street,
New Orleans, Louisiana.

Sir;

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of January 26, 1926, with its enclosure, regarding the status of American citizens reported to be serving in the armed forces in Morocco.

It is believed that the following statement of the facts in the matter will be of interest to you.

During the summer of 1925 letters were received by the Department stating that American citizens were reported to be enlisting in the army of the Sultan of Morocco for service in Morocco. These letters expressed apprehension concerning the situation and appeared to consider that the matters should receive the attention of the Department. The Department, realizing that the misapprehension might also exist in Morocco, believed it advisable and proper to inform its officer in Morocco of the laws with respect to the enlistment of Americans in foreign military forces. It, therefore, sent a telegram

to

881.00/1194

to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier stating that in order to avoid any misapprehension which might be caused in Morocco by the reports of alleged enlistment of American citizens in the Sultan's army, it was suggested that he might care to consider the advisability of calling to the attention of American citizens in Morocco the provisions of Section 5282 and 4090 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. These statutes read as follows:

R. S. 5282 (Section 10 of the United States Criminal Code):

"Whoever, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains another person to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, as a soldier, or as a marine or seaman, on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer shall be fined not more than a thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than three years, * * *"

to which was added on May 7, 1917, the following proviso which ceased to have effect at the termination of the late war:

"Provided, That this Section shall not apply to citizens or subjects of any country engaged in war with a country with which the United States is at war, unless such citizen or subject of such foreign country shall hire or solicit a citizen of the United States to enlist or enter the service of a foreign country. Enlistment under this proviso shall be under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War."

R. S. 4090 reads as follows:

"Capital cases for murder or insurrection against

the

the Government of either of the countries hereinabove mentioned (extraterritorial countries), by citizens of the United States, or for offences against the public peace amounting to felony under the laws of the United States, may be tried before the Minister of the United States in the country where the offense is committed if allowed jurisdiction; and every such Minister may issue all manner of writs, to prevent the citizens of the United States from enlisting in the military or naval service of either of the said countries, to make war upon any foreign power with whom the United States are at peace, or in the service of one portion of the people against any other portion of the same people; and he may carry out this power by a resort to such force belonging to the United States, as may at the time be within his reach."

The Department has no evidence as to whether the aviators in question did or did not enlist in the Army of the Sultan of Morocco nor has it information as to the nature of their connection with the armed forces in Morocco. The Department, however, felt it to be its duty to call the attention of American citizens in Morocco to the laws of the United States designed to prevent and make unlawful the enlistment, in the United States or in countries where we enjoy extraterritorial privileges, of American citizens for service in foreign armed forces.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr., Chief,
Division of Western European Affairs.

Feb. 6, 1926

WE:JDD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

October 31, 1925

Dr. Richardson:

I should prefer to let the whole matter rest until it is again brought to our attention by the Spanish Ambassador. In our acknowledgment we merely said that we would give his proposal consideration and made no promise to reply.

Moreover the situation is at present so confused that I do not believe anything is to be gained by bringing up the question of our recognition of the Spanish Zone at this time, and this we could hardly avoid in any communication we might make.

The Spanish Government has shown no further interest in the course of twelve months, and therefore I think we can mark this File.

WE:HC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SO (Mr. Anderson)

I am in full

agreement with Blak

+ suggest accepting

Riano in the sense

of Blak's pp 6-7 — this

will keep our foot in

the door pending an

new Moroccan Liquid

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
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SOLICITOR

Index Bureau
REC.
JAN 27 1926
Dept. of State

October 27, 1925.

WE
Mr. Carter:



The attached despatch from Tangier appears to present a political rather than a legal question. Blake's suggestion on pages 6 and 7 is a matter of policy with respect to exchanging the settlement of all outstanding cases with the Spanish authorities and the assenting to Spanish taxes in the Spanish zone of Morocco in return for the recognition of the Spanish protectorate by this Government. From the legal point of view, of course, the proposed taxes will not bear upon American citizens until the assent of this Government is given. You may prefer, however, before considering assenting to any taxes, to follow Mr. Blake's suggestion with a view to settling the question of recognition of the Spanish protectorate over the Spanish zone.

As previously pointed out by this office, the only tax referred to in the Spanish Ambassador's

note

881.00/1195

FEB 4 1926
PTY END

INDEX BUREAU

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SOLICITOR

- 2 -

note, which raised this whole question, that ^{are} ~~is~~ similar to any of the taxes in the French zone appears to be the taxes upon industry, commerce, professions, and fairs. The imposition of these taxes and the tax on beer would not be objected to by this office, but it cannot see its way clear to consent to the stamp tax. This stamp tax would appear to be contrary to the provisions of Article 65 of the Act of Algeciras. (See Memo. of Nov. 6, 1923)

FMA:VMM:SS

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jma".

American Friends of the Riff


who are organizing

The Americas' Commission for the Riff

- Purposes—1. To secure recognition as belligerents of the Berbers under Krim.
2. So they may receive medical supplies and Red Cross Service.
3. Then to promote enduring peace, with justice to all and autonomy for an unconquerable people in their homeland.

Office of the chairman, Herbert Myrick, Room 800, Myrick building.

Springfield, Mass., U. S. A., Feb. 6, 1926



Courtesy of the New York Times.

Stop this annihilation of an Ancient People

Honorable Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

You may wish to keep the inclosures on file.

Very respectfully,

Herbert Myrick


Herbert Myrick
Chairman American Friends of the Riff

Inclosures:

- Article in "Justice" February 1926
- Clipping from Springfield Republican Jan. 17, 1926
- Wisset Farms Talks pages in New England Homestead Feb 6, Jan 30, Jan 23
- Certified copy of letter to Ambassador Beranger, copy of which was sent to the Spanish Ambassador.

"The IMPORT of the RIFF—A blazing cry for justice to one of the most ancient of peoples. Their regeneration may clear up an ominous situation and avert a world catastrophe."

See this comprehensive article in the Magazine JUSTICE for February, 1926



FEB 10 1926

881.00/1196

88 INDIAN BUREAU

Cloudy, Colder Today
Partly Cloudy Tomorrow

Details of Weather on Page 2

ESTABLISHED BY SAMUEL BOWLES
WEEKLY IN 1824; DAILY IN 1845; SUNDAY IN 1846

I. C. C. SQUABBLE COLLAPSES AFTER TAYLOR APPROVED

Alabama Nominee Gets Committee O. K.—Woodcock Case Still Pending

REGIONAL PROPOSAL ALSO GETS APPROVAL

Opposition to Both Men Promised on Senate Floor, However—Taylor Creates Favorable Impression

Washington, Jan. 11.—(AP)—Senate opposition to one of the two Interstate Commerce commission nominees submitted last week by President Coolidge virtually collapsed today after the interstate commerce committee voted unanimously for a favorable report on the appointment of Richard V. Taylor of Alabama.

The nomination of Thomas F. Woodcock of New York, who was given a recess appointment last summer after the Senate failed to act on the last session, still is pending, however. He appeared before the committee Saturday and will be heard again Wednesday.

Smith Bill Approved
Before acting on the Taylor nomination, the committee without dissent, but with only eight members present, approved the principle of the Smith bill for recess appointments to the Interstate Commerce commission.

The committee vote on the Taylor nomination for 30 minutes after the committee had been held in "open executive session" for 30 minutes, and a slight owing to 68 years and a night illness, he impressed the committee with his knowledge of railroad affairs and of problems confronting the industry in the South, particularly in the Gulf section.

The nomination will not go through the Senate without dissent, however, Senator Hiram, Democrat of South Carolina, who has been a vocal opponent of the Taylor nomination, said he would demand consideration of both this and the Woodcock nomination in "open executive session."

Members of the committee who are supporting Mr. Woodcock said they would continue to do so, but they were not in any wise associated, and each was to be heard in his own right. Senator Hiram, Democrat of South Carolina, who has been a vocal opponent of the Taylor nomination, said he would demand consideration of both this and the Woodcock nomination in "open executive session."

Approval of the principle of the bill, under which recess appointments would be divided into regions for purposes of appointments to the commission, was the first action taken by the committee. The bill, introduced by Senator Smith of South Carolina, authorizes the president to make recess appointments to the commission, and the bill, named "An Act to provide for the filling of vacancies in the Interstate Commerce Commission," was introduced by Senator Smith of South Carolina.

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Berlin, Jan. 11.—(AP)—President von Hindenburg has given the party leaders until Thursday morning to consider among themselves the possibility of forming a coalition government with a wide political base in the Reichstag. He will call for their report at that time and if they are not in agreement, he is determined to exercise his initiative and himself choose a man to form a government.

The new government is expected to be formed by the coalition of the Nationalists, the Social Democrats, the Progressives, the Catholics, and the Communists. The coalition is expected to be formed by the coalition of the Nationalists, the Social Democrats, the Progressives, the Catholics, and the Communists.

"South-Paw" Cop
Gets Two Bandits
By Speedy Draw

Cleveland, Jan. 11.—(AP)—Two bandits are in the hands of the police of the city of Cleveland, Ohio. The bandits were captured by a police officer named "South-Paw" who is known for his quick draw.

Garland Arrested; Gives \$1000 Check for \$500 Bail; Hovey Woman Disappears

Leader of "Colony" at Allentown, Pa., Charged With Adultery—Other Members of Colony Called as Witnesses—Reported Garland's Wife on Way to Join Husband "Whom She Still Adores"—Eccentric Millionaire Borrows Dollar to Go With Officers—Flustered By Telegram

Allentown, Pa., Jan. 11.—(AP)—A dramatic "short" was being played today by District Attorney E. Boyle to the effect that the "Colony" at Allentown, Pa., was a group of people who were living in a "colony" and were being led by a man named Garland. Garland was arrested today on a charge of adultery.

It had been the intention of the author of the "Colony" to have the man arrested on a charge of adultery. The charge against Garland was adultery.

Borrowed Dollar
When the warrant was issued, Garland, he made no comment.

WEST SIDE WILL GET REDUCTION IN TELEPHONE RATES

Chief O'Brien Outlines New Schedule to Agawam Congregational Men's Club and Members Vote to Accept

Outlining a proposal that will bring a decided reduction in telephone rates to 225 residents of Agawam and West Springfield, William H. O'Brien, chief of the telephone and telegraph division of the state public utility commission, outlined the new schedule today at a meeting of the Agawam Congregational Men's Club.

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SPRINGFIELD, MASS., TUESDAY

HOUSE TAX RAISERS SCHEDULE PAID BY SENATE

Plan on Normal Income Improved With Democrats' Substitution

CAPITAL STOCK LEVY REPEALED BY

Action Seeking to Veto Inheritance Tax
Minority Waps 25 Per Cent Surtax

Washington, Jan. 11.—(AP)—Vital revenue provisions of the House revenue bill, including the income tax schedule, were accepted today by the Senate Finance Committee in rejecting the Democratic program calling for a total tax reduction of \$100,000,000.

Changes Made in House
The following changes in the House revenue bill were accepted by the Senate Finance Committee today:

On Riff League
At Local Club
Herbert Myrick Tells Winthrop of Pan-American Scheme for Recognition of Embattled Rebels

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ANUARY 12, 1926—SIXTEEN PAGES

MINERS REJECT LATEST OFFER ON PEACE PLAN

Coal Conference Makes No Progress and Adjourns Until Today

LEWIS DETAILS ARBITRATION IDEAS

Miners Will Not Consider This Plan on Wages Alone
Property Rights Ought to Be Considered

New York, Jan. 11.—(AP)—Another peace plan popped up in the anthracite wage conference today and was promptly knocked flat. The conference made no material progress and adjourned until today.

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ANUARY 12, 1926—SIXTEEN PAGES

Picked Troops Go to Get Bandits in Train Massacre; American Tells of Escape

"Nightmare of Wanton Bloodthirstiness," Says Virginian, First Survivor of Mexican Express Holdup and Slaughter of Guards and Passengers—All of Soldier Escort Killed and 50 Men, Women and Children in Cars Murdered—Pursuing Force to Take No Prisoners

Mexico City, Jan. 11.—(AP)—The "nightmare" of the Mexican revolution, the massacre of the passengers of the train between Mexico City and Oaxaca, was described today by a Virginian, the first survivor of the massacre.

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ANUARY 12, 1926—SIXTEEN PAGES

NEW ENGLAND FARM VALUES ON UPGRADE

Myrick Optimistic in Address Before Winthrop Club

The greatest difficulty facing New England agriculture today is the shortage of labor, according to Herbert Myrick, editor of the New England Farmer, in an address to the Winthrop club.

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ANUARY 12, 1926—SIXTEEN PAGES

ARRESTED FOR ROBBING COTTAGES

Three Southwick Men Are Charged With Larceny From Summer Camps at Congamond

Southwick, Jan. 11.—(AP)—A series of summer cottage robberies at Congamond, Mass., have been traced to three men from Southwick, who were arrested today.

Changes Made in House
The following changes in the House revenue bill were accepted by the Senate Finance Committee today:

On Riff League
At Local Club
Herbert Myrick Tells Winthrop of Pan-American Scheme for Recognition of Embattled Rebels

Stora were taken at a meeting at the Winthrop club yesterday to organize a pan-American league, to be known as the "American League for the Recognition of the Rights of the Rebels."

Approval of the principle of the bill, under which recess appointments would be divided into regions for purposes of appointments to the commission, was the first action taken by the committee. The bill, introduced by Senator Smith of South Carolina, authorizes the president to make recess appointments to the commission, and the bill, named "An Act to provide for the filling of vacancies in the Interstate Commerce Commission," was introduced by Senator Smith of South Carolina.

HINENBURG FORCED
TO USE "BIG STICK"
Tells Party Chiefs in Berlin to Form Coalition Cabinet by Thursday or He Will Do So Himself

Berlin, Jan. 11.—(AP)—President von Hindenburg has given the party leaders until Thursday morning to consider among themselves the possibility of forming a coalition government with a wide political base in the Reichstag. He will call for their report at that time and if they are not in agreement, he is determined to exercise his initiative and himself choose a man to form a government.

The new government is expected to be formed by the coalition of the Nationalists, the Social Democrats, the Progressives, the Catholics, and the Communists. The coalition is expected to be formed by the coalition of the Nationalists, the Social Democrats, the Progressives, the Catholics, and the Communists.

"South-Paw" Cop
Gets Two Bandits
By Speedy Draw

Cleveland, Jan. 11.—(AP)—Two bandits are in the hands of the police of the city of Cleveland, Ohio. The bandits were captured by a police officer named "South-Paw" who is known for his quick draw.

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ANUARY 12, 1926—SIXTEEN PAGES

Wanted Men Go to Get Bandits in Train Massacre; American Tells of Escape

"Nightmare of Wanton Bloodthirstiness," Says Virginian, First Survivor of Mexican Express Holdup and Slaughter of Guards and Passengers—All of Soldier Escort Killed and 50 Men, Women and Children in Cars Murdered—Pursuing Force to Take No Prisoners

Mexico City, Jan. 11.—(AP)—The "nightmare" of the Mexican revolution, the massacre of the passengers of the train between Mexico City and Oaxaca, was described today by a Virginian, the first survivor of the massacre.

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ANUARY 12, 1926—SIXTEEN PAGES

RUBBER MEN PLAN TO GROW OWN SUPPLY

Production Under American Control of Needs of United States Protected

New York, Jan. 11.—(AP)—A detailed plan for production under American control of the bulk of crude rubber needed by the United States will be considered tomorrow by the board of directors of the Rubber Association of America.

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Starting Sweet Clover

I have a very poor piece of land that I want to build up with sweet clover. Would you recommend using 16% acid phosphate, or nitrate soda, and how much of each per acre? I am going to inoculate the sweet clover seed. Do you think Farm-O-Germ is reliable that Haskell Implement & Seed Co. have for sale? Where would you advise buying inoculating germs, also sweet clover seed. I have two plots, one is sandy loam the other one third clay and two thirds loam.—[Z. Y. C., Maine.]

Biennial sweet clover is one of the easiest to grow of all the clover family, but if you are sowing it upon land where it has never grown it will be wise to inoculate the seed with the variety of bacteria adapted to sweet clover. Farm-O-Germ or others in that line puts up bacteria for sweet clover, another for alfalfa and so on. Of course you understand that the bacteria which thrives on sweet clover may be quite a "different breed" from the germs that thrive on alfalfa, soy beans, vetch, etc.

Sweet clover seed should be sown on well prepared land as early as the soil can be worked. This seed has a very tough and hard shell, but if sown early while the soil is moist the heat and moisture will soon soften the shell so that the seed will sprout. But if the soil is dry, or you are late in sowing it this spring, it is a wise precaution to scratch or scarify the seed. A simple and quick way of doing this is to drive sharp nails thickly into an empty nail keg, fill it about half full of sweet clover seed, put on a cover, then rotate or roll so as to scratch the seed.

We infer that your "very poor land" has not been worked for a long time, is hard packed, not aerated and lacking in bacterial life. The more deeply it is plowed and harrowed so as to let in the sun and air, the better for sweet clover or any other crop. Many of these old lands need to let in the sunshine and air, as well as to plow under green stuff whose rotting will supply bacteria. If you can get a load of loam from some neighbor's field where sweet clover is thriving, spread it lightly on your land, either with or immediately after the seed, and harrow both in at once, preferably upon a cloudy, foggy or moist day before the hot-sunshine can kill the bacteria. Use per acre 300 to 500 pounds of acid phosphate mixed with 100 or 200 pounds of nitrate, broadcasted as evenly as possible and harrowed in before seeding.

You ought to get a fine catch that

will make a good growth by mid-summer, when it can be grazed down by the cows, sheep or (rung) hogs. Do not feed it too close, for it should go into winter in a vigorous state. The following spring it will "grow like a house afire," so much so that you will have to plow it down a week or two before corn planting time or it will be too big to plow under.

Inside Facts of Sugar Tariff


What our Washington correspondent said in The Homestead Jan 9 about the sugar tariff interested me immensely. For as a champion of the then infant beet sugar industry, I had no small part in making the high tariff on sugar. At the crisis over the tariff bill, I wrote the paragraph acceptable to the beet sugar people, President McKinley told Chairman Foraker to go ahead with it, and the bill became law in exactly my phraseology.

Then Roosevelt dropped into the presidency, and was going "to give the American market to the poor Cubans before Christmas!"

"You never were so mistaken in all your life, Mr. President," I replied in our talk at the White House the third day he was in the office. "The roses will bloom again in the Aroostook before the Senate acts, and then it will be only a 20% differential." That was what transpired the following June.

I was working to create a home market for a new crop, sugar beets, that would pay western farmers a fair profit in lieu of surplus grain. But it is shameful how much of the tariff went to the factories and how little to the growers. Great Western Sugar Co shows profits of nearly \$135,000,000 "over and above its investment 20 years ago". At least half those ungodly profits should have reached growers in dividends on beets! Today, in spite of present low prices of sugar, the beet sugar industry could be made profitable right here in New England, especially in the Connecticut valleys, if growers could get a square deal in it.

Do you realize how your body's structure is like unto that of the cat? Or that during your prenatal nine months you passed through the whole evolution of the race that had taken millions of years? Or that even heredity may be somewhat influenced, while environment can be wholly controlled? Enough in these three questions to keep you thinking—[H. M.]



Squeezing the Life Out of an Ancient People?

Did you read in my Wisset Talks last week how France and Spain plan to subjugate the Berbers and Moors of The Rif who, in all time heretofore, have succeeded in resisting all invaders? This picture and last week's story make this whole thing as plain as A B C. If you agree with me that the Berbers under Abdel-Krim are entitled at least to the rights of belligerents so that they can have Red Cross aid equally with their foes, just write to Herbert Myrick, Chairman American Friends of The Rif, Springfield, Mass. "Please enroll the undersigned as a Friend of The Rif, adding your signature and address. Of course, this does not bind you in any way financially or politically, but does express your sympathy with an indomitable people who are putting up the greatest fight the world ever saw for what is their homeland, which they have possessed from time immemorial."

It is just fine the way our folks are responding to this call in behalf of liberty and freedom. Thanks for the many signatures already sent in. Let's roll up a million names.



I say they're good Overalls

IN THESE days of goods-made-to-sell, it's refreshing to find some products are still made first of all to SERVE.

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Write for booklets, etc. Agents wanted in uncovered territory. Are you interested?

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NEW INVENTION SAVES MILLIONS

A Lamp that Burns 94% Air.

A new oil lamp that gives an amazingly brilliant, soft, white light, even better than gas or electricity, has been tested by the U. S. Government and 35 leading universities and found to be superior to 10 ordinary oil lamps. It burns without odor, smoke or noise—no pumping up, is simple, clean, safe. Burns 94% air and 6% common kerosene (coal oil).

The inventor, R. W. Johnson, 642 N. Broad St., Philadelphia, is offering to send a lamp on 10 days' FREE trial, or even to give one FREE to the first user in each locality who will help him introduce it. Write him today for full particulars. Also ask him to explain how you can get the agency, and without experience or money make \$250 to \$500 per month.—[Adv.]

LET US TAN YOUR HIDE

Fox, Coon, Mink, Skunk, Muskrat, etc., dressed and made into latest style Coats (for men and women), Vests, Caps, Neckties and other Garments. Horse, Cow, Bear, Dog or any animal hide tanned with fur on, made into Robes, Coats, Rugs, etc. Hides tanned into Harness, Sole or Belt Leather. Calf skins into Shoe Upper Leather, any color. FREE CATALOG AND STYLE BOOK gives prices, when to take off and ship hides, etc.

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Among the Farmers

Coming Events

Brief notices of meetings, etc., to occur will be inserted free of charge. Same should reach us the Friday preceding date of publication. Important gatherings should be listed two or three weeks in advance.

Ct. Union Farm Session, Hartford, Jan. 26-28.
Boston Automobile Show, Mechanics Building, beginning March 6 at Boston.
Maine Farm Bureau Federation, Orono, March 30.

Better Farm Homes Conference, Hotel Sherman, Chicago, Feb. 18-19.
Second summer session of American Institute of co-operation, Twin Cities Minn., June 21-July 17.

N. Y. Dairymen's League Meetings
At Great Barrington, Mass., Jan. 30.
At Litchfield, Ct., Jan. 30.

Connecticut Annual Meetings

Connecticut swine growers' association, Tuesday, Jan. 26.
Connecticut sheep breeders' association, Wednesday, Jan. 27.

Connecticut state department of agriculture, Thursday, Jan. 28.
Connecticut Guernsey breeders' association, Thursday, Jan. 28.

Union agricultural banquet, Thursday evening, January 28, 6 p. m.
Connecticut poultry association, Friday, January 29.

All sessions at Hartford in connection with annual Union get-together.

VERMONT

Franklin, Jan 12—Nice weather to work in the woods with just enough snow so farmers can get up wood, haul material and such work. Ice 10 inches thick on Lake Carmel. People are waiting for it to get a little thicker before storing for the summer. Good block wood selling at \$4.50 to \$5 p single ed and scarce at that. Potatoes \$2.25 p bu, not many for sale. Roads are hard surfaced all right now without bonding the state either.

Bennington, Jan 12—Ground covered nice and even with snow. It is light but there has been no wind. Some are driving sleighs. Apples are \$3.50 to \$4 p bbl for seconds, No 1 apples higher \$5 to \$8. Potatoes sell at \$5 to \$8 p bbl, eggs 50 to 75c. Coal is still scarce and very high.

Northfield, Jan 13—The Northfield co-operative creamery paid 52c for butter fat for the last period. Eggs bring 50c, dressed pork 18 to 20c, dressed beef 9 to 11c. Numan Smead has sold his farm to Addison Denny from Mass who buys for a summer home. The fine view of the surrounding hills from this farm is a delight. Mr Denny will fix up the building in the spring. The recent snow storm was needed as the snow was about gone and the roads were icy.

Burlington, Jan 22—The thaw this week has ruined the sledding and rendered all roads hard-surfaced, but this is not the kind of hard-surfaced roads desired by the cement trust, for they did not get a profit off them. The people who are deriving large incomes from tax-free securities are not satisfied with our hard-surfaced roads because they were not built by bonding so that they could invest their income in these bonds tax-free and the real estate holder would have to dig himself to death to pay the interest on the bonds. The principal would never be paid.

Holden, Jan 16—About 18 inches of snow fell last Saturday in about five hours. It is quite good sleighing at present though automobiles are running about as usual. Hens are not laying very well. Price of butter is dropping a cent or two a week, bringing 50 to 52c at wholesale. Four foot hard wood brings \$10 to \$12 p cd.

Peacham, Jan 22—The area test of dairy cattle for tuberculosis in the town of Peacham has just been completed by state and federal veterinarians. In all about 1900 cattle were examined representing 125 herds. The owners of all the herds in town volunteered for this test in the desire to get a clean rating for Peacham dairies. The test showed a total of 33 reactors. Of this number 16 were in the herd of S. W. Thurston. The work was done by Dr L. H. Adams of Montpelier, in charge of this service for the department of agriculture, assisted by federal veterinarians and Dr William Hamilton of Danville. Dr John Thomas of Wells River and Dr S. E. Bolton of Cabot. The next town to be signed up is Barnet. So far the winter has been much milder than was predicted last

fall. There was about 18 inches of snow, but on Jan 16 we had a fierce rain that took off a good part of it. Work had just fairly begun in the woods. Harold Somers is putting in 3000 cakes of ice. Potatoes are very high and scarce. Eggs have been selling for 40c. Not much sale for hay. Many are ill with prevailing distemper.

MASSACHUSETTS

Dudley, Jan 13—Harold Easterbrook has built an ice house 40 by 80 ft and is now filling it with ice. He intends to sell at wholesale to dealers in the village. He is also filling in several private ice house and selling cut ice at the house to many of the farmers in the vicinity who find it cheaper than cutting it themselves. The Sunday before Christmas at about 11 o'clock p m three women in an automobile entered the grounds of Mrs Henry Babcock on Dudley hill and gathered a lot of greens from the shrubbery and broke a lot more down by running over them with their machine. The number of their automobile was taken and reported to Registrar Goodwin. J. Thatcher recently had a lot of grain stolen from his barn. The grain was delivered by truck by a local dealer at 5 o'clock in the afternoon and the next morning it was gone. Ralph L. Easterbrook recently completed a new cow stable of modern construction and equipped it with labor saving appliances.

Rowley, Jan 16—Snowfall of some 4 inches Jan 9, heaviest since Oct 10, but little sledding. Roads in good condition for autos. During the holidays C. L. Dole and others having new milk cows found a good demand. George A. Todd and others recently sold a large part of their hay crop. But little of last season's produce in growers' hands, quality of apples none too good. General business very quiet, eggs much lower.

East Brookfield, Jan 20—Good clear ice of 12 inch thickness has been secured. Much cord wood is being cut both for home use and for sale, there being a great demand because of the scarcity of hard coal. Honey bees are wintering quietly and have plenty of stores to carry them through the winter. Honey market seems slow and demand not at all active.

MAINE

Hiram, Jan 15—Thus far the winter has been rather mild; there is only 4 or 5 inches of snow in the woods—not enough for logging, still there is considerable activity in that line. However, with little profit, it would seem. Mr. Harmon, is nearing the end of labelling corn packed this past season; he had, besides the storehouse at the cannery full; a large amount stored in a barn in the outskirts of the village.

It is reported that Nathan Kimball, secretary, and Eli Wadsworth, chairman, of the local farm bureau, extended an invitation to the school children to attend the annual planning meeting. The high school principal Mr Orcutt in company with all the high school students, attended during the afternoon session, the school having been dismissed at an early hour to enable them so to do. It is said that Mr Orcutt has had experience in club work for boys in agricultural lines, and that he will try to start clubs for both boys and girls; considerable interest was manifest by the students. Mr Kimball was re-elected secretary and Mr Wadsworth, chairman. A particularly interesting program was arranged. Experimental plots of alfalfa, proper spraying of fruit trees, grafting, pruning, the improved seed potato fields, the selection of the best individuals for breeders from flocks of hens, being only a part. It is said that the women's division gained several new members.

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Wakefield and Brookfield, Jan 22—Throughout the fall the weather forecasters were generally—almost universally—telling of signs pointing to a cold winter, deep snows, a hard winter, a long winter. We have some three months ahead in which a good deal of serious winter mischief can be done. The season is far from over. But speaking of what we have had thus far, the predictions have hardly been fulfilled during the nearly first half of the usual season. December was not unusually warm throughout. There were quite a few days with severe temperature. But we had many pleasant ones. Snow held off late and at close of the month there was not enough for good teaming in the woods.

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Not an Experiment Station

HOW it interferes with the farmer's regular work to undertake something out of the usual line. I am often asked to test out new implements, apparatus or ideas, but usually this costs a lot more than it comes to. In farming more than in other effort, the weather, the seasons and insects or blights, cause enough interruptions. No one who is farming for a living can afford to make an experiment station out of his farm. It is easy to try out some new vegetable or fruit in a small way or to adopt some labor saving wrinkle, but this testing out of everything that comes along is costly business. On the other hand, it is just as easy to make the mistake of sticking in the old rut too long. These are some of the reasons why it takes a lot more judgment, sense and stickto-itiveness to run a farm successfully than a bank or factory. And the manufacturer or banker who tries farming is the first to admit the truth of this remark.

Get Spring Supplies Early

THANKS to a neighbor who is attending to the business, a few of us have clubbed together to buy peach baskets in carlots. Each man pays spot cash for the goods he buys, plus his share of the freight, and hauls them the day the car arrives. The neighbor who places the order thus is able to pay slight draft against bill of lading or upon arrival of the goods. He doesn't have to spend a lot of time, thought and effort in trying to collect from those who may be slow paying.

Right here we get up against one difficulty in co-operative neighborhood buying. The man who places the order often is put to no end of bother and inconvenience by some one or more members of the pool failing to put up the cash in advance. The art of pooling credits so as to raise the money with which to pay cash is another phase of the matter. This order for baskets is placed with the right to cancel in case late frosts destroy the crop.

Most of the fruit growers hereabouts already have ordered and some have received their chemicals for dusting and spraying, also their fertilizer. Our farmers like to get this stuff in early and where there are many tons of it, haul it on the snow. If you have these supplies in your barn, shed or cellar before the end of March, you don't have to worry about delays in freight or express later on in the spring rush of transport traffic.

If you get your stuff in early and get it paid for, you are that much ahead of the game. And it is a lot cheaper for the buyer to borrow cash and pay cash than it is to buy on long term credits. I would rather borrow at the bank at 6% or even 7% and get the lowest spot cash for farm supplies this spring than to buy the stuff under terms that might easily make it cost from 15 to 25% more. We farmers often bite a cent in two to save half, but overlook the big things or leaks that cost us dollars.

Use of Poultry Manure

I have five or six tons of chicken manure. What should be added to it to make the best fertilizer for asparagus, grapes, currants, cabbage, corn and potatoes?—[E. H. B. C.]

If this manure is from adult birds well fed and has been kept under cover, each 100 pounds of it may contain 50 to 60 pounds of water, one to two pounds of nitrogen, 1/3 to 2/3 pounds of potash, one to two pounds of phosphoric acid and one to three pounds of lime. This stuff will weigh from 300 to 400 pounds per ordinary flour barrel. At current prices of its fertilizing ingredients, a ton of it is theoretically worth \$6 to \$8. Its most valuable element, nitrogen, is in a soluble form that easily washes out. Its potash content is very low, but it may have about as much nitrogen as phosphoric acid.

Poultry manure acts quite quickly because it is so soluble and therefore is much used for topdressing lawns or for gardens and in the hill for giving

corn a quick start. Do not mix wood ashes or lime with poultry manure, as both of them are strongly alkaline and will release ammonia (nitrogen), thus causing greater loss than if nothing were mixed with the manure. If for each 100 pounds of poultry manure you use 50 pounds of dry acid phosphate containing 16% of actual phosphoric acid, the mixture will contain of nitrogen about 1%, phosphoric acid, 4 to 5%, and potash hardly 1/4 of 1%.

For almost any crop, especially those you mention, much more potash is required, enough to bring the mixture up to 4 or 5% of actual potash. The potash salts, also the acid phosphate, may be applied to the soil separately or can be mixed into one mixture and then applied. Put the manure on by itself, as it is quite a nasty job to mix it with the chemicals. The plants will find all the nutriment added to the soil, even if the chemicals are not mixed with the manure.

The Joy of Service

It does my heart good the way that you are giving the American people a chance to help the Berbers and Moors under Abd-el Krim to establish the Rif Republic. I am sure great good will come out of this effort. I believe American friends of the Rif can do as much for that country now as Lafayette did for this country when our forefathers were fighting for liberty. I am sending you 25 signatures.—[C. E. T. Mass.]

How refreshing it is to be thinking and doing something besides hog and hominy, money and taxes. You know what the good book says about "bread-cast upon the waters." Stranger things have happened than that the moral support in behalf of the Rif, which is being tendered by the American people, may be effective now in securing belated justice for a mighty people who never yet have been subjugated. And this may be done on a basis mutually and permanently agreeable to France, Spain and other nations as well as to the Rif. You can help the good cause by sending me your signatures and addresses, and those of your friends on a slip headed "Please enroll me as an American friend of the Rif." There are no fees or dues.—[Herbert Myrick, Springfield, Mass.]

Nothing New Under the Sun

I question whether the rights of landlord and tenant, in agriculture, are much better or more fairly defined now than in the days of the first code of laws, by Hammurabi at Babylon, nearly 4000 years ago.

Women's rights also were set forth therein upon a basis that compares favorably with our most modern law. Some husbands today may prefer that ancient code, for it provided that if a woman had not been a careful mistress, had gadded about, had neglected her house and belittled her husband, they shall throw that woman in to the water. Is this, why our Wilbraham has the Ducking pond?

"I have always wanted to hear a Boston symphony concert, but never could afford it," said Martha to her father at supper Saturday night. She is quite a musician, and although the farm is a good many miles out of town her father lets her take his automobile to run in to her lessons.

"All right, daughter," responded Farmer Jones heartily, "mother will have dinner right after church, then we can jump into the car and reach the auditorium in Springfield in time for the concert at three, it's only a dozen miles."

"Do ye one thing better than all others, and people will wear a path to your door," truly says Emerson. I know a barber in a back hamlet whose shop is patronized from miles around. Many a country lawyer gets big cases from distant corporations that appreciate his clear head and sound judgment as much as his mastery of legal technicalities. The minister who can unite and lead all rural factions may do better service for the Lord in country than in city, and net as much out of it financially. (I say net, for life is cheaper in country as well as more wholesome.)—[H. M.]

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
EVERY animal you free from lice adds something to your milk income. When you clear off the vermin which in countless numbers feed on the vitality of your cows at this time of year, you put added quarts of milk into the pail. Relentless war on lice saves a milk loss far heavier than is commonly realized.

LOUSE-CHASE has made the problem of vermin extinction sure and easy. The pests congregate in great numbers at certain points on the cow's body. A little LOUSE-CHASE, used according to the directions on every can, quickly kills every louse and mite. This harmless white powder sifts on as simple as using a salt shaker. A single can will give one treatment to twenty-five cows.

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COST LESS — PRODUCE MORE

Merchandizing Milk

Milk Price Not Reduced

HATS off to the sales committee of the New England milk producers' association! February price of milk is 8½ cents per quart delivered with the usual deductions. Those who question the power of organization in a righteous cause are referred to this achievement of the rather loosely associated effort of New England dairymen. As intimated in The Homestead last week the stage was all set for a reduction of at least 1 cent a quart effective February 1. March would see a further reduction with the flush period still ahead. Regardless of individual producers' convictions as to a proposed New England-wide marketing organization for dairy products, here is a concrete example of what associated effort, loosely drawn though it may be, can accomplish.

How this fortunate and righteous price was maintained is a long story. In a word it reflects much credit upon the leadership of the N E M P A. It is true that the winter has been favorable for production of milk, although there is no greater amount of milk than a year ago. Consumption, thanks to the favorable influences of the New England dairy and food council, is increasing.

The N E M P A in its negotiations frankly admitted a more or less disturbed market condition due to a readjustment of business, but it maintained that this did not affect supply and demand. The consolidation of the chain stores and their plan to procure the entire supply from the vicinity of Bellows Falls is not changing the amount of milk available, although it may force a certain amount of the supply formerly moved in those channels to seek a new outlet. The significant fact is that it does not increase the supply nor does it decrease the demand but is simply a market readjustment. It is a problem for those operating in the market to meet and solve. Fortunately, the sales committee of the N E M P A showed that this should not be used as a club to beat down prices which are amply justified by supply and demand.

The sales committee righteously maintained that conditions of production and consumption justified no reduction in price, that the likelihood of change in the near future is very slight, that the period for which prices were announced last October need not be shortened, that dealers as well as producers should work to stabilize conditions over the longest possible periods. Sound judgment was shown in the principle that the way to meet the temporary flush is to redouble sales effort rather than to eat down prices already so low that cows are disappearing from each New England state and the young stock situation approaching an alarming status. These are only suggestive points in the leadership New England dairymen are so fortunate as to have in the present N E M P A.

Will It Hold?

How long the present price will stand will depend on conditions which develop in the market and the action of dealers. The sales committee of the N E M P A, backed up by the board of directors, took action last week to protect the association and put it up to the dealers squarely to prove their claims as to cut price milk, or to pay the price agreed upon for a long term winter period.

The trade offered by the association had some new features. The principal one was that the price would run indefinitely unless some dealer or dealers called for a reopening. Such a reopening can come at any time on a five day notice from dealers or the association. Unless such a notice is given, backed up by reasonable grounds for a reconsideration, the sales committee of the association will not be called in.

Under this trade the 8½ cent price will continue unless dealers take the initiative and force a reopening of the question of price on a five day notice. The sales committee believes that there are no conditions in the market at the present time, nor are conditions

likely to arise in the near future, which would give the dealers any just ground for asking for a reconsideration of the price. The sales committee is standing pat.

In the negotiations it was evident that certain dealers would like to take refuge in a retroactive plan of making a price and adjusting afterwards to most conditions which might arise. This procedure gives them the advantage of having a certain price named and of selling what milk they can on the basis of that price, then, if a retroactive adjustment is made, paying on a lower price. The consumer pays the higher price but the dealer settles on the basis of a lower price.

The sales committee stood out firmly against any such arrangement. Under the proposition put up by the sales committee no price adjustment would be recognized as having any effect previous to the formal five day notice.

Another important feature of the trade is that no outside purchases shall be charged out of sales under the surplus plan unless such purchases are paid for at the N E M P A price. Provisions are made for a verification of the price paid, so as to give no dealer any advantage over any other dealer in this respect. At the time The Homestead goes to press some of the dealers have not accepted some of the stipulations in this proposal. It is expected, however, that all will fall in line.

Milk Receipts More Liberal

NOVEMBER receipts of milk at Boston over the three lines of railway were materially larger in 1925 than in either of the two preceding years. Receipts for the year ending November 1925 were 5½ million quarts more than for the same period ending November 1924. The accompanying table is compiled from data furnished by the Massachusetts board of railroad commissioners and will be of interest to dairymen.

COMPARATIVE ANNUAL MILK RECEIPTS (in quarts at Boston)					
1923-1925	B & A	B & M	N & H	Total	
Nov 1923	201,473	12,331,776	3,025,443	15,618,692	
Nov 1924	201,473	11,335,934	3,025,443	14,562,850	
Nov 1925	330,957	11,724,994	2,528,102	14,783,233	
Receipts for year ending Nov 1923				196,934,248	
Receipts for year ending Nov 1924				191,264,800	
Receipts for year ending Nov 1925				184,136,723	
MONTHLY RECEIPTS AT BOSTON					
	B & A	B & M	N & H	Total	
Nov	201,473	12,331,776	3,025,443	15,618,692	
Oct	301,918	12,814,674	3,160,435	16,277,027	
Sept	146,410	12,559,291	3,229,538	16,205,239	
Aug	257,509	13,264,948	3,458,208	17,226,716	
July	580,390	13,865,663	3,537,556	18,103,609	
June	726,746	14,985,894	3,674,564	19,387,204	
May	926,765	15,267,876	3,567,176	20,761,817	
April	889,707	12,429,446	3,345,853	16,665,006	
Mar.	908,181	12,308,419	3,165,697	16,472,297	
Feb.	885,586	10,464,113	3,149,380	14,499,079	
Jan.	814,555	10,394,572	3,119,209	14,328,336	
Dec.	723,096	10,046,970	3,001,239	14,771,305	

Dairymen Succeeding

ASSEMBLED at Springfield, Mass., this week Tuesday, members of the Springfield dairy System received an optimistic report of the year's business. The co-operative organization has not been in operation quite for two years, but the reports showed a growth of business and an expansion into other markets far in excess of what co-operatives ordinarily secure in so short a time. An indication of the size of the business done is given in the value of milk sold in December, \$115,374.

The meeting opened at 11 o'clock with a business session given over largely to reports and discussion of plans for the coming year. Manager Luke H. Rickert submitted the big figures of business done and expansion in his annual report and told some of the marketing factors which are now preventing the co-operative organization from still further service to its members. He reported as an average price paid to farmers for all milk sold to the System during the last six months of 1925, 53.47 per hundred weight, or almost 7½ cents a quart.

Pres O. A. Tuttle of Hardwick gave his annual message, taking up some of the larger aspects of the co-operative organization and giving especial attention to the situation which presents itself to the organized dairy interests of New England through the develop-

Why farmers get longer wear from "U. S." Blue Ribbon Overshoes

WHERE do your boots or overshoes give out first?

The chances are it's one of four places—sole, over the instep, around the ankle, or at the heel.

That's why there's extra strength and wearing quality built into "U. S." Blue Ribbon footwear at every one of these points!


"U. S." Blue Ribbon boots and overshoes are made with thick, over-size gray soles—tough as an automobile tire. Into the uppers is put rubber so elastic it will stretch 5 times its length! This elastic rubber resists cracking and breaking—stays flexible and waterproof.

Anchored in the rubber are the strongest reinforcements ever used—from 4 to 11 separate layers of rubber and fabric!

"U. S." Blue Ribbons are built to give more wear than any ordinary boot or overshoe can give. And they've got all the comfort you could ask for.

It will pay you to buy "U. S." Blue Ribbon footwear.

United States Rubber Company



The "U. S." Blue Ribbon Walrus slips right on over your shoes. Its smooth rubber surface washes clean like a boot. Made in red or black—4 or 5 buckles.

U.S. Boots
Walrus
Arctics
Rubbers
BLUE RIBBON

If you cut a strip of rubber from a "U. S." Blue Ribbon boot or overshoe you'd find it would stretch more than five times its length!



Be a Friend of the Riff

Champion the Cause of a Brave
People's Plucky Fight Against
Invaders

I read in the newspapers with delight that our Editor-in-Chief is heading up an international commission to secure justice for the Riff. I am sure that by a big majority the people of the United States will support the commission in its efforts to get a square deal for the Moors. Will you please tell us more about it in your Wisset Farms Talks, which everybody reads with interest? As I see it, we Americans really are being taxed to pay for France's war in Morocco, for if France were not spending millions upon millions of treasure upon that war, France could pay at least a corresponding amount upon her debt to U. S. A.—J. E. H. T., Rhode Island.

The picture below shows how the Spanish army proposes to advance upon the Riff from the north, while the French army advances from the south and thus squeeze the life out of the Riff. At least this is the plan for the spring and summer campaign, but the Berbers or native Moorish people under Abd-el Krim may again whip both their adversaries, or every last man of the ancient Moorish nation will die in the attempt.

You see, neither Spain nor France has any more right to crush Morocco, or at least its mountainous nation of the Riff, than Spain or France have a right to crush New England and annihilate Massachusetts! Morocco is the native habitat of the Berbers from time immemorial. When the Moors were expelled from Spain in the 15th century the emigres returned to their folks in Morocco.

Whipped Spain and France

Four years ago Krim and his plucky tribesmen captured the whole Spanish army of 20,000 men under General Sylvester. Krim has kept them licked ever since. Of late years France has been getting a foothold in southern Morocco, and last summer the French army advanced against Krim and in support of Spain. The Berbers or Moors resisted the French successfully. Neither Spain nor France has been able to make a move during the winter rains.

By sheer pluck, downright bravery and unparalleled tactics the natives under Krim, with almost none of the accoutrements of modern warfare, have resisted the invasion of the strongest military nation (France) and Spain combined. Meanwhile the native families and tribes have become united into the Moorish nation under Krim with the three attributes of state sovereignty—the power of self-defence, the power to collect taxes, and the power to enforce order.

Right to Freedom

The Berbers under Krim have a vastly better right to be free and independent than had our revolutionary ancestors here in America in 1775. In many ways the Berbers have put up a better fight against the invaders of their country than did our American patriots. Certainly the Riff are entitled to recognition as belligerents. This would give them a better show and entitle their side to the services of the Red Cross, for the Riff is utterly lacking in hospital facilities or even first aid.

The world is moved to tears and admiration at the pluck and ability of these comparatively unarmed natives' indomitable fight for their home land.

But we Americans are filled with righteous indignation that the worst atrocities thus far have been perpetrated by citizens of U S A serving as aviators for the French. They bombed defenceless villages, even the sacred city itself, murdering inoffensive women and children and other non-combatants.

Lend Your Influence

Hence it is that I appeal for justice to the Riff. Will not you help to the extent of becoming A FRIEND OF THE RIFF?—no fees, no dues. There are no fees or dues, the object being to so mobilize public opinion that "The America's Commission for the Riff," to be named by the various groups of Friends of the Riff, may have the backing of the moral support and justice loving opinion of the world. With such backing the American commission, co-operating with the British committee and similar groups in other countries, may be powerful enough to bring about recognition by Spain and France of the belligerency of the Riff.

The fact is, the people of France and Spain by a vast majority are sick and tired of their government's campaign in Morocco. French and Spanish people will welcome an honorable settlement that shall be permanent. Suggestions toward such an adjustment were made to Abd-el Krim some months ago by Spain and France. It is hoped that with belligerent rights enabling them to get more supplies and to enjoy the services of the Red Cross equally with their foes, the Riff may be in such a position that, with the support of world opinion, negotiations may follow this summer that will result in a just and permanent peace.

You can help toward this glorious consummation by sending in your signature and address, also as many others as possible, to Friends of the Riff, Springfield, Mass. Who will send in the most signatures? Let the members of every church, lodge, grange, union, or other group join. Discuss the matter at your meetings. Consult the current literature upon it. Lend a hand for a people, a cause and a nation that have proven worthy.—Herbert Myrick.

When I store truck or auto for winter, it is blocked up under each axle until the wheels are free from the floor. This takes the weight off the rubber. We give the wheels a whirl once a week or two, so the rubber won't always be in the same position. Tires kept in cellar where fruit keeps well and turned occasionally will be less affected than if allowed to freeze. To save costly tires, another plan is to use them less—team, jitney, trolley can save much rubber mileage.

We have often said that more than half of the cases brought before the courts are useless, and for the benefit of lawyers instead of to help their clients or benefit the public. Now comes Judge Anderson of the United States circuit court of appeals at Boston, stating in his address at Williamstown that after 35 years experience at the bar he is satisfied that "from one-half to three-fourths of the cases brought before the courts are sheer parastical waste." Yet some lawyers have thought that the Homestead was rough on that fraternity!

To the Friends of The Riff, Springfield, Mass.

Please enroll the undersigned as a Friend of the Riff. (It is agreed that this does not bind me in any way, financially or politically.)

Signatures

P.O. Address

State

Copy or cut this coupon, paste or pin at head of a sheet of paper, get more signatures, and mail to above address. Persons of either sex over 16 are invited to join and thus use their influence in behalf of a square deal for the Riff.

NEW ENGLAND HOMESTEAD

Reg. U. S. Pat. Off.
WEEKLY

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NEW ENGLAND HOMESTEAD

Myrick Building, Springfield, Mass.

Week Ending January 23, 1926

The Real Menace

The menace of over production in tobacco can be remedied: Reduce acreage, improve quality.

But the far greater menace which confronts New England farmers may not be so easily conquered. We refer to the new menace of the new milk trust, the new power trust and the other new combines.

These new menaces multiply while the public sleeps. The Homestead will have more to say about them.

Meanwhile farmers must sink their differences and present a united front to the new enemy. There is no other way.

Plenty to Eat—and Corn

Not long since, "economists" averred that U S A would soon become unable to feed her increasing population. But at the opening of what may prove to be one of agriculture's most prosperous years, the corn belt is agog over its surplus!

Now comes Professor McFall with a sensible epitome (Yale Review, January) showing that, practically speaking, there is almost no limit to what American farmers can produce if prices are high enough to reward the effort.

It is as refreshing to have New England Homestead's views sustained, as it is to welcome the west's renewed effort to eat more corn instead of crying for some federal hocus-pocus by which the surplus may be dumped at low prices in foreign markets.

Such control by our government for the purpose of arbitrarily depressing grain prices abroad, would be even more bitterly resisted by foreign nations than U S A now resists foreign government monopolies which put up prices of rubber, nitrate, potash, silk, etc., in our markets.

And this latest notion that by act of Congress the laws of chemistry can be altered so as to transmute corn sugar (glucose) into cane or beet sugar (sucrose) is like unto the folly that legislative fiat about clocks changes sun time! Corn products are good enough to sell for what they are, in-

stead of palming them off for what they are not.

With markets firm, prices advancing, and the International Harvester Co accepting No. 2 corn Chicago at a dollar a bushel for its implements, the corn belt's surplus may soon move at values that will render ridiculous the present buncombe by which designing politicians would feather their own nests with the votes of deluded grain growers!

The good women of the Providence, R I, housewives' league do not appear to be bombarding the press with their

Misguided potato boycott these days.

Enthusiasm Some weeks ago they started

out valiantly to show the

country their invincible courage and their

profound wisdom as related to high prices

of the humble spud. By refraining from

the use of potatoes (if they did) and by

proper publicity of such sacrifice on the al-

leged altar of the masses, they apparently

visioned a great service to downtrodden hu-

manity. But cruel and inexorable fate

seemed against them. Regardless of their

heralded courage and sacrifice the price of

potatoes went up instead of down. Some-

how the authoritative figures showing a

comparatively short crop had more influence

on prices than did the boycott. The recent

revised government figures showing many

millions shorter crop than first forecasted

hasn't helped to reduce prices. In all kind-

ness let the question be asked what sound

reason (economic or ethical) these fine

women had for that boycott. Did their ac-

tion typify knowledge of actual conditions

and broadness of vision? Or did they only

emulate examples of what the male of the

species too often in days before has shown

to be narrow, unproductive, even destruc-

tive?

Shall those Vermont towns that have been

furnishing electricity be driven out of the

business by the combines

which are monopolizing New

England's electrical service?

The village of Northfield is

squarely up against this question. Here-

before it bought its current at wholesale

from one of the big producers, retailing the

juice to the villagers and farmers at low

prices, yet the village treasury netted \$5,000

a year profit from its municipal electric de-

partment. Now the concern from which the

village bought its current demands an in-

crease of 50% in the price, as well as the

right to go into the town and undersell the

municipal plant. Northfield should of

course apply to the state public utility com-

mission at Montpelier for justice. The con-

certed effort that seems to be under way to

freeze out rural municipal electric plants

obviously is part of the scheme to trustify

power throughout New England. The Home-

stead has been exposing this thing for many

years, but only after most of the merging

has been completed is the public belatedly

waking up to realize what has happened.

The Homestead protests against the ad-

vance of 1-5 cent a quart in freight rates

by the Boston & Maine

Protest Proposed railroad. We doubt

Milk Rates its claim that old

rates were unprofit-

able. Milk is a commodity that moves every

day in the year. It usually is considered

such profitable freight that of late years rail-

roads in the eastern states have tried to in-

crease this business, irrespective of the needs

of producers or consumers. The advance now

demanding is another reason for reorganizing

the marketing of milk in New England. What

is the sense of hauling milk long distances

to market, only to create a surplus, which knocks down the price of what milk is sold. Keep that surplus off the market by putting it into butter and cheese at point of origin, pooling the entire dairy produce of New England so that every farmer shall receive his pro rata part of the proceeds. The surplus in freight alone on butter, cheese, cream over the cost of shipping whole milk as surplus should make the new plan profitable to producers if it is handled right. Details of what Boston and Maine railroads wants in the 20% advance will be found in our milk department this week.

The radical wing in A F B F were routed last week at Washington. The national conference of co-operative associations rejected all bureaucratic schemes for dumping surplus grain at low prices upon foreign

markets with a view to advancing prices of domestic consumers, of whom farmers constitute a very large body. Instead, the conference favored the pending bill to establish U S D A a bureau of co-operative marketing. This may enable the department to of some further help in organizing and running co-operative enterprises. However over this way farmers generally want Uncle Sam to let them alone, simply giving them a fair chance to work out their own salvation. There seems to be very little sympathy in the middle and eastern states with Candace Lowden's schemes for lifting the price of grain by its bootstraps through a government export corporation. Evidently the same feeling pervades the farm bureau and farm circles generally throughout the west and south.

Radicals tions rejected all bureaucratic

Routed schemes for dumping surplus

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of domestic consumers, of whom farmers

constitute a very large body. Instead, the

conference favored the pending bill to estab-

lish U S D A a bureau of co-operative mark-

eting. This may enable the department to

of some further help in organizing and run-

ning co-operative enterprises. However

over this way farmers generally want Uncle

Sam to let them alone, simply giving them

a fair chance to work out their own salva-

tion. There seems to be very little sympathy

in the middle and eastern states with Can-

candace Lowden's schemes for lifting the pri-

ce of grain by its bootstraps through a gover-

ment export corporation. Evidently mu-

the same feeling pervades the farm bureau

and farm circles generally throughout the

west and south.

Birds of a feather flock together—the

(1) who want a federal department

education to lord it over the school

(2) who would put new life into the over-

whelmingly rejected child labor amendme-

to the U S constitution (3) who would have

the war department dictate military drill in

all schools! Add to this list a national law

for fake time, and how could toil on soil at

sea pay taxes enough to support the result-

ing horde of federal bureaucrats? Aw,

with all such folly! Leave the people

alone—let them be free!

Sensational indeed is the decline in num-

bers of live stock during the past five years

while population has much increased. Cer-

tainly the figures prove that the live stock

industry is growing into a very strong po-

sition. Prices should be profitable for some

years. Every heifer calf from a sire a

dam with a good record for performance

should be reared. Sheep and hogs should

be profitable.

To repeal the section of eminent domain

law giving public service corporations the

right to dispossess a property owner on

days notice, is the purpose of an important

bill before the Massachusetts legislature

the farm bureau federation. Fine! See the

big story about it in next week's Homestead

Last summer the U S Senate solemnly

agreed to vote on the world court Janua-

15. Now that the enemies of that great

measure realize that they are licked three-

one, they aim to displace the world court re-

solution before the Senate by the tax bill. Oh

people will not submit to this or any other

trickery aimed at further delaying of U

entry into the world court. You who agree

with this thought please cut out or

this editorial and pin or paste it to the letter

you write to both of the senators from your

state at Washington in behalf of a prompt

and favorable vote.

Cause of the Riffs Arouses Sympathy

Historic Background of Present Hostilities—
Morocco Long an International Battlefield—
Helped Set the Stage for the World War

THE FORTUNES of the Riffs entered into the definite concern of Springfield people with formation last week of the "Friends of the Riffs," a local branch of the American commission for the Riff, of which Herbert Myrick is the head. Mr. Myrick reports that public response from all over New England to aid the cause of the Riffs is encouraging. It is expected that the local group will meet for organization in the near future.

Exploitation of Morocco

The troubles in the Riff are the outgrowth of the forward movement of the French and Spanish in their exploitation of the lands of Morocco which was retarded for a time because of the great war which also awakened and increased the spirit of nationalism on the part of the Moors. In the early years of the 19th century Morocco was one of the chief fields of European controversy and in the discussion of its distribution Germany took an active part. Several of the wars in the years preceding 1914 were due to demonstrations by the German emperor in protest against action in Morocco in which Germany was allowed no part.

The basis for the Franco-British entente cordiale was laid in the agreement by which England gave France a free field in Morocco in exchange for the withdrawal of the French claim to an interest in Egypt. In the same fashion a few years later the entente cordiale was converted into the triple entente by a partition of Persia between England and Russia and the stage was thus made ready for the World war.

During the war the operations of France in Morocco were necessarily halted, but after the armistice the work of colonization was again actively resumed and many valuable improvements were made particularly in agriculture and in the construction of new roads. The Spanish side of the boundary line for administration had not been so successful and the revolt of the people of the Riff, the mountain stronghold which no force since the dawn of history has ever subjugated, led to a disastrous rout of the Spanish armies.

Encouraged by this success the Riffians under the leadership of Abd-el-Krim crossed the boundaries separating the Spanish zone from the French zone to the south and stirred up tribes which had hitherto been passive into a revolt against the French. Although the French suffered no such military disaster as the Spanish, they suffered severe losses and were obliged heavily to re-enforce their army at a cost to the treasury which the government could ill afford.

The movement for peace has been pressed by the Socialists in the French Chamber, but received a setback from the successes won by the French arms in the closing days of the fall campaign. Overtures for peace on the part of the Riffians were recently conveyed unofficially to the French government by an Englishman acting privately, but the French government refused to accept these proposals and no peace negotiations have as yet been entered into.

Mr. Myrick's Views

Mr. Myrick gives his view of the situation in the following statement, which is a summary of an article which will appear in the magazine, Justice, next month.

"Many Americans in various states have asked me what could be done to help the Berbers to get a square deal. The way in which these tribes under Krim have maintained their victory over Spain for more than four years, has captured the admiration of all who believe in giving the under-dog a fair chance. Then when Krim and his indomitable troops fought to a standstill with the French attack last autumn, public sentiment in the United States and other countries showed evidence of admiration for the way in which this untutored minority of poorly-equipped natives won by their own courage, striving to prevent being overwhelmed by two great nations equipped with every modern means of warfare.

"It should be understood that the Moors, or Riffians, are making their last stand in behalf of the land to which they have been native from time immemorial. Indeed, Count Frolov's latest excavations in the Hoggar mountains in the south Sahara have revealed a Berber culture tracing far back into the prehistoric period.

Simple and Generous

"The Berbers possess many characteristics which appeal to Americans as desirable. In my forthcoming comprehensive article on this whole subject in the magazine, Justice, for February, it is pointed out: 'Cleanly of person and simple in dress, kindly and often generous, in marked contrast to the filthy, ragged Arab whose cruelty and rapaciousness is a byword, the Riffians with their simple and austere life are relatively healthy, vigorous and long lived. While their culture has suffered since the Moors were expelled from Spain after dominating it for 700 years, they annihilated the ill-conquered Portuguese would-be conquerors of Morocco.

"Of late years the Berbers under Abd-el Krim have sought to throw off the Spanish yoke which was imposed upon them without a shadow of reason or justice. Even the apologists for Spain admit that her attempted protectorate in Morocco has been accompanied by the graft, inefficiency and exploitation which in Cuba became so offensive as finally to induce the United States to drive out the Spaniard that Cuba might be free.

Last summer France came to the rescue of Spain, but her campaign ended in a stalemate with the winter rains. However, both the French and Spanish governments now announce their determination to push the campaign with great thoroughness this spring as soon as the rainy season is over. The Spanish troops pushing down from the north, and the French troops working up from the south hope to squeeze the life out of what is left of a once mighty people and a historic civilization.

Britain's Interest

As to the rumor that England is interested in maintaining Morocco as a buffer state, that she wants to thwart French and Spanish ambitions in Africa, also that London means to exploit what are believed to be the rich mines in the mountains of the Riff, Mr. Myrick writes:—

"I have no knowledge, directly or indirectly, of such political or economic ambitions on the part of Great Britain. I do know that a group of liberty loving Englishmen are said to be contributing \$1 annually at membership fees toward the support of the British committee for the Riff. It is the honorable secretary of this committee, Capt. Gordon Canning, who was recently in Paris apparently empowered to represent Abd-el Krim in negotiating for peace.

"The primary purpose of the British committee is declared by its secretary to have Krim and his men

recognized as belligerents. Then the principles of international law will apply to the Riffians who are now without such rights and are considered as rebels by the Spanish and French. Such recognition may be followed by a Red Cross mission to the Riff whose tribes and troops have been elementary first aid.

Expects Strong Commission

As to the American commission which will proceed in the effort to accomplish this result, Mr. Myrick says: "The facts of the situation will be made known more thoroughly through the press and by discussion. The various groups of people whose sympathies are aroused may appoint a delegate to represent them upon the American commission for the Riff. Judging from the interest already aroused, it is believed that the commission will soon be representative of powerful groups and strong influences throughout the United States, Canada and Mexico. It will take longer for the people of Central and South American nations to act, but it is believed that an important constituency among each of these people likewise favors justice to the Riff.

"The increasing vigor of public sentiment throughout the western hemisphere is being reflected in a public opinion throughout Europe in favor of belligerent rights for the Riff. Indeed, it is an open secret that the masses of people in Spain and France are quite disgusted with the Riffian situation. They would like nothing better than to find some honorable way out of it. If the truth were known, probably the also is the opinion of the present administration in control of the governments of Spain and France respectively. Backed by the public opinion of the western hemisphere, the influential mass of citizens in Spain and France who wish to settle once for all honorably and fairly with the Riff may be enabled to do so.

Friends of the Riff

"The public response here in Springfield and New England," says Mr. Myrick, "indeed, throughout the country, since the somewhat premature announcement from Tangier on February 16 of the American's commission, already is resulting in the formation of 'Friends of the Riff.' Everyone is invited to join a friend of the Riff by simply writing me to that effect. There are no fees or dues."

"Springfield Friends of the Riff" will in due time meet to organize the local organization for this city. The same plan is being followed in cities, towns, villages, school districts and organizations throughout the United States. There may be a group of 'Friends of the Riff' in any church, lodge, group, labor union, political or social organization, also among the young people in the higher schools, colleges and universities.

Indeed, 'Friends of the Riff' are turning up in the most unexpected quarters. A man stopped me on the street and said: 'I am a poor man busy making a living, but I would like to volunteer to work some hours a week in any way that the commission thinks will help the Riff.'

JOHN DREW AT 73 PLANS STAGE RETURN

Famous Actor Would Like to Find a Good Play—Now Living Life of Leisure

New York, Jan. 15.—(AP)—His love of the theater underlying his life of the theater, John Drew, a leading exponent of polite comedy, classical and modern, is planning to return to the stage as soon as he can find a suitable vehicle.

The actor has no special plans in mind other than "a good one," and, perhaps, one of the type which made him famous, as a "boy cavalier and the charming fop" of social life. Meanwhile, Drew is living a life of leisure. He has left his home in East Hampton, L. I., his Broadway hotel, and his theatrical season. Here, he greets his friends and is a familiar figure in the surroundings he likes best.

"Tell you about some of the things that have happened in my past?" he laughed, repeating the question of an interviewer. "Yes, I have been long enough through everyone to know about my past. At least, I hope so. Let's talk about the present and the future."

Then he told what he thought of many of the actors and actresses now starring on Broadway, and made it plain he was not to be listed among those who believe all the good days were those of the past.

"We have many fine actors," he said, "but there are no more Hooche and Jeffersons. Why? Because no more Booths and Hoffmans have been born, so far as I can see. To name a few of those that I think are very good are Ann Harding, Jane Cowell, Laurette Taylor, Ina Claire, Madge Kennedy and Noel Coward. There are others, of course."

He is greatly interested in the careers of John, Ethel and Leonid Barrymore, children of his sister, Georgie Drew, and Maurice Barrymore, but, being John Drew, he declined to "rag about the family," as he expressed it.

I like "The Vortex," "The Last of Mrs. Cheever," "The Green Hat" and "Stolen Fruit," he resumed. "I thought Cyril Maude was very good in 'The Charming People,' and before the season is over I expect to see some more good plays."

The Masked Ball was the play in which Drew first starred—Maudie Adams shared honors with him—but of all his productions he likes best "Rosemary" and "Second in Command." This he admitted before going on to talk about the past.

The actor's last long stay in a Broadway production was in "The Circle," two years ago. Mrs. Leslie Carter appeared opposite him. Last year, he played a week in the rapid Pinner's "Trailway of the World."

Drew in his 73d year, but he carries himself erect, his face is rugged and his voice is the same as of old. He has given up his favorite exercise, horseback riding, because of trouble with his eyes. His eyesight is good enough, however, to permit him to do much reading.

When the interviewer was ready to leave, Drew insisted on holding his coat.

"It's a sure sign a man is growing old," he said, "when he declines to let someone hold his coat for him."

The new union station in Jacksonville, Fla., will have more track space than any other railway terminal in the United States.

The Germans are the largest growers of potatoes and the Belgians the largest consumers, the Irish coming second in this respect.

A new appliance for gas stoves and heaters is a clock device which automatically lights or extinguishes the burners at any specified time.

ISSUED BY AMERICAN FRIENDS OF THE RIFF

From office of

The America's Commission for the Riff

Herbert Myrick, Chairman
Room 800, Myrick Building, Springfield, Mass.

Be a Friend of the Riff

Champion the Cause of a Brave People's Plucky Fight Against Invaders

I read in the newspapers with delight that our Editor-in-Chief is heading up an international commission to secure justice for The Riff. I am sure that by a big majority the people of the United States will support the commission in its efforts to get a square deal for the Moors. Will you please tell us more about it in your Wisest Farns Talks, which everybody reads with interest? As I see it, we Americans really are being taxed to pay for France's war in Morocco, for if France were not spending millions upon millions of treasure upon that war, France could pay at least a corresponding amount upon her debt to U. S. A.—[E. H. T., Rhode Island.

The picture below shows how the Spanish army proposes to advance upon The Riff from the north, while the French army advances from the south and thus squeeze the life out of The Riff. At least this is the plan for the spring and summer campaign, but the Berbers or native Moorish people under Abd-el Krim may again whip both their adversaries, or every last man of the ancient Moorish nation will die in the attempt.

You see, neither Spain nor France has any more right to crush Morocco, or at least its mountainous nation of The Riff, than Spain or France have a right to crush New England and annihilate Massachusetts! Morocco is the native habitat of the Berbers from time immemorial. When the Moors were expelled from Spain in the 15th century the emigres returned to their folks in Morocco.

Whipped Spain and France

Four years ago Krim and his plucky tribesmen captured the whole Spanish army of 20,000 men under General Sylvester. Krim has kept them licked ever since. Of late years France has been getting a foothold in southern Morocco, and last summer the French army advanced against Krim and in support of Spain. The Berbers or Moors resisted the French successfully. Neither Spain nor France has been able to make a move during the winter rains.

By sheer pluck, downright bravery and unparalleled tactics the natives under Krim, with almost none of the accoutrements of modern warfare, have resisted the invasion of the strongest military nation (France) and Spain combined. Meanwhile the native families and tribes have become united into the Moorish nation under Krim with the three attributes of state sovereignty—"the power of self-defence, the power to collect taxes, and the power to enforce order."

Right to Freedom

The Berbers under Krim have a vastly better right to be free and independent than had our revolutionary

ancestors here in America in 1775. In many ways the Berbers have put up a better fight against the invaders of their country than did our American patriots. Certainly the Riff are entitled to recognition as belligerents. This would give them a better show and entitle their side to the services of the Red Cross, for The Riff is utterly lacking in hospital facilities or even first aid.


The world is moved to tears and admiration at the pluck and ability of these comparatively unarmed natives' indomitable fight for their home land. But we Americans are filled with righteous indignation that the worst atrocities thus far have been perpetrated by citizens of U S A serving as aviators for the French. They bombed defenceless villages, even the sacred city itself, murdering inoffensive women and children and other non-combatants.

Lend Your Influence

Hence it is that I appeal for justice to The Riff. Will not you help to the extent of becoming A FRIEND OF THE RIFF?—no fees, no dues. There are no fees or dues, the object being to so mobilize public opinion that "The America's Commission for The Riff," to be named by the various groups of Friends of The Riff, may have the backing of the moral support and justice loving opinion of the world. With such backing the American commission, co-operating with the British committee and similar groups in other countries, may be powerful enough to bring about recognition by Spain and France of the belligerency of The Riff.

The fact is, the people of France and Spain by a vast majority are sick and tired of their government's campaign in Morocco the French and Spanish people will welcome an honorable settlement that shall be permanent. Suggestions toward such an adjustment were made to Abd-el Krim some months ago by Spain and France. It is hoped that with belligerent rights enabling them to get more supplies and to enjoy the services of the Red Cross equally with their foes, the Riff may be in such a position that, with the support of world opinion, negotiations may follow this summer that will result in a just and permanent peace.

You can help toward this glorious consummation by sending in your signature and address, also as many others as possible, to Friends of The Riff, Springfield, Mass. Who will send in the most signatures? Let the members of every church, lodge, grange, union, or other group join. Discuss the matter at your meetings. Consult the current literature upon it. Lend a hand for a people, a cause and a nation that have proven worthy.—[Herbert Myrick, in New England Homestead.



Stop this annihilation of an Ancient People

To American Friends of The Riff, Springfield, Mass.

Herbert Myrick, Chairman

Please enroll the undersigned as a Friend of the Riff. (It is agreed that this does not bind me in any way, financially or politically.)

Signatures

P.O. Address

State

Copy or cut this coupon, paste or pin at head of a sheet of paper, get more signatures, and mail to above address. Persons of either sex over 16 are invited to join and thus use their influence in behalf of a square deal for The Riff.

The IMPORT of the RIFF

A blazing cry for justice to one of the most ancient of peoples. Their regeneration may clear up an ominous situation and avert a world catastrophe

By Herbert Myrick

Editor's Note:

The development of agriculture and industry, manufactures and commerce, banking and finance, education and social service, literature and art owe much to Herbert Myrick. Through the periodicals and other efforts under his direction, this private citizen's constructive work permeates the marvelous evolution of the United States. He originated, organized and led many of the movements whose results have become vital in American progress. Dynamo of human energy, tireless worker, animated by the highest motives, gifted with the sound judgment that comes only from a trained mind backed up by long and international experience, as fearless as he is able, firm of will and pure of purpose, it is natural that "The Americas' Commission for the Riff" should now be forming under the chairmanship of Herbert Myrick. Through this agency, with headquarters in the Myrick building at Springfield, Mass., U. S. A., leading citizens of the nations of North America and South America may join in the effort to secure justice for the Riff.

They learn with pleasure that as *Justice* is going to press with Mr. Myrick's article, comes the welcome news that liberty-loving Englishmen had formed in London some months ago a committee for the Riff, whose secretary, Captain Gordon Canning, was sent to investigate conditions in Morocco. Cap-


tain Canning returned to Paris about December 21st as the accredited representative of Abd-el Krim.

The Americas' Commission joins with the British group in urging that Spain and France recognize as belligerents the Riffians under Krim, and as such entitled equally with their foes to the services of the Red Cross. They have fought a good fight all these years practically without any of the hospital or sanitary facilities with which the armies and navies of Spain and France are well equipped. Abd-el Krim sends word that through Captain Canning he is willing to negotiate for peace along the lines suggested by France and Spain last July, desiring for the Riff a status similar to that of Canada—virtual autonomy.

"After Riffian belligerency shall be recognized and the Red Cross becomes available in Morocco to both sides," says Chairman Myrick, "the Americas' Commission may tender its good offices, along with those of the British committee, in promoting negotiations for a just and per-

manent peace."

The accompanying article is being brought to the attention of the governments and peoples of Spain and France, recorded with the League of Nations and filed at Washington. It also is being promulgated throughout the world.



Courtesy of the New York Times.



HITE NATIONS, TREMBLE at the import of the Riff! Lovers of liberty, champion the cause of the Riffians. Believers in right over might, lend a hand!

History records no finer or greater struggle of a virile people for their own country and for liberty than the Riff affords right now and for several years past. Nor is there in history a worse or more unpardonable instance of strong nations uniting to rob a relatively weak people, the Riffians, of their own land, their own institutions, their own government.

Yet hardly a voice has been raised in protest among other peoples. The chances of the Riff throwing off the pincers whereby Spain and France would squeeze

her to death, have been probed, analyzed and discussed with the cold disregard of human rights that characterized German war *kultur* at the depth of its infamy. But no friend of common humanity has yet led a revolt against this inhuman attempt to wreck an ancient people—to destroy the last vestiges of a civilization which was once the glory of mankind, and that may be such again if given a fair field and no favors.

What are the facts, in brief?

For hundreds if not thousands of years the Berber tribes have possessed the mountainous area of Morocco. Apparently of Nordic admixture or ancestry, the Riff blood and brains made possible the culture that was Spain's for 700 years until the expulsion of the Moors.

Capitalizing the Past

(Continued from Page 90)

children's features is due to the stories and their continuity, also, the familiar voice that comes out of the air every night with a new story and finally, the fact that these little tales stimulate the imaginative powers of the child as well as create an interest in story telling.

"The home economics department wherein household problems are discussed and solutions provided, has an appeal for women. Farm talks have a following in the rural districts, and the classical musical programs and carnival features are calculated to entertain the lovers of jazz and those who prefer the works of the masters of music. Of the other features, we have had afternoon frolics, midnight revues and at home shows, the last named including vocal and instrumental selections sent out by our staff artists.

"Of all the forms of entertainment and education provided via KYW, I think one of the most popular is the World Crier who comes on the air every half hour with news bulletins gleaned from all parts of the world by the International News Service and Universal Service. The World Crier reads only short news items and market reports, and these with the fact that he comes on the air at regular intervals all contribute to the success of this feature.

THE radio fans of this country, in my opinion, want variety first, then dependability in the matter of having certain features at specified intervals. Especially is this true of the fans who enjoy the work of radio stars who have become popular through radio. Broadcasting has made a great family of radio artists and they have become known through their work at the microphone. Radio has developed a new type of personality and the great appeal back of it is the human voice.

"The announcers who carry on at the microphones were unknown four years ago. Today, each has a following. Announcing has become a fine art. The successful man at this game must convey in a few words a mental picture of the studio, the football field, baseball diamond, theater or great auditorium with its crowd and striking personalities. He must take his hearers into his confidence and through a well developed sense of observation show them all the eyes cannot see but the ears can hear.

"With a capable announcer it is possible to broadcast almost anything that is regarded as entertainment. There are some exceptions, one being a child prodigy and another, a large chorus. In the case of the former it is difficult for radio fans to visualize the child artist, and in the case of the chorus it just 'can't be done' with any degree of success."

Discussing the future of radio Mr. Wetherbee pointed out that interest and diversification would play an important part in program presentations. "Radio has its limitations," he said, "and we must recognize the fact that we have only sound to work with when we broadcast. It follows then that we will have a technique peculiar to radio. These, of course, are problems to be worked out and with their solution radio will become a greater factor in our daily life. It has come suddenly with possibilities unlimited and we must make it serviceable for all men."

Lafayette Square

(Continued from Page 47)

wounded Polish soldier. The inscription as you may readily see, is:

"And Freedom shrieked when Kosciuszko fell."

"We will, if you please, go to the west and at that corner we will find another monument unveiled December 7th, 1910, in commemoration of Baron Von Steuben, who on the ice and in the snow drilled the raw colonial troops at Valley Forge during the bitter months of the winter of 1778. He was a member of that historic court martial that tried and condemned the British spy André. As we approach you can readily see that classically garbed bronze warrior with a helmet on his brow, standing on the east side, teaching a youth the arts of war. On the west side there is a bronze group, a woman admonishing a kneeling lad to remember. On the south side there are two portraits of bronze, one of Colonel William Worth, the other of Major Benjamin Walker, both aides and friends of Von Steuben. A replica of this statue was presented to William II, Emperor of Germany, and was unveiled at Potsdam September 2d, 1911, where it still stands.

"We will turn southward from here and find the figure of Rochambeau in bronze and of heroic size, facing the White House grounds, presented by France and unveiled by President Roosevelt in 1902. He came to America to offer his sword to the colonies of America, bringing with him six thousand French soldiers; and he with his little army gave great aid to Washington and LaFayette in the battle of Yorktown. The families of both Rochambeau and LaFayette were represented at the unveiling. On the south side there will be found a figure of a woman holding a sword in one hand, in the other a banner, at her side the bird of freedom. She is a symbol of that "Liberty" for which Rochambeau fought. On the north side there is found the following inscription:

"We have been contemporaries and fellow-laborers in the cause of liberty, and we have lived together, as brothers should, in harmonious friendship."

"Washington to Rochambeau, Feb. 1st, 1784."

"Now we go to the southeast corner, where stands the memorial to one who as a youth of nineteen came to these shores with his soul yearning to aid those who had cast their lot in the scale of freedom against that of oppression; one for whom a room had been set apart, and which bears his name in the mansion of that shrine of patriotism—Mount Vernon; one for whom this historical place is honored by bearing his name—LaFayette. This statue was erected by the Act of the American Congress, and was unveiled in 1891. The bronze figure sculpted by Alexandre Falguieré and Antonin Mercié stands on a pedestal designed by Paul Pujol. On the front a partly draped figure of a woman is seen offering to him the sword of America. On the east side are two figures—D'Estaing and De Grasse—of the French Navy; on the west two other figures—Rochambeau and Duportail—of the French Army.

"Thus I have given you but a bare outline of the description of these four monuments to four strangers who came to us placing their lives in the balance to aid those who were in the death strife against a power that had made them serfs and would continue to hold them as such."

With a wave of the hand in half salute, he turned and passed down the "Avenue." On a breath of the breeze there came to my ears.

"God be with you till we meet again."

Import of the Riff

(Continued from Page 16)

Re-creating an Ancient Empire

IN the face of all these difficulties, Abd-el Krim has succeeded in bringing about a real union of thought and action among the various Berber tribes, at the same time extending their domination over the Arabs. He has created a veritable state, of which he proclaimed himself sultan in 1922. He is recognized by the whole population as their political chief and religious head.

Though not yet recognized by any foreign government, the Riff is in fact "a primitive Moslem despotism" of, by and for the native peoples under Abd-el Krim. Already it is a state and has been a state for some years, "with a state's attributes of the power of self-defense, the power to collect taxes, and the power to enforce order," as testified to by Hall Scott Mowres and other trustworthy observers. He testifies that feuds have been abolished between families and tribes, order established, taxes collected and justice rigidly enforced upon the principles of the Koran.

The population is aflame with a determination to win independence. In this respect Riffians today are more united than were the people of the British colonies during much of our American revolution. The organization and discipline of the Riffians now probably compare favorably with the Americans then.

A vital difference between the two struggles is that your Riffi never admits defeat. His will for liberty and self-government impels him to "come back" stronger than ever after each repulse. His clothing, equipment and color enable him to merge himself into the landscape so as to be almost imperceptible to infantry, cavalry or aviators. His place of abode is so simple that even if demolished by aerial bombs, families quickly re-establish themselves in caves or mud huts. It remained for American fliers to achieve the infamous distinction of letting themselves to the French forces for bombing the women and children of the Moors in their own homes. Now will Yankee aviators be allowed to return this spring to rain gas upon what is left of a people defenceless against this last atrocity of modern warfare? Perhaps so, since right now the American people are spending their good dollars to hear lectures against the Riff from a spokesman for the defeated Spaniard!

A Real Leader

MEANWHILE, aided by his gifted brother and an able cabinet, Abd-el Krim is preparing to hurl back the invaders' advance the coming Spring. "A man of wide knowledge, insight and discrimination," Krim

forms a striking figure as the leader of a native people determined to retain their own. He declares that he is serving only his own people, without reference to the rest of Africa or of Islam as a whole.

My own judgment is that the Berbers as a right are free, and ought to be independent. Who is the young American that shall do for them what LaFayette did for us?

Blessing to the World

Their success in re-creating an empire of the Moors co-terminous with Morocco, may prove a blessing in disguise to Spain, France, Italy, England and the rest of Europe. I believe it will be to the advantage of those and other nations to allow this new buffer state to work out its own salvation.

Under Abd-el Krim or his brother in succession, the Moorish empire will develop along modern lines, with good highways and railroads, mail and telephone, telegraph and radio, boats and bridges. The capital, Ajdir, may then soon possess all the facilities of a modern city.

Regenerating a People

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Such renaissance of all that was finest in Moorish culture, with probably even superior accomplishments in bodily, mental and spiritual health, art, education and industry, will be a tremendous experiment in eugenics well worthy of international favor.

Avoid Ominous Danger

On the other hand, continued oppression or subjugation of the Moors may incite the aspirations of all Islam to dominate Africa through the Africans, India through the Indians, Asia through the Asiatics. Out of such a movement might come in time a coalition of the black, tan and yellow races which will be ominous indeed to the white race.

Men and women of white blood in this or other countries who share the writer's views are requested to write him in care of JUSTICE, with a view to forming an international group favorable to the present aspirations of the Berbers for their own government in their own land, independent of but co-operating with other nations in a tolerant attitude for the peace and progress, prosperity and happiness of the whole world.

To American Friends of the Riff, Springfield, Mass., Herbert Myrick, Chairman

Please enroll the undersigned as a Friend of the Riff. (It is agreed that this does not bind me in any way, financially or politically.)

Signatures

P. O. Address

State

Cut out this coupon, paste or pin at head of a sheet of paper, get more signatures, and mail to above address. Persons of either sex over 16 are invited to join and thus use their influence in behalf of a square deal for The Riff.



Herbert Myrick, who has devoted a life in remarkable service to the promotion of self-government, agriculture, arts, manufactures, education and human welfare.

Never conquered before or since in their native habitat, the Riffi early embraced Mohammedanism and with it Arabian culture, but they are not Arabs and always have been the dominating force throughout most of what for years has been called Morocco. They annihilated their Portuguese would-be conquerors 400 years ago, and now the Riffians again have almost driven out their Spanish exploiters.

Virtues of the Berbers

FRRIEND and foe agree in attributing to the Riffians many characteristics and qualities that appeal to Americans as desirable. Cleanly of person and simple in dress, kindly and often generous in marked contrast to the filthy, ragged Arab whose cruelty and rapaciousness is a by-word, the Riffians with their simple and austere life are relatively healthy, vigorous and long lived. Lacking the limitless fanaticism of the Arab, your Riffi is a Musselman without extreme enthusiasm for his religion—"a simple soul, like an English North Country peasant, abysmally ignorant and insular, but possessed of all the essential virtues, with good humor and friendliness thrown in." This opinion of Vincent Sheean is confirmed by other American and English reporters who have toured Morocco in recent months and come in close contact with her various tribes and leaders. Their racial characteristics, history and heredity, their past and present, further prove the superiority of the Riffi to the Arab, as a group or individually. Count Prorok's recent excavations in the Hagar Mountains reveal a Berber culture extending far back into the dim recesses of the prehistoric period.

The valor of the Berber is beyond all praise. Soldiers from the cradle up, their reckless courage, their physical endurance inured to little food and less water when campaigning, their amazing marksmanship afoot or horseback, welcoming death as the beginning of unspeakable joys and the end of a less alluring existence here, as fighters the Riffi typify all that brave men honor in the individual who battles for his home, loves, land and heritage.

Struggling Against Vast Odds

THESE are the people, for centuries native to their beloved country, who of late years have sought to throw off the Spanish yoke that was imposed upon them without a shadow of reason or justice. Even the apologists for Spain admit that her attempted protectorate has been accompanied by the graft, inefficiency and exploitation which in Cuba became so offensive as finally to induce the United States to drive out the Spaniard that Cuba might be free.

When Spain assumed northern Morocco, some years ago, France took over southern Morocco. With their cleverness in dealing with alien peoples, the French under Marshal Lyautey have accomplished wonders in developing the country in the name of the sultan, and thus a more puppet of France.

France regards French Morocco as vital to her vast colonial possessions, which have many thousands of blacks to each French inhabitant. The black soldiers under the tri-color were potent in the defense against the onslaught of Germany. The French ignore the color line, have granted citizenship to Negroes under certain conditions, and look to their African empire to insure the future stability and greatness of France.

Now that Germany has been readmitted to the family of nations, she will try diplomatically to regain part of her former colonies in south central Africa, and may even presume to have interests in Morocco. Mussolini makes no secret of Italy's ambition to largely expand its dominion and power in north Africa. England's interests in the dark continent are so far-flung that she looks askance at Spanish, French, German and Italian aspirations in Africa. Thus it is that Morocco's position today is that of a key for which other nations are striving to unlock the door into their African domains. Hence national greeds and all the selfishness of Europe seek to dominate Morocco, even to the extent of obliterating its native peoples and real owners.

Spain Licked, France at Standstill

WITH but a handful of poorly armed Berbers, their chief Abd-el Krim, after several years of guerrilla warfare, captured General Sylvestre with 20,000 of the flower of the Spanish army and vast military material at Anual in 1921. Thereafter the Riffian offensive was



A Hard Nut To Crack

pushed so aggressively that during the past summer Spain withdrew into her ancient citadels of Ceuta and Melilla, leaving to the victorious Berbers nearly the whole area previously claimed by the Spanish protectorate.

Fearing that such eliminating of Spain would induce the Berbers to attempt the reclamation of that part of Morocco which for some years has been under French control, France promptly advanced her troops upward from the south into the Riff. In so doing she had the fullest cooperation of the Spanish government. But little real headway was made in the French campaign, which ceased with the advent of the rainy season only to be renewed upon a larger scale the coming Spring unless other circumstances prevent.

(Continued on Page 110)

Import of the Riff

(Continued from Page 16)

Re-creating an Ancient Empire

IN the face of all these difficulties, Abd-el Krim has succeeded in bringing about a real union of thought and action among the various Berber tribes, at the same time extending their domination over the Arabs. He has created a veritable state, of which he proclaimed himself sultan in 1922. He is recognized by the whole population as their political chief and religious head.

Though not yet recognized by any foreign government, the Riff is in fact "a primitive Moslem despotism" of, by and for the native peoples under Abd-el Krim. Already it is a state and has been a state for some years, "with a state's attributes of the power of self-defense, the power to collect taxes, and the power to enforce order," as testified to by Hall Scott Mowres and other trustworthy observers. He testifies that feuds have been abolished between families and tribes, order established, taxes collected and justice rigidly enforced upon the principles of the Koran.

The population is aflame with a determination to win independence. In this respect Riffians today are more united than were the people of the British colonies during much of our American revolution. The organization and discipline of the Riffians now probably compare favorably with the Americans then.

A vital difference between the two struggles is that your Riffi never admits defeat. His will for liberty and self-government impels him to "come back" stronger than ever after each repulse. His clothing, equipment and color enable him to merge himself into the landscape so as to be almost imperceptible to infantry, cavalry or aviators. His place of abode is so simple that even if demolished by aerial bombs, families quickly re-establish themselves in caves or mud huts. It remained for American fliers to achieve the infamous distinction of letting themselves to the French forces for bombing the women and children of the Moors in their own homes. Now will Yankee aviators be allowed to return this spring to rain gas upon what is left of a people defenceless against this last atrocity of modern warfare? Perhaps so, since right now the American people are spending their good dollars to hear lectures against the Riff from a spokesman for the defeated Spaniard!

A Real Leader

MEANWHILE, aided by his gifted brother and an able cabinet, Abd-el Krim is preparing to hurl back the invaders' advance the coming Spring. "A man of wide knowledge, insight and discrimination," Krim

forms a striking figure as the leader of a native people determined to retain their own. He declares that he is serving only his own people, without reference to the rest of Africa or of Islam as a whole.

My own judgment is that the Berbers as a right are free, and ought to be independent. Who is the young American that shall do for them what LaFayette did for us?

Blessing to the World

Their success in re-creating an empire of the Moors co-terminous with Morocco, may prove a blessing in disguise to Spain, France, Italy, England and the rest of Europe. I believe it will be to the advantage of those and other nations to allow this new buffer state to work out its own salvation.

Under Abd-el Krim or his brother in succession, the Moorish empire will develop along modern lines, with good highways and railroads, mail and telephone, telegraph and radio, boats and bridges. The capital, Ajdir, may then soon possess all the facilities of a modern city.

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UNDER SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 10 1926

DEPT. OF STATE.

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SOLICITOR'S OFFICE

FEB 15 1926

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

February 9, 1926

~~Mr. Castle:~~

~~Mr. Grew:~~

~~Mr. Hackworth:~~

RECEIVED
DEPT. OF STATE
FEB 17 1926

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7-10
FEB 17 1926
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Your attention is called to page 11 of the London Times of January 23 which publishes a news despatch from Tangier to the effect that Portugal has adhered to the Tangier Convention, thus leaving only the United States and Italy who have not adhered. The tone of the despatch tends to blame the United States and Italy for the present confusion, and we may expect more propaganda along this line.

It has been commonly believed that Portugal had hitherto refrained from adhering on the advice of Great Britain. Consequently adherence at this time would point in the direction of a diplomatic bargain, between Great Britain and another Power, presumably France.

It will be interesting to see what Blake says in this connection.

881.00/1197

FEB 17 1926

WE:HC

No. 59.

American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General.

Tangier, Morocco, February 5th, 1926.



File
per
SUBJECT: The Adherence of Portugal to the Tangier Statute.

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:-

I have the honor to advise that the Chamber of Deputies of Portugal, according to press reports, has finally voted adherence to the Tangier Statute. This action, while interesting, is unimportant and its effect is discounted. It has long been expected that the Portuguese Government would be cajoled or coerced into agreement, and the most noteworthy feature of the action

action taken by the Chamber on January 20th, is its tardiness, unless the vicissitudes of government in Portugal be considered an explanation of the delay. That determined pressure by the British Government could enlist Portugal in the adventure sponsored by Sir Arnold Robertson has long been conceded.

In an interview with the Diplomatic Agent and Consul-General of Portugal here, he stated to me that he had been informed through unofficial channels that the Senate of January 30th, ratified the action of the Chamber, information which is confirmed by reports in the Portuguese press. The interest of the Portuguese Foreign Office in Portugal's prospective association in the Tangier experiment, as well as the importance of its Agent in Tangier, is perhaps sufficiently indicated by Señor Ferreira's admission that as yet he has received from his Government no notification of any kind of the action taken.

Señor Ferreira stated that in conversations with his Foreign Office last November he learned that at that time there was no intention of submitting the Tangier Statute to Parliament for consideration. Spain and France had both sought to influence the Portuguese Government, but the latter had demanded as a condition precedent the settlement of certain naturalization issues between it and the French Government. Señor Ferreira frankly states that the present action is responsive to British pressure, and assumes that the British Government has committed itself to an effort to promote the settlement of the naturalization question between Portugal and France.

The


The Tangier Statute will not stand by virtue of the adherence of Portugal, any more than the abstention of Portugal would have caused it to fall. The local situation remains to all intents and purposes unchanged.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant



Franklin B. Frost.
American Vice-Consul.

Approved: 

Maxwell Blake.
Agent and Consul-General.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SO (my opinion)

Please return
to WE

~~WE~~

Where does Blake
obtain ^{his} fearful and
wonderful leprology?

Jma

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDERSECRETARY

March 2, 1926

PP

WE

Mr. Carter:

Noted on [illegible] Records

Blake's despatches, particularly this one of January 28, are extremely interesting and valuable, and reveal a masterful grasp of the situation in his bailiwick. I only wish he would use simpler language.

A handwritten signature, possibly "A. J.", written in dark ink. The signature is stylized and appears to be written over a horizontal line.

JCG.GAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

~~DR~~

~~Mr. G. H. Jones~~

In spite of
Baker's involvement
style, this aspect
in present work and
responsibility for

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881.00
No. 54.

UNDER SECRETARY,
MAR 2 1926
DEPT OF STATE.

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American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General.

Tangier, Morocco, January 28th, 1926.

Office of Foreign Personnel
MAR 2 1926
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FEB 26 1926
WESTERN EUROPE

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881.00/199
INDEX BUREAU

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 12 1926
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Moroccan events in perspective; Incidents,
Episodes and Actualities.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 11 1926
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

MAR 15 1926

Sir:-

As I have had the honor, hitherto, of endeavoring to avoid anything lacking in significance, and not possessing both relation and value to the matter under survey,

survey, I venture to choose, for the subject of this Despatch, a few only of some of the more important events, which have transpired in Morocco during the recent past, but in which, it is believed, much other pertinent matter is included.

In this category of subjects might be mentioned THE FRANCO-SPANISH CONFERENCE IN MADRID; THE FALL OF MARSHAL LYAUTEY; and PEACE FORMULAS, WHICH ARE NOW CURRENT IN THE PRESS, AFFECTING THE RIFF.

The question of Tangier, which is so specific in character, and relatively isolated, ^{881.00/148} was somewhat exhaustively treated in my No. 16 of September 4th, 1925 and, in the interlude, since no tangible developments have occurred, which could be put forward as, in any way, modifying the situation, as therein described, this question, consequently, will be mentioned only in so far as it may be involved in the general solution of the political problems of Morocco.

The origin, significance, and results of the Madrid Conference have not been accurately revealed in the press, and there has been no political account of it, that I have seen, which has not been both superficial and ill-informed.

Undoubtedly it possessed, from points of view of appearance, important political characteristics and its consequences, as officially enumerated, purported to be constructive, but the forces operating together, throughout the Conference, were too badly coordinated to

convince

convince any well informed observer of its success.

On one side, the interests were passively expressed; on the other, assertively so. Historic, psychological and racial antagonism, in addition to fundamental dissimilarities of temperament, made, in fact, complete co-operation and full accord between France and Spain, over political principles and military methods in Morocco, an utter impossibility.

Neither side entertained any deep rooted esteem for the other, and in such an atmosphere, fusion was incomplete and confidence curiously lacking. These incongruities induced me to communicate to the Department the impressions conveyed in my No. 4 of July 16th, 1925, and I have now nothing to retract from, and little to modify, in the contents of this message.

The origin of this Conference grew out of public opinion, and the domestic political embarrassments, which the two Governments were encountering over their respective Moroccan programs. Abdelkrim, having imposed upon Spain a military dictator—who in turn was finding himself as powerless as his exiled predecessors had been against the Riff leader—suddenly launched, in May last, a series of dramatically successful attacks against the French lines along the Northern frontier of the Zone of the French Protectorate, and the growing disaffection and threatening attitude of the native tribes, throughout Southern Morocco, suddenly revealed, to French public opinion, the seriousness and magnitude
of

of the difficulties inherent to the pacification of Morocco, and brought into relief the grave error underlying the policy of Marshal Lyautey, namely, antagonism to Spain in her neighboring mandated territory. Under these circumstances, France was brought to make those overtures to Spain, which I described in my Despatch above referred to, as: "Her Belated Inspiration for Unity and Collaboration in Morocco."

I also ventured to assert, at that time, that Marshal Lyautey had fallen into grave discredit and bankruptcy, and would soon figure upon the superannuated list, and that, metaphorically speaking, the capital of France had been transferred to Madrid, in view of the almost epical event of the presence, in Madrid, of delegates of one of the foremost Islamic Powers, seeking peace terms with a rebel, through the intermediary of a European State, which had already suffered an ignominious defeat at his hands. I further observed that any failure, on the part of Spain, to reap the advantages of her position, in this regard, would be solely due to the narrowness and ineptitude of her statesmen.

Spanish diplomacy, in history, has seldom achieved the laurels of great distinction, and it will be suggested in this Despatch that there has been no departure from this rule, with regard to the late Franco-Spanish negotiations. The Moroccan problem, for Spain, continues to be an item of first concern, and one, if
anything,

anything, more acute than ever before. The Franco-Spanish accord was unfavorable to Spain, because it entailed fresh military enterprises, thus rendering, to an increasing degree, disparity between public revenue and expenditure.

In short, the compact and grandiose proposals of co-operation between France and Spain in Morocco, as published, constituted in reality, regardless of their designs, cautions and plausibilities, little more than a trivial diplomatic entertainment, presented under a euphemistic title.

The conduct of the Conference itself, when it opened, after sundry postponements, was serio-comic, France was represented by, among others, her Ambassador in Madrid, Count de Perretti de la Rocca, one of the best informed of men, suave, calculating and persuasive, whose program was well prepared but cleverly concealed. The Spanish Plenipotentiaries, on the other hand, were sedentary and decrepit Generals, ignorant of politics and inaccessible to all competent advice.

The disadvantage and the secondary distinction of being Plenipotentiaries soon became more apparent, however, to the Spanish members themselves than to any one else, for the sequel was (and they collectively accepted this early realization of the fact) that, had it not been for a chance, chronic, physical infirmity of the presiding member of their delegation, the Conference itself might have been broken off and adjourned

sine

sine die, with all the abortiveness that such an arid confession of failure would have implied. Thanks, however, to the urgencies described, the President of the Conference was always discomfited, when some urgent or original matter was proposed, or when his Colleagues were being "hammered" by the resourceful French negotiators, and it was here that the Spanish spokesman, by a sign or a signal, pleaded the truce of temporary absence, which he availed himself of, for hasty consultations, outside the Conference room, where it would only be a charitable supposition to believe, he found any positive appeasement from his preoccupations.

The first ten days of the sessions were consumed in a debate, characterized at times by some lachrymosity, on both sides, over the reoccupation of Sheshaoun by Spain, a point from which she had recently retired. France desired to relieve the pressure on her front, at a critical moment, by sending Spain forward, and thus compelling Abdelkrim to reduce his activities along the Werga front, but the Spanish Plenipotentiaries, in the end, categorically refused to agree.

The next question approached by the Conference was that of the blockade. The French desired to establish a maritime blockade off the Riff coast, with the co-operation of Great Britain and Spain, extending beyond the three mile limit, and to invoke the American Liquor Treaties, as creating a precedent for the recognition of this principle. Great Britain refused to

adhere,

adhere, and it soon became obvious that such contemplated action would meet with resistance from all other Powers, most of all in such highly frequented waters as the Straits of Gibraltar. It was also realized that any action of this sort, even if successful, would have been tantamount to recognizing Abdelkrim as a belligerent. The agreements finally reached, on the point of naval co-operation, were purely formal, but sufficient to suggest to public opinion that some understanding had been arrived at.

For over a fortnight, (from June 20th to July 7th), the debates were particularly confused and sterile of any practical resolutions, owing to the fact that Spain was making a determined, though maladroit, and eventually abortive, bid for a fundamental revision, in her favor, of the agreements in regard to Tangier. There does not seem to be any doubt that the resistance of the British Foreign Office was one of the reefs, upon which the Spanish pretensions were wrecked. The Spanish manoeuvre, in this regard, was clumsily, and injudiciously based upon the pretended menace of the internationalized zone to the security of the Spanish military forces, in the neighboring zone, and finally resulted in the reinforcement of the military police corps, in Tangier, created by the Act of Algeciras, and a consequent further weakening of Spain's position in the Tangier Zone, as the principal military police forces therein, are under the command of French Officers.

The

The next point, upon which an agreement was arrived at without any difficulty, was that neither France nor Spain would conclude a separate peace with Abdelkrim without the consent of the other, but there was, however, a secret clause authorizing either country to conclude, in entire independence of the other, peace with any of the tribes composing the Riff military contingents.

The Spanish delegates at the Conference apparently failed to realize the subtle difference between their position and that of France, which would result in the operation, to the detriment of Spain, of the secret agreement, in regard to independent peace with the tribes. Abdelkrim's main forces are established within the Spanish mandated territory, and the tribes on the fringe of this territory, and in immediate contact with the French lines, have always assumed an unsteady allegiance to the Riff leader.

If France, therefore, succeeds in definitely gaining to her cause these border tribes, by the independent negotiations, authorized under the secret clause, the result will be that France's concern, in the fate of Abdelkrim, will be so diminished as to enable her, with impunity, to withhold any further concerted military action, and to invite Spain to follow her example in likewise treating with the tribes. It is evident that the tribes on the French border are much more easily susceptible of separate treatment, than those in

the

the heart of the Riff under Abdelkrim.

By this process it is to be foreseen that France will be able to withdraw from her co-operation commitments, leaving Spain to carry on, alone, the campaign against Abdelkrim's forces—reduced it is true by the defection of his southern border tribes—but unmolested by a passive attitude on their part, dictated by French policy and the seductions of monetary compromises.

This situation cannot fail before long to revert to the open attitude of antagonism between France and Spain in Morocco, which continually characterized the position of these two Powers, until a momentary panic had produced that simulacrum of co-ordinate action, which evolved from the Madrid Conference.

While there was not an agreement for complete military collaboration, there was an understanding, at the Conference, that naval and military activities should be planned and co-ordinated in advance, but carried out independently, in full accord. But the execution of these agreements resulted in mutual disappointment, and this was conspicuously illustrated at Alhucemas, where Primo de Rivera manoeuvred up and down the Riff coast, for three days, awaiting for the pre-concerted French advance, from the Tazza front, which was to have synchronized with the Spanish landing on the Riff coast. Finally, in sheer desperation, he threw ashore 16,000 seasick soldiers, and having despatched aeroplanes immediately to the French base, inquiring

as to the French delay, he was informed that they were not yet ready to advance.

The primary and organic difficulties which obstruct the path of complete agreement, between France and Spain, in Morocco, are especially vexatious and perplexing, since they result from the mistrusts and jealousies, which the past has engendered, and which the present has not allayed.

The country itself also still suffers from an infectious complex and remains as before a region of deeds, risks and distracting possibilities, and with this brief observation we will cast our glance in another direction.

Although, in passing—in the hour of his adversity—I would pay an adequate, rather than an extraordinary tribute to him, the fall of the adventurous, daring and vehement Marshal Lyautey, senile but still ebullient, whose conceit had hitherto eminently qualified him to face undaunted all obstacles, constitutes an event too important to be passed over in silence.

Personally, I have been much too close, both to his work and to his weaknesses, even remotely to subscribe to the flattering phrases, with which his name is so often associated. Love of power and pettiness were his outstanding frailties, and though, at times, he nearly approached great things, his occasional
exhibitions

exhibitions of magnanimity were always more akin to an impulse than to an inspiration. Belief in his own endowments led to growing excesses and indiscretions, and in spite of a fairly respectable record, it is pathetic to find that his name already seems to have been unmercifully forgotten, in the country, which first gave him his renown, and where he felt sure of a favorable verdict from posterity. Notwithstanding a harshness of form and a demonstrative, if not a bullying manner, Lyautey loved the Court more than the Camp, and usually made Courts of his Camps. He preferred society to soldiering, although parade in, any form, was always pleasing to him. In the nature of a collateral perquisite, a complimentary validity to his high administrative functions in Morocco—a point somewhat successfully insisted upon by his wife—Lyautey was indulgently allowed—since nobody seemed to care—to create a Court for his amusement, and this weakness for social show and ceremony must be pointed to, as one of the direct causes of his downfall. His army in Morocco was full of picked flatterers and aristocratic parasites. The Cabinet at Rabat was likewise recruited, and all things so ordained everywhere, that the entire planetary system oscillated around the center of Lyautey's own personality.

The observations, which I have here permitted myself, concerning Marshal Lyautey, are not for the purpose of detraction, or with a desire to disturb, the
obsolescent

obsolescent if unmollified retirement into which his figure has now receded, but they are designed simply to set down, what I conscientiously believe to be, a somewhat truer reconstruction of his personality, than has been made to appear, by the propaganda and panegyrics, publicly circulated in the past, concerning his character and achievements.

In his day, he was looked upon as the first orientalist of France, alluded to by his partisans as the "Marshal of Islam," and was entrusted with the initiation and direction of a French Islamic policy seeking the creation of an alliance between France and the entire Mohammedan World.

For the furtherance of this ambitious scheme, Lyautey conceived the project of the erection of a Mosque in Paris—the funds for the building of which have, in no small measure, been alimanted by forced contributions from the natives of Morocco—to be a monument symbolic of the position claimed by France, as the foremost White Islamic Power, the one western nation comprehending the soul of Islam, and in perpetual sympathy with its religious ideals.

In the field of more practical politics, Marshal Lyautey directed his efforts to French policy in the Near East after the war, and he selected Pellé and Gouraud, as his instruments in Syria and Turkey. He it was, who conceived the idea of reviving Turkey as a State, first in order that French Bond Holders might
receive

receive their debt, and concurrently, to magnify French prestige, throughout the Islamic world.

The magnitude of his miscalculations, in this regard, can be most graphically, and perhaps best described, by the uncharitable processes of recollection, retrospect and result. His was the dream of founding a United North African Empire, under a single and religious political head, the Sultan of Morocco, (with himself in control), and this explains his connivance with the native movement against Spain in her Zone, his desire to eliminate that Power from Morocco, his manoeuvring for the mastery of Tangier, in order that France, as a great Power might take her seat at the entrance of the Mediterranean, in preparation for the future.

His miscalculations were grave, even glaring at times, but day and environment were running in his favor, until the vicissitudes of time exposed his exhaustion, and until he was awakened from his vain dreams, with his prestige and power shattered at the hand of a rebel chieftain from the Riff mountains.

I have no desire to sit, as a Court of Last Appeal, over Marshal Lyautey, for the purpose of reversing the general judgment concerning his administrative qualities, or the estimates currently found of his deeds and achievements in Morocco, but my impressions would be incompletely expressed, and all proportion in delineation lost, without some pious reference

to

to this phase of his career, his pursuits and his problems.

That he has been an extraordinary figure in the life of this country, it would be foolish to deny, and equally so to question his passion, his assiduity, or his vast and restless energy.

In Morocco he conceived for himself, tasks of his own making, and he must be given the credit for always accepting the fullest responsibility for their execution. He has challenged his enemy in the open. He has never fenced with opponents, as he always preferred to fight them, and these are some of the strong and outstanding qualities, that have compelled admiration, and endeared him to his friends, just as they may explain the case, with which he has vanquished the weak, for the purpose of prolonging enjoyment of power. But in spite of his various virtues or reputed vices, when all has been said, he has been ambulatory, extravagant, flamboyant, and always cocksure of his own hallucinations. To be perfectly truthful, the Riff revolt was the only real problem that he encountered throughout his entire administration in Morocco, and the one, almost at the touch of which, he crumbled into dust, for, after practically creating it, he was no more able to visualize its consequence, than he had been able, previously, to foresee the dangers of his dexterous Turkish policy. It is true he conquered the peasant inhabitants of the plains of Morocco, but this

was

was done without much opposition. It is true he respected the glories of the faithful and paid early and spectacular tribute to the legends and shrines of Mohammedan saints, and that, in most of the minor forms of native contact, he was both shrewd and successful. He built roads in Morocco, adding to its material prosperity, and contributing to solve the problems of transportation, and incidentally to enhance the comfort of tourists and travellers, but here, it may be said, that his talents end, for he was without the plenitude and comprehension of genius, and unable to distinguish the true relation, which lies between engaging political mystery, and the basic principles of common governmental realities. In short, Marshal Lyautey, worked to make of Morocco a personal preserve, a place in which his presence was indispensable, rather than to create, for France, a strong and independent political planet, and consequently his claim to fame, as an administrator, is bound to suffer with the lapse of time.

The Department will appreciate that my judgment of Marshal Lyautey is not an elaboration of retrospects enlightened by the catastrophe of his career, but that this has been my feeling during my many years of close observation of his methods and work, and my present appreciation of his character has been faithfully presented to the Department, in my past reports, and notably so, in my unnumbered Despatch of April 20th,

1922,

1922, entitled: "Visit of the President of the French Republic to the Shereefian Empire," prepared on the eve of my departure, from this country four years ago.

Marshal Lyautey has been succeeded by Senator Steeg, a man of modesty but of medium measure, undistinguished in appearance, but rumored to be competent, steady and self possessed, and esteemed, by those who know him, for the impeccable rectitude of his principles. As an Administrator, Mr. Steeg gave evidence of his talents in Algeria, and as a reformer, he has already proved in Morocco that the old Lyautey régime, which was once so deeply embedded in the life of the country, is dead, and is to be swept away, with all its ostentation and egotism.

There is little doubt, in view of his past associations in North Africa, that Mr. Steeg will steadily pursue a policy of political and economic union between Morocco and Algeria, with the ultimate goal of the practical annexation of Morocco by France, should France be able to raise the hypothecations of International Treaties, in regard to international liberty of trade and economic development in the Shereefian Empire.

It is always hard to reduce and confine, within the limits of actuality, wayside rumor and widespread report, and when it is said, locally and at large, that movements are on foot, for the establishment of peace

in

in the Riff, it remains to be seen whether, under existing conditions, one side is as completely submissive and sincere, as described, and concurrently whether the other side is a little less bellicose than before, for after all, this alone constitutes the magic key for a solution of a poignant situation. On occasion, and at times, propositions can be put forward in which both sides to a controversy have more to gain than to lose, even by what may be described as the terms of abject compromise, but it would be perilous, as yet, to prophesy, whether such a primitive habit of thought pervades those responsible for the conduct of the Moroccan problem.

Since last July, when the French and Spanish Governments, while accumulating vast military forces, equipment and supplies upon their battered fronts, announced that peace conditions, drawn up jointly by the protecting Governments, would be communicated to Abdelkrim, there has been a great improvement, in the military situation, both of the French and Spanish armies in Morocco. The French have reoccupied practically all the territory wrested from them by the initial advance of the Riffians; the Spaniards have successfully repulsed the rebel attack upon Tetuan, and effected a landing, and consolidated a strong position, in the Bay of Alhucemas. The gain of these advantages, the increasing difficulties of the followers of Abdelkrim, ascribed to the efficacy of the blockade of the rebel territory,

territory, and the reported defection of important tribes, appear to have modified any intention—if such ever really existed—on the part of the French Government, to treat with Abdelkrim, as the Riff leader, the terms of a peace settlement.

The French Government recently proclaimed that the policy of pacification is henceforward to be pursued through the means of tribal submissions, the capitulating groups being relied upon, to achieve the complete disintegration of Abdelkrim's organization, and eventually to bring about the final downfall of the Riff leader, with a minimum of military intervention, and without direct negotiations.

The French policy above described is, however, in my opinion fraught with very real danger. In the first place, it is not improbable that the weakening of Abdelkrim's fighting strength is over-estimated; secondly, the newly subjugated rebel tribes, are an essentially unreliable instrumentality, and are apt, upon a partial success, and regain of prestige of Abdelkrim, to revert to his influence.

A recovery of strength, and the far from impossible contingency of a successful onslaught, by Abdelkrim, upon the Spanish lines, and the capture of some of the vast stores and ammunition, accumulated in the Spanish Zone, would result in the prolongation of the struggle on the border of the French Protectorate, involving immense burdens in men and treasure, to the

French

French army of occupation.

Furthermore, a disaster to the Spanish forces in Morocco, could not fail to have a vital effect upon the Spanish Government as at present constituted; the downfall of the Primo de Rivera régime would become inevitable, and the position of the King might even be involved.

To come back however to points that are neither subtle nor disingenuous, peace in Morocco is obtainable at what may be described as a fair purchasable price. The formula—put forward in anything but didactic terms—is not an involved one, and has already been indicated to the Department in a Despatch of mine No. 4 dated July 16th, 1925.

If we care, here, to exercise our attention over the facts of the case, it will be seen that Abdelkrim's operations are now confined exclusively to the Spanish Zone, and therefore, it can only be at the sacrifice of Spanish territorial rights in Morocco, no less than at the cost of Spanish pride and prestige in the Peninsula, that the establishment of peace in the Riff is possible.

Abdelkrim therefore pursues a mistaken political psychology, in not preoccupying himself first with Spain, for neither Gordon Canning in Paris, (whose expenses were borne by a German steel group, and whose motives are consequently likewise suspect to France), nor Mr. Sheean, as the agent of a syndicated and spectacular
press,

press, (whose animosity to Spain has been publicly declared), can be accepted in good faith by either side, as appropriate mediums for the opening of peace negotiations. In addition to the disqualifications indicated, and imputable to their haphazard, jejune and meddlesome enterprises, it is obvious that the path of both these novices in Morocco is beset with diplomatic and psychological difficulties inevitably leading them into a labyrinth from which, it is credibly suggested, that neither possesses sufficient ingenuity to effect successful escape.

If the two Powers, France and Spain, are equally sincere in their desire to commemorate in Morocco, a peace without conspiracies, and equally advantageous to both, there is no doubt that the question of representation between all parties concerned could first be easily agreed upon, as an indispensable preliminary to any formal negotiation—a point upon which the Madrid Conference was suspiciously non-committal. Actually, in this connection, it must be confessed, in fairness to both sides, that neither France nor Spain, following the heavy sacrifices and almost fatal risks, which both have run—and appear momentarily to have overcome—to maintain their prestige in Morocco, can be expected to be in a mood to accept, either a feverish or a phenomenal plenipotentiary, both "on the make," for a first discussion of terms.

Abdelkrim in spite of his self infatuation and

romantic

romantic designs, also must be made to realize that no side to any important controversy ever cares to be placed at a disadvantage by the skilful manoeuvres of its adversary. He should be well enough advised, by his reputed friends, to know that the practice of diplomacy in Morocco, although not an art, at least has been responsible for the creation of a system, whose forms have been crystalized, perhaps sanctified—in European opinion—by traditions, and any laxity of rule, in either procedure or conduct, cannot but be uncompromisingly rejected.

There should be nothing hierarchic or highsounding in the letters designating those chosen to discuss settlement proposals. No top hats. No retinues in palace enclosures. Nor should there be previously any widespread propaganda. Three common place men in a cave with a candle over a cup of tea would be the most effective method of dealing with the leader of this tribal guild, and in this phrase, there is less fancy than fact.


In so far as one may regard the cessation of hostilities and the dispositions to be taken for the control of peace in the Riff and Gibala tribelands, the eventual negotiations may be looked upon as the sole concern of France and Spain in Morocco. But many questions are involved in the broader considerations of the proceedings, for if territorial re-arrangements, or the institution of a new administrative authority, is to take place in Morocco, outside existing treaty engagements,

engagements, and beyond the frame of the organic system of control as now devised, all Powers interested in maintaining the integrity of their economic rights, under existing treaties, might claim a right of regard in the framing of any such new, or semi-independent régime, while in the case of Great Britain and of Italy, strategic and political desiderata may greatly widen the scope of any recommendations affecting the distribution of influences along the Mediterranean littoral of Morocco.

Up to this last point, I have dealt, in the main, with what might be described as the recent historical and actual political aspects of the Moroccan question, and as I desire to continue, within these restraints, without invading the potentialities of the future, in a search for perils yet to be incurred, I will conclude, by stating, in a word, that I am led to believe, from the facts and examples I have above attempted to estimate, that the game of events in Morocco may still not inaptly be compared to a quick kaleidoscope, holding within itself nothing fixed, but always possessing fresh opportunity for international surprise and adventure, under the birth of new movements.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,


Maxwell Blake,
American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul-General.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

A-3

Mar 6

Mr. Hugabler - F.A.

Does my memo.
to Mr. Carter re. repairs
for the building at Tarpier
give the situation as
you understand it?

If so, will you forward the
notes to Mr. Carter?

RHW

W3
Mr Carter

V-3

RECEIVED - JUNE 1967

RECEIVED - JUNE 1967

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Mar. 6.

Mr. Carter: W^h

There are no funds available for any extensive repairs this year, so far as I know. The question of disposing of the present building & buying a new one would depend on the action of Congress on the Porter Bill, & the disposition of funds by the Dept. If it seems necessary to make important repairs soon, the only way to get funds would be by a deficiency appropriation, & none has been requested so far.

Sen

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

A - W (Mr. Wilson)

There is the
letter I spoke
to you of at
length

ll

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

A ~~F~~ ~~W~~
F ~~P~~

Excerpts sent to
F.O. and J. L.

See pp 4-5



Please return to WE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

W.P.

THE UNDERSECRETARY

~~Mr. Carter~~

~~Mr. I. D.~~ informs

me that ~~Suggenworth~~ is
~~not~~ known to the

War Staff.

not?

12th
Beade informed
by private letter
[Signature]


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Mr. Anderson,
This letter will
be of interest to you
as well as its au-
thors.

Please return





WE

Tangier, Morocco, February 2nd, 1926.

Index Bureau
RECEIVED
MAR 5 1926
Dept. of State

UNDER SECRETARY
MAR 2 1926
DEPT. OF STATE

My Dear Carter:-

I have succeeded after much delay in getting off by this Pouch, a political Despatch No. 54, entitled: "Moroccan Events in Perspective; Incidents, Episodes and Actualities," and I sincerely hope some little new light at least is thrown upon the subject.

I have not dealt at all with the amateurish efforts of Gordon Canning to bring about peace in the Riff, for I had faith neither in the man nor his methods from the first.

There is a correspondent here now of "The New York Times," by the name of Booth, who, I understand is writing about the "canning of Canning," and it would be superfluous to go into the matter at any length here. I will only add that his reception was rejected by the

French

INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1200

MAR 12 1926

Henry Carter, Esquire,
Department of State,
Washington.

French Foreign Office last month because they had intercepted private correspondence proving his association with German interests, and tending to refute his declarations of personal disinterestedness. I only refer to this matter at all, because Gordon Canning is the Secretary of the Riff Committee in London, and this organization, I understand, is now creating an affiliation in the United States, under the guidance of Herbert Merrick, of Springfield, Massachusetts. I am told that Mr. Merrick is a man of some wealth and influence, and it is understood that the London Committee is advising him.

The Riff Committee in London has always been under the suspicion of the French and the Spaniards, as an association cloaking insidious designs of the British Government, and incidentally with an eye upon the mines in the Riff. Whether these suppositions are well founded or not is questionable, but the exposure of Gordon Canning has certainly very much damaged the standing of the Riff Committee as a group of humanitarians.

I attach to this letter an issue of the local English newspaper, in which you will find several references to the Gordon Canning matter.

In connection with this same affair, a friend of mine here has told me that Gordon Canning is in possession of a letter, written on United States War Department paper, addressed to him as Chief Staff Officer of His Majesty the Sultan Abdelkrim, and that

this

this letter is signed by an individual named Guggenworth. In this letter the writer states that Secretary Kellogg entertains friendly dispositions towards Abdelkrim but that circumstances are not such as to render his intervention feasible. The letter may be a forgery, but if there is any such individual as Guggenworth associated with the War Department, he deserves investigation.

Turning to Tangier, you will already have seen that Portugal has adhered to the Statutes, but this action has called forth nothing more than ironical comments, and can be discounted, from all points of view, as lacking any political importance. For purposes of record, I have asked Frost to prepare a report on this, which he is now preparing.

About two weeks ago, Walter Harris, "The Times" correspondent, who has undergone a great change of heart, informed me that he had written three long articles on the Tangier question, to be published in "The Times,"

Harris feels that the British Foreign Office may prevent the publication of these articles, in view of their caustic criticisms of the new régime, and his prophesy that, without the adhesion of Italy and the United States and the correction of other defects, six months may be accepted as the limit of its expectancy of life.

The British Financial Adviser, one of the very few officials working honestly and without ulterior political objectives, for the good of the town, is

reported

reported to be resigning his post in June. This action reflects the general state of dissatisfaction prevailing in all quarters. In fact, nothing has occurred, which alters, in the slightest particular, my Tangier Convention Despatch, but on the other hand, there are fresh proofs every day that the conclusions of this Despatch were sound.

I enclose to you also two letters, one from Vincent Sheean newspaper correspondent, which is self explanatory, and one written in French by Mohammed Tazzi, agent of Abdelkrim in the Riff, and son of the late Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sultan in Tangier. I have not replied to either of these letters, and of course, under no circumstances would I receive Mohammed Tazzi, on behalf of Abdelkrim. I merely send the letters to you however for your information.

✓ By the last Pouch, I wrote Dawson, asking him if he would intervene before the Personnel Board to help us out by the appointment of an experienced Consular Officer here, at least for the time being. I suggested his enquiring of your division, as to whether it was not a fact that political work of importance was being neglected, pending re-organization, and for the other reasons, which I set forth at length in that letter. ✓
Furthermore, I am hoping in April next, to commence rebuilding the Legation, providing Congress votes the funds, and this will take much of my personal time.

If

If anything can be done along the lines suggested, it will be greatly appreciated. I would also greatly appreciate your having the Department telegraph me if Congress votes the funds for improvements and repairs, and whether the appropriation is available for expenditure during current fiscal year. ✓

Very sincerely yours,

Wm B. Tamm

Monsieur Le Ministre des
d'Amérique à

Changer

Atit Hamara (Riff) le 17 Novembre 1925

Abd-el-Kader Gazi à Monsieur Le Ministre
d'Amerique à Tanger.

Monsieur

Les Riffains reconnaissants, à votre loyalisme, votre dévouement pour la liberté des peuples, si bien compris par votre noble nation, honorent avec justice la libre Amérique et glorifient votre beau geste.

Pour notre droit les pays libéraux ne resteront pas sourds nous l'espérons, à nos gémissements et nous sollicitons leur appui pour l'égalité de tout le monde pour nous dédomager de nos forts sacrifices.

Vous savez certainement que nous sommes encerclés, gênés et empêchés de correspondre ou entrer en relation directe avec le monde ami des lois. Les Riffains et les marocains opprimés voudraient être en contact avec les États Unis d'Amérique.

En ces termes, j'ai l'honneur de solliciter de votre bonté une interview confidente pour vous entretenir d'affaire Riffaine et marocaine en même temps. Dans le cas affirmatif, daigner, monsieur Le Ministre me recevoir chez vous.

Je tiens à vous faire remarquer, que je suis le fils de l'ancien naïb de Tanger et je cours par la suite un risque d'être appréhendé par les autorités ennemis. En cas que cela se soit pourrai-je compter sur votre protection, monsieur Le Ministre

E. J. V. P.

De mon côté, je prendrai les mesures nécessaires et possibles pour passer inaperçues.

Dans l'espoir d'une réponse favorable permettez, monsieur Le Ministre, d'être votre obéissant serviteur.

Abdelhadi Taji

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Paris, November 12, 1925.

Dear Mr. Blake:

I am sorrier than I can tell you that I did not get in to see you again before I left Tangier, but I had a very strenuous day on Monday and missed two things which I wanted very much to do---one to see you, the other to see M. Feit. Everybody, from Mr. Harris to Floyd Gibbons and back again, has told me so much about your profound knowledge of Morocco that I had rather counted on getting some of it, free of charge, for the vile purposes of publication. There were quite a few things I wanted to ask you about, to get perfectly straight before I ventured ~~in~~ into print with them.

As for the short visit I did get a chance to make to the legation, I am afraid it was a little spoiled. I came at the wrong moment. H.E. Mr. M. does not in the least care for me; I suppose he expressed his opinion with great frankness, as usual. I may as well tell you I am not very well regarded by the Spanish authorities, and the ambassador more or less reflects that attitude. They have two attitudes, really; one is (as expressed in a communique from the Spanish embassy here to the French press) that I am anti-Spanish because I had an unfortunate personal experience in Madrid in 1924; the other is that I know nothing about the Rif and have never been there (as Primo tried to make me believe the last time I saw him---he actually told me I could not possibly have seen Abd el-Krim, because Abd el-Krim was in Paris at the time!) I mention all this because I don't want you to be prejudiced by anything the ambassador may have said; the ambassador merely reflects the official Spanish attitude.

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2

Don't think I am on bad terms with the embassy in Madrid; I have always got along excellently with everybody, including the ambassador himself. About a year and a half ago he was, indeed, very friendly to me; but things have changed since then. I deeply resent some of the things he has allowed himself to say about me in fairly public places in Madrid and in Washington; and if he has said any of the same things in your office, I hope they have not too much harmed me in your opinion.

I hope to come back to Tangier in about a month, and shall come to the legation to beg this long-deferred talk with you. You and Mr. Harris are the two people on whom I had counted more or less to set me straight on various points; like a lot of people, I have had plenty of experience but very little background where Morocco is concerned. If I return to the Rif a third time I hope to do so equipped with a little of other people's knowledge.

Yours very sincerely,

Vincent Sheean

P.S. I should have told you before that I was responsible for Sidi M'hammed's writing to you. I don't know what he said, but I know he asked me everything I knew about you, and your name, etc. I told him you knew more about Morocco than any minister we had had for some time (I had this from Harris, Gibbons, et al.) and he said he would write to you at once.

Hope you haven't been too much bothered.

AL-MOGHREB

AL-AKSA &

TANGIER GAZETTE

WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED

MOROCCO

PUBLISHED EVERY SATURDAY EVENING

FOUNDED 1883

TANGIER, SATURDAY, JANUARY 30th, 1926.

No. 2732

AL-MOGHREB AL-AKSA the first newspaper to be published in the Empire of Morocco.

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CAPTAIN GORDON CANNING AND THE RIFF COMMITTEE.

Captain Gordon Canning is the Secretary of the Riff Committee, and has for some time past been negotiating to bring about peace between France and Spain and Abd-el-Krim.

His efforts have been unsuccessful and M. Briand refused to see him.

It was generally hoped that Captain Canning's efforts would have met with some measure of success, and some surprise was manifested at the attitude of M. Briand.

Both officially and unofficially, in the Press and privately, Captain Canning has asseverated and still asseverates his complete independence, stating that it is due to this exceptional position of independence that he is able to influence Abd-el-Krim, and hopes to be able to influence the French and Spanish Governments.

Captain Canning has been in direct communication with Abd-el-Krim for some time past, not only personally, but by correspondence.

"*Litera scripta manet*," and in this instance it remains in the hands of the French Government who have come into possession of extremely compromising documents.

We are not here to sit in judgment on Captain Gordon Canning, but he has succeeded in drawing public attention to himself throughout the world, as the champion of the defenceless, and the defender of the rights of a small nation fighting for its independence.

He has proclaimed the absolute purity of his intentions and efforts.

We have the right to put certain questions to the Riff Committee.

Is the Riff Committee aware of the fact that half Captain Gordon Canning's expenses are being paid by Herr Hacklander, a gentleman who states he has no interest in the Riff beyond having the same aspirations as Captain Gordon Canning himself, a desire for peace. Since writing the above relations with this gentleman have been broken off and the money returned.

Captain Gordon Canning satisfied himself that Herr Hacklander's account of himself is correct, but we find it difficult to understand that he should be ignorant of the fact that Herr Hacklander was formerly the partner and financial backer of Captain Gardiner, a fact which we think should have sufficed to put him on his guard, and to cause him to make enquiries as to whether Herr Hacklander was so entirely disinterested as he asserts.

Does the Riff Committee see the correspondence, which passes between Captain Gordon Canning and Abd-el-Krim, and is it aware that some of that correspondence seized by the French authorities, so long ago as last October, advises

Abd-el-Krim to adopt methods which we find it difficult to recognise as honourable.

We do not believe for one moment that such gentlemen as Lord Lamington, and Amir Ali, are acquainted with the actions of their Secretary, but members of a Committee are responsible for all that is done in their name and it is their duty to state plainly how far they are cognisant of Captain Gordon Canning's conduct of affairs in their name.

In common with the English Press, we have accepted Captain Gordon Canning's assurances of his absolute purity of motive. We regret that we are unable any longer to support those claims.

We publish in another column a letter from Captain Gordon Canning giving a copy of a telegram he has sent to Herr Hacklander terminating his relations with him.

Whilst agreeing that Captain Canning is wise to break off these relations we regret that we are still unable to support his contention that he has no motive for his intervention in the Riff beyond a desire for peace.

NATIVE ADMINISTRATION.

The Casablanca Press has lately had a good deal to say on the subject of justice as administered, to and by natives. We are not greatly concerned as to the methods of government adopted in the French Protectorate, but it does interest us to this extent, that the native Administration in Tangier, was, under the Statute, confided to the Shereefian Government, and it consequently behoves us to see that we do not fall into the same errors, that have been made in the French Zone.

The evils of which complaint is made there, are apparently largely due to the fact that, particularly in Marrakesh, justice, or shall we say law, is largely in the hands of natives, whereas in Tangier, the dangers are of a different character.

We referred the other day, to a very scandalous case that had occurred, in connection with Hasane money, and when a question on the subject was put to the Administrator, he replied, as might have been expected, that native Administration had nothing to do with the Assembly.

The question might perhaps have been so framed, as to have forced an answer, but a question merely as to some incident having occurred in connection with the Administration of native affairs, could be safely ignored.

Now there is more than one point that we have to consider, not merely in connection with the case referred to, but generally as regards the Administration.

We pay a lump sum toward the expenses of native Administration—to whom it is handed we do not know, but it should of course be given to the Mendoub, or perhaps to the Shereefian Government.

It is not very material who actually handles the money, but what is very material is, that we have no check on it, as to how it is spent, whether wisely or foolishly, the answer to which is again that it is none of our business. Here we join issue.

The payment of the rate-payers money entails an obligation on the part of those responsible for receiving it, to account

for it. It is not sufficient to say that the small amount we pay, barely £1,000 a year only goes part of the way toward the expenses.

We think we are entitled to know how much the Mendoub and his khalifas receive, how much is expended on motor cars, whether M. Courtin's salary is paid out of it &c., &c.

We are in any case entitled to know that it is expended legitimately on the Native Administration.

The Customs Administration is removed from our control, but we have at least the satisfaction, or the reverse, of knowing how the money is dealt with, and it seems to us that we ought to see the budget of the Native Administration.

The next point to consider is, to what extent are we responsible for the protection of the native.

We should probably be informed that we had no concern whatever with the native and that whether he was well protected or ill protected was no business of ours, but solely a matter for the Shereefian Government. Again, we join issue.

The fact that for convenience sake, the Administration of native affairs was placed under the Shereefian Government, does not absolve us from responsibility.

We are morally if not legally responsible for the welfare of the native, and the mere fact that the police whom we pay, are responsible for law and order in the town, is proof conclusive of our responsibility.

In the event of serious disturbances, what would be the attitude of the Shereefian Authorities, would they accept responsibility, we fancy we can hear them disclaiming any responsibility whatever, asserting that it was our business to keep order, and theirs only to deal with legal questions.

The framers of the Statute had not a sufficient knowledge of the country to grasp the meaning of their enactments, and the position is entirely illogical.

That we should pay police to arrest people, and wash our hands of what happens afterwards is ridiculous.

We heard the other day of a scandalous case which came before the Mixed Court, when the accused stated that they had been beaten until they gave the desired evidence and the soldiers belonging to the Tabor who had arrested the accused, admitted that they had threatened them.

This is of course quite in accordance with native ideas of justice, but it can not be tolerated under European Administration.

There is one more point which seems important, the Moorish population is represented on the Assembly by six members, and we ask by what process of logic can it be argued that the native is to have a vote on matters which concern Europeans, whilst the European is to have no say whatever in matters concerning the native.

It seems to us that Native and European are so indissolubly mixed in Tangier, that to arbitrarily dissociate them by having, what amounts to, a second Legislative Assembly, is entirely wrong.

The functions and powers of the Native Administration must be defined with greater accuracy, we can admit the validity of the Mendoub and his Khalifas

judges, but let them act independently and precisely as if they were free agents, but to make them puppets at the end of a string, is neither common sense nor in accordance with the spirit of the Statute.

ANGLO-MOROCCAN NEWS

(From our London Office.)

Mining Lane Report

22th January 1926.

TEA.

The tendency for cheap lots to be picked up continues even more marked, more especially with Gunpowder teas which, having been quiet for some weeks, now show signs of more activity.

BARLEY.

Very little business has been done during the last week and buyers, both malting and feeding varieties, show little interest. Black Sea is offered for shipment for 28/-s. per 400 lbs. c. i. f. but there are sellers of landed parcels at 28/6d. No. 3 Canada Western is offered at 30/1d. without finding buyers. Morocco is quoted at about 27/6d. c. i. f. which is considerably too dear.

LINSEED.

There has been a better demand owing to lower prices. Calcutta afloat to London has been sold at £19:1:3 and, for Dec/Jan. shipment £18:7:6 per ton. New Crop for Apl/May. £17:12:8; to £17:15:0: Plate passage £16:0:0: Jan/Feb. shipment £15:17:6: Feb/Mar. & Mar/Apl. £16:15:0:

BEANS.

Market idle. On spot in London £10:15:0: per ton is wanted. The market in Scotland has declined in harmony with the cereal market. Sicilians are quoted at £10:15:0: and Smyrnas at £10:5:0:

MAIZE.

Prices have fallen owing to heavy Plate shipments and a poor demand. Passage 31/-s. per 480 lbs. Jan/Feb. 31/6d. New Crop for May/June 31/6d.

CANARY SEED

There has been a little business in specially good Mazagan quality at 28/3d. ex store. Mazagan seed is offered for Jan/Feb. shipment at 26/9d. c. i. f. and Casablanca at 25/3d. c. i. f. without attracting buyers.

COBBLANDER.

Is offered at 16/-s. per cwt. ex store., but there are no buyers.

CUMMIN SEED.

Is offered at 36/-s. per cwt. ex store, but no buyers.

FENUGREEK.

Sellers are holding for 14/-s. per cwt. on the spot and quoting 13/-s. for shipment. Spanish variety is quoted at 12/6d. for Jan/Feb. or Feb/Mar. shipment but buyers do not seem disposed to pay these prices.

MILLET.

There are sellers of Morocco quality at 9/9d. per cwt. c. i. f. but buyers are lacking.

BROWN BARBARY GUM.

There have been some small sales at 51/6d. per cwt. ex store, but the demand is restricted.

GUM SANDRAC.

Nominal price 150/-s. to 155/-s. per cwt. ex store, according to quality, but no buyers.

BEESEWAX.

Market continues firm but inactive. Nominal value of good pure quality 49/-s. per cwt. ex store.

EGGS.

The price for near arrivals will probably be 10/6d. to 11/-s. per 120.

ALMONDS.

The market unchanged, demand curtailed by high prices.

The highest price for Mazagans is 182/6d. but Haha quality Mogadors have fetched 180/-s. Sous quality Mogadors 178/9d.

Prices from Sicily have fluctuated from 182/6d. to 189/-s. C. & F. About 178/-s. C. & F. for Prima Baris. Buyers show little interest in either of these qualities.

Majorca market remains unchanged. There are quotations of Selected at 185/-s., Farmers at 179/-s. and Current Quality at 172/-s. C. & F. but no demand. Sellers of Persians are holding for 187/6d. and this price is likely to be paid owing to reduced stocks.

In Canary Almonds the market is slightly firmer with Rounds at 192/6d. and Flats at 182/6d. Landed Terms.

In Bitter Almonds only a small business has been done on spot in good Mogadors at 165/-s. There is no demand for Mazagans which are held for 170/-s.

As is usual at this time of the year, the demand has eased off considerably, and it looks as though for the next few weeks a quiet time will prevail.

HIDES AND SKINS.

There was a fair attendance at the Raw Hides sales on the 14th January but demand was quiet and the tendency to rather lower values. Salted West India were mostly about 1/- per lb. lower on Heavy and Light where sold, and part of the offerings had to be withdrawn, but Kips were in good demand and about 1d. per lb. advance. Colombian, where sold brought about previous rates for Best Selections, but Seconds met only low offers and were withdrawn. The offering of Venezuelan was small, the bulk of those catalogued not being landed in time for the auction; where sold, previous rates were obtained. Mombassa, East African and Nigerian did not obtain competition and were all withdrawn. Cape sold to only a limited extent at unchanged values. Buffalo were in good request, and mostly sold at late rates.

Lancashire Cotton Industry.

22nd January 1926.

A larger amount of business has been offering in the Manchester market than for some weeks back. Buyers have displayed increased confidence in current rates. Many manufacturers during the week have extended their engagements, a noticeable feature being the further large transactions in light cloths. All round a more hopeful feeling prevails regarding future developments, and many traders will be surprised if there is not a decidedly healthier business being done before very long. There have been no big price movements in raw cotton rates, but distant months tend to harden at the expense of near month positions.

A considerable amount of business has been offering in the cloth section. Many of our customers abroad are still putting forward low prices, but during the last few days there has been a tendency to raise limits. In many sections of the market an encouraging turnover has taken place. An extensive inquiry has again been met with for India in light fabrics and dhooties in particular have been purchased on a free scale. Steady operations have also occurred in mulls and jacquets. Rather more demand has been about in grey shirtings for Calcutta and an improved business has been done. With regard to China, inquiry has been healthier, and more transactions have put through in shirtings and fancies. It is reported that this week's auctions sales in Shanghai have again been satisfactory.

There have been indications of a little more activity for Egypt in greys and whites. Fine fabrics have attracted rather more attention for the Continent; and useful support has been given by the United States and the Colonies. A broadening demand has been reported for Central and South America.

In the yarn section, quotations for American descriptions have been firmer. There has been a reduction in stocks in first hands. Spinners are now in the position of being able to resist poor bids. From Monday, Jan 25th, the mills spinning American cotton have been recommended to stop two days per week, and it is officially stated that the recommendation will be carried out by a large majority of producers.

India has again provided fair orders in export yarns, chiefly in fine numbers. Useful contracts have also been booked for the Continent.

LONDON NEWS.

POLITICS

Now that the opening of Parliament is close at hand, political speeches are the order of the day, and economy is as much talked of as ever, but whilst it consists of saving twopence on the one hand, and spending half a crown on the other, I am not much of a believer in its efficacy.

We are all very virtuous, and every one is most eager that some one else should economise but nobody quite likes economy in his own house.

It is only when we are driven to it that we exercise it, and it is then generally too late.

The Germans have got over their crisis, and one hopes that they will be able to rout the socialists and join the League of Nations.

If and when that event comes off I shall be much interested to see whether all the allies will really bury the hatchet, and try and forget the war. I have grave doubts about it, and am afraid there will be bickerings and petty jealousies. Admission of superiority is always a bitter pill to swallow, and although as a nation I don't regard the Germans as superior, there are certain ways in which they have shown superiority, and given a chance will hold it.

DR. AXHAM

The Royal College of Surgeons Edinburgh has made a move in the right direction, and have restored Dr. Axham's diploma, which now renders him eligible for readmission by the G. M. C. and we may hope that this will be arranged without too much delay. It is a belated act of justice, to say the least of it, and when one considers the penalty which this omnipotent body is able to inflict, the sentence of a Court of Law seems to be light, for in that case you have at all events a time limit.

THE LINCOLN MURDER

The murder for which Lincoln has been tried and condemned, would probably not have caused more than a slight interest, but the fact of his being the son of the notorious Trebitch Lincoln once a member of Parliament, has drawn a good deal of attention to it. The Murder itself was a sordid enough crime, but lately the crime of murder seems to have been committed with frequency, the criminals being actuated by motives, that in countries where blood perhaps runs hotter, do not cause so much surprise, but since the war, a very slight motive has sufficed to cause murder.

THE SENNAR DAM

The opening of the Sennar Dam which took place this week, marks a great

Pearl
SOAP



Matchless
for the
Complexion.

stride in the development of the Sudan and Egypt.

When that masterly stroke of policy, due to Lord Cromer, of making the Sudan a partnership with England, was achieved, it was certain that unless some gigantic cataclysm took place, the Sudan was bound to go ahead, and it has a great future before it.

Climate and population are the two difficulties but both these are susceptible of being overcome in time.

SALARIES FREE OF INCOME TAX

An interesting case, was finally disposed of by the House of Lords, this week. I say interesting although it pursued an unchecked career of triumph in every court, not a single court having given the plaintiff a glimmer of hope, and although it was admittedly a test case, the ordinary man would have realised not only that law, but logic, by no means the same thing, were hardly at issue.

A man who is paid his salary free of income tax, is virtually receiving a higher salary than that on which the tax is paid.

LEGACIES WITH CONDITIONS

One must sympathise with the gentleman who had already changed his name in order to receive an estate, and then was left another estate with a similar condition, only to find that he could not have both estates.

I think the law is somewhat unkind in this respect, but I suppose testators are entitled to make what conditions they think suitable. In any case the beneficiary is no worse off than he was, and in these times it is perhaps desirable, that estates should be split up.

THE DEATH OF MR. DOUGHTY

Every student, or person interested in Arabia, is acquainted with the classic work on Arabia, with which Mr. Doughty's name will always be associated. Curiously enough he did not write the book, either with the idea of its being a scientific record, or a descriptive work for the benefit of travellers, but as a serious literary composition to redeem English from the slough into which it had fallen since the times of Elizabeth.

Mr. Doughty was recognised as a great poet, but his works are not as well known as they deserve to be.

THE MONEY MARKET

Money has been in demand all the week, at high rates, but the supply has been equal to the demand.

The Bank return shows the loss of half a million in gold, but owing to other circumstances the Proportion is a shade higher.

Japanese exchange has made a big recovery, but other countries show no marked change.

THE STOCK EXCHANGE

The Stock Exchange has, on the whole, been rather dull in tendency, but towards the end of the week there was a better tone. Rubbers were a bit better after a considerable drop.

English rails are out of favour and are likely to be with the continued unrest in the labour market. It is amazing that the demagogues who stir up strife do not see, that they are killing the goose, but I suppose they are the same type in the railways as elsewhere. Let me have a good time and a comfortable income, and the rest can go hang.

Usual list of closing prices herewith.

Stock Exchange Prices.

5 o/o War Loan	101	101 1/8
4 o/o Victory	98 1/8	98 3/8
India 3 1/2	67 1/4	67 1/2
Sudan 5 1/2	107	108
Argentina 4 o/o (1900)	75 1/4	76 1/4
Brazil 5 o/o funding	81	82
Chinese 5 o/o (1896)	92	93
do (1912)	62	63
Egyptian Unified 4 o/o	81 1/2	82 1/2
French 5 o/o	13	13 1/2
French Midi 6 o/o	81 1/2	82 1/2
P.L.M. 6 o/o	82 1/2	83 1/2
North 6 o/o	82 1/2	83 1/2
Orleans 6 o/o	81 1/2	82 1/2
Spanish 4 o/o	65	67

OILS

Royal Dutch	33 5/8
Shells	4 13/16

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PARIS PRICES		
Morocco Loan 1904	355	
do 1910	1440	
Compagnie Algérienne	900	

CASABLANCA.

From our Casablanca Correspondent

28th January, 1926.

The British Chamber of Commerce for the French Zone of Morocco is giving a dinner to Sir Andrew Ryan, K.B.E., C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Rabat, on Saturday, the 30th instant, at 8 p.m. at the Hotel Excelsior. Sir Andrew is the Chamber's first Honorary President, and it is expected that a large number of members will attend the dinner. It is hoped to give an account of the proceedings in the next issue of this paper.

The fall in the value of the franc is having its repercussion on our economic life, and once again, but with more concern than formerly, it is being asked "Whither are we tending?" The cost of living, which until recently, was comparatively cheap, continues to rise, daily. Not only are we faced with an increase in the price of the common necessities of life, but the landlords too are becoming more exigent, and whenever a lease expires, are doing their utmost to get another 25% from the tenant. More building is going on now than has been for some years. Nevertheless flats centrally situated are extremely difficult to find, with the result that the landlords are not doing so badly. Prevailing conditions can only be met if wages rise in proportion to the increased cost of living. A proportionate rise in wages can only come about through increased profits. Can it be said these are being made? I think not.

Two remedies are suggested. Prices, rents, and wages could be fixed on a gold-franc basis. Alternatively, an independent currency could be created. Either would entail hardship one way or another. But something will require to be done sooner or later. It seems landlords in many parts of France fix their rents on gold-franc basis and the procedure is legally recognised. But it would be folly to adopt the course of fixing the rents alone on a gold-franc basis. Unless prices and wages were similarly treated, we should in all probability be worse off than before. With a stable French franc there would naturally be no problem to solve; and possibly this is what we shall get-one of these days. Esha Allah!

Reports about the crops these days are

rather conflicting. I think on the whole it may be taken for granted that prospects continue good. On the other hand, there is little doubt that in some districts, particularly those round Casablanca, rain, if not actually required, would be very welcome.

In a few weeks time, the automatic telephone system is to be instituted at Rabat. The system, which does away with the use of operators and a central exchange, is said to work very efficiently in Nice and Orleans, and is at present being installed in Evreux, Lyons, Bordeaux, and other French towns. Should it be a success in Rabat, the Protectorate authorities will extend the system to other towns in Morocco. The installation at Rabat has been carried out by the Compagnie Thomson-Houston, which alone has the right to exploit the American patent Stowger.

I don't know if Casablanca yet figures as a coaling port, in the up to date publications which make a speciality of giving information about matters of this kind. I do know it has a future before it in this connection. It is not so long ago that a 300 ton barge built for account of the Société Charbonnière de Casablanca left the stocks of Messrs. Galinari Freres. Last Monday another of the same tonnage was launched. And it is stated that a further eight are shortly to be built locally by the same enterprising firm. This will ensure the coaling in the minimum of time of steamers of any tonnage which call specially at Casablanca for this purpose.

It is of interest to note that the "Colombo" belonging to the Société Générale de Navigation Italienne, which called here on Sunday on her way from Buenos Ayres to Genoa, was able to lie alongside. The "Colombo" which is 175 metres in length, is the largest vessel that has so far been able to lie alongside at Casablanca. Crowds of curious sightseers visited her during her short stay in port.

Casablanca Market Prices.

Jan. 21, 1926.

Prices ruling for Actual transaction:	
Barley	Fcs. 90.00 per 100 kilos
Hard wheat	150.00
Soft wheat	161.00
Beans	124.00
Linseed	250.00
Maize	105.00
Chickpeas	150.00
Canary Seed	270.00
Coriander	140.00
Fenugreek	127.00

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authorised Capital	£4,000,000	Paid-up Capital	£1,200,000
Subscribed Capital	£3,000,000	Reserve	£400,000

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Also at: GIBRALTAR AND IN THE CANARY ISLANDS, AND WEST AFRICA

WEATHER.**Mazagan.**

16th January 1926.

Rainfall to-date 8.27 inches, 3 inches of rain having fallen during the week.

Weather cloudy.

Wind veering to east.

Barometer has risen considerably.

23rd. January 1926.

Weather variable. Strong winds blowing from North-East.

Further good rains have fallen in the country and prospects are said to be excellent.

Rabat.

21st. January 1926.

Satisfactory weather has been experienced during the week. Rain and sun. The reports indicate that the country Moors are satisfied, rain having fallen throughout the region. There was some rain at Rabat last night, and the wind is S. W. to W.

Saffi

22nd. January 1926.

Two further days rain since our last report contributed 0.63 of an inch, bringing the total for the season to date up to 6.43 inches. Barometer now rising again, indications point to dry, cold weather for a time.

Mogador.

14th. January 1926.

Until Tuesday, the 13th inst., the weather remained very good. The wind then changed to the West and rain commenced to fall and has fallen heavily off and on since that date. The wind which continues in the West has blown at times with great force.

22nd. January 1926.

This week opened with heavy rain on Monday which continued until Tuesday midday, since when, though much cooler, the weather has remained very fine. The wind blew very strongly during the earlier part of the week.

Casablanca.

22th. January 1926.

A small amount of rain fell during the week, the total to date being 5.8/5 inches against last year's 6.7/10 inches. Further immediate rains are necessary as the early sown crops are very backward.

Marrakesh.

15th. January 1926.

Rain fell during the nights of the 13th and 14th and more is expected as there are plenty of clouds and the barometer is very low. Already a better tone as regards prospects is to be noticed amongst the Natives.

22nd. January 1926.

A little rain fell on the 18th and 19th, but not enough to affect prospects, more being badly needed. The weather however is brilliant at the moment.

Fez.

15th. January 1926.

CROP REPORT.

A few showers have fallen during the past twentyfour hours and more rain seems probable. This is welcomed though the fine effects of the heavy rains of November are yet well in evidence.

Information concerning the area of sowing is conflicting. It may be taken that the disturbed state of the country has gone against any extension as compared with last year, but we are told that the state of the soil a month and six weeks ago was such as to encourage heavy sowing and that the area under cultivation has in many districts been extended. Certainly the appearance of the country immediately surrounding Fez goes to make the spoken reports of good prospects in the district, generally credible.

22nd. January 1926.

After a few showers of small importance on the 15th. and 16th. inst., the weather has again continued fine and dry. The temperature is exceptionally warm for the time of year. The crops are in good state, but it is as yet too early to attempt a forecast.

A Leader in Missionary Enterprise.

THE LATE MR. E. H. GLENNY.

The last surviving founder of the North Africa Mission, and for many years its Honorary General Secretary, Mr. Edward H. Glenny passed to his rest at 1 p.m. on Thursday, January 7, in the seventy-fourth year of his age. His health had been failing for some weeks, and the sudden development of acute functional trouble necessitated an operation at midnight on Sunday, January 3, from which he was not able to rally. He passed away peacefully, in the presence of Mrs. Glenny and members of his family at the nursing home in Dorset Square, London.

The great work of his life, was the North Africa Mission. Becoming interested in Algeria as a possible sphere for business operations as well as for Christian work, he was introduced by Dr. Grattan Guinness to Mr. George Pearce, who was also concerned for the spiritual welfare of the Kabyles; and these three established the "Mission to the Kabyles," as it was then called. With the exception of the labours of Raymond Lull in the Middle Ages, this was the first Gospel effort in the Barbary States since Mohammedanism overran those countries thirteen centuries ago. In 1881, Mr. Glenny paid the first of his many visits to North Africa, and in 1883 the Mission was reorganized, with Mr. Glenny as its Honorary General Secretary, the title of the Mission being altered to that by which it is now known.

To further this work, Mr. Glenny spared neither toil nor sacrifice. In his prime, he was a man of magnificent physique, standing well over six feet and full of immense energy and enthusiasm, and he called upon every power he possessed to advance the cause of the Mission. He gave of his wealth with a generosity that amounted to munificence. He travelled, lectured, preached, and wrote articles; ran back and forth to North Africa, kept open house for missionaries, trained candidates at headquarters and in his mission halls; he wrote innumerable letters of extraordinary detail, made war on heresy in the field and at home, and took, in every way, enormous responsibilities on his shoulders. In many respects he was unique as a Christian worker, and in his Home-going a really great figure has passed from our midst.

«The Christian.»

Exhibition and Fairs.**BRITISH INDUSTRIES FAIR.****EXTENSION TO BIRMINGHAM SECTION.**

Although it was definitely known some weeks ago that the Birmingham section of the British Industries Fair would be of greater magnitude than even the record display of last year, the bookings of space have so exceeded expectations that it has now been found necessary to make a large extension to the permanent exhibition buildings at Castle Bromwich.

This development is partly due to the important electrical section, which this year, for the first time on a considerable scale, has been organised by the trades concerned. In addition, the general engineering section of the Birmingham Fair is three times as large as on any former occasion.

It is interesting to note that, before the extension now to be made, the Birmingham Fair buildings, with an area of more than 170,000 square feet under one roof, constituted already the largest exhibition hall in the country. The enlargement decided upon takes the form of erecting an entirely new building on vacant ground between buildings B and C— at present connected by two corridors; when this is completed in readiness for the 1926 Birmingham Fair next month these three buildings will be thrown together, making one great display hall with an area of approximately 100,000 square feet.

The new electrical section—which, regarded as a self-contained unit, is the most notable development in the successful history of the Midland Trade Fair—is the outcome of a recent conference at the

Birmingham Chamber of Commerce, attended by representatives of the British electrical trade organisations. A committee of experts was then formed to take steps to secure the support of the industry as a whole. Their efforts had such immediate effect that within a week or two many of the leading electrical firms in the country had booked space of the large dimensions necessary for the purposes of working exhibits. Power for these demonstrations will be supplied by plant permanently installed in the exhibition buildings, including a 19-ton transformer and cable with a capacity of 2,000 kilowatts. In addition to the exhibits of plant there will be an extensive display of electrical accessories of all kinds, numerous firms specialising in such products having indicated their intention of taking part.

ELECTRICAL CONFERENCES.

As may be gathered from the important character of the exhibits, the industry as a whole is taking keen interest in this new demonstration of electrical progress. A series of conferences on subjects connected with electrical development is to take place during the period of the fair (15th to 26th February), and invitations to visit the display and take lunch with the Fair Council have been issued to representatives of the principal trade and other organisations, including:—

The Electrical Contractors' Association.
The Electrical Wholesalers' Federation.
The Incorporated Municipal Electrical Association.

The Institution of Electrical Engineers.
The British Electrical and Allied Manufacturers' Association.

The Cable Makers' Association.

The Incorporated Association of Electric Power Companies.

The Conference of Chief Officials of London Electric Supply Companies.

The Provincial Electric Supply Committee of the United Kingdom.

The Electric Lamp Manufacturers' Association of Great Britain.

Every day fresh applications for space are being received, and the Chairman of the Fair Council stated a few days ago that, notwithstanding the extra accommodation to be provided, the Birmingham Fair is now almost full to its utmost capacity. «Not only have we had to find room for the new electrical exhibits,» he said, «but big demands for space have been made by leading engineering firms, who in 1924 and 1925 concentrated their displays at Wembley and are now returning to the British Industries Fair. In the hardware, ironmongery, building and construction groups, also, there are many newcomers, while old exhibitors at Birmingham have done so well that they have felt justified in further increasing their space.»

ROYAL VISIT TO THE BIRMINGHAM FAIR.

It is officially announced that H. R. H. the Duke of York will pay a visit to the Birmingham section of the British Industries Fair on or about 18th February. He will be the guest of the Fair Council at luncheon in the exhibition buildings, and will then make a complete tour of what promises to be the most magnificent trade display ever held of the newest products of British manufacture.

«The Board of Trade Journal.»

«Book-keeping Without Tears.»

The practice of double entry book-keeping is now so well-established that it is difficult to realise that there could be a simpler and easier method of keeping accounts. Yet such a method is the claim of Mr. R. Borlase Matthews. In a recent lecture at the London School of Economics he explained the underlying principle of a system of auto-countancy or first-final entry book-keeping, of which he is the originator and which, he said, has been thoroughly tested over a number of years.

In the new system the usual array of day books, journals, cash-books, and the like is done away with, all that the auto-countancy book-keeper needs being two specially-headed ledgers and a quantity of ordinary blank invoices in triplicate.

«Manchester Guardian Commercial.»

TANGIER NEWS

Mr. Clive, British Consul-General, left for Gibraltar on Thursday to attend the ceremonies connected with the arrival of the Atlantic Fleet. He returned on Wednesday.

Col. G. Wilson arrived by the Bland boat on Tuesday.

Mr. Leverton Harris arrived here on Tuesday, on a short visit to his brother. He left again yesterday.

It is reported from Lisbon, that the Chamber has voted in favour of the adherence of Portugal, to the Statute. Although it has been understood for a long time, that Portugal would eventually give her adherence, and consequently its effect has been somewhat discounted, the actual announcement is regarded as a satisfactory solution of certain difficulties, with which the Administration has to contend.

It will be another five or six months, we understand, before it is ratified by the Senate.

British Women's Association

A first meeting of the above newly formed association will be held at Lady Scott's house on Tuesday next 2nd February at 5.30 p.m. when a subject of interest will be debated.

British Sports Club.

The Annual General Meeting will be held on Monday 1st February 1926 at the British Chamber of Commerce, at 5 p.m.

AGENDA

Presentation of Accounts.
Election of the Committee for 1926.
Proposed changes of entrance fee and subscriptions.
Tournaments.
Any other business.
Any member wishing to make a proposition at the General Meeting is requested to give notice to the Secretary before the meeting.

E. S. VERDON,
Hon. Secretary.

The Committee of Control.

The budget has been accepted by the Committee of Control, with two reservations. One is that the Statute calls for the Octroi tax. For heaven's sake let us once more disregard the Statute, for of all vexatious taxes this is the one which causes more injustice and more annoyance than any other.

We congratulate the Assembly on having been wise enough to abolish this tax.

It appears however that taxes im-

posed by the Statute must be collected. They can of course be so handled as to be valueless, but in this case we understand that the tax properly administered, will bring in an appreciable amount.

The second reservation is that provision must be made for the problematic Gendarmerie.

We think it is a sound rule not to cross the bridge until you get there, we see no reason why a reserve fund for emergencies should not be made, but we really can not see why after all the fuss we have had about the Tabors, that there is any need to provide funds that are not required at the present moment, and are not likely to be required for some time.

Much Ado about Nothing

The Assembly appears to be torn in sunder by conflicting opinions, as to whether the country trader in the Soko should pay a tax similar to that levied on the regular traders.

Some argue that he should not be taxed, some that he should.

The Administration suggest a via media viz that market days should be free, but on other days the intruder should pay a tax, in order to meet the protests of the regular traders, who say, not without reason, that they are at a disadvantage, and like the rest of us, call for economic equality.

The Assembly appears to take the view that this is their business, and much ardent discussion took place.

Although agreeing in principle, that it is not wise to allow the Administration to take the initiative in any new measure, in this case the measure is not a new one, but merely the extension of an old one.

Before the Statute came into force the vendors in the market paid some one, something, for the privilege, but whether that something reached the coffers of the State we know not.

Under the present Administration, there is no question whatever, that money collected finds its way without deviation into the public treasury.

Whether it might or might not be wise to take a broad view, and say the Open Market, the Soko Grande shall be open daily, free, is another matter.

There are two sides to most questions and whether these small taxes bring in enough to make their collection worth while, is a question for the Director of Finance to answer. He did not inaugurate the tax, and the Assembly is competent to abolish it, if they think fit.

If we are to have an octroi tax as well, it might be a good thing to abandon some tax that is not obligatory.

Even the liberty of action of the Assembly is so restricted, that we don't know quite what their powers are, in regard to taxation.

Dispensary for Sick Animals of the Poor

Number of cases treated at the Dispensary during two weeks ended 27th instant:

Horses	25
Mules	95
Donkeys	79
Dogs	35
Other animals	6

Total 240

W. A. BIRD,
Technical Asst.

Correspondence

Letters to the Editor intended for publication must, if they are written over names de plume, be accompanied by the writer's card as a guarantee of good faith.

To the Editor AL-MOGHREB AL-AKSA
AND TANGIER GAZETTE AND MOROCCO.

Sir,

I beg to inform you that I have dispatched the following wires.

1. Tinan, 31, Rue Gaillée, Paris.

Please communicate "Matin" and "Journal" following:— "Certain facts having been brought Gordon Canning's knowledge regarding Hacklander's previous interests in Riff, Canning has wired Hacklander that he considers it advisable to cease all co-operation and communication with him and refunds £30 received as a small share in expenses of last journey."

2. Hacklander Rheinland.

In view of certain facts in regard your interests in Riff question before co-operating with me I think it advisable cease all communication and co-operation and am returning you £30 received. This cancels all letters dispatched Canning.

Your truly,

R. GORDON CANNING.

To the Editor AL-MOGHREB AL-AKSA
AND TANGIER GAZETTE AND MOROCCO

17th December 1925.

Dear Sir,

In your issue of the 22nd of August last, you made mention in the "Gazette" of certain proceedings taken by our firm against Mr. E. M. Doff and the Colonial Trading Co., in the British Consular Court at Casablanca.

Simultaneously with these proceedings, we took proceedings here, against the suppliers of the goods to the Colonial Trading Co., in respect of the same infringement of our Trade Marks. These proceedings have now terminated upon the suppliers giving to us (in consideration of our not carrying the proceedings any further) their written undertaking not to use themselves, or to allow the Colonial Trading Co., to use the numbers 123 and 1949 on any of their cotton fancies, at both these numbers are, as they admit

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Total Premiums 5,292,578
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in their undertaking, well known and established in the Moroccan market as denoting muslins exported by Messrs. H. Cansino and Sons of Manchester.

It is satisfactory for us to find that the suppliers recognise our title to the Marks and that the omission to which you refer in the paragraph in the "Gazette" in August last, does not enable infringers to maintain a defence in the English Court. We trust you will give the same publicity to this letter as you did to the report of the case heard in Casablanca.

Yours faithfully,
Signed:

H. CANSINO & SONS.

To the Editor AL-MOGHREB AL-AKSA
AND TANGIER GAZETTE AND MOROCCO

28th December 1925.

Dear Sir,

With reference to the case Cansino & Sons, Manchester, versus E. M. Doff, Colonial Trading Co. Casablanca judged at the British Consulate in Casablanca in August last, the result of which I take the liberty to enclose herewith for your perusal.

I am informed that an arrangement has been made in Manchester between Cansino & Sons and my suppliers in which the latter it seems gave an undertaking not to use the numbers in question and have joined my name with theirs, if so, without my consent.

As I understand that Cansino & Sons have the intention of publishing this in the Moroccan papers I hereby wish you to understand that I adhere to the just verdict given in the British Court of Casablanca, and should esteem it a favour that should Cansino & Sons wish to insert in your paper any promise or undertaking, joining the name of E. M. Doff or The Colonial Trading Co., with same, if you will kindly insert immediately below such statement my repudiation and at the same time add that I am open to book orders at current prices for the same goods in question stamped No. 122 and 1949 and make up in the same way as imported by me in previous years.

Hoping you will give this matter your attention and thanking you for your courtesy.

I am,
Yours faithfully,
E. M. DOFF.

Morocco Peace Mission.

CAPTAIN CANNING'S FAILURE.
From our own Correspondent.

Captain Gordon Canning has arrived here. He is naturally disappointed at the lack of success of his mission. For eighteen months he has been working to bring about peace negotiations with Abdel-Krim, and when I met him here on his return from the Rif he believed that he was about to succeed. He states that when he left for the Rif early in November he was convinced by the speeches made by responsible persons of the French and Spanish Governments that both Powers wanted a fair and loyal peace with Abdel-Krim, and were prepared to offer the same conditions as they did in July. On his return from the Rif a month later, Captain Canning found the conditions changed. The Painlevé Government had given place to that of M. Briand. Because of numerous tribal submissions, the situation is now considered less favourable for Abdel-Krim.

In regard to his mission, Captain Canning seems to have neglected to gain the confidence of the Spanish Government, and the refusal of M. Briand to receive him at Paris may be due to that fact.

"The Daily Telegraph."

An Adventurous Life.

Until he was 46 Howard confined his philanthropy to Cardington, in Bedfordshire. He was a for a quiet life. His model cottages and their tenants were sufficient for him. Drainage and water supply were his studies, and he had strict notions of the way too keep unsatisfactory dependents in order. Yet he had

adventures; had married for gratitude a woman more than twice his own age, and after her death had been captured by a French privateer and unpleasantly imprisoned at Brest.

It would be natural to suppose that this latter experience disposed Howard to the campaign of his life. Apparently it had no such effect. Howard's conversion to the public service was a direct consequence of his appointment as High Sheriff of the County of Bedford. At his first Assize he was shocked to find that prisoners who had been acquitted were obliged to return to gaol until they could pay the fees of the gaoler and the tipstaff. On learning that the men about a gaol got their living by such fees, Howard proposed to the justices that salaries should be paid. The justices asked him to show a precedent for laying the expense on the county. Thereupon he rode into neighbouring counties in search of a precedent, and, though he failed in his main object, his eyes were opened to abuses he had never expected.

So began the sixteen years of travel through England and the Continent which placed "mad Jack Howard," as he liked to call himself, among the foremost of reformers. In large volumes he reported what he saw. Select Parliamentary Committees examined him. He made friends both at home and abroad. The conscience of the world was touched—if that can ever be said of it.

Howard's discoveries cannot even be summarized here. They may be imagined by any reader of 18th-century novels, into which the truth strayed, by a series of lucky chances, as it rarely entered into more serious literature. The prisons were unveiled as dens of physical and moral squalor, where barbarity usurped the place of discipline, and gross licence was compatible with absence of liberty. Many foreign prisons were not so bad as those of England; and when in France, Flanders, and Holland anything seemed admirable to Howard, he did not scruple to approve. He proved himself a just observer, whose only aim was reform. It does not follow that men of to-day can always understand why he was pleased. The occasional difficulty is, perhaps, a criterion of the distance between the modern world and the world of Howard.

BASTILLE AND INQUISITION.

Few prisons could keep him out. Often one is surprised at the facilities given him for inspection. But the Bastille kept its secrets. "I knocked hard at the outer gate," is Howard's account, "and immediately went forward through the gate to the drawbridge before the entrance of the castle. But while I was contemplating this gloomy mansion, an officer came out much surprised; and I was forced to retreat through the mute guard, and thus regained that freedom which for one locked up within those walls it is next to impossible to obtain. A picture—is it not?—of a man confident, pushing, and resolute.

He was more successful with the Inquisition than with the Bastille. Its prisons received him as a guest during his wanderings in Spain, and the inquisitors told him some of their methods, though they failed to respond to his willingness to be accepted as prisoner, just to see what it was like. This zeal for personal trial carried him, in an examination of lazarettes, to the expedient of taking passage from Smyrna to Venice in a ship with a foul bill. The voyage was enlivened by a "smart skirmish" with a Tunisian privateer, and ended in an illuminating test of Venetian quarantine.

Apart from the Bastille failure, France presented Howard with other problems of entrance. In order to get into the Toulon Arsenal he disguised himself as a Parisian exquisite; which, judging from the descriptions of his face and figure, must have been difficult. In Paris a mysterious man in a black coat, a sword at his side, and his hands in an enormous muff, came into the bedroom where Howard was lodged, and put alarming questions. The reader is prepared to hear that this was the genuine Parisian exquisite. On the contrary, he turned out to be a genuine

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
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RAWALPINDI 16000	Redhead	9th Feb.
MANCHI 16000	Brooks	23rd Feb.
KAISAR-I-HIND 11400	Manley	9th March
RANPURA 16000	King	23rd March

For Marseilles, Port Said, Aden, India, Colombo, Japan and Australia.

Tons	Capt.	About.
MORRA 11000	Thornton	2nd Feb.
MARRUNDA 16000	Evans	16th Feb.
MACEDONIA 16512	Potter	2nd March
MOOLTAN 21000	Finch	16th March
CHITRAL 15000	Smith	30th March

For Plymouth and London (Tilbury Docks.)

Tons	Capt.	About.
RANCHL 16000	Brooks	31st Jan.
MACEDONIA 16512	Potter	7th Feb.
KAISAR-I-HIND 11400	Manley	14th Feb.
MOOLTAN 21000	Finch	21st Feb.
RANPURA 16000	King	28th Feb.
MALWA 11000	Jenkins	7th March
RAJPUTANA 16000	Cadis	14th March
MALOJA 21000	Warner	21st March
RAWALPINDI 16000	Redhead	28th March

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ORMONDE 14388	Shelford	10th Feb.
ORONSAY 20900	Owens	24th Feb.
ORAMA 20900	Staverton	10th March
ORMUZ 14533	O'Sullivan	24th March

For Plymouth and London (Tilbury Docks.)

Tons	Capt.	About.
ORMUZ 14533	O'Sullivan	24th Jan.
ORAMA 20900	Staverton	14th Feb.
ORVETO 12000	Jamieson	14th March

*Orvieto will call at Southampton instead of Plymouth.

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KAWI 15 Feb.	19 Feb.
PATRIA 1 March	5 March

TANGIER to MARSEILLES

Leave TANGIER	Arrive MARSEILLES
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INDRAPOERA 16 Feb.	18 Feb.
INSULINDE 2 March	4 March

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BRITANNIA	20 Mar.	27 Mar.	7 April

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	Due	Due	Due
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MASSILIA	12 Feb.	15 Feb.	20 Feb.
SCINDIA	20 Feb.	23 Feb.	28 Feb.
ELYSIA	26 Feb.	1 Mar.	6 Mar.
CIRCASSIA	13 Mar.	16 Mar.	21 Mar.

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Paris, March 2, 1926.



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MAR 18 1926

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Paris press publishes despatches from Rabat and Fez indicating a lively renewal of hostilities throughout the area of the Riffian front. Numerous skirmishes are reported in which the forces of Abd-el-Krim have taken the offensive, but the French forces are generally reported to have the situation in hand, and no large Riffian gains appear to have been made. This activity is generally attributed to a sudden spell of good weather.


There is transmitted herewith a translation of an article which appeared in the "Temps" of March 2nd, giving a review of the situation and events in Morocco

since.....

since February 27th.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Benjamin Muse". The signature is fluid and elegant, with a large initial "B" and a long, sweeping underline.

Benjamin Muse
Second Secretary of Embassy.

Enclosure:

1. Translation of article in "Le Temps"
of March 2nd, 1926.

Copy to E. I. C.

March 2, 1926.

--translation--

MOROCCO

(From "Le Temps" March 2, 1926)

REPRESSION OF RIFFIAN REBELLION

The Military Operations.

Since February 27, the Riffian pressure on our entire front has been considerably increased.

Everywhere our small outposts are being attacked, and guerillas squeeze in through our front lines. This general renewal of activities seems to have as its aim the strengthening of Abd-el-Krim's moral standing with the tribes recently brought under our power and to camouflage the preparations for a local offensive.

From information received by our higher command on the movements of the Riffian harkas (guerillas) and of munitions trains, it seems, however, possible to determine in a general way the front on which Abd-el-Krim intends to launch his biggest attack; it is the sector between Fez-el-Bali and Ain-Aicha. For the past month we have arrested several Riffian agitators in this sector. It is also in this district that the number of armed bands has been reported the largest. It would appear that the Riffians endeavor once more to occupy the positions of difficult access situated on Mount Messaoud, East of Kelaa-des-Sless, positions from which we had so much trouble expulsing them and which, due to their location South of Ouergha River, would enable them to renew their raids on a large scale.

Our high command has taken steps to counter this Riffian offensive.

Fez Group. During the day of the 27th the enemy made a strenuous attempt to gain a foothold in the Mtions District, that is North of Astar-Sker, by means of two attacks originating from the Kelaa of Beni-Kacem, and the Kelaa of Beni-Berber. Our irregular forces aided by reinforcement troops put up a strong

resistance. The behavior of the Mtiousa tribesmen is excellent.

Taza Group. Detachments which went reconnoitering as previously reported in the Bou Inou and Azron Mountains have returned without trouble after a successful operation.

Aviation. In addition to numerous bombarding operations which took place lately in the Taza District, and on the banks of the Loukkos River, operations performed with considerable effect, our aviation has lent its constant support to our irregulars in the Mtiousa District.

Southern Front. The conquest of the Tichoukt range, in the Middle Atlas, now in preparation for several days, will soon enter in a decisive period.

Aviation is busy controlling the fire of the artillery from the posts at Engil and El Mers, and bombards actively the rebels in this district, on the Northern slope of Tichoukt, particularly Tizi-Izouliten, Ouiedh and Ikkis. From last reports, the enemy losses are heavy.

The Tichoukt range, last stronghold of the Ain-Tsegroutchen rebels, is a mountainous district, with numerous valleys, the altitude of which varies between 2500 and 2800 meters. It is 60 kilometers South of Fez. Encircled since 1924 by our posts of Engil, Boulmane, El Mers and Taghzout, it constitutes a zone difficult to hold by reason of the configuration of the terrain and of severe climatic conditions, in addition to the prospective resistance of the enemy.

The Tichoukt rebels are led by a famous chief, Said ou Mohand, and are under the sway of the fanatic agitator Sidi Raho.

Strengthening of our Front.

The City of Fez bears anew its aspect of wartime days. Soldiers and irregulars from the Fez district leave hastily by army trucks in a Northern direction.

All these troops are sent to the Mtiousa front where yesterday
preparations.....

preparations of an impending Riffian attack were reported. Already several villages have been set on fire and our late protegés, the Mtiousa Tribesmen, are begging for help.

Inasmuch as it is extremely important not to reduce the strength of our posts in this district, the high command has taken the necessary urgent steps to send reinforcements to that sector. This offensive against our Mtiousa allies is the first heavy attempt of the enemy on this front.

In Abd-el-Krim's camp.

Last reports show a renewal of Riffian activity. Detachments are being grouped or reinforced in various sectors and attempts made to induce the tribes to take up arms again.

Villages on fire are reported especially in the Taounat district, inhabited by Mtiousa tribes under our protection.

Towards Teronai the rebels appear to prepare an offensive as they send back their supplies in a Northerly direction.

Contingents of Riffian regulars have arrived to reinforce the tribesmen, headed by Khaled, son of Raisauli, who are to operate against Tetuan and among the Djeballa tribesmen.



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1392

Lisbon, February 22, 1926.

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

For the information of the Department, I have the honor to transmit herewith copy of the DIARIO DO GOVERNO of February 19, 1926 containing the text of law No. 1040 authorizing the Government of Portugal to adhere to the convention relative to the organization of the Statute of Tangiers, signed at Paris December 18, 1923, by the Plenipotentiaries of Spain, Great Britain and France, for their respective Governments.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Fred Morris Dearing

Enclosures: Copy of DIARIO DO GOVERNO.

Copy to E.I.G., Paris.



DIÁRIO DO GOVERNO

PREÇO DESTE NÚMERO — \$90

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Decreto n.º 11:455 — Permite a importação até 1:200 bovinos adultos — Determina que até 30 de Abril de 1926 a carne de bovinos fornecida pelos criadores portugueses para os talhos de Lisboa, pelo actual regime, seja paga por preço não inferior ao que fôr cobrado pela carne das reses argentinas.

MINISTÉRIO DO INTERIOR

Repartição da Segurança Pública

Rectificação

Para os devidos efeitos se declara que no artigo 7.º do decreto n.º 11:442, publicado no *Diário do Governo* n.º 32, 1.ª série, de 11 de Fevereiro corrente, onde se lê: «e os restantes abonos» deve ler-se: «e os respectivos abonos».

Repartição da Segurança Pública, 18 de Fevereiro de 1926. — O Chefe da Repartição, *Luis Machado Pinto*.

MINISTÉRIO DA JUSTIÇA E DOS CULTOS

Direcção Geral da Justiça e dos Cultos

Portaria n.º 4:577

Convindo que do *Boletim Oficial do Ministério da Justiça* conste o tempo de serviço público de cada magistrado judicial e do Ministério Público:

Manda o Governo da República Portuguesa, pelo Mi-

nistro da Justiça e dos Cultos, que, sem encargo algum para o Estado e sob a superintendência do director do *Boletim Oficial do Ministério da Justiça*, se organize, no mais curto prazo possível, uma lista da qual conste o tempo de serviço público de todos os magistrados, lista que no referido *Boletim* passará a figurar sob uma rubrica especial a seguir à do tempo de serviço na classe. Para os efeitos da organização desta lista o director do *Boletim* poderá corresponder-se directamente com os magistrados a quem houver de pedir quaisquer informações ou documentos comprovativos de serviço prestado antes da sua nomeação para o quadro da magistratura. Todas essas informações e documentos de carácter official ficarão arquivados junto à folha de cada magistrado, constituindo elementos para as notas biográficas e passagens de certidões. O director do *Boletim Oficial* poderá ser auxiliado na elaboração da mencionada lista por qualquer magistrado ou funcionário dependente do Ministério da Justiça e dos Cultos, sem remuneração alguma especial.

Paços do Governo da República, 19 de Fevereiro de 1926. — O Ministro da Justiça e dos Cultos, *João Catinho de Meneses*.

Administração e Inspeção Geral dos Serviços Jurisdicionais e Tutelares de Menores

Decreto n.º 11:446

O Conselho Superior dos Serviços Jurisdicionais e Tutelares de Menores, sob proposta da respectiva Administração e Inspeção Geral, em execução do decreto com força de lei de 27 de Maio de 1911 e do decreto organico regulamentar n.º 10:767, de 15 de Maio de 1925, aprovou em sua sessão de 12 de Dezembro último a fundação de um reformatório para o sexo masculino no prédio denominado Quinta da Mitra, adquirido pela Junta Geral do distrito da Guarda e que este corpo administrativo ofereceu ao Estado para este fim;

Ouvida a Comissão Central de Execução da Lei da Separação, esta informou no respectivo processo que, dos rendimentos dos bens cuja administração está a seu cargo, há fundos disponíveis para ocorrer às despesas com a instalação e funcionamento do referido estabelecimento, dos quais não resulta assim qualquer encargo para o Orçamento Geral do Estado; visto que todas as despesas são suportadas pela força daquelas receitas especiais e privativas dos Serviços Jurisdicionais e Tutelares de Menores;

Nestes termos, em execução do disposto no artigo 151.º do decreto n.º 10:767, de 15 de Maio de 1925, com referência ao artigo 104.º da Lei da Separação e decretos com força de lei de 1 de Janeiro e de 27 de Maio de 1911;

Sob proposta dos Ministros da Justiça e dos Cultos e das Finanças e no uso das atribuições que me são conferidas pelo n.º 3.º do artigo 47.º da Constituição da República:

Hei por bem decretar o seguinte:

Artigo 1.º Será instalado um reformatório para o sexo masculino no edificio e terrenos rústicos anexos da Quinta da Mitra, no Vale do Mondego, concelho da Guarda, estabelecimento que será designado por Reformatório da Guarda.

Art. 2.º A Comissão Central de Execução da Lei da Separação, por força do saldo liquido disponível das suas receitas, depositará no Banco de Portugal, em conta do Tesouro, a quantia de 150.000\$ por uma só vez; e por força desta verba, nos termos do citado artigo 151.º e seu § 1.º, será aberto um crédito especial

da mesma quantia a favor do Ministério da Justiça e dos Cultos — Serviços Jurisdicionais e Tutelares de Menores — a inscrever na despesa extraordinária, capítulo novo, do respectivo orçamento, para as despesas com a instalação do Reformatório, adaptação e reconstrução do edificio e aquisição de material.

Art. 3.º A Comissão Central de Execução da Lei da Separação depositará anualmente no Banco de Portugal, em conta do Tesouro, em conformidade do mesmo artigo 151.º e seu § 1.º, a quantia de 284.000\$, por força da qual será aberto um crédito especial de igual quantia a favor do Ministério da Justiça e dos Cultos — Serviços Jurisdicionais e Tutelares de Menores — da qual serão applicados 122.604\$40 a remuneração, vencimentos e subvenções do pessoal do quadro e extraordinário, e 162.000\$ à dotação anual ordinária e extraordinária para material e diversas despesas.

§ único. No presente ano económico será feito somente o depósito dos duodécimos correspondentes aos meses ainda não decorridos.

Art. 4.º O quadro do pessoal, respectivos vencimentos e as dotações do novo estabelecimento serão os mesmos que estão fixados para o Reformatório de S. Fiel no orçamento da despesa do Ministério da Justiça e dos Cultos, e as verbas a que se refere o artigo anterior serão descritas no orçamento sob as mesmas rubricas nos artigos e capitulos correspondentes.

§ único. Os funcionários, embora nomeados, só perceberão os seus vencimentos à medida que forem chamados e entrem em serviço efectivo.

Art. 5.º Uma comissão constituída pelo juiz presidente da Tutoria da Infância da comarca da Guarda, e por este presidida, pelo presidente da comissão executiva da Junta Geral do mesmo distrito, pelo presidente da comissão executiva da Câmara Municipal, por um engenheiro do quadro do Ministério do Comércio e Comunicações da respectiva circunscricção e pelo presidente da comissão concelhia delegada da Comissão Central de Execução da Lei da Separação, como secretário, administrará a verba destinada à reconstrução, adaptação e aquisição de material para a instalação do Reformatório, sob a direcção da Administração e Inspeção Geral dos Serviços Jurisdicionais e Tutelares de Menores.

§ 1.º Esta comissão regular-se há pelas disposições applicáveis do regimento aprovado por decreto n.º 10:620, de 17 de Março de 1925, para a comissão instaladora da Tutoria de Coimbra, e bem assim pelas disposições regulamentares da lei n.º 1:523, de 27 de Dezembro de 1923, salvas as modificações do presente decreto.

§ 2.º A referida comissão, por intermédio da Administração e Inspeção Geral, requisitará à 4.ª Repartição da Direcção Geral da Contabilidade Pública os fundos de que fôr carecendo para a execução das obras, por conta da dotação que lhe é attribuída.

§ 3.º Os duodécimos vencidos da verba da dotação anual ordinária e extraordinária destinada a «Material e diversas despesas», enquanto o Reformatório não funcionar, poderão ser applicados para complemento das despesas de instalação do estabelecimento, se a verba a este fim especialmente destinada fôr insufficiente.

Art. 6.º Os serviços de escrituração, lançamentos, correspondência e registos serão feitos pelo economo, que será desde logo chamado ao serviço, sob a superintendência do vogal secretário da comissão administrativa.

§ único. Ao economo poderão ser incumbidos outros serviços, como os de pagamentos, de fiscalização e de guarda das obras.

Art. 7.º As obras serão executadas por empreitada, em tarefas operárias, precedendo concurso público, ou por administração directa, se assim fôr julgado mais conveniente e o aconselhar a mais estrita economia.

Art. 8.º A comissão administrativa não poderá con-

tratar nem remunerar outro pessoal que não seja o pessoal técnico, artífice e operário que fôr indispensável para a execução das obras.

Os Ministros da Justiça e dos Cultos e das Finanças assim o tenham entendido e façam executar. Paços do Governo da República, 19 de Fevereiro de 1926.—**BERNARDINO MACHADO**—*João Catanho de Meneses*—*Armando Marques Guedes*.

MINISTÉRIO DAS FINANÇAS

Direcção Geral das Contribuições e Impostos

1.ª Repartição

Por ter saído com inexactidões novamente se publica o artigo 4.º do decreto n.º 11:440, de 9 do corrente, inserto no *Diário do Governo* n.º 30, 1.ª série, da mesma data:

Artigo 4.º O imposto será liquidado sobre o valor atribuído aos locais a título de chave, ou como valor comercial e industrial dos estabelecimentos, que em caso algum será inferior ao produto da renda anual constante da matriz multiplicada por 10.

Direcção Geral das Contribuições e Impostos, 12 de Fevereiro de 1926.—O Director Geral, *Herculano da Fonseca*.

4.ª Repartição Central

Decreto n.º 11:447

O artigo 28.º do Código das Execuções Fiscais fixou em dois o número de escrivães do Tribunal das Execuções Fiscais do Porto. Pelo artigo 11.º da lei n.º 683, de 12 de Maio de 1917, foi suprimido um destes lugares. Em face do movimento que actualmente tem esse Tribunal, reconhece-se não poder um só escrivão executar e trazer em dia o grande serviço que tem a seu cargo.

Por outro lado, no Tribunal das Execuções Fiscais de Lisboa, onde, desde a proclamação da República, já foram suprimidos trinta lugares, ainda hoje existem quatro contadores, sendo esta a única categoria de funcionários em cujo quadro, até ao presente, se não fez redução alguma, podendo todavia os respectivos trabalhos ser efectuados apenas por três.

Podem, pois, prover-se as necessidades que para os serviços existem na criação de um lugar de escrivão no primeiro destes tribunais com a supressão de um lugar de contador no segundo.

Tanto os lugares de escrivães como os de contadores destes tribunais são desempenhados por segundos oficiais do quadro geral dos funcionários da Direcção Geral das Contribuições e Impostos, n.º 5.º do artigo 10.º do decreto n.º 5:859, de 6 de Junho de 1919. Suprimindo-se um lugar de contador no Tribunal de Lisboa, e criando-se um de escrivão no Tribunal do Porto não se altera portanto esse quadro, não só pelo que em si representam, mas, sobretudo, porque eles são, quando devidamente organizados, a garantia da cobrança voluntária das contribuições e impostos.

Assim, tendo em vista o disposto no § único do artigo 54.º do decreto-lei n.º 5:524, de 8 de Maio de 1919, e no artigo 14.º da lei n.º 683, de 12 de Maio de 1917;

Usando da faculdade que me confere o n.º 3.º do artigo 47.º da Constituição Política da República Portuguesa:

Hei por bem, sob proposta do Ministro das Finanças, decretar o seguinte:

Artigo 1.º É suprimido um lugar de contador no Tribunal das Execuções Fiscais de Lisboa.

Art. 2.º É criado um lugar de escrivão no Tribunal das Execuções Fiscais do Porto.

§ único. Pelo que se refere aos escrivães deste Tribunal, a distribuição a que alude o artigo 12.º e seu parágrafo da lei n.º 683, de 12 de Maio de 1917, será feita da seguinte forma: 10 por cento para o que exercer as funções de chefe da secretaria e 8 por cento para o outro.

Art. 3.º Fica revogada a legislação em contrário.

O mesmo Ministro assim o tenha entendido e faça executar. Paços do Governo da República, 19 de Fevereiro de 1926.—**BERNARDINO MACHADO**—*Armando Marques Guedes*.

MINISTÉRIO DA MARINHA

Direcção Geral da Marinha

Direcção da Marinha Mercante

Decreto n.º 11:448

Considerando que o decreto n.º 11:020, de 20 de Junho de 1925, aprovou um regulamento dos meios de salvação a bordo, com carácter internacional, para começar a vigorar a partir de 1 de Março próximo;

Considerando porém que as suas disposições só em Janeiro deste ano puderam ser transmitidas ao Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, em virtude de demoras havidas na sua tradução, não sendo portanto razoável dentro do curto prazo disponível exigir-se aos navios estrangeiros que frequentam os nossos portos o cumprimento exacto daquele decreto;

Considerando ainda que grande parte do material de salvação tem de ser importado, o que obriga os armadores a grandes demoras para conseguirem pôr os seus navios nas condições mencionadas no regulamento do decreto n.º 11:020:

Hei por bem, sob proposta do Ministro da Marinha, tendo ouvido o Conselho de Ministros e usando da faculdade que me confere o n.º 3.º do artigo 47.º da Constituição Política da República Portuguesa, decretar o seguinte:

Artigo 1.º O prazo a que se refere o artigo 14.º e seu parágrafo do decreto n.º 11:020, de 20 de Junho de 1925, é prorrogado até 31 de Agosto de 1926.

Art. 2.º O decreto n.º 11:020, de 20 de Junho de 1925, entrará definitivamente em vigor no dia 1 de Setembro de 1926.

Art. 3.º Fica revogada a legislação em contrário.

O Presidente do Ministério e os Ministros das demais Repartições assim o tenham entendido e façam executar. Paços do Governo da República, 19 de Fevereiro de 1926.—**BERNARDINO MACHADO**—*António Maria da Silva*—*João Catanho de Meneses*—*Armando Marques Guedes*—*José Esteves da Conceição Mascarenhas*—*Fernando Augusto Pereira da Silva*—*Vasco Borges*—*Manuel Gaspar de Lemos*—*Ernesto Maria Vieira da Rocha*—*Eduardo Ferreira dos Santos Silva*—*António Alberto Torres Garcia*.

1.ª Repartição

3.ª Secção

Decreto n.º 11:449

Considerando que de há muito se vem realizando de maneiras diversas, segundo o critério das autoridades marítimas locais, a execução para pagamento de custas e selos das acções julgadas nas capitães dos portos e delegações marítimas do continente e ilhas adjacentes, e bem assim dos emolumentos e taxas a satisfazer por serviços efectuados e documentos passados pelas mesmas estações marítimas, tornando-se por isso conveniente regular e uniformizar o procedimento a seguir em emergências desta natureza:

Hei por bem, sob proposta dos Ministros das Finanças e da Marinha, e usando da faculdade que me confere o n.º 3.º do artigo 47.º da Constituição Política da República Portuguesa, decretar o seguinte:

Artigo 1.º A execução para o pagamento das custas e selos das acções julgadas pelos capitães dos portos ou delegações marítimos e dos emolumentos e taxas a satisfazer pelos diversos serviços e documentos passados pelas capitães dos portos e delegações marítimas, quando voluntariamente não forem pagas no prazo legal, pertence nos concelhos de Lisboa e Porto aos juizes dos distritos fiscaes e nos outros concelhos do continente e das ilhas adjacentes aos respectivos secretários de finanças.

Art. 2.º Serve de base à execução uma nota da capitania do porto ou delegação marítima de onde conste: os quantitativos, por extenso, das importâncias a que se refere o artigo anterior e a designação dos serviços por que são devidas, os nomes, profissão e moradas dos devedores dessas importâncias e as entidades a quem são devidas.

Art. 3.º A importância cobrada na execução será enviada dentro do prazo de três dias à respectiva capitania ou delegação marítima.

§ único. Se essa importância não fôr sufficiente para pagamento do devido ao Estado e para pagamento dos emolumentos será pago em primeiro lugar o Estado e o restante, se o houver, rateado entre aqueles a quem forem devidos emolumentos.

Art. 4.º Continuam em vigor as disposições da alínea d) do n.º 47.º do artigo 28.º do decreto n.º 5:703, de 10 de Maio de 1919, e o artigo 6.º do decreto n.º 9:704, de 21 de Maio de 1924.

Art. 5.º Fica revogada a legislação em contrário.

Os Ministros das Finanças e da Marinha assim o tenham entendido e faça executar. Paços do Governo da República, 19 de Fevereiro de 1926. — BERNARDINO MACHADO — Armando Marques Guedes — Fernando Augusto Pereira da Silva.

6.ª Repartição da Direcção Geral da Contabilidade Pública

Decreto n.º 11:450

Usando da faculdade que ao Governo confere o n.º 5.º do artigo 25.º da carta de lei de 9 de Setembro de 1908, tendo ouvido o Conselho de Ministros e sob proposta do Ministro da Marinha:

Hei por bem decretar que do capítulo 2.º, artigo 8.º, «Rações», da proposta orçamental da despesa ordinária do Ministério da Marinha para o corrente ano económico seja transferida para o artigo 7.º do mesmo capítulo 2.º a quantia de 250.000\$, destinada a reforçar a verba de «Subsídios a oficiais da corporação da armada».

O presente decreto será publicado no *Diário do Go-*

verno, depois de registado na Direcção Geral da Contabilidade Pública.

O Presidente do Ministério e Ministro do Interior e os Ministros das demais Repartições assim o tenham entendido e façam executar. Paços do Governo da República, 19 de Fevereiro de 1926. — BERNARDINO MACHADO — António Maria da Silva — João Catanho de Meneses — Armando Marques Guedes — José Esteves da Conceição Mascarenhas — Fernando Augusto Pereira da Silva — Vasco Borges — Manuel Gaspar de Lemos — Ernesto Maria Vieira da Rocha — Eduardo Ferreira dos Santos Silva — António Alberto Torres Garcia.

Decreto n.º 11:451

Usando da faculdade que ao Governo confere o § 1.º do artigo 4.º do decreto n.º 8:786, de 28 de Abril de 1923: hei por bem, tendo ouvido o Conselho de Ministros e sob proposta do Ministro da Marinha, decretar que do capítulo 3.º, artigos 143.º, 147.º e 148.º, da proposta orçamental do Ministério do Comércio e Comunicações para o corrente ano económico sejam transferidas para o Ministério da Marinha respectivamente as quantias de 1:600.000\$, 450.000\$ e 450.000\$, as quais deverão ser inseridas na proposta orçamental deste último Ministério para o corrente ano económico; constituindo o capítulo 6.º, artigo 36.º, «Fundo de protecção à marinha mercante e portos nacionais», com a seguinte discriminação:

Premios de construção	1:600.000\$00
Escolas de construção naval	450.000\$00
Escolas Náutica e departamentais de pilotagem	450.000\$00

De conformidade com o disposto no artigo 3.º do decreto com força de lei n.º 5:519, de 8 de Maio de 1919, não poderá em caso algum ser paga em conta das mencionadas verbas importância superior à que se arrecadar.

O presente decreto será publicado no *Diário do Governo*, depois de registado na Direcção Geral da Contabilidade Pública, nos termos do artigo 1.º do decreto n.º 2 de 15 de Dezembro de 1894.

O Presidente do Ministério e Ministro do Interior e os Ministros das demais Repartições assim o tenham entendido e façam executar. Paços do Governo da República, 19 de Fevereiro de 1926. — BERNARDINO MACHADO — António Maria da Silva — João Catanho de Meneses — Armando Marques Guedes — José Esteves da Conceição Mascarenhas — Fernando Augusto Pereira da Silva — Vasco Borges — Manuel Gaspar de Lemos — Ernesto Maria Vieira da Rocha — Eduardo Ferreira dos Santos Silva — António Alberto Torres Garcia.

MINISTÉRIO DOS NEGÓCIOS ESTRANGEIROS

Direcção Geral dos Negócios Políticos e Diplomáticos

1.ª Repartição

Lei n.º 1:840

Em nome da Nação, o Congresso da República decreta, e eu promulgo, a lei seguinte:

Artigo 1.º É o Governo autorizado a aderir à Convenção relativa à organização do estatuto de Tanger, assinado em Paris, aos 18 de Dezembro de 1923, em

nome dos respectivos Governos, pelos Plenipotenciários da Espanha, da Grã-Bretanha e da França.

Art. 2.º Fica revogada a legislação em contrário.

O Presidente do Ministério e Ministro do Interior e os Ministros das demais Repartições a façam imprimir, publicar e correr. Paços do Governo da República, 28 de Janeiro de 1926.—**BERNARDINO MACHADO**—*António Maria da Silva*—*João Catanho de Meneses*—*Armando Marques Guedes*—*José Esteves da Conceição Mascarenhas*—*Fernando Augusto Pereira da Silva*—*Vasco Borges*—*Manuel Gaspar de Lemos*—*Ernesto Maria Vieira da Rocha*—*Eduardo Ferreira dos Santos Silva*—*António Alberto Torres Garcia*.

MINISTÉRIO DO COMÉRCIO E COMUNICAÇÕES

Direcção Geral das Indústrias

1.ª Repartição Industrial

Decreto n.º 11:452

Tendo sido insuficiente o prazo marcado pelo decreto n.º 10:967, de 27 de Julho do corrente ano, para a cobrança do emolumento anual devido pelos estabelecimentos comerciais e industriais, em virtude da deficiência de pessoal nas circunscrições industriais:

Hei por bem, sob proposta do Ministro do Comércio e Comunicações, ouvida a Direcção Geral das Indústrias e nos termos do n.º 3.º do artigo 47.º da Constituição Política da República Portuguesa, decretar o seguinte:

Artigo 1.º É prorrogado até 30 de Junho de 1926 o prazo estabelecido no artigo 1.º do decreto n.º 10:425, de 31 de Dezembro de 1924, para o pagamento do emolumento anual devido pelos estabelecimentos industriais e comerciais, o qual estava já prorrogado pelo decreto n.º 10:967, de 27 de Julho último.

Art. 2.º Fica revogada a legislação em contrário.

O Ministro do Comércio e Comunicações assim o tenha entendido e faça executar. Paços do Governo da República, 19 de Fevereiro de 1926.—**BERNARDINO MACHADO**—*Manuel Gaspar de Lemos*.

MINISTÉRIO DAS COLÓNIAS

Direcção Geral das Colónias do Oriente

Repartição de Angola e S. Tomé

2.ª Secção

Portaria n.º 4:578

Tendo o governo da província de S. Tomé e Príncipe, em diploma legislativo n.º 32, de 9 de Setembro de 1925, alterado o regime de diuturnidades estabelecido para determinadas categorias de funcionários da província, com o fundamento de que, fazendo essas diuturnidades parte do vencimento metropolitano de categoria, se torna indispensável harmonizá-las com a distribuição dos mesmos funcionários pelas classes determinadas nos diplomas legislativos coloniais n.ºs 38 e 46 (decretos), respectivamente de 5 de Setembro e 8 de Novembro de 1924;

Verificando-se, porém, que não foram ainda fixadas definitivamente as classes de funcionários de que tratam os citados decretos, e que assim a providência determinada pelo governo da província de S. Tomé e Príncipe

é inoportuna e inconveniente à regularidade da administração colonial:

Manda o Governo da República Portuguesa, pelo Ministro das Colónias, nos termos do disposto no artigo 7.º da lei n.º 1:836, de 4 de Fevereiro de 1926, e usando da faculdade que lhe confere a base 7.ª, n.º 1.º, das leis orgânicas da administração civil e financeira das colónias, codificadas pelo decreto n.º 7:008, de 9 de Outubro de 1920, rejeitar o diploma legislativo do governo da província de S. Tomé e Príncipe n.º 32, de 9 de Setembro de 1925.

Para ser publicado no «Boletim Oficial» da província de S. Tomé e Príncipe.

Paços do Governo da República, 19 de Fevereiro de 1926.—O Ministro das Colónias, *Ernesto Maria Vieira da Rocha*.

Portaria n.º 4:579

Tendo o governo geral da província de Angola, em diploma legislativo n.º 72, de 7 de Março de 1925, reorganizado a caixa de aposentação dos funcionários do quadro aduaneiro de Angola e S. Tomé como associação de socorros mútuos e alterado algumas das disposições que a este respeitam, afectando assim encargos e direitos inerentes a mais de uma colónia, pois que o pessoal das alfândegas da província de S. Tomé e Príncipe não constitui um quadro único, como está determinado pelo artigo 1.º do decreto de 25 de Outubro de 1899, providência essa que é da exclusiva competência do Poder Executivo: manda o Governo da República Portuguesa, pelo Ministro das Colónias, nos termos do disposto no artigo 7.º da lei n.º 1:836, de 4 de Fevereiro de 1926, usando da faculdade que lhe confere a base 7.ª, n.º 1.º, das leis orgânicas da administração civil e financeira das colónias, e sob consulta do Conselho Colonial, rejeitar o citado diploma legislativo do governo geral da província de Angola n.º 72, de 7 de Março de 1925.

Para ser publicado no «Boletim Oficial» da província de Angola.

Paços do Governo da República, 19 de Fevereiro de 1926.—O Ministro das Colónias, *Ernesto Maria Vieira da Rocha*.

MINISTÉRIO DA INSTRUÇÃO PÚBLICA

Direcção Geral de Belas Artes

2.ª Repartição

Decreto n.º 11:453

Tendo em vista o que propõe o Conselho de Arte e Arqueologia da 1.ª Circunscrição;

Usando da faculdade que me confere o n.º 3.º do artigo 47.º da Constituição Política da República Portuguesa:

Hei por bem decretar, sob proposta do Ministro da Instrução Pública, que sejam classificados monumentos nacionais a igreja da Atalaia, que é uma obra de João de Castilho, com um magnífico pórtico, em estilo da Renascença, regularmente conservado, e um conjunto interno muito interessante a que dão realce excelentes azulejos do princípio do século XVII; e a igreja de S. Vicente, em Abrantes, que é um dos mais notáveis templos edificados nos fins do século XVI, tendo sido reedificado, em grande parte, por ordem de D. Sebastião.

O Ministro da Instrução Pública assim o tenha enten-

dido e faça executar. Paços do Governo da República, 19 de Fevereiro de 1926. — BERNARDINO MACHADO — *Eduardo Ferreira dos Santos Silva.*

Decreto n.º 11:454

Tendo em vista o que propõe o Conselho de Arte e Arqueologia da 3.ª Circunscrição;

Usando da faculdade que me confere o n.º 3.º do artigo 47.º da Constituição Política da República Portuguesa:

Hei por bem decretar, sob proposta do Ministro da Instrução Pública, que sejam classificados monumentos nacionais os seguintes imóveis:

Ruínas da cidade velha de Santa Luzia, em Viana do Castelo (zona de defesa em volta das ruínas nunca inferior a 20 metros);

Muralha de Melgaço;

Muralhas denominadas de D. Fernando, Pôrto, e respectivo miradouro;

Torre de Barcelos, chamada do Postigo da Muralha;

Capela-mor da Igreja de Longos Vales, arredores de Monção;

Casa chamada de João Velho ou dos Arcos, Viana do Castelo;

Casa de Miguel de Vasconcelos, Viana do Castelo;

Cruzeiro de S. Julião, Melgaço;

Ponte do Rio Ave, entre Guimarães e Braga, estrada nacional n.º 27;

Igreja de S. Domingos de Vila Real de Trás-os-Montes e, nos termos do artigo 45.º do decreto com força de lei de 26 de Maio de 1911, o pequeno fontenário existente no Largo da Sé do Pôrto.

O Ministro da Instrução Pública assim o tenha en-

tendido e faça executar. Paços do Governo da República, 19 de Fevereiro de 1926. — BERNARDINO MACHADO — *Eduardo Ferreira dos Santos Silva.*

MINISTÉRIO DA AGRICULTURA

Secretaria Geral

Decreto n.º 11:455

Tornando-se indispensável suprir com gado importado a falta de carne para a alimentação da população de Lisboa, e para atender o pedido da Câmara Municipal desta cidade;

Tendo sido ouvido o Conselho Superior de Agricultura;

Usando da faculdade que me confere o n.º 4.º do artigo 47.º da Constituição Política da República Portuguesa, e sob proposta do Ministro da Agricultura:

Hei por bem decretar o seguinte:

Artigo 1.º Fica permitida a importação até 1:200 bovinos adultos, devendo contudo o gado a importar estar no Tejo até o dia 15 de Abril, o mais tardar.

Art. 2.º Até 30 de Abril do corrente ano a carne de bovinos fornecida por criadores portugueses para os talhos de Lisboa, pelo actual regime, será paga por preço não inferior ao que fôr cobrado pela carne das reses argentinas.

Art. 3.º Ficam revogadas as disposições em contrário.

Os Ministros das Finanças e da Agricultura assim o tenham entendido e faça executar. Paços do Governo da República, 19 de Fevereiro de 1926. — BERNARDINO MACHADO — *Armando Marques Guedes — António Alberto Torres Garcia.*



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, March 9, 1926.

No. 6129

For Distribution

yes ☒

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 20 1926
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Office of Economic Adviser
MAR 22 1926
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INDEX BUREAU
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The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Washington.

Sir :

I have the honor to report that the first activity of the Riffi this spring has, according to the Paris press of the past few days, been satisfactorily met, notably by French gains in the region near Taouerta.

The attack on the M'tioua tribe, which submitted to the French during the latter part of January, has failed conclusively, and calm now rules this region. The attitude and assistance of the M'tioua has been reported on with praise by the French.

Following the opening of spring hostilities on February 27th and his defeat during the following three days, Abd el Krim has resumed guerilla warfare and attempts to

win

win over to him the tribes whose aid he failed to get by his recent abortive offensive. Villages have been burned, women and girls violated, and other reports tell of savagery such as is difficult to believe.

A report from Madrid says that Abd el Krim's agents are spreading the rumor that France and Spain are no longer agreed on a plan of campaign, and that France would make an independent peace. In this connection LE JOURNAL DES DEBATS of March 7th publishes a statement of General Primo de Rivera in which he says: "We should follow the system of last year, loyal cooperation with France to repress the revolt of Abd el Krim against the authority of the Sultan."

LE TEMPS of March 6th gives the following information as to the organization of the Military in Morocco at present:

General Boichut, Supreme Commander of Troops in Morocco is established at Rabat with his Staff but retains a post of command at Fez. The military forces on the north front are divided into two sectors, one around Fez, the other around Taza. General Dufieux commands the former sector, and General Mittelhauser, former Chief of the French Military Mission to Czechoslovakia, the Taza sector. It is of interest to note that General Dufieux was until recently head of the French War College. The following Territorial Commands have been assigned: Fez region, General de Chambrun; Meknes region, General Freydenberg; Marakech region, General Dangan; Taza region, Colonel Huot.

Reports that the opening of hostilities in the spring campaign would cause Marshal Pétain to be sent again to Morocco were commented on by LE JOURNAL of March 4th.

"Until


"Until further notice," it said, "Boichut will remain Commander in Chief in Morocco. No change has been decided yet." It may be of interest to recall that LE JOURNAL is often well informed in advance of appointments, it having announced the name of Senator Bérenger as Ambassador to Washington a full day before any other paper.

The scene of operations is apparently shifting to Mount Messacud, south of Taza, as foreseen some days ago (See my Despatch No. 6107, March 2, 1926) where enemy activity leads the French to think Abd el Krim plans an offensive before the French can begin an attack on the Jaia region.

There is transmitted herewith a translation of the salient parts of an article in LE TEMPS of March 5th which summarizes the recent hostilities begun by Abd el Krim.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,



Myron T. Herrick

Enclosure

As stated above.

In quintuplicate.

Copy to E.I.C.

--translation--

MOROCCO

(From LE TEMPS, March 5, 1926)

The Riffian Attack Against the M'tioua.

The attacks made by the enemy against tribes that are friendly to us on and after February 27th in the Taounat sector can now be considered as repulsed; the Riffians have been pushed back of their former lines.

It is now possible to summarize the events of the last few days. During the evening of February 26th and the day of the 27th, a strong offensive from the Ben-Kacem region (15 kilometers northwest of Astar-Sker) and the Oulad-Said (15 kilometers northeast of Sker on the main line of Riffian communications between Tabarrant and Tacuerta) was suddenly begun against the M'tioua-dial-Outa, who submitted the latter part of January. The resistance of this tribe, nevertheless, was energetic and resolute. The attackers, 1200 Senhadja of Srair, armed with grenades and automatic rifles, under the command of Cherif Khamlich, burned several villages but could not force our allies to surrender in spite of the savagery of the assault.

From the beginning the M'tioua manifested great loyalty, preferring to leave their homes and take their flocks to safety behind our line of outposts rather than again submit to the Riffian yoke.

The Beni-Melloul tribe, of the Beni-Zboual group, encountered first the invaders; they let them pass through and furnished supplies and even a few reinforcements.

On the 28th our counter-offensive began and with the aid of allied tribes we stopped the invaders.

On March 1st we assumed the offensive. The same day our regulars occupied Bou-Redoub and Imerdend, 5 kilometers beyond our outposts, and our allies pursued the enemy

to

to the boundaries of the region inhabited by the M'tioua. Work of reconnaissance and artillery fire from our guns continued on March 2nd. At the end of the day our troops drove the enemy from Tacuerta and advanced to Tijda, 3 kilometers northwest of Tacuerta.. The Riffians offered sharp resistance. Our troops will probably advance to Tacounat-El-Kchour which commands the pass where the rivers Klama and Taghzout converge to form the Sra thus forming between the Hill Tacounat on the west and the Hill Telfest on the east a military emplacement of first rank.

It is indispensable that we protect against another such aggression the tribes that have submitted to us.

Our troops continue to occupy the positions taken by March 1st, 5 kilometers beyond previous outposts. The losses of our allies in the past few days fighting were light. Up to the present, there have been no losses among our regular troops. During the engagements our air forces gave their usual effective and brilliant assistance.

CITY: LONDON.

Imperial and Foreign News.

INTERNATIONAL TANGIER.

I.—WORKING OF NEW STATUS.

(FROM OUR MOROCCAN CORRESPONDENT.)

At a conference held in Paris in the later months of 1923, at which Great Britain, France, and Spain were represented, a convention for the permanent neutrality of Tangier was drawn up which was duly ratified by the Governments of those three Powers.

It was scarcely disputed at the time that this convention was more political than practical and that its object was rather to rid the interested Governments of a difficult and possibly dangerous question than to discover a solution that would ameliorate the unhappy condition of Tangier and its population. A sufficient measure of good will and conciliation was exhibited in Paris to facilitate an arrangement, within the limits of political exigencies. The three Governments concerned considered that they could count upon the acquiescence and the support of the other Signatory Powers of the Algeiras Act in any decision that they might themselves arrive at. The Italian Government had expressed a desire to participate in these deliberations, but its request was refused for reasons which, even if their legitimacy was evident, were neither quite reasonable nor quite wise.

The convention signed in December, 1923, was only officially brought into force in Tangier in June, 1925, for many supplementary questions, such as the drawing up of the Sultan's "Dahirs" and of the legal codes, had to be undertaken, matters of considerable labour.

There is no need to-day to do more than recall the outline of Tangier's status. The town and its zone of little more than 200 square miles in extent remain under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco, who is represented in Tangier by the Mendub. The Mendub and his assistant officials have all but complete control of the native population, while the administration of the Islamic law is also placed under the Sultan's authority. The native population, both Moors and Jews, who form a large majority of Tangier's inhabitants, are thus to all intents and purposes withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the international administration and subjected to the government of the Sultan and of the French Protectorate, over which the Tangier Administration has, of course, no control.

The Moors and Jews have their Islamic and Rabbinic Courts, entirely apart from the Tangier Government. The international civil and criminal codes are administered in Mixed Tribunals by Judges of British, French, and Spanish nationality. The executive government of Tangier lies in the hands of an Administrator and two Assistant-Administrators. They are of French, British, and Spanish nationality. The Public Works are under the charge of a Spanish engineer, and the staffs of the various Government offices are recruited from the many nationalities and several religions of Tangier, chosen for their qualifications.

and the financial outlook is gloomy. Nor in drawing up the Budget has the Administration taken into due consideration the responsibilities that entail to self-government—relief of distress, hospitalization, public health, and the manifold duties that the instinct of humanity demands. The Governments that introduced this status, in which they largely participate to-day, cannot repudiate a considerable measure of responsibility for the welfare of the population, especially as this responsibility was of their own seeking and their own creation. The native has as yet seen little result beyond the appointment of a large number of foreign officials, toward the payment of whose salaries—salaries, as a matter of fact, owing to the depreciation of the franc, entirely inadequate—he pays his quota of taxation.

The only test of the success of such a status as has been introduced into Tangier is whether it guarantees justice equally to one and all, has brought an amelioration in local welfare, and created confidence abroad. In the case of Tangier it has done none of these. The condition of the people has not improved, there is no equality of treatment, and no confidence has been created. On the one hand the distress continues, on the other foreign capital holds aloof. No industries have been founded and there is a slump in all kinds of property. The war in the Rif and the fall in the franc have had an adverse influence on Tangier's position, but the principal factor is this, that the status itself is looked upon with suspicion both locally and abroad. There is a desire, often expressed at Tangier, that Italy and America will continue their refusal to adhere, so that some radical modification of the status will be forced upon the interested Powers.

(To be continued.)

ministrators. They are of French, British, and Spanish nationality. The Public Works are under the charge of a Spanish engineer, and the staffs of the various Government offices are recruited from the many nationalities and several religions of Tangier, chosen for their qualifications.

There is an International Representative Assembly which is responsible for local legislation. This Assembly is in turn subject to a Committee of Control—consisting of the Consuls-General of the adhering Powers—whose duty it is to confirm the Assembly's decisions provided they are in accordance with the terms of the convention. The Legislative Assembly should, if fully constituted, consist of 26 members, representing eight nationalities, elected by their compatriots or nominated by their Consuls-General.

ITALIAN AND U.S. REFUSAL.

As a matter of fact the two Italian members and the American member have never been elected or nominated, as the respective Governments of these countries have not yet recognized the new status. It is this refusal on the part of these two Governments to acquiesce in the change of *régime* that is one of the principal obstacles to the success of Tangier's internationalization. There are, it is true, many other and serious drawbacks in the status itself, sufficient to retard the smooth working of so complicated a machine. One, and a very important one, though perhaps it was inevitable, is this isolation of the Moroccan subjects of Tangier under what amounts to the foreign control of the Sultan and of the French Protectorate Government.

The result of the abstention of Italy and America is this—that while the Governments of Great Britain, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium, who are all represented to-day in Tangier by Consuls-General, have recognized the new status and taken the necessary legal steps to place their nationals at Tangier under its jurisdiction, the subjects of Italy and of America, on the contrary, are not amenable to the new laws, and still enjoy the privileges—if such they can be described—of the old *régime*. That is to say, they have the benefit of the Capitulations and remain, as formerly, under the jurisdiction of the laws and Consular Courts of their respective States. The result, as can be realized, is one that cannot fail to cause difficulties, while it may at any moment cause danger, and it does away with all principles of equality of treatment.

It stands to reason that a town where a portion of the population is not subject to the laws in force or even to municipal or police regulations—where there is a minority that ignores licences, can refuse to pay taxes, and recognizes no local authority outside its own Consulates—cannot be satisfactorily governed. Until the status of Tangier is recognized by all the Governments concerned its failure is certain, and even if so recognized it can never in its present form prove anything but irksome and prejudicial to the administrated and difficult to those in whose charge the administration lies.

It is quite comprehensible from these few months' experience that the Governments of Italy and the United States are no more inclined, perhaps less, to adhere to this new situation than they were when it was introduced. Of the adhering Governments those of Great Britain and France appear moderately satisfied with their handiwork, but the Spanish Government, more nearly touched by the convention's imperfections, insists that, entirely apart from the question of Italian or American adhesion, the status is in any case unwieldy, impracticable, and disadvantageous.

HONEST EFFORTS.

There have been honest local endeavours to render the arrangement a success. Individual departments of the Administration have overcome many difficulties. The finances have been well handled and for the moment the revenue more than suffices: but Tangier's charges will increase as time goes on by the payment of the Port deficit and of the interest on the Port and Railway Bonds.

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(To be continued.)

CITY: LONDON.

Imperial and Foreign
News.INTERNATIONAL
TANGIER.II.—WEB OF POLITICAL
EXPEDIENTS.

(FROM OUR MOROCCO CORRESPONDENT.)

In the last article it was pointed out that the introduction of an international status into Tangier has brought very little satisfaction to its mixed population and has awaked little confidence abroad. The blaring of trumpets after the Paris Conference of December, 1923, when Tangier's fate was decided, failed to bring about the crumbling of the diplomatic walls that had so long obstructed its progress and prosperity; for the convention was in reality more of a deal among interested parties than an endeavour to remedy the situation. Tangier passed, in fact, from the servitude of diplomatic control into the meshes of a web of political expedients and contradictions—and even the web was not complete, for the Italian and United States Governments have refused to adhere to the status. It is clear to-day that should these two Governments continue in their refusal to recognize the convention, the international status of Tangier is doomed to failure. Even should they eventually be persuaded to reconsider their decision, it may safely be stated that their acquiescence will depend upon essential and definite modifications in the existing status.

To return to the situation existing in Tangier to-day. It is necessarily complicated. Three languages are legally current in the Legislative Assembly. French, Spanish and Arabic, a number not perhaps exaggerated when it is taken into consideration that, when complete, no fewer than eight nationalities will be represented there. The French and Spanish languages are not interpreted, as members are supposed to know both, but speeches and questions are translated into Arabic and vice versa. The meetings of the Assembly are orderly and generally dignified, but the discussions are often unduly prolonged by a natural disinclination on the part of the Vice-Presidents to be severe in their rulings.

The Administrators are present at the meetings to give information and explanations when required. The Mendub—the Sultan's representative—presides, but takes no part in the discussions. Decisions arrived at by the Assembly are referred to the Committee of Control for ratification, and, if they are found to be within the provisions of the Convention, are eventually issued as edicts by the Mendub in the Sultan's name.

PRESENT IN SPIRIT.

Although the terms of the Convention have been as far as possible strictly followed, difficulties, owing to the non-adhesion of Italy and the United States, have arisen which have required some skill or imagination to overcome. For instance, the absence of the members of those two nationalities from the Assembly—two Italians and one American—has prevented the forming of a legal quorum.

The difficulty has been solved by a decision to consider these absolutely non-existent members as permanently

tell you so—with any surcharged stamps of which the equivalent gold value works out at, or more than, 2d. at the rate of exchange of the day. The British stamps are supposed to be surcharged in gold centimes and centimos, but just as one has learned all this one finds there are exceptions. While the 8d. British stamp is surcharged 80 centimes and the 10d. stamp 1 franc, the 9d. stamp is only surcharged 75 centimes. What the Post Office loses in the depreciation of the surcharging it gains in the number of surcharged stamps sold to make up the equivalent of the English value at the current rate of exchange.

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In the British Post Office English money—or French, Moorish and Spanish moneys at the local rate of exchange—is accepted; in the French Post Office only French or Moorish francs; and at the Spanish Post Office only Spanish money. Just as you have learned that as a general rule each service accepts the currency of the money of its own country you discover that the British telegraph office will take only Spanish money. With a choice of 61 different denominations of stamps issued by the post-offices of Tangier, letters can be made more decorative than picture post-cards. An afternoon amongst the Tangier postal regulations is like getting lost in Hampton Court maze on a foggy day.

As an example of the difficulties that the abstention of certain Powers from recognizing the Tangier Convention has brought about, a typical case is that of gambling. All games of chance are prohibited by the convention, though the Committee of Control have the right, by a unanimous vote, to permit gaming, understood to be in a form as little damaging as possible to the moral welfare of the place and licensed in a manner to increase the revenues. On the day of the introduction of the status all the proprietors of the establishments in which gambling took place who were subjects of the Powers which had adhered to the convention loyally closed down their tables. But the subjects of the dissenting Powers naturally refused to recognize the legality of these orders, and not only maintained such gaming places as they possessed, but immediately opened new ones. So unjust in these circumstances appeared to be the orders closing the establishments of the subjects of the adhering Powers that the Committee of Control was obliged to permit their reopening, with a result that, though forbidden by the convention, gambling is more rife than ever and completely uncontrolled.

(To be continued.)

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The difficulty has been solved by a decision to consider these absolutely non-existent members as permanently sitting on every occasion. A parallel case would be that in order to obtain a quorum in the House of Commons all the unsuccessful candidates at the last General Election should be counted as present. The Legislative Assembly of Tangier without the spiritual presence of these three apocryphal strangers would not be properly constituted.

The judicial administration of Tangier, with its Judges of three nationalities, sitting in mixed tribunals and assisted by juries of various religions, tongues, and colours, is beset with many evitable and inevitable difficulties, and with all the good will in the world the new Courts have not achieved complete success. Of the six Judges two have already resigned in the first six months and another has announced his resignation—and it is feared that the infection may spread to other branches of the public service.

More complicated even than justice are the currencies and postal arrangements of Tangier. The Morocco franc, which rises and falls—generally falls—with the French franc, is the basis of the legal currency, but the Spanish peseta has, by the convention, the "liberty of being current" as well. Taxes and all Government charges, fees, and salaries are paid in the former, but a great deal of the local trade is done in the peseta. There is also the old Moorish currency—the Hassani dollars and pesetas—which are still almost the sole means of transactions with the natives. The Hassani coinage is destined to be withdrawn, but, as it will remain current in the neighbouring Spanish zone, its suppression will be difficult, and may tend largely to impede local trade with the surrounding tribes, who practically use no other currency, although the Spanish peseta circulates in certain districts.

These three currencies, all in constant use, have brought into circulation no fewer than 26 metal coins—besides paper money—the value of the highest of which is about equivalent to 3s. in English money, while 23 are below 1s. in value. Nor is this all; for the relative values of these three currencies alter, according to the exchange, often several times a day; and the confusion and complications which ensue can be imagined.

POST OFFICE PUZZLE.

There are three post-offices at Tangier—the Sherrefian, or Moorish Government Post Office, a British Post Office, and a Spanish Post Office—and each issues stamps and has its own postal system. Between them they issue 61 denominations of postage stamps—the Moorish post 20 denominations, the British post 28, and the Spanish post 13. The British Post Office issues British postage stamps with "Morocco Agencies" printed in black across them, and either unsurcharged or surcharged in French or Moroccan centimes or Spanish centimos.

The postage from England to Tangier is 1d.; the postage from Tangier to England is 2d. The only explanation I ever heard was given by a Moorish clerk to a lady. "I suppose, madame," he said, "that it is further from Tangier to England than from England to Tangier." The lady took the opportunity to give him a little lecture in geography. "It is the same both ways," she said. "Surely," she added, "it is the same distance to go from Tangier to Tetuan as it is to come from Tetuan to Tangier?" "No," he replied, "not if it rains while you are in Tetuan, for in that case you have to return by another and longer road on account of the mud." The lady abandoned any further attempts to unravel that particular mystery.

But there are other mysteries at the British Post Office. You can send a letter from Tangier to England with a 2d. British stamp, but you can also send one—the local postal authorities will sell you the stamps, but may hesitate to

CITY: LONDON.

Imperial and Foreign
News.INTERNATIONAL
TANGIER.II.—WEB OF POLITICAL
EXPEDIENTS.

(FROM OUR MOROCCO CORRESPONDENT.)

In the last article it was pointed out that the introduction of an international status into Tangier has brought very little satisfaction to its mixed population and has awaked little confidence abroad. The blaring of trumpets after the Paris Conference of December, 1923, when Tangier's fate was decided, failed to bring about the crumbling of the diplomatic walls that had so long obstructed its progress and prosperity; for the convention was in reality more of a deal among interested parties than an endeavour to remedy the situation. Tangier passed, in fact, from the servitude of diplomatic control into the meshes of a web of political expedients and contradictions—and even the web was not complete, for the Italian and United States Governments have refused to adhere to the status. It is clear to-day that should these two Governments continue in their refusal to recognize the convention, the international status of Tangier is doomed to failure. Even should they eventually be persuaded to reconsider their decision, it may safely be stated that their acquiescence will depend upon essential and definite modifications in the existing status.

To return to the situation existing in Tangier to-day. It is necessarily complicated. Three languages are legally current in the Legislative Assembly. French, Spanish and Arabic, a number not perhaps exaggerated when it is taken into consideration that, when complete, no fewer than eight nationalities will be represented there. The French and Spanish languages are not interpreted, as members are supposed to know both, but speeches and questions are translated into Arabic and *vice versa*. The meetings of the Assembly are orderly and generally dignified, but the discussions are often unduly prolonged by a natural disinclination on the part of the Vice-Presidents to be severe in their rulings.

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III.—THE RIGHTS OF SPAIN.

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Permanent neutrality and economic equality are the bases of the Tangier Convention. The former has not yet been tested and probably can only be tested in the case of war. Of the latter there is at present but little vestige. The refusal of the Italian and American Governments to adhere to the Convention has rendered any pretence of economic equality a farce. The subjects of those Powers do not pay the taxes introduced by the new Administration. American and Italian ships pay anchorage and port dues on the old and very much reduced scale, while all the vessels of the other Powers are liable to the recently introduced tariffs.

A premature and doubtfully legal attempt of the Administration to suppress the Hassani currency amongst the natives was met by a refusal on the part of American and Italian subjects to conform with this order in their transactions with their native clients. Under the terms of the Convention an inquiry is about to be opened into the possession by private individuals of Moorish Government property and of "Habous" ("Religious Foundations") property, so that more revenue can be created by an increase of rents, but American and Italian holders of such properties cannot be approached. They will remain in possession on terms that will be far removed from the principle of economic equality.

There are many other examples that might be stated. Even apart from economic questions, the minority of dissident Powers have made their presence felt. Their representatives remain diplomatic agents, while those of the adhering Powers have become Consuls-General. They maintain the Conseil Sanitaire, which was, by the terms of the Convention, merged into the new Administration, and they continue to act accordingly. They issue bills of health to ships of their own nationalities entirely independently of the Administration, and they collect fees for the same, maintaining that the Conseil Sanitaire remains intact. Bills of health given to ships of their nationalities by the authorities of Tangier's new Government they consider null and void. In the case of quarantine regulations they claim to be empowered to adopt dispositions entirely different from those of the new local authorities. Vessels coming from the same port might be subject or not to quarantine, according to the flag under which they sailed. The way is widely open to a host of difficulties.

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It should be stated that there are no signs of political antagonism. The representatives of the non-adhering Powers merely uphold the old régime on the ground that it has not been supplanted. Legally they are undoubtedly within their rights. Politically they are to-day treating the adhering Governments much as the adhering Governments treated them at the time of the Paris Conference. They were ignored then; to-day they ignore

themselves allow; perhaps still more of her troubles have been due to the constant changes of policy of each successive Government in Madrid and of each successive High Commissioner in Tetuan.

It was not till the Marques de Estella in 1924 undertook himself the direction of affairs that eventual success seemed possible. His admirable determination, his wise policy of withdrawal toward the coast in the face of great opposition, his courageous action—not inaptly described as a mighty gamble—in landing Spanish troops at Alhucemas Bay have all been successful and Spain's position is much improved. The prestige which she has lost has been largely regained, and even her most severe critics cannot fail to applaud the reforms and ameliorations that the Marques de Estella has brought about, and his tenacity of purpose.

That Tangier's isolation has proved a veritable drawback to Spain must be frankly acknowledged. As far as contraband of war is concerned there has been practically none from Tangier for the simple reason that there have been greater facilities upon the coast of the Spanish zone itself and across the French Protectorate frontier.

REFUGE FOR ADVENTURERS.

But Tangier has been a little haven of refuge for many a stormy petrel. Abd-el-Krim's Rif agents and strange international adventurers in search of concessions in the Rif and a host of others have sojourned and sojourn to-day here in the full enjoyment of political liberty and immunity not only from interference but also from justice, for it cannot be denied that Tangier's neutrality has been abused at times. Correspondence between Tangier and the Rif is easy. Some of these visitors have been content to send and receive letters, others have themselves ventured, with more or less success, to penetrate into the Rif. All have by the nature of their professions, and here one must include journalists, been used by Abd-el-Krim as instruments of propaganda, and Spain has had no redress. The Spanish Government demanded the expulsion from Tangier of all natives whose origin is the Spanish zone. Tangier could not possibly accept, and rightly so, for the international status can only exist by exerting its independence of action and exhibiting its political immunity, though these may be often employed at the expense of Spanish interests.

It is not from ill-will or opposition, for this policy is forced upon Tangier by existing circumstances. The security of the place is not owing to its small but excellent force of French officered police, who are in charge of the zone, useful and tactful as this force has been. The existing tranquillity is due to the fact that as long as Tangier is permitted to remain a "sanctuary" to the Rifi and Jabala tribesmen, and maintain a neutrality that is essentially benevolent to the enemies of Spain, it will be respected by Abd-el-Krim and his followers. The day that Tangier puts difficulties in the way of the Rifis and their friends there will be danger—and Tangier is incapable of defending itself.

Tangier cannot live alone, and without the closest and most intimate contact with the neighbouring Spanish zone it is destined to succumb. The Spanish zone, as long as the Tangier enclave remains a refuge for her enemies, is handicapped beyond all possibility of success. The two are commercially and politically inter-dependent, and as soon as a favourable opportunity arrives, when the security of Tangier would no longer be threatened, this difficult and delicate but all-important question must be solved. It is the only hope for peace in North Africa.

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It has been argued, and with reason, that, quite apart from the abstention of certain Powers, the difficulties with which Tangier's new Government finds itself confronted arise more largely from the situation which existed in Morocco when the Convention was drawn up and the restrictions that this situation imposed upon the negotiators than from imperfections in the status itself. There were acquired rights which could not be disregarded; there were claims justified and unjustifiable; there were political, strategical, and commercial requirements—and above all, the foundation on which the new structure had to be raised was the corrupt system already in existence.

Again, the whole question of Tangier had already been greatly influenced by its geographical position. Its situation on the narrow straits that unite the Mediterranean and the Atlantic is almost unique in its advantages, lying as the town does on the high road of shipping at the point where Europe and Africa are nearest. Yet it has been largely this natural advantage that has done so much to ruin Tangier, for it has given the place a strategical value of such importance as to awake the jealousies and suspicions of the European Powers. Its possession by such a weak authority as was the Sultan of Morocco before the introduction of the French Protectorate gave certain Governments of Europe a wonderful opportunity for protracted intervention, and they were not slow to seize it.

TANGIER'S ISOLATION.

From 1912, when Morocco was definitely split up into French and Spanish spheres, Tangier and its little zone have been isolated, and they remained on under the corrupt Moorish *régime* rendered still more injurious by constant diplomatic obstruction to all improvement. Geographically, Tangier is part of the Spanish zone, and, geographically, the two should have remained inseparable. There were practical and political reasons why this was not possible, just as there were reasons why Tangier could not have been attached to the French Protectorate. Nevertheless, the stroke that rendered Tangier independent of the Spanish zone deprived it of its hinterland and its means of livelihood and Spain of this most valuable outlet to the sea for her African sphere. Political exigencies led to the perpetration of a geographical error, but geography is permanent while politics are evanescent.

It has often been asked why Tangier was not included in either the Spanish or French zones, or a mandate given to England for its administration. The answer is simple. Neither England nor France could afford to see the other installed there. The same difficulty did not exist in the case of Spain, for she already owned the northern shore of the Straits, with the exception of Gibraltar, and was already destined to command most of the Southern shore. It was considered, however, expedient that Spain should not be permitted to include Tangier within the limits of her zone. The reason was that, although Spanish possession of the place was not in itself a menace to England or to France, a combination of Spain and Germany was always possible as a set off to the, at that date, newly formed Entente between England and France. Happily, Spain is to-day a firm and valuable friend to the two Entente Powers.

Had the Spanish Government realized at that moment the direct hindrance that Tangier, excluded from her zone, was to prove to the pacification of her African sphere, they might well have refused to undertake so thankless a task. That many of Spain's troubles in Morocco have been owing to mistaken and ill-applied methods of government the Spaniards

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
(Concluded.)

• • • The first article appeared in *The Times* on February 16, and the second yesterday.



No. 6145

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, March 15, 1926.



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FILE



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The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington.

Sir :

I have the honor to enclose for the information
of the Department and as a supplement to my Despatch No.
6129 of March 9, 1926, regarding the reopening of hostil-
ities in Morocco, translations of two articles from the
conservative LE TEMPS and the Communist L'HUMANITE.


The former notices with concern the unfortunate
results which the attack on the M'tious has already had
among submissive tribes, notably the defection of the
Beni Melloul, and urges more effective French protection
of the tribes that have submitted and are open to the
attacks of Abd el Krim.

L'HUMANITE sees in the position taken by LE TEMPS
a move to prepare public opinion for a spring offensive;

it calls on the Communist Party to unite in protest against the imperialistic "war of brigandage."

These two articles express clearly the consistent attitude of these two papers on the Moroccan question: LE TEMPS favoring effective control of the Protectorate, and L'HUMANITE the ending of hostilities at almost any cost.

I have the honor to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,


Myron T. Herrick

Enclosures:
4 As stated.

In quintuplicate.

Copy to E.I.C.

Enclosure No. 1 Despatch No. 6145 March 15, 1926.

-translation-

MOROCCO

(From LE TEMPS, March 11, 1926.)

The Lesson of the Attack on the M'tioua.

If the recent Riffian offensive against the M'tioua, repulsed in a few days, was for us a sufficiently definite military success by reason of its quick solution, it may have on the other hand less satisfactory political consequences.

During the winter when military operations were necessarily suspended, the General Staff concentrated on an extremely clever propaganda campaign which had the very appreciable result of covering our front--except from Mes-sacud Hill to the Loukkos River--by a mesh of allied tribes extending from 10 to 25 kilometers beyond the positions reached in October 1925. For a multiplicity of reasons, but especially in view of the precarious nature of means of communication, the High Command decided to send no regular troops north of our line of outposts.

Our partisans, armed by us and officered by members of the Information Corps, upheld by goums and makhzen, were thus charged with protecting their own territories. This system, excellent in principle, contained, however, certain inconveniences by reason of the circumspection necessary as to arming submissive tribes. Hence it was that the Marnissa, partially armed and with "rations" of ammunition, feared that they would not be able to oppose successfully a better-armed enemy. Their chief, Omar ben Hamidou, expressed this idea. Our High Command understood the dilemma, but as one of its members said: "The problem is insoluble. The confidence we put in our partisans has to

be

be very limited; it is indispensable not to arm them too strongly in case, which is always possible, they turn against us after Riffian reprisals or a local defeat of our troops."

The attack expected on the Marnissa was made farther east on the M'tioua February 26th.

The enemy, armed with bombs and machine guns, found in front of it only guard posts whose defenders were armed with old-style rifles.

In spite of the desperate resistance of our allies, the Riffian wave spread out as it did last April, laying waste the land of the M'tioua, but stopping at a respectful distance from our outposts which they knew enough to let alone.

Nevertheless the M'tioua suffered terribly. Besides several hundred combattants killed or wounded, we must deplore the numerous villages burned, the women raped, the children killed or mutilated, all the horrors that we could not prevent because our regular units were too far away to arrive in time.

Our prestige, therefore, suffered noticeably.

It is to be feared that the pillage of the M'tioua may cause tribes recently submitted to us to change their allegiance; more dissidents may leave. Already on February 24th, the Beni Melloul, a part of the Beni Seroual which had joined us a month earlier, foresaw the Riffian attack and took back their liberty of action.

At that time no extension of the field of operations was planned before May or June because of the importance of the construction of roads that are indispensable to our line to the limits of our zone of influence, but now it is possible that the attack on the M'tioua will cause the High

Command

Command to modify its intentions.

Whatever happens, the events of February 26th showed once again that the protection given by allied tribes is ineffective when the enemy attacks in earnest with well-armed units.

If we do not wish to take the chance of losing more dissidents--which is demoralizing for the tribes, some of which have returned to the mahkzen twice since the beginning of operations, we must make up our minds to effectively "cover" these people and protect them against all attempts at terrorization.

March 15, 1926.

-translation-

MOROCCO

(From L'HUMANITÉ, March 11, 1926.)

The French High Command Demands an Immediate Offensive.

In spite of the optimism of the communiqués, it is beyond doubt that the Riffian offensive of February 26th on the M'tioua has had a great effect on the tribes allied with France and hence on the French invaders. Although the communiqué is silent on this subject, we know that the troops sent hastily to reinforce this part of the front had to beat a retreat and regain their trenches protecting the line of last October. Today it is admitted that Riffian units came within nine kilometers of Sker.

Already the results of the success obtained by the Riffians against the M'tioua and the invaders have been felt, and a certain number of the tribes of Beni Zeroual, among them the Beni Melloul, have again become dissident.

Of course the French press talks about the "horrors" committed by the Riffians against the M'tioua in the same terms it talked in 1914 of German atrocities: it doesn't even spare us the couplet about children's hands being cut off, for obviously the Riffians are barbarians and the French and their chiefs are little white lambs (even when they mutilate or cut off the heads of their prisoners.)

Whatever the conditions are, the High Command takes these events for pretext to demand a new urgent offensive. LE TEMPS, which sets the tone, wrote on this subject:

"Our prestige has suffered noticeably.

"Although no extension of the field of operations was planned before May or June because of the importance of constructing roads that are indispensable to our line of communication with the limits of our zone of influence, it is possible that the attack on the M'tioua will cause the High Command to modify its intentions.

"If

"If we do not wish to take the chance of losing more dissidents--which is demoralizing for the tribes, some of which have returned to the mahkzen twice since the beginning of operations, we must make up our minds to effectively "cover" these people and protect them against all attempts at terrorization."

We know what such declarations mean. They aim to prepare public opinion for the spring offensive as in 1917, isn't that true Monsiuer Assassin Painlevé?

The French bourgeoisie needs a nice tricolor victory to exploit. Briand has to give promises to the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas and to French imperialism. Such a clever man, he who manages Locarno and the Riff simultaneously, who sings of the delights of peace and prepares at the same time new charnel houses!

The war is beginning again in Morocco. They are going to ask for more money, more munitions, more human sacrifices. And at three separate and distinct times it would have been possible for the Cartel Government to make peace with the Riff, a "just and honorable peace", to talk like M. Painlevé did last July.

As last year, it is up to the Communist Party to oppose this bloody and ignoble war of brigandage by the united protest of the French proletariat.

Get ready to unite, French workers, to unite as you did last year against the imperialism of your country.

(Marcel Fourrier)

THE LESSON OF THE ATTACK ON THE M'TIOUA

from LE TEMPS, March 11, 1926.

La leçon de l'attaque sur les M'tioua

Si la dernière offensive rifaine sur les M'tioua, brisée en quelques jours, a été pour nous l'occasion d'un succès militaire assez net, par suite du redressement rapide de la situation, elle peut avoir, par contre, des conséquences moins satisfaisantes, au point de vue politique.

Au cours de l'hiver, les opérations militaires étant forcément suspendues, l'action de l'état-major s'était concentrée dans une propagande politique extrêmement adroite qui avait eu le résultat très appréciable de faire couvrir notre front — sauf du djebel Messaoud au Loukkos — par un matelas de tribus ralliées s'étendant entre 10 et 25 kilomètres en avant des positions atteintes en octobre 1925. Pour des raisons multiples, mais surtout en raison de la précarité des voies de communication, le commandement avait en effet décidé qu'il ne fallait à aucun prix envoyer de troupes régulières au nord de notre ligne de postes.

Les partisans, armés par nos soins, commandés par des officiers de renseignements, soutenus par des goums et des makhzen, étaient donc chargés d'assurer la sécurité de leur propre pays. Cependant, cette façon de procéder, excellente en principe, comportait une part d'inconvénients en raison de la circonspection avec laquelle on devait armer les tribus soumises. C'est ainsi que les Marinissa, armés succinctement, rationnés en cartouches, craignaient de ne pouvoir résister victorieusement à un ennemi bien armé, disposant au surplus de munitions nombreuses. Leur chef, Ohmar ben Hamidou, se fit l'écho de cette inquiétude. Notre commandement était au courant de la situation, mais, a déclaré un de ses représentants : « La situation est malheureusement insoluble. La confiance placée dans les partisans doit être très limitée; il est indispensable de ne pas les armer trop puissamment au cas, toujours possible, où ils se retourneraient contre nous, soit à la suite de représailles rifaines, soit à la suite d'un revers local de nos armes ».

L'attaque, tout d'abord prévue sur les Marinissa, s'est déclanchée plus à l'est, chez les M'tioua le 26 février.

L'ennemi, muni de grenades et de mitrailleuses, ne trouva en face de lui que des postes de garde dont les défenseurs étaient armés de fusils démodés.

Malgré une résistance acharnée de nos partisans, la vague rifaine déferla, comme en avril dernier, ravageant tout le pays M'tioua, mais s'arrêtant à distance respectueuse de nos postes, où l'ennemi savait trouver à qui parler.

Il n'en resta pas moins que les M'tioua ont souffert terriblement. Indépendamment de plusieurs centaines de tués et de blessés parmi les combattants, nous devons déplorer de nombreux incendies de villages, des viols de femmes, des assassinats et des mutilations d'enfants, toutes horreurs que nous n'avons pu empêcher, nos unités régulières se trouvant trop éloignées pour pouvoir intervenir à temps.

Notre prestige subit, de ce fait, un coup sensible.

Il est à craindre que le pillage des M'tioua ne donne à réfléchir aux tribus ralliées, au cours de notre campagne politique d'hier, et ne provoque de nouveaux départs en dissidence. Déjà, le 24 février, les Beni-Melloul, fraction Beni-Zerroual ralliées depuis un mois, pressant l'attaque rifaine, reprenait leur liberté d'action.

Alors qu'aucune opération de quelque envergure ne devait être tentée avant mai ou juin, en raison de l'importance des travaux de construction du réseau routier, indispensable pour porter notre ligne, en toute sécurité, à la limite de notre zone d'influence, il est possible que l'attaque sur les M'tioua oblige le commandement à modifier ses intentions.

Quoi qu'il en soit, les événements du 26 février confirment, une fois de plus, que la couverture de partisans est inopérante au cas d'une attaque ennemie menée à fond et avec des moyens suffisants.

Si nous ne voulons pas nous exposer à de nouveaux départs en dissidence, très démoralisants pour des tribus dont quelques-unes sont par deux fois rentrées sous l'obédience du makhzen, depuis le début des opérations, il faut que nous nous décidions à « couvrir » effectivement ces gens et à les protéger efficacement contre toute tentative de terrorisme.

THE FRENCH HIGH COMMAND DEMANDS AN IMMEDIATE OFFENSIVE

from L'HUMANITE, March 11, 1926.

La guerre reprend au Maroc
sur tous les frontsLe haut-commandement
français
réclame une offensive
immédiate

Malgré le ton optimiste des communiqués il est hors de doute que l'offensive des Riffains du 26 février sur les M'tioua a eu un très grand retentissement sur l'ensemble des tribus ralliées — par force — aux envahisseurs français. Bien que le communiqué soit muet à ce sujet, nous savons que des troupes envoyées précipitamment en renfort, ont dû battre en retraite et regagner les postes retranchés établis en couverture de la ligne atteinte en octobre dernier. On avoue cependant aujourd'hui que des éléments riffains sont parvenus à 9 kilomètres de Sker.

Déjà les résultats du succès obtenu par les Riffains contre les envahisseurs et leurs partisans se font sentir et un certain nombre de tribus des Beni Zeroual, dont les Beni Melloul, sont rentrées en dissidence.

Bien entendu, la presse française parle des « horreurs » commises par les Riffains contre les M'tioua dans les mêmes termes où en 1914 elle parlait des atrocités allemandes : elle ne nous épargne même pas le couplet sur les mains coupées aux petits enfants, car évidemment les Riffains sont des barbares et les titailleurs employés par les Français et leurs chefs des petits agneaux tout blancs (même quand ils coupent les têtes des prisonniers ou les mutilent).

Quoi qu'il en soit, l'état-major prend prétexte de ces événements pour réclamer une offensive D'URGENCE. Le Temps, qui donne le ton, écrivait hier à ce sujet :

« Notre prestige a subi un coup sensible... »

« Alors qu'aucune opération de quelque envergure ne devait être tentée avant mai ou juin, en raison de l'importance des travaux de construction du réseau routier, indispensable pour porter notre ligne, en toute sécurité, à la limite de notre zone d'influence, il est possible que l'attaque sur les M'tioua oblige le commandement à modifier ses intentions »

« Si nous ne voulons pas nous exposer à de nouveaux départs en dissidence, très démoralisants pour des tribus dont quelques-unes sont par deux fois rentrées sous l'obédience du makhzen depuis le début des opérations, il faut que nous nous décidions à « couvrir » effectivement ces gens et à les protéger efficacement contre toute tentative de terrorisation. »

De telles déclarations, on sait ce qu'elles peuvent signifier. Elles ont pour but de préparer l'opinion publique à « l'offensive de printemps », comme en 1917, n'est-ce pas monsieur l'assassin Painlevé !

Il faut à la bourgeoisie française une belle victoire tricolore à exploiter. Briand a des gages à donner à la Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas et à l'impérialisme français. L'habile homme en vérité, que celui qui sait faire à la fois Locarno et le Riff ; qui chante les délices de la paix et prépare à la même heure de nouveaux charniers !

La guerre reprend au Maroc. On va demander de nouveau de l'argent, des munitions et du matériel humain. Et pourtant à trois reprises différentes il aurait été possible au gouvernement cartelliste de faire la paix, de conclure avec Abd el Krim cette « paix juste et honorable », pour parler comme M. Painlevé, en juillet dernier.



Comme l'an dernier il appartiendra donc au Parti communiste de dresser contre cette ignoble et sanglante guerre de brigandage la protestation de l'ensemble du prolétariat français.

Contre l'impérialisme de votre pays travailleurs français apprêtez-vous, comme vous l'avez fait l'an dernier, à vous unir. — Marcel Fourrier.



No. 6188

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, March 25, 1926



INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1206

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Washington.

Sir:

Two events characterize the situation in the Riff since this Embassy's last despatch on the subject: (1) The calm resulting from the Ramadan month of fasting in Morocco and other Moslem countries; (2) The persistent rumors of peace negotiations going on with agents of Abd el Krim at the Residency in Rabat.

Commenting on the Ramadan, LE TEMPS of March 19th said in part:

"The period of the Ramadan is usually used for long discourses between the evening meal and the final midnight repast. It is the time of propagating the Holy War, for the Ghorfas, direct descendants of the Prophet, travel among the tribes exhorting them to penitence and fasting

fasting.

"It should not be forgotten that it was during the last Ramadan that Abd el Krim prepared the attack launched in April 1925 on the Ouergha posts of submissive tribes. Riffian emissaries disguised as holy men went among the border tribes near the Ouergha and turned them against us. It is possible that Abd el Krim will try the same game this year, but our Information Service has profited from the experience of last spring and has taken all precautions to prevent another such event."

LE JOURNAL DES DÉBATS of the same date called attention to the similarity of the conditions existing this spring and last spring and quoted the following communiqué from the War Department which, it added, should not be allowed to produce a false feeling of security:

"During the last few months our patient political efforts in Morocco have had considerable results.

"Thanks to them we have constituted in front of our regular troops a completely pacified zone occupied by tribes which a few months ago were insurgent but now resist Riffian attempts at invasion. Thus there is at present a wide protective strip in front of our units which gives them greater freedom of action and protects them from surprises.

"The attack loosed February 27th by the unsubmitted Senhadja de Brair in the Middle Ouergha against the M'tious de l'Outa, which was broken by the M'tious supported by our forces and hurled back to its point of origin, is characteristic. Without forcing our regular troops to intervene, the most pretentious enterprise of the Riffians during the winter was completely repulsed.

The

"The line effectively held by our partisans is considerably beyond that held by us at the end of winter in 1924 before the first Rifian agressions and confirms in many places with the frontiers granted us by Treaties. The region where the Marnissa and the Ghezmaia are fighting for us consists of territories where we have never before penetrated."

Furthermore, added the JOURNAL DES DEBATS, "considering our adversary and the extent of the zone of operations, a strategic defensive may be inadequate. If we do not wish to face uprisings in all North Africa, we must settle the Rifian question quickly. The defensive is only to be recommended if it is absolutely impossible to do anything else."

On March 21st L'ERE NOUVELLE reported that at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, War Minister Painlevé answered questions as to whether or not it was true that France and Spain were negotiating for peace with agents of Abd el Krim by saying that France was always ready to attempt to reach a quick and definite peace providing it did not infringe on her rights and dignity.

The next afternoon the JOURNAL DES DEBATS dated March 23rd asserted that "since the declarations of M. Painlevé saying that he could not deny the reports of negotiations with the 'rognil' of the Rif, it is known that the conversations have begun." It then recalls that Abd el Kader twice signed peace treaties in 1834 and 1837 when he was on the eve of being defeated and used the respite to reform his forces for a new attack continuing these tactics for eleven years after the Treaty of Tafna (1837).

The

The article concludes:

"A moment of slackening, a false humanitarianism, may cause new massacres in the future.

"At this time we have forces in Morocco which will enable us to settle the question. It is certain that Abd el Krim never would have taken his present bellicose stand if he had not known from day to day the military reductions consented to by Marshal Lyautey. Is it certain that if the danger occurs again we could make the same effort and make it in time? We almost failed last year.

"If we let up now it is to be feared that our troops will be repatriated too rapidly and in too large numbers. The future's risk is too grave for the French Government to accept it lightly with the sole aim of obtaining an apparent success in the hope of strengthening a wavering Cabinet."

Naturally this appeal to continue along offensive lines caused L'HUMANITÉ, of March 24th, to reiterate its cry of "Down with the War in Morocco...Workingman and Peasant you are warned, mothers and wives you can order your mourning...the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas needs the blood of your menfolk to fertilize the soil of the Riff."

It may be noted in conclusion that heavy rains have recently made all operations impossible on the French front.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,



Sheldon Whitehouse

Copy to E.I.C.

In quintuplicate

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim





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20582

APR 16 1926



THE THIRD NORTH AFRICAN CONFERENCE AT TUNIS, TUNISIA.

From Vice Consul Charles B. Beylard, Charles B. Beylard

Tunis, Tunisia.

Date of preparation: March 18, 1926.

Date of mailing : March 27, 1926.

Approved by:

Leland L. Smith

Leland L. Smith,

Consul.

Tunis, Tunisia, March 27, 1926.



APR 21 1926

✓ The third North-African Conference will be held at
✓ Tunis on March 22, 1926. It will be comprised of all
the chiefs of the Governments of Tunisia, Algeria,
Morocco, and French Occidental Africa.

(REPRESENTATIVES--)

REPRESENTATIVES OF TUNISIA:

M. Lucien Saint,.....	Minister Plenipotentiary, Resident General of France.
M. Pierre Catat,.....	Secretary to the Embassy, Chief of the Civil Cab- inet of the Resident General.
Lieutenant-Colonel Courtot,.....	Chief of the Military Cabinet of the Resident General.
M. Ristelhueber,.....	Consul General of France, Director General of the Interior.
M. Crancier,.....	Director General of the Finances.
M. Mourgnot,.....	Director General of Public Works, Post and Telegraph.
M. Leseure,.....	Director General of Agriculture, Commerce, and Colonization.
M. Doliveux,.....	Director General of Pub- lic Instruction and Arts.
M. Ducos de Lahaille,.....	Director of Justice.
M. Dupont,.....	Director of the Post Of- fice.
Colonel Boutet,.....	Chief of the Staff of the General Commanding the Division of the Army of Occupation.
Commander Miquel,.....	Chief of the Central Ser- vice for Native Affairs.

Secretaries for the Conference:

M. Lavastre,.....	Chief of the Cabinet of the Resident General.
M. Giraudet,.....	Chief of the Bureau of Service at the Residence General.

REPRESENTATIVES OF MOROCCO:

M. Steeg,.....	Commissioner-Resident Gen- eral of the French Republic.
M. Serres,.....	French Consul, Chief of the Civil Cabinet of the Resident General.

(M. Delpit)

M. Delpit,.....	Director General of Public Works.
M. Malet,.....	Director General of Agriculture, Commerce, and Colonization.
M. Hardy,.....	Director General of Public Instruction.
M. Branly,.....	Director General of Finances.
Commander Ducloux,.....	Director General of Native Affairs.
Commander Bennard,.....	Under Military Chief for the Military Cabinet of the Resident General.
Lieutenant-Colonel Strohl,.....	Under Chief of the Staff of the Superior Commander of the Forces of Morocco.

REPRESENTATIVES OF ALGERIA:

M. Violette,.....	Governor General.
M. Maury,.....	Director of the Civil Cabinet of the Governor, and Political Affairs.
M. Fricaux,.....	Director of the Civil Cabinet of the Governor and Affairs Administrative.
Lieutenant of the Navy Bleuset,.....	Under Chief of the Military Cabinet of Governor.
Lieutenant Leefson,.....	Ordinance Officer for the Governor.
M. Vieillard-Baron,.....	Director of Public Works.
M. Brunel,.....	Director of Agriculture.
M. Escallier,.....	Director of Finances.
Lieutenant-Colonel Boubard,.....	Under Chief of the Staff of the 19th Division.
Captain Rouger,.....	Staff Officer of the 19th Division.
M. Roussaud,.....	Director General of Algerian Railroads.

REPRESENTATIVES OF FRENCH OCCIDENTAL

AFRICA:

M. Duchesne,.....	State Counsellor, Director of Political Affairs for the Ministry of the Colonies Representative of the Governor General of French Occidental-Africa.
M. Terrasson de Fougères,.....	Governor of Soudan.
Lieutenant-Colonel Martin,.....	Chief of the Military Cabinet of the Governor General of A. O. F.

A great number of questions relative to political, administrative, economic, and military conditions are to be discussed during the conference of which a list follows:

1. Sanitary agreement re: Epidemics, tuberculosis, and insanity.
2. Public security: Passports, identity cards.
3. Control of and assistance to native travellers in France.
4. Co-operation among the fiscal administrations in order to combat fraud.
5. Customs-house regulations common to Algeria and Morocco, and the Algero-Moroccan border.
6. Sanitary protection re. vegetable diseases.
7. Tourist trade.
8. Participation of scientific and historic organizations in the interest of their advancement.
9. Intellectual and scientific reports.
10. Railroads.
11. Telegraphic and telephone connections.
12. The question of the Occidental Sahara.
13. Execution in each Possession of the demands for taxation emanating from the two other countries.
14. Union of the customs and fiscal laws with Algeria.
15. Economic and administrative measures in favor of the natives.
16. Study of fiscal questions of like interest to the three governments.
17. Organization of professional and technical instruction.
18. Unification of the ranking of the Civil Comptrollers in Tunisia and Morocco.
19. Possible application to French North African Possessions of the French law concerning the sale and mortgage of commercial enterprises.
20. Adaption by the three Governments of the books Nos. I and II of the "Code du Travail et la Prévoyance Sociale"

21. Regulations governing change of pasture-land.
22. Repression of fraud in the wool and cereal commerce.
23. Improvement of sheep raising in view of the wool production.
24. A common policy concerning alfa.
25. Preparation of a questionnaire to be presented to the International Conference at Rome, for the protection of cultures.
26. Co-operation between institutions of the agromomic researches of the three governments, including the study of a common program for cotton production according to French interests.
27. Tourist publications and joint action for the promotion of the tourist trade.
28. Algero-Maroccan frontier from the political and mining standpoint.
29. Naval and commercial relations between Morocco and French Occidental Africa.
30. Adaption by each of the three Possessions of the Acts and Judgements emanating from each of the three countries of the rules adopted in France and Algeria re. registration and stamp taxes.
31. Fiscal rules regulating automobile vehicles, registered either in Algeria or Morocco, and in temporary use in the neighboring country.
32. Applying the rules enjoyed by bonded merchandise to goods transported over the Tunis-Casablanca line.
33. Protection of the North African cotton cultures against the destruction of the cotton seed-vessels by the "pink worm".
34. Installation at Aix-en-Provence of a regional center for researches pertaining to oil.
35. Standardization of the types of material and electric current for the transportation and distribution of electricity.
36. Organization of the Phosphate industries in North Africa.
37. North African aviation service.

38. Organization of meteorologic protection for the aviation service in North Africa.
39. Exchange of rapid and direct information between the governments of North Africa and French Occidental Africa.
40. Liason of Algeria and French Occidental Africa at the wells of "d'Aguerakten".
41. The question of Rio-de-Oro.
42. Radio-telegraphic liason between the governments of North Africa and French Occidental Africa.
43. Inter-Saharan liason.
44. Modification of date of beginning of the financial year.

The study of the above questions divided according to their nature into five principal groupes will be submitted to Commissioners whose resolutions will be then submitted for the approval of the chiefs of the Government united in conference.

The work of the Conference will be divided into five groups which will be studied by the same number of commissions. The five subdivisions are: Financial questions; Agriculture, Commerce, Colonization, and Tourism; Public Works; Political Affairs, Administration, and Education.

The Conference will probably not last longer than three days, and will be finished the afternoon of March 24, 1926.

A reunion of the Chiefs of the Military Staff Officers of the troupes of North Africa will be held on

(the)

the 20th. day of March for the preliminary study of the military questions affecting the four Governments.

Upon the arrival of the various delegates they will be met at the station by the Resident General, accompanied by the members of his civil and military cabinets and a sub-division of a squadron of "Spahis" commanded by Lieutenant de Labatie.

(The data for this report were compiled from personal interviews and newspaper reports.)

In quintuplicate.


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
No. 81

American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General.

Tangier, Morocco, March 25th, 1926.



SUBJECT:- Transmitting newspaper articles on the Tangier Statutes.



COPY in file

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:-

I have the honor to transmit to the Department, herewith, excerpts from the issue of March 20th, 1926, of the local English weekly publication "Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa & Tangier Gazette" containing two articles entitled respectively "The Gate Tax" and "Tangier's Future" commenting upon the Statute of Tangier.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant

Maxwell Blake
Maxwell Blake.
American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul-General.

Enclosures:-

Two newspaper cuttings as above stated, in quintuplicate.

881.00/1209
INDEX BUREAU
APR 19 1926
FBI MD

THE GATE TAX

The Assembly decided on Wednesday, that they would ignore the veto of the Committee of Control, and resolved, for the second time, that there should be no Gate Tax or Octroi.

The tax in question is no new one, having been in existence before the Statute came into being, it was farmed out, and the farmer made a handsome income out of it, at least we must assume that he did, as when the question was discussed not long ago of the Administration taking it over, we understand the then farmer offered a substantial increase on what he paid for the privilege.

In Meknes, a city about equal in size to Tangier, the octroi reaches a figure of something like 600,000 francs per annum, a sum worth collecting,

As regards the tax itself, it is one of the most objectionable forms of raising revenue that has ever been devised.

Even when it is fairly collected, it bears with undue severity on the lower classes, it introduces all kinds of abuses, and causes the unfortunate vendor who has come in from the country, to sometimes sacrifice his produce, rather than take it back. We do not know how the practice of collection is carried out here, but we know that in Egypt, it was one of the first taxes to be abandoned.

The people who framed the Statute, were people whose actual knowledge of conditions in Tangier, was extremely limited, and although they were assisted by people who did know something about them, they were apt to overrule expert advice, with the result that innumerable follies were committed, and a vast amount of regulations introduced, which wiser counsels would have left for the newly constituted authorities, to work out for themselves.

That the tax in question was left in and embodied in the Statute, was natural enough, but that instrument had no flexibility, and its provisions became a law binding on the nationals of those Powers who adhered to it, but leaving the others free to go their own way.

The position at the moment is awkward, and raises a very serious question, in fact it is not too much to say, that the existence of the Statute is imperilled.

Under the Convention, the Committee of Control have the duty of vetoing any legislation contrary to the provisions of the Statute, and, exercising that power, they vetoed the decision of the Assembly to abolish the Gate tax; and referred the matter back to them to re-adjust. The Assembly has declined to accept their veto, and has again passed a resolution to abolish the tax.

The Committee of Control has no executive power, and no means of

enforcing its decisions, except by appealing to the Nations they represent to supply armed forces to carry out the provisions of the Statute.

It is obvious that such a proceeding would not only be ridiculous, but impossible, and in the present state of opinion throughout the world, would raise the whole question of the right of self determination, and of self government.

The result at which we arrive is negative, but if the matter is left as it stands, it means neither more nor less than that the Committee of Control is powerless, and the Statute a negation. It is clear that we must arrive at an understanding, either the Statute must be modified, in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, or it must be admitted that the Statute has ceased to function.

A Statute that can be ignored at will, is obviously impossible, and although this is by no means the first case where a breach of its provisions, has been winked at, and passed over in silence by the Committee of Control, this is the first case where an absolute conflict of authority has arisen, and where the Assembly has thrown down the gauntlet to the Committee of Control.

It has been clear for a long time, that sooner or later, a clash would come, and as so often happens, the particular clash is comparatively unimportant, but it derives importance from striking at the very foundation of the authority which brought the Statute into being, and it seems to us that the Nations concerned must take action of some sort. It only brings into prominence the necessity, which we have never ceased to advocate, of an entire revision of the Statute.



Tangier's Future.

THE CLAIMS OF SPAIN AND FRANCE.

The International Statute of Tangier, which came into force last June, has just completed its first financial year—seven months only in reality. And, contrary to all expectations, this has been done with a Balance of three million francs in the Treasury. The town is admittedly cleaner, it is well run, roads are cared for, trees being planted, justice is being administered, taxes properly collected and accounted for—and yet there is throughout Morocco a feeling that, as it now stands, the statute is quite impossible to run.

For this, many reasons might be given. The chief is that Italy and America have not yet given their assent, and so the local laws and taxes cannot be made to apply to their nationals, nor can criminals belonging to these countries be judged by local courts. The whole machinery of the statute is extremely cumbersome. The Legislative Assembly, nominated by the Consuls General, is itself checked by the Committee of Control, consisting of the consuls of the various Powers who have adhered to the statute. There are six judges, of three nationalities, and a native Governor, who has complete and separate control of Moorish subjects. There is an Administrator and two assistants, who come so low in the order of precedence that the Assembly has power to veto anything they may put forward. Each section can check and counter-check every other, so that prompt action is almost impossible.

Tangier is convinced the statute will have to be altered or to go. What is to come next remains a fierce subject of debate. No one wants to go back to the chaos that existed before, when the town was run by a small committee under the power of the various consuls and very little was done one way or another.

There are those who wish to give Tangier to Spain, a project openly advocated by the Madrid papers. On the face of things this seems fairly reasonable. Tangier is surrounded by the Spanish zone and is full of Spaniards and Spanish Jews. It is declared that Spain is the only country which can and will put sufficient capital into the town to develop it. But the strongest argument against this is the fact that, once given to Spain, the town would almost certainly be attacked by Abd-el-Krim, and Tangier is terribly open to attack on all sides. Spain has not proved by her development of Larache or Tetuan that she can or will further the material prosperity of the Moors by being given another town, and she can hardly be expected to prove strong enough to keep out the Riffs once the sacredness of the town to attack is lost.

The adherents of France have many arguments ready. France has a strong foothold in the place in advance, for the Mendoub, the native Governor, is entirely under French influence and provided with French advisers. The Administrator for the first six years has to be a Frenchman. The whole of the contracts for port and railway are in French hands. The Customs duties are collected and examined by the French before being handed over to the Financial Adviser, and the French claim the right to alter them as they like. The officials are paid in French francs, though the peseta is of more general currency in Tangier and far more stable. French schools educate the children of the poor, free, the middle-class children for a few francs a month, in French ways, ideals, and language. Even if we grant that France might be willing to develop the port in Tangier (thus giving a formidable rival to her own port of Casablanca), she would also hold a port and submarine base in unpleasant nearness to Gibraltar. Can we afford to hand her such possibilities?

When all is said and done it remains that Tangier is one of the greatest pawns in the three-cornered game France and Spain are playing with Abdel Krim in Morocco. He is not yet beaten, and, though he is biding his time now while his men cultivate their lands, he will fight again in the spring if peace has not been declared by then. And if France cannot effectually crush him, many of the tribes who have now given in their allegiance will rise again. The future of Tangier probably depends on the needs and luck of the allies in the war game—and what they will be the fighting in the spring will soon show.

—Manchester Guardian.



Assistant Secretary
of State
APR 17 1926
MR HARRISON

Office of Economic Adviser
APR 26 1926
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 23 1926
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

INDEX BUREAU

Report No. 27

Voluntary.

From David Williamson

Vice Consul

Algiers, Algeria.

Date of Preparation: April 10, 1926.

Date of Mailing:

April 10, 1926.

* * * * *

THE THIRD NORTH AFRICAN CONFERENCE

On March 22, 1926, the third North African Conference was opened at Tunis. The administrative heads of each of the four North African countries under French dominion, with their chiefs of bureau, were present:

Mr. Steeg: Resident General at Morocco;

Mr. Maurice Viollette: Governor General of Algeria;

Mr. Lucien Saint: Resident General of Tunisia, and

Mr. Duchêne, representing the Governor General of French West Africa. Mr. Duchêne, holds the position of Chief of Political Affairs in the Colonial Bureau.

The

Organization

The heads of the colonial administrative bureaux met their colleagues from the other colonies and protectorates in five committees, grouped as follows: finances; agriculture, commerce and colonization; public works; political and administrative; and military. The Moroccan delegates were: Messrs. Serres, Chief of Cabinet for M. Steeg; Delpit; Mallet; Hardy; Branly. For Algeria were present: Messrs Maury, Chief of Cabinet for Political Affairs; Trioux, Chief of Cabinet for Administrative Affairs; Vieillard-Baron, Director of the Southern Territories, and Director of Public Works; Brunel, Director of Agriculture; André, Chief of Customs' Service.

Approximately fifty subjects appeared on the agenda of the Conference, of which the more important were: stimulation of the production of alfa, cereals, and cotton; improvement in North African animal breeds; uniform sanitary and plant quarantine measures; touristic propaganda; a North African Customs' Union; electrical power; uniform police regulations for foreigners.

A programme was formulated in regard to trans-Saharan routes: (1) the establishment of an automobile road from Tunis through Southern Algeria to Fort Polignac, a point on the caravan route to Lake Chad; (2) the extension of the road work and the construction of rest-houses on the Ouargla-

in-Salah

in-Salah Tamanrasset trail; (3) the establishment of fueling stations on the Colomb-Béchar-Timbuctoo track. Saharian aviation and wireless communications were considered in conjunction with this programme.

As the sessions of these Conferences are held in secret, only such portions of the proceedings as were given out officially are known. Three speeches, however, were published in extenso by the press.

Mr. Viollette's Speech

Mr. Viollette opened his discourse by condemning the idea that a unified North Africa, with a single centralized government, was contemplated or possible. He pointed out that such a government, being superimposed upon existing governing bodies, either would be powerless and perfunctory, or would be so centralized as to be tyrannical "in an age when nations cannot live unless they be largely decentralized". The wide historical, social, ethnological and geographical differences between the various portions of France's North African empire would nullify the attempts of any single governing body to rule all jointly.

Mr. Steeg next spoke. His speech reflected
the

the troubled state of Moroccan affairs, and the opening sentences alluded to the necessity of combined action in regard to the Mussulman. He too mentioned that it would be a long time before a political unification of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco could take place. He showed that, in default of a unified government, North African conferences were necessary. "We must compare our views, fund our experiences, tell each other of the success or failure of our plans, search out together the reasons therefor and the results." Mr. Steeg, who was formerly Governor General of Algeria, pointed out that Moroccan problems were identical with Algerian problems, under a different name.

Mr. Duchêne then took the floor, declaring that the Sahara had been conquered and "that a new state of affairs was developing in Africa."

Those portions of Mr. Viollette's and Mr. Steeg's speeches that disclaim any intention on France's part for the creation of a unified Africa may be regarded as merely rhetorical. The nationalist parties in Tunisia and Morocco, are implacably opposed to any change in the existing political order in their countries, especially to any change engineered by France. Probably
these

these denials were calculated to allay any fears the Destourians in Tunisia might entertain on the score of "annexation"; and any official utterance that hinted of a further "encroachment" by France on the Sultan of Morocco's prerogatives could not aid the French task of pacification in that country. Moreover, in another part of his speech, Mr. Steeg emphatically stated that "it is indispensable for us to strengthen our Mussulman policy". Now France's "Mussulman policy" consists largely in modifying existing Mussulman institutions; to strengthen this policy, therefore, would be to do the opposite of what he professes to be the French intention.

Broadly speaking, there appears to be a steady tendency towards a unification of French North Africa which manifests itself under various forms. One hears of proposals to replace Moslem law by French law, to eliminate all customs' formalities, to institute a uniform school system. The recrudescence of this question in the press is notable. On October 10, 1925, to cite one example among many, a Tunisian paper announced that the Painlevé cabinet was planning the creation of a single government for all North Africa; the ensuing discussion gave an opportunity for publishing lengthy expressions of opinion on the subject. Again,
attacks

attacks are repeatedly being made on the commercial barriers that exist between the Colony of Algeria and the Protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco. Common commercial interests, the huge increase of automobile and air traffic, and the use of Algerian and Tunisian troops in Morocco, are factors that combine to hasten the formation of a greater colonial France.

Quotations from French newspaper comments seem to reflect the public's desire to attain this goal. "North Africa", says the DEPECHE COLONIALE, on April 1, 1926, "which had a Roman unity, can and will have a French unity. In spite of two major troubles that the ancients did not have - the slow but continual encroachment of the sands, and Islamic fanaticism - the proposal for North African unification reappears and progresses periodically. This progress is the aim of the annual convention of the Algerian and Moroccan and Tunisian heads of Government, and these conventions seek to destroy every sort of frontier which causes, on the east of Algeria, the slowing up of Tunisian expansion and, on the west, the Moroccan irredentism. The bare enumeration of the acts of the third Conference very clearly shows the prime objective, and the activities of the representatives of French sovereignty".

The

The ANNALES COLONIALES, of March 23, 1926, printed the following:

"The political and administrative unification of the three great countries in French North Africa is a much mooted question. It is objected that this plan runs the risk of raising international and diplomatic difficulties, and that two out of the three vitally interested countries fear to lose thereby the small autonomy that they yet retain.

The plan also has its active partisans who announce its realization in the near future.

Whatever the case may be, beside official motivation, economic bonds are growing more and more numerous between the three countries. The colonists understand that, far from being in opposition, their interests are identical."

To sum up, then, the results and implications of the North African Conference, it may be viewed as another definite step in the direction of a unified North African government. French public opinion seems to favor this extension of French sovereignty, and it comes as a logical conclusion to France's military efforts in Morocco. Added to this, the dream of re-establishing trans-Saharan commercial routes is about to be realized.

Everything

Everything, therefore, would indicate that an attempt on the part of French statesmen may be expected, as soon as the Moroccan trouble is settled, to revise the international agreements which constitute the only major obstacle to the consolidation of North Africa into a single colony.



David Williamson

Vice Consul.

Approved:



Lewis W. Haskell,

Consul.

April 9, 1926.

800
In quintuplicate.


DW:T.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, April 16, 1926.

No. 6256



FILE

For Distribution	yes	No
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INDEX BUREAU
88.100/1211

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Franco-Spanish negotiations with the Riff appear to be rather the result of French internal politics than of any carefully planned Moroccan policy. Briand, Painlevé, and Pétain have, until very recently, believed in the necessity of a spring campaign, which should have commenced at about the present time and the object of which would have been definitely to crush the Moorish rebellion. The sudden change in policy of the French Government is probably due to pressure from Resident-General Steeg.

Some weeks ago an emissary of Abd-el-Krim suggested peace negotiations to the French military authorities in Morocco, but received

ceived little encouragement from them. Steeg, however, since then is said to have threatened to resign if the peace proposals were not followed up, and Briand is reported to have ceded to his importunities rather than to precipitate an internal crisis.

The coming negotiations, although planned hurriedly, will take place in close co-operation between France and Spain. Olivan, the principal Spanish representative, has been in Paris, and has returned to Madrid accompanied by Ponsot, the Under Director for African Affairs of the Foreign Office, who will head the French representatives. The French Delegation also includes General Simon, Commander of the 11th Division, and Major Duolos, of the Residency General.

The Government has tried to make it appear that the negotiations are not with Abd-el-Krim but with representatives of the tribes, but the Riffian Delegates are Azerkane, the brother-in-law of Abd-el-Krim and his "Minister for Foreign Affairs," Hitmi, a cousin and official of Abd-el-Krim, and Chedi, who also belongs to the Beni Urriaghel.

Even the papers which support the Government urge that the negotiations shall be hastened, in order that the fully prepared spring offensive may take place before the hot weather if the negotiations fail.

The Franco-Spanish peace terms, as given by the press, are the disarmament of the tribes and their recognition of the suzerainty of the Sultan over the Riff, and the removal of Abd-el-Krim. As subsidiary to the principal terms, the administrative autonomy, a Riffian militia under Franco-Spanish control, amnesty, and exchange of prisoners are mentioned.

The following comments upon the negotiations have been made

within

within the last few days in the French press:

LE GAULOIS: The negotiations of Ujda are unfortunate in that they are not the result of an incontestable victory of our arms, but take place through internal political considerations which have constrained the French Government to show more care for an immediate peace than for the future security of the Moroccan Protectorate.

LE FIGARO: The question is to know whether the peace that is suggested to us is not the means for our adversary of the future recommencement of a still more redoubtable war.

L'AVENIR: Steeg has blackmailed his chiefs. "If you will not treat with the Emir of the Riff," he said to them, "I will resign and you can then arrange your affairs with the Cartel, which, as you well know, requires that hostilities be finished in Morocco.

LE TEMPS: The discussions which are about to take place should not, in any degree and under no pretext, result in either the de facto recognition of a Riffian nation which does not exist or of a Riffian state which does not exist, or in any diminution in the prestige of France in North Africa.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Sheldon Whitehouse".

Sheldon Whitehouse,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

In quintuplicate.

Copy to E. I. C.

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

Index Bureau
RECEIVED

Madrid

UNDER SECRETARY,
APR 27 1926
DEPT. OF STATE.

April 13, 1926.

My Dear Carter: APR 28 1926

Dep't. of State

You will undoubtedly be receiving better news of the Franco-Spanish-Riffian peace negotiations from Paris and Tanger than I can give you from Madrid, for Primo de Rivera has prohibited all discussion of the subject here, while admitting that negotiations are in progress.

The Chicago Tribune of Paris, April 10, just received, states that the conference with the Riffians will take place in Oudjda, north of Fex, and that General Simon and M. Ponsot, possibly also Malvy, will be the French delegates. It says that the French government is eagerly awaiting the nomination of the Spanish delegates. I hear privately that these Spanish confererers are likely to be Sr. Saavedra, who represents the Spanish Foreign Office in Tetuan and Sr. Aguirre, member of the colonial section of the presidency of the council.

It is reported that the French delegation is coming to Madrid tonight, perhaps accompanied by Sr. Quinones de Leon, Spanish ambassador in Paris.

The Chicago Tribune alleges that Abd-el-krim's terms are autonomous possession of the Spanish protectorate, except Ceuta and Melilla, and perhaps Tetuan, and Spanish evacuation of Axdir and the Island of Alhucemas. It alleges further than Spain has asked in return for evacuation of these places a revision of the Tanger convention and a Spanish protectorate over the zone,

17
file
Ram

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APR 28 1926

No information on these allegations can be obtained here at present, but it is known that Tanger has been the subject of recent discussions between France and Spain.

Very sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Augustus V. Farni". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed text "Very sincerely yours,".

P.S.-I enclose a hurried translation of an important editorial in this morning's El Sol on the subject of the Mediterranean Fly and trade relations with the United States, and apologize for the typing, which is my own, as Miss Taylor is not in the office today.

Editoriales

EL TURISMO Y LA MOSCA MEDITERRANEA

Con el natural regocijo y con sincero deseo de aplauso y elogio recogimos la noticia de que una de nuestras Compañías de navegación va a establecer una línea directa de vapores entre Nueva York y Sevilla, aprovechando el admirable engrandecimiento de este último puerto. Ciertamente que a ningún otro medio más propicio podría apelarse para atraer hacia la capital andaluza una intensa corriente de turismo. Lograrlo, una vez establecido el servicio directo de vapores, dependerá solamente de la intensidad mayor o menor con que se realice una labor de propaganda en los Estados Unidos. Y una vez creada la atracción de yanquis, el puro recreo se convertirá en posibilidades de negocios, porque nuestra Andalucía occidental encierra numerosas riquezas apenas conocidas y muchas inexploradas.

En cambio nos produce honda tristeza ver cuán porfiadamente la Cámara Uvera y otros organismos de Almería y de otras ciudades levantan se ven obligadas a rogar, a suplicar, a mendigar casi, que se les haga justicia y se logre de los Estados Unidos que libren a aquella región del sambenito que han colgado a sus productos agrícolas con la acusación de estar infectados y ser vehículos de propagación de la ya famosa mosca mediterránea. En tal caso es que por puritanismos abstemios se ha prohibido la entrada en el enorme mercado yanqui de los vinos españoles y a sus derivados destilados, y por una cuestión de higiene rural se ha prohibido la entrada de la uva almeriense, codiciado postre en la mesa yanqui.

Ciertamente que no se habló de mosca mediterránea cuando los agricultores de California llevaron a estos campos plantones de los paraisos almerienses. La aparición de la famosa mosca en España ha coincidido con el hecho de producirse ya en el oeste yanqui una gran cosecha de uva similar a la española, aunque de degenerada calidad y necesitada de que se la libere de la competencia del producto genuino de nuestros campos.

En cambio porque se realiza con ello una obra política, los Estados Unidos han abierto sus Aduanas a la producción frutícola argentina... No sentimos nosotros celos de la República del Plata, cuyas prosperidades anhelamos tanto como las propias; pero es forzoso señalar la diferencia de trato a que nos somete el imperialista capricho yanqui. No están, desgraciadamente, libres de plagas e infecciones los campos argentinos. En la enorme extensión de su pampa y sus sierras, en sus bosques y praderas vírgenes, el escrupulo yanqui pudo encontrar, de haberlos apetecido, motivos iguales a los que encontró para impedir que la uva de Almería compitiera con la de California.

Hasta la propia aborrecida mosca mediterránea parece haber salvado la extensión de los mares y haberse instalado, no ya en Suramérica, sino en el propio Océano Pacífico, donde parece haber invadido las pomaradas de Nueva Zelanda y de Australia. Eran estos países exportadores de manzanas a los mercados suramericanos, y la Argentina no ha querido ser menos que los Estados Unidos y ha enviado una Comisión de agrónomos y entomólogos y profesores de Patología vegetal, para que comprueben si existe o no en las lejanas islas de Australasia la temible mosca devoradora de los gustosos frutos.

Comenzamos a creer que más que díptero vivo y volador, la tal mosca es un arbitrio de protección arancelaria, cuya invención ha hecho fortuna y va a extenderse por el mundo entero. Entre tanto se comprueba este hecho, no estaría de más que considerásemos el enorme desnivel que hay en nuestro comercio con los Estados Unidos. Le compramos por valor de 425 millones de pesetas, y le vendemos solamente 175. Después de lo acontecido con las naranjas y la uva no hay por qué no imaginar que cualquier día encontrará un pretexto para impedir la entrada en su mercado de otras mercaderías españolas. Y llegará un momento en que nuestro comercio con Norteamérica sea, más que un cambio, una tributación que, además de llevarse tantos millones de pesetas, ejerce

una influencia decisiva en la depreciación injusta a que se somete a la peseta en las cotizaciones de las Bolsas.

No pedimos concretamente ninguna represalia; nos limitamos a exponer los hechos. Apenas enviamos ya a la gran República, aparte el cobre de Ríotinto, más que almendras, aceitunas, aceite, cebollas y pieles de cabra. De almendros y de olivos se están haciendo plantaciones en diversos Estados de la Unión yanqui. Temamos, pues, que cualquier día veamos acusados a estos pobres productos españoles de peste parecida a la de la uva almeriense, y prohibida su admisión por aquellas Aduanas. Y menos mal que los Estados Unidos quieran compensar a la agraviada economía española enviándonos sus legiones de turistas, que nos devuelvan el exceso de dinero que les pagamos sin trabas ni regateos por sus exportaciones de algodón, de maquinaria y de automóviles, que podríamos comprar muy bien en otros países que no nos acusan de haber convertido nuestros parrales en incubadoras de mosca mediterránea.

TOURISM AND THE MEDITERRANEAN FLY.

Editorial in El Sol, Madrid, April 13, 1926.

With the natural rejoicing and with the sincere desire of applause and eulogy we welcome the news that one of our steamship companies is going to establish a direct line of vessels between New York and Sevilla, profiting by the admirable enlargement of that port. Certainly to no other means more propitious could we appeal to attract to the Andalusian capital an intense current of tourism. To accomplish it, once established the direct service of steamers, will depend only on the greater or less intensity with which is realized a work of propaganda in the United States. And once created the attraction of Yankees, pure recreation will convert itself into possibilities of business, for our ^{western} Andalusia encloses numerous resources scarcely known and many unexploited.

On exchange, it gives us deep sadness to see how obstinately the Camara Uvera and other organisms of Almeria and of other Levantine cities see themselves obliged to ask, almost to beg, that justice be done them and that it be obtained from the United States to free that region from the "sambenito" which they have hung on their agricultural products with the accusation that they are infected and are vehicles of the now famous Mediterranean Fly. The sad fact is that for abstemious puritanism entrance to the enormous Yankee market has been forbidden to Spanish wines and their distilled derivatives, and for a ^uprecaution of rural hygiene has been prohibited the entry of the Almerian grape, coveted desert of the Yankee table.

Certainly the Mediterranean Fly was not spoken of when the agriculturists of fertile California took to their fields cuttings from the Almerian arbors. The apparition of the terrible fly coincided with the production in the Yankee

West of a great harvest of grapes similar to the Spanish, though of a degenerate quality and needing to be freed from the competition of the genuine product of our fields.

On the other hand, for political reasons, the United States have opened their Customs to the Argentine fruit production.. We are not jealous of the Republic of La Plata, whose prosperity we desire as ardently as our own, but it is necessary to point out the difference of treatment to which the imperialist Yankee caprice subjects us. The Argentine fields are not, unhappily, free from plagues and infections. In the enormous extension of their pampas and sierras, in their woods and virgin meadows, Yankee scruple could encounter, if it wished to, motives equal to those which it found to prevent the Almerian grape from competing with the Californian.

The abhorred Mediterranean Fly itself seems even to have crossed the seas and to have installed itself, not now in South America, but in the very Pacific Ocean, where it appears to have invaded the orchards of New Zealand and Australia. These countries were exporters of apples to the South American market, and the Argentine has not wished to be less than the United States and has sent a commission of agronomists and entomologists and professors of vegetable pathology to prove if there exists or not in the distant isles of Australasia the fearful fly, devourer of the tasteful fruits,

We begin to believe that more than live and flying insect the said fly is an extraordinary measure of tariff protection, whose invention has made its fortune and is about to extend through the entire earth. While this fact is being proved, it would not be idle to consider the enormous lack of balance there is in our commerce with the United States. We buy from them to the value of 425 millions of pesetas and sell to them only 175.



After what has happened with the wines and grapes it is not to be imagined that some day they will not find a pretext to prevent the entry into their market of other Spanish merchandise. And will come the moment in which our commerce with North America may be, more than an exchange, a tribute which, besides taking away so many millions of pesetas, may exercise a decisive influence in the unjust depreciation to which the peseta is submitted in the quotations of the exchanges.

We do not ask concretely any reprisals; we limit ourselves to exposing the facts. We hardly send now to the great republic apart from the copper of Rio Tinto, more than almonds, olives, olive oil, onions and goatskins. Of almonds and olives they are making plantations in various states of the Yankee union. We may fear, therefore, that any day we may see these poor Spanish products accused of pest like the Almerian grape and their admission prohibited by the Customs. And less bad that the United States wish to compensate the aggrieved Spanish economy by sending us legions of tourists who will return to us the excess of money which we pay them without limits or question, for their exportations of cotton, of machinery and automobiles, which we could buy very well in other countries which do not accuse us of having converted our harbors into incubators of Mediterranean Flies.



No. 6279

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, April 23, 1926.



For Distribution

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1 copy to Mr. D
MAY 6 - 1926

INDEX BUREAU
881.00/1213

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the impression is general both here, in Morocco and in Tangier, that the calling of the Conference at Oujda is due to the necessities of French internal politics. The unpopularity of the Riffian war in Spain and the desire of the Spanish Government to satisfy this sentiment, made Spain accept the conference; but the responsibility for it is generally laid to France.

It is stated in some quarters in Paris that M. Steeg had induced - even forced - M. Briand to go into the meeting; that he has done this because he is opposed to undertaking a difficult military campaign in the Riff; this impression did not seem to exist in Morocco. There it was considered that M. Steeg is playing M. Briand's game and is

showing

MAY 10 1926
P.M.

MAY 4 - 1926

showing himself more anxious to help the Prime Minister keep his majority in Parliament than to pacify quickly the Riff.

M. Steeg is an important political man, but it would be perhaps assigning him too big a role and too firm a character to suppose that he would do more than urge his views upon the Prime Minister. The latter may not be unwilling to have it appear that he is yielding to the Resident General; he may believe, as do most people, that nothing definitely useful can be accomplished at Oujda and when this develops he can say that he only made the trial because M. Steeg so strongly urged it.

The best opinion in Morocco seems convinced that the conference is - to use the expression constantly repeated - a bluff; a bluff on the part of France to silence Socialist clamor for peace in the Riff; a bluff on the part of Primo de Rivera, who wishes to prove to all Spaniards that he is willing to go to any length in an effort to save Spanish lives and yet defend Spanish honor in the Riff; a bluff on the part of Abd-el-Krim who wishes to do everything he can to delay the French offensive and who sees in the conference a good possibility of enhancing his prestige. The only people who are frankly dissatisfied with the whole business are the military men who planned the campaign that has been halted by the conference. Nevertheless, even among soldiers there is not unanimity, for the old Africans of the Lyautey School consider that Marshal Pétain has organized for the attack against the Riffians as though he was fighting Germans in France and that this is the most expensive and the least efficient way of conquering them.


Where so many divergences exist, it is too much to expect clean cut results, and the first move at Oujda bears the imprint of this conflict of ideas in the Franco-Spanish camp. They have gone to treat with Abd-el-Krim because the political situation at home

required

required it; but they have little confidence in success: one is even tempted to say they don't desire it. For the conditions offered him are little better than those imposed upon Abd-el-Kader seventy-five years ago; but the latter had been soundly beaten and had to surrender, while Abd-el-Krim is in a far different posture. That the French and Spanish expect him to accept exile and disarmament is too much to believe; that his refusal of these severe conditions will silence the Socialist clamor for peace seems improbable.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,



Myron T. Herrick.

In quintuplicate.

COPY TO E.I.C.




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, April 30, 1926.

No. 6294

FILE



INDEX BUREAU
88.100/1214

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that to-day's QUOTIDIEN states, with reference to the negotiations at Ujda, that an agreement with the Riffians appears more and more difficult of accomplishment and that French troops are taking positions all along the north bank of the Ouergha. This paper gives the following points regarding which difficulties have arisen:

Autonomy of the Riff: The Riffians understand by autonomy the complete independence of the Riff. They will accept the entry into the territory of our technicians, workmen, and companies of exploitation, but only under their control.

Removal of Abd-el-Krim: The Riffians say that this question

can

can be settled only by Abd-el-Krim himself, and suggest that he be sent for.

Disarmament: The Riffians declare that a single commission, without soldiers, may enter the Riff. But disarmament can only be accomplished by the tribes themselves.


Suzerainty of the Sultan. According to the opinion of the Riffians, the suzerainty of the Sultan can only be of a fictitious nature.

LE QUOTIDIEN continues:

"The divergence of views between the Riffian negotiators and ourselves regarding these points is complete. However, conversations continue. But it is said in official circles, France and Spain cannot tolerate in the heart of Morocco the existence of a war zone and that they will show themselves firm on this point."

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,




Myron T. Herrick.

In quintuplicate.

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MAY 10 1926
Sam Eric
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(Voluntary Report.)

THE FRENCH-NORTH-AFRICAN CONFERENCE

From David C. Elkington, American Vice Consul,
 Casablanca, Morocco.

Date of Preparation April 5, 1926 .
 Date of Mailing, April 15, 1926 .

#####

Long Program for North-African Conference.

The third conference of the chief representatives of the French Republic in North Africa was held this year in Tunis, Tunisia, beginning on Monday, March 22, 1926, and lasted three days. The first conference was held in Algiers, in 1923 at the instigation of Mr. Steeg then Governor-General of Algeria. The second was held in Rabat, Morocco in 1924. Due principally to the Riff War none was held in 1925. This time there was present a representative of French West Africa also, in the person of an under secretary in the French Colonial Office, who had had considerable experience in the field.

The agenda of the 1926 conference, as published

locally,

881.00/1215
 INDEX REPORT

locally, was as follows:

Questions Pending Since the 1923 Meeting at Rabat.

Public safety, passports, and identification papers.

Control of and aid to "native" laborers in France.

Cooperation between the different fiscal departments with a view toward the prevention of fraud in tax matters.

Questions of customs control common to Algeria and Morocco, particularly in relation to the frontier between the two countries:

Frontier guards,

Algerian and Southern Moroccan free zones,

Organization of joint Algerian and Moroccan customs houses.

Plant quarantine measures.

Tourist traffic.

Aid to and ~~propaganda~~ on behalf of scientific or historical societies.

Intellectual and scientific relations.

Railroads.

Telegraphic and telephonic connections.

Western Sahara.

Application of control measures originating in any of the three countries.

Questions of Interest to Algeria and Tunisia Only.

Customs union between Algeria and Tunisia and application of similar fiscal policies.

New Questions.

Administrative and economic measures on behalf of

"natives."

"natives."

Study of financial questions common to all three governments.

Organization of professional and technical instruction.

Consolidation into one service of the members of the civil administrations in Tunisia and Morocco.

Sale and liquidation of business enterprises.

Adoption by the three governments of Books 1 and 2 of the Labor and Social Insurance Code of France.

Regulation of the grazing movements of livestock (transhumance).

Stamping out of fraud in wool and cereal dealings.

Improvement of livestock especially with a view toward better wool production.

General policy concerning alfa (esparto grass).

Preparation of questions for submission to the International Conference in Rome on plant diseases.

Liaison between agricultural experiment stations in the three countries, including a study of a common cotton-culture program in the interest of France.

Tourist publications and concerted action on tourist propaganda.

Algerian-Moroccan frontier from political and mineral points of view.

Commercial and maritime relations between Morocco and French West Africa.

Application in each of the three possessions of the system adopted in France and Algeria as regards the registration

istration and stamping of legal documents and the charges therefor.

Fiscal control of motor vehicles registered in Algeria or Morocco and being operated in the neighboring country.

Application of the system of "international transit" to merchandise transported by rail between Tunis and Casablanca.

Production (Protection?) of North African cotton plantations against the "red worm."

Organization at Aix-en-Provence (France) of an experiment station for vegetable oil plants and products.

Standardization of electrical current and of the equipment used in transmitting it.

Agreements to be entered into by the different producers of phosphates in North Africa.

Aerial navigation in North Africa.

Organization of a meteorological service for the protection of aerial navigation in North Africa.

Direct and rapid exchange of information between the governments of North Africa and French West Africa.

Liaison between Algeria and French West Africa at the Agueraktem wells.

Rio de Oro question.

Liaison by wireless telegraph between French West and North Africa.

Liaison between the different parts of the Sahara Desert:

By automobile and by airplane.

By

By caravans.

By weather bureaux.

Opening Addresses Optimistic.

Mr. Lucien Saint, French Resident General in Tunisia, in his opening address, stated that the greatest problems awaited the attention of the conference. These he enumerated as follows: public safety; campaign against epidemics; condition of laborers; linking up of communications; solution of common financial difficulties; agricultural prosperity; sea and air navigation; and "all that tends toward the raising of social and moral standards among the natives."

Unification of French North Africa Impossible Now.

Following Mr. Saint came Mr. Theodore Steeg, French Resident General in Morocco, but formerly Governor-General of Algeria, who, while the head of that colony, instituted, as was stated above, the French North African Conference.

Very near the beginning of his speech, Mr. Steeg pointed out the improbability that the three possessions of France in North Africa will be united. Such a happening is, he said, "so distant yet that we should now neither look forward to it nor prepare for it." This conclusion he bases on geographical, ethnical, political, and intellectual grounds, each of the three countries having its own originality and unique characteristics. In taking account of these differences, however, he emphasized

phasized the advisability of not forgetting the resemblances and analogies, many of which are very subtle. He brought this out more clearly in saying that "while not disregarding the novelty of my task and the need for absorbing information and making investigations," problems peculiar to Morocco did not bring the greatest unknown element, for the Algerian experience stood him in good stead. "I have seen reappear in Morocco," he continued, "the fundamental problems and elements that a sojourn of four years in Algiers had rendered familiar to me. Is that not the proof that our interests, without necessarily being blended, can be similar."

For the time being, however, the task of the conference is to find the causes of conflict between the interests of the three countries, for interests in conflict today are conciliated thereby tomorrow. In other words "The knowledge of a disease is half its cure."

The Riff Question.

The remainder of Mr. Steeg's speech was given over largely to purely Moroccan subjects. He called attention to the rapidity of the growth of modern Morocco, then took up the Riff question, wishing, he said, "to dispel today the anxiety which troubled and perhaps still troubles the French people."

The policy of France toward the natives, he said, has not failed but has been strengthened. He continued,

"A map is proof enough. On the borders

of

of the Riff we have today a defensive front, fixed last fall by our troops and supported at certain well-chosen points. Behind that front, Morocco is working to the full. Public order and safety is there as great as in Algeria and Tunisia. In advance of the front what do we find? Rebels, unsubdued tribes, hostile neutrals, but also faithful tribes, which have turned toward France and who are deserving for having done it. Lead by chiefs appointed by us, faithful to the officers who have won their confidence, receiving from us but very feeble material aid, they are fighting for us and overcoming the outcroppings of the Riffian uprising.....

"What tribes are these which have enough faith in us to bear the brunt of blows which without them would fall on our own men? They are of two kinds, those which rose up eight months ago and those which up to this time had remained independent, having submitted to neither the Sultan nor the French.

"We are registering daily the progressive breaking up of Riffian unity. It increases in direct proportion to our approach. Can it be pretended then that our methods have suffered a setback? Have we not the right to affirm that although submission is due to force, pacification is by organization? Is it not felt that progress is solid when its creative powers continue? How can there be any doubt of the effect of the road which is being extended, of the market which opens, of the dispensary which is established, of the social aid created, of the security of property, of the suppression of abuses, and of the impartial administration of justice?"

Governor General Violette of Algeria followed Mr. Steeg and reaffirmed the Resident General's idea that the unification of French North Africa is at present "impossible." He likewise partook of his predecessor's optimism in the future of the three possessions of France in North Africa.

Measures Favored by the Conference.

The following are the measures favored by the conference,

ference, as shown by resolutions passed by it and reported in the local press:

Tourist Propaganda.

Annual preparation of tourist propaganda and participation of all three governments in the expenses of publishing and disseminating of a booklet describing French North Africa from a tourist standpoint.

Labor and Insurance.

Application to the three countries, as far as their industrial and economic evolution permits, of the French code relating to labor and insurance.

Educational Measures.

Inclusion of vocational education in primary schools as is done in France, with the addition of gardens and shops to the schools for this purpose and "practical benefit" examinations at end of terms. The conference favored the exchange between all of France's colonies, protectorates, and other possessions of scientific information, publications, official and otherwise.

Public Health.

In view of improvement in maritime health relations, due to use of the telegraph, exchange of public health information by telegraph is recommended in case of epidemics (pestilences) as is likewise the organization of a frontier health service and obligatory health examinations for all persons crossing the borders of the three countries, during epidemics in any of them;

Public health liaison between Morocco and French West Africa, weekly exchange of public health bulletins
between

between the two possessions, and study of method of notification of contagious diseases and the measures of prophylaxis to be taken, their development and obligatory application;

Building of tuberculosis hospital in Algeria, for climatic reasons, to receive patients from all three French North African possessions, the right of priority to be given to war victims of the disease;

Isolation of tuberculosis patients in public hospitals; and

Erection of insane asylum at Blida, Algeria, to care for patients from all French North Africa.

Agriculture and Kindred Industries.

Greater control over the harvesting of alfa (esparto grass). Algeria already has quite a measure of control over this industry, the quantities to be harvested each year being fixed by the Prefects of each of the three departments. The industry is not of much importance in Morocco as yet, palm-leaf fiber having precedence.

Common measures for the increase and protection of cotton culture in French North Africa to aid the homeland economically and to keep out the pink boll worm, respectively. This pest has already made considerable headway in Tunisia. A Dahir appeared recently prohibiting the importation into Morocco of cotton seeds.

Uniform plant quarantine measures.

Uniformity of regulations concerning the classification of cereals.

Building

Building of grain elevators and centers for sorting.

Upkeep of watering places for migrating flocks of sheep and other livestock and the establishment of bourses for improvements in breeds of animals. Much of the wealth of the three countries depends on the well-being of the livestock industry.

Control over wool production to prevent fraud.

Discounting by Bank of Algeria of paper of the Mutual Agricultural Credit Societies in both Algeria and Tunisia to the extent of 75,000,000 francs. Because the Moroccan State Bank believes the bank-note circulation should be based solely on business transactions, it has discontinued accepting agricultural paper, which is turned over to an especially chartered land bank. (See Page 36 et seq. of quarterly economic report from this office, under date of January 23, 1926.)

Communications by Electricity.

Construction of a telephone line between Taza and Oudjda, Morocco, in order to complete the linking up of Morocco and Tunisia.

Establishment of radio stations, especially those using short wave-lengths.

Motor-vehicle Communications.

Concerted program of Sahara penetration, involving the prolongation of the automobile track between Babès and Fort Saint, Tunisia to Polignac and Djanet;

Construction of a caravansary at Fort Saint;

Prolongation of three tracks in Algeria toward Tim-

buctoo

buctoo and Lake Chad;

Prolongation of the automobile track to Djanet, Tunisia, by a caravan track to Lake Chad, and the establishment along automobile routes of gasoline depots and repair stations; and

Institution of a competition for heavy duty and light vehicles operated by "gazogène" motors.

Railway Transportation.

Establishment of system of international transit on railways between Tunis and Casablanca.

Placing in service of a weekly train in both directions between Oudjda and Tunis, during the months of October to May, inclusive. This is particularly for tourists.

Air Services.

Classification of Casablanca as an aerial port and establishment of landing fields and air stations at Tangier on the France-Morocco line, at Agadir on that from Casablanca to Dakar, at Oudjda for the Casablanca-Tunis line, and at Sétif, Algeria, for the Laghouat route.

Extension of air routes from Algiers to the Niger River and from Tunis to Lake Chad and the concurrent linking up of these regions by radio.

The designation of Casablanca as the center for aerial activities in French North Africa and not Algiers puts an end to the rivalry between the two cities. The chief claim of Algiers was its location, while Casablanca is the terminus of many air lines.

Phosphate

Phosphate Production and Control.

Twice-yearly conferences between the three government departments interested in phosphate exploitation, in which representatives of the various producing firms may be invited to take part. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that the Protectorate Government in Morocco has the monopoly of phosphate production in Morocco and that the Moroccan product is richer than either of those from the other two countries.

Control of Business.

Unification of procedure and regulations covering the sale, transfer, and liquidation of commercial enterprises. This will include bankruptcy.

Customs Tariff.

Study of question of free trade between the three countries. Expression of satisfaction over agreement between Morocco and Algeria on customs regime between the two countries.

Eventual unification of customs between Algeria and Tunisia, impossible for the time being.

Simplified Administration.

Establishment, possibly through respective automobile clubs, of the three countries, of a booklet granting the right of temporary admission, without deposit of bonds, for motor vehicles crossing the borders while in service.

Recommendation that the circulation tax in Tunisia be replaced by one on gasoline, to conform with practice in Algeria and Morocco.

Changing

Changing Moroccan and Tunisian systems of registering and stamping legal documents and the charges therefor to conform to the French-Algerian requirements.

Uniform identity card for all three countries.

Uniform warrants of arrest. This is understood to have been brought about already in Morocco and Tunisia, but a new law is necessary for Algeria, so one was introduced in the Chamber of Deputies in Paris in January, 1926, and the conference recommends its speedy passage.

Uniform fiscal year in the three countries, beginning July first of each year, especially because of the agricultural interests involved, which are paramount.

Unification of civil control services in Tunisia and Morocco, which are both protectorates.

Mr. Steeg Optimistic.

In an interview granted in Paris, Resident General Steeg stated,

"Certainly, we have not yet resolved along ideal lines all the questions in which the three great French countries of North Africa are involved. Those interests are sometimes divergent and it is but little by little, by straightforwardness and the seizing of opportunities that we arrive at an agreement. But even now we have done good work and I have found our neighbors quite favorable toward obtaining happy results."

Mr. Steeg did not desire to enter into details, believing them unnecessary, inasmuch as the Moroccan newspapers were represented at the conference, but he did say that all he did in Tunis was "inspired directly by Moroccan interests with which" he is charged and which should

should have confidence in his faithful defense of them.

In particular, the Resident General pointed out that certain things in the situation are not subject to dispute on the part of the other two French possessions in North Africa. One is that the port of Casablanca is assured of a bright future, due to its facilities and the low freight rates possible because of the assurance of a return cargo in phosphates.

Mr. Steeg was pleased to have been able to render a service to Morocco in the domain of tourism in having abolished the formalities at the frontiers concerning passenger motor vehicles in service at the time of crossing those frontiers.


D. C. Elkington,

American Vice Consul.

Approved, April 14, 1926;


H. Earle Russell,

American Consul.

Copy to:

Diplomatic Agency and Consulate General, Tangier.

In quintuplicate.

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No. 96.

American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General.

Tangier, Morocco, May 5th, 1926.

CONFIDENTIAL.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAY 21 5

WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: The problem of peace in Morocco; Native
agitation and the drift toward unity;
The present aspects of French rule.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:-

In a recent Despatch of mine, I had the honor to make allusion to native discontent in Morocco and to the efforts that the inhabitants were making to arrest despotic rule, by direct complaint against a usurpation of power by foreign functionaries, inconsistent with the terms of the existing régime.

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The charges of incorrect relations, and the censures passed thereupon, were enumerated in the Enclosure of my Despatch No. 82 of March 24th, 1926, and without mentioning in detail the anomalies and abuses therein complained of, I desire here, without deviation from this subject, to bring up to date further circumstances in this same regard.

Although there is an apparent tendency under the new Resident-General to preserve tranquility by the promise of reasonable conciliation, political ears in France would tingle if the ups and downs of native sentiment in Morocco, were known in all their implicative reality, for, in spite of the harmonious cord usually played upon by the press to divert opinion and to explain the ostensibly correct attitude of French administration in this country, there is undoubtedly a hardening of opinion among the natives and a monotone of bitter complaint, with which, if given full vent to, France will be powerless to cope.

The point to consider here is whether the new civilian methods of the Resident-General will meet the situation by satisfying the anxieties of the hour, and will be able to resist the momentum acquired by the military methods, which have been the custom of the country since the commencement of the French occupation some 15 years ago.

Good will between the ruled and the ruler is essential to peace and prosperity in this (or any other) country

country and it is tolerably certain, under present exasperations and the unhappy lot of the natives, that the existing state of affairs cannot last indefinitely, for encroachments upon their liberties show no tendency to abate with time.

Avoiding therefore all hypercritical depreciation and not desiring in any way to provoke alarm by prophesying the early capsize of French rule in Morocco, this subject is none the less to-day a point of legitimate inquiry, and the generalizations which are now to follow accurately characterize the situation, as far as it may be foreseen.

We must retreat a little to explain the background. Marshal Lyautey—as we have seen—after his spectacular fall from power, has been succeeded as Resident-General by Mr. T. Steeg, a man of professional distinction, opposed to most of the methods and ideals of his predecessor. The present is therefore a time of transition between two fundamentally different conceptions of protectorate policy, and under the impulse of his vitality, it is known that Mr. Steeg desires to breathe a new spirit into the governmental and administrative régime of Morocco.

It remains to be seen whether, even with his expert assistance, Mr. Steeg is capable of including in his policy of prayer piety and compromise, the sufficient element of firmness, indispensable in dealing successfully with an eastern population, and whether in
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the growing difficulties besetting France, and the change in the temper and preponderances of her home influences, she can maintain herself in Morocco a sufficient length of time to accomplish, by a slow process of evolution, a program based in its origin upon military conceptions.

In a consideration of this aspect of the question, we will call as first witness Marshal Lyautey, a man whose personality will never lose its fascination because of his cosmopolitan outlook and imperial visions.

Some years ago, (before his olympian epoch) in the course of a conversation with him, I enquired whether it was premature to ask in what degree of affection he considered France was held by the native, and if he entertained any doubt that through the processes of gradual adaptation, under changing conditions, the native would finally come to accept French rule in Morocco without either misgiving or misunderstanding.

In marked contrast to smaller men, Lyautey—though choleric under cross examination—was consoling in one regard, for he was always frank to a degree fully satisfying precision, and frequently so, even to the point of indiscretion. He did not like my question at all, as he plainly showed, for he would be the last person living to claim that he possessed faculties of hiding what he felt. I am convinced that if it had been in a former age, and he had been a magistrate, he would have sent me straight off to prison for contempt against
public

public order, and for the good of the commonwealth, but as it was I escaped with only the punishment of his frown and was then befriended (out of sociability) by a response which he left me free to interpret, either as an answer to my question, or as a personal confession. He said in substance he did not assume I considered that my countrymen were popular in the Philippine Islands to a greater extent than the British were liked in India or in Egypt; for history with its boring examples, no less than experience, has taught that alien races dominated by a civilization of different origin, with its foreign conceptions and culture, never wins complete allegiance. Loyalty could not be attained by the glamor and romance of great enterprises and the occupation of Morocco by France—which is based on force—will continue so long as the methods of force are applied, and dominion will cease on the day when her strength is lost. These were the risks of France in Morocco and soldiers and statesmen must equally share full blame for their consequences; be they good or be they ill. In short there was no such word as nationalization in colonization, but there is a word called usurpation, which constitutes a title without compromise to the ruling Power.

It would be hardly required in this place to revive the memories of this interview as a studious meditation, unless it held some association with the present crisis of affairs and the incertitudes of the future in Morocco, but in the circumstances of the case,

its

its significance is invested with more than anecdotal interest.

Recently a person with whom I am acquainted was in Fez where he frequently met the Military Governor of that region, General de Chambrun—one of Lyautey's few lingering friends and favorites in Morocco—and to my informant, General de Chambrun spoke very freely, as men do, who crave conversation but who do not fear the restraints of conventionality. General de Chambrun has had much rugged experience as a soldier in Morocco, under the responsibilities of his military seniority, and when he is induced to speak of this country, he might perhaps be well described as an able, unperturbed and sophisticated witness. In speaking of Lyautey's suspended reign in Morocco, and after recalling his knowledge of public affairs and his administrative ability—for which de Chambrun expressed admiration—he said that he was much struck by the none too hopeful prediction of Lyautey concerning the future of this country, as the latter had stipulated a time limit of 30 years from the date of French occupation, as the maximum period of French rule in the Shereefian Empire, and according to this calculation sixteen years only remain for its anticipated span of power.

I then asked General de Chambrun whether Lyautey's pessimism in this regard might not be a personal premonition, perhaps explained by the lassitude of an aging man, disappointed by inadequate recognition over

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the consequence of his achievements, but General de Chambrun replied that he did not share this point of view at all as Lyautey, (although rhetorical) was by no means an alarmist by nature and never inclined to make mischief of his visions.

Marshal Lyautey's temperament varied under circumstances, and often from day to day, and his impatience undoubtedly affected his judgment at times, but I have no doubt that these sentiments represented Marshal Lyautey's actual feeling in this regard, as this is corroborated by the views he expressed to me in the conversation above related which took place over ten years ago.

Due to deep rather than superficial causes these prophecies of Lyautey are becoming of current interest in view of the appearance of numerous symptoms throughout the country which tend to confirm them. The Fez petition has already been spoken of and received exhaustive comment, and almost each day brings forth new developments.

In lifting the veil which covers this living problem, I will recite some of the warning causes that are the growing subject of comment and complaint and which it would be a misfortune for any one not knowing this country to undervalue as mere pieces of news or dismiss as passing echos of the hour.

There is a fairly familiar overflow of rabid complaint—undoubtedly based on just causes—in
connection

connection with the scandalous conditions under which the native silver currency was demonetized in the French Protectorate a few years ago. In addition to depriving the native of a metallic token to which he had been accustomed for centuries, he was given in return a paper Franc, at a forced rate of exchange some 30 per cent below the then market price of his money as metal, and the native felt in consequence that he had been exploited, if not robbed, by a Power that stood before the eyes of the world as his protector. This was one of the greatest errors of judgment committed by Lyautey during his reign. There was a perplexing and clumsy explanation given at the time based on what was described as political exigency, but where the profits vanished which grew out of this usurious transaction has never been declared.

The demonetization of the Moorish silver currency and the imposition upon the natives of the paper Franc was the cause of angry demonstrations at the time it was carried into effect, and open rebellion was with difficulty averted. It was a measure more extensive in its antagonistic effect upon the natives than any other despotic decree of the French Administration since its inception. This act not only undermined the commercial stability of Morocco itself, and threw back the economic recovery of the country, but what is far more detrimental to the influence and prestige of France, it struck at the root of the interests of every tribe, every village, every individual in the French Zone, and has constituted

a grievance common to millions of human beings, uniting tribes and nomads in resentment against this symbolic measure of spoliation, a resentment which grows in intensity and which naturally becomes more articulate with the decline in the value of the paper currency thus forced upon them.

The effect of the steady fall of the Franc therefore politically speaking has been well-nigh calamitous to the country.

It is generally admitted that Mr. Steeg is a man of high principles, but in turn he has committed (perhaps in good faith) almost as his first official act, a blunder equally serious; I refer to his policy of planting French colonists upon the communal tribe lands, and diverting the waters of streams from the cities and villages for the irrigation of these settlements. The natives are greatly concerned over these encroachments and grow more and more to feel that they are now to become the victims of a further vigorous exploitation, and that this plan is the first move, finally to deprive them of their lands.

Discontent sometimes condemns without accuracy and frequently denounces without either fairness or fact, and although I do not wish to make use of curious information in connection with the agitated order in this country, we must now turn from the citation of acts of political policy, to native grievances arising from administrative abuses and practices involving the personal particular

particular complaints voiced against the appliances of power.

Mr. Urbain Blanc, Delegate Resident-General at Rabat, (whose career in Morocco has not been a dull one), was recently suspended from the exercise of his high functions by the new Resident-General, Mr. T. Steeg, on charges of corruption in exploiting natives and in influencing the employment of convict labor in enterprises of his own, surreptitiously held in the name of others, and further of misappropriating Government property for the improvement of his own illegally acquired estates in the French Zone. These facts are well known throughout the native community. It would appear however that Mr. Steeg failed to take into account the political influence supporting Mr. Urbain Blanc in France, and he was ordered from Paris to reinstate Mr. Blanc. These facts are also equally well known to the Moorish notabilities and are pointed to as public proof that justice is both a mockery and a myth in Morocco.

There are however still current references, in the press and elsewhere, to the probable departure of Mr. Urbain Blanc from Morocco, and this circumstance appears to indicate that the Resident-General maintains the measure he has taken, but has compromised with the Colonial party on considerations of the impairment of French prestige by the dismissal of Blanc under a cloud. This compromise, it will be evident, from the comments

rife

rife in the native community, is too belated to be effective, but it may indicate that, if Mr. Steeg is to remain in Morocco, he will insist in the future upon being left in undisputed control of his Administration. Mr. Steeg, upon whom now so much depends, will probably have a part of his time monopolized by problems of a similar character. The country is honey-combed with favoritism and nepotism under all its mean devices, and the pitiful strife among French functionaries in Morocco, (said to number 60,000), is carried on in the open, without the slightest pretence of disguise, and even to a scandalous degree in the press itself.

We now come to a case in another category which cannot be slurred over or ignored.

Some little time ago a mountaineer was on the way to a market village. On a narrow trail over which he was passing, his beast (loaded with produce) jostled a person in European costume, who was subsequently discovered to be a French professor at a native school in a community nearby. The Moor after having been warmly reproved and remonstrated with over his lack of civility, quoted in defence or at least in excuse of himself, an excerpt from the Koran to the effect that Allah had willed in his words of wisdom that "all paths in this world were wide enough for two." Whereupon the enraged French professor gave the Moor a blow. It appears that the assaulted native lost his balance and

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in falling over the ledge of a cliff his skull struck a stone with fatal consequences. The purely accidental results of this incident, unfortunate and so unpremeditated, perhaps would not have been long remembered, much less magnified, had there been even the semblance of some redress, but no trial was ordered. This grave error of judgment was based upon the weakest kind of susceptibilities, for bureaucracy had concluded that the dignity of the state was at stake in native opinion (as in fact it was), and consequently they decided they could not challenge their own prestige by indicting a functionary attached to an important branch of their own organization.

As a consequence of this attitude, on the part of the authorities, and because of the human attribute involved, the case was soon talked about from one end of the country to the other and finally became famous. Smaller incidents are recorded in history which have precipitated political upheavals and mutinies.

In this present case the persistence and pressure of the peasants upon the Kaids became so great, and public opinion was so much aroused that the latter were forced to ask the French for some kind of satisfaction, and when these demands were made the Kaids were flattered and cajoled and begged even by the highest Generals to hush the matter up with money, if they were unable to do so by a dictatorial nod.

If I mention this particular affair at such

length,

length, it is to emphasize its possible reactions and to remark how far a splendid organization can fail if based upon such uninspired and unexalted conceptions of the administration of justice where native welfare is concerned.

It is obvious that in countries where there should be a punctilious observance, on the part of those in authority, to exert the full weight of their pressure to prove to the alien that in the administration of justice, the governing race would not depart from its judicial standards by asking exemption or immunity from its own laws, in favor of one of its own subjects, that a reversal of this principle constitutes a danger, and if frequently practised, cannot but be followed by grave consequences.

If I do not single this case out as an isolated example exhibiting the methods of France in Morocco, on the other hand I do not desire to infer that, in this particular incident, the motives were dictated by considerations of injustice alone. That it was an aberration must on all sides be admitted, but it was an aberration which, if often revealed will be followed by a revulsion of feeling in this country, because the native is beginning to perceive the frequency with which similar abuses are being committed, and what is more, he is losing his apprehension of discussing them publicly.

One of the notables of this country, very

capable

capable but without any personal following, whose immunity of opinion has been somewhat ungrudgingly conceded by all, because of his resigned attitude and tactful unchallenging disposition, recently said that the French had rendered one great service to Morocco, for which the native profoundly thanked them. They had made the country one.

In former times even the cause of their liberty, (resistance to the invasion of an alien Power), did not suffice, in any palpable degree, to extinguish the feuds between Arab and Berber, the strife and rivalry between Kaids and tribes, but a few short years under the plastic hands of governing France has brought into existence, among all the heterogeneous elements of the native population of Morocco, a spirit and a movement of organized unity in the defence of their rights and property against further encroachment.

It would be an easy task to produce much other matter not commonly mentioned or publicly realized if the purposes of this Despatch were to seek out faults in the form of detailed evidence rather than to serve other more legitimate and limited ends.


In endeavoring however to hold the Department's attention in this brief survey of cause and effect, it will be clearly implied from the context, (unless my assumptions are baseless), that there is apparently a pronounced if not a profound prejudice against French rule in Morocco, and although opinion is still in what
might

might be described as a pink state, there is danger that it may become carmine, unless some form of rule is invented, or successful practise is applied, to arrest a more dynamic form of its expression in the future.

This state of domestic order, (which is not to be permanently hidden), Mr. Steeg is perfectly familiar with, and it is also known in Paris, in spite of the comparative blindness of politicians, and it possesses a mute but none the less intimate connection with the recent peace moves of France at Udjda, a subject which will be dealt with in my next Despatch.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,



Maxwell Blake.
American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul-General.

NOTE:-

Copy of this Despatch for E. I. C., Embassy, Paris.

.. , , Embassy, Madrid.

No. 93.

American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General.

Tangier, Morocco, April 26th, 1926.



SUBJECT:- Transmitting newspaper article on the Tangier Statutes.



The Honorable,

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:-

I have the honor to transmit to the Department herewith, excerpts from the issue of April 24th, 1926, of the local English weekly publication "Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa and Tangier Gazette and Morocco" containing one article entitled "Future of Tangier" commenting upon the Statutes of Tangier.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant

Maxwell Blake.

American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul-General.

Enclosure:-

One newspaper cutting
as above stated.

FUTURE OF TANGIER.**Unpopular Statute.****INTERNATIONAL OUTCAST.**

It must be admitted that among commercial people of all nationalities at Tangier, European and native alike, the Statute, the Convention for which was signed by England, France, and Spain at Paris in December, 1923, is becoming increasingly unpopular. Those who reside at Tangier merely on account of its pleasant climate, natural beauty, and for them, comparatively low taxation are satisfied at the improvements which have come about under the new administration, and feel that the money they pay in taxes is being well expended in the better upkeep and extension of the roads, the increased cleanliness of the town, and the beautifying of the place by the planting of many trees. Under the old régime, before the Statute, nothing was done by the authorities to relieve suffering; at the present time an extensive free dispensary for Europeans and natives is being installed, which will prove a great boon to the poorer classes.

From an administrative point of view, the Statute may also be regarded as not unsuccessful. The Legislative Assembly, composed of representatives of England, France, Spain, Belgium, and Holland, together with those of the Mussulman and Jewish subjects of the Sultan, has done good work. The revenue from taxation and other sources has exceeded previous estimates, and at the end of the first financial year there was a considerable surplus in hand. It must, however, be borne in mind that Tangier has liabilities to meet in the future, such as the interest on the bonds of the railway now in course of construction, which will unite Tangier with the French Protectorate, also any deficit in the working of the new port which is being built, and, in addition, there is a very great amount of municipal work to be done to place Tangier on a footing with most European towns of the same population. It may be fairly said that, under the Statute, Tangier for the first time in her history enjoys the benefits of an honest and capable administration.

From the commercial standpoint the situation is less favourable. The United States and Italy decline to ratify the Convention of Paris, and in consequence their subjects cannot be made to pay the new taxation, which came into force with the promulgation of the Statute. Apart from the difficulties to the administration arising from such a situation, the subjects of the ratifying Powers are unfavourably placed commercially compared with those of the non-ratifying Powers.

EFFECTS OF THE RIFF WAR.

Before the extension of the Riff war to the Jeballa tribes in the vicinity of the Tangier zone, the trade of Tangier was mainly with these tribes, and with the inland towns of Fez and Mequinez in the French zone. Now, on account of the war, the Tangier zone is surrounded by a ring of Spanish military posts, which stops commerce between her zone and that of Spain, also the lack of complete security in Spain's zone prevents the establishment of any important tourist service between Tangier and the French zone, which would certainly enrich Tangier. For this the Statute cannot be blamed, and no amelioration may be expected till the war is ended. If this were all, the traders of Tangier might hope for better times with the ending of the war, but unfortunately the following clause figures in the Convention:

Article 20.—“The Tangier Customs shall levy duties and taxes only on goods destined exclusively for consumption in the zone. Goods landed at Tangier and destined for use or consumption in the French and Spanish zones shall enjoy the benefit of the ordinary rules of transit, warehousing, or temporary admission, the proper Custom duties being collected at the Custom houses of the zone of consumption.”

By Article 20 Spain has the right to levy duty on all goods passing from the Tangier zone into her zone, and a native who buys a little sugar or a packet of candles in a Tangier shop is liable for duty on his small purchases when he returns to his home in the Spanish zone. The Customs duty on the same will have already been paid at the port of Tangier, and presumably the native, by presenting the receipt received from the Spanish Customs officials, might recover the duty paid at the Tangier port, but it is much more likely that, to avoid trouble, he would discontinue coming to buy at Tangier and go instead to Arzilla, Larache, or Tetuan, towns within the Spanish zone.

Under the Act of Algeciras, which before the Statute regulated the Customs charges for all Morocco, duty was paid at the port of entry, and goods might pass free of further duty to all three zones, French, Spanish, and International. Article 20 of the Convention may not only prove disastrous to the trade of Tangier, but also furnish Spain with a legitimate means of bringing pressure on Tangier.

It was proposed by the Legislative Assembly of Tangier to pay a sum annually to the Spanish zone, conditional on Spain abstaining from levying the duty on goods passing from Tangier into her zone, but it is rumoured that Spain intends to enforce

her rights and to establish a Customs barrier between the two zones. This rumour is causing great anxiety among business people here.

PRO-SPANISH PROPAGANDA.

In December last I stated that an extensive propaganda was being carried on at Tangier, among Europeans and natives, for the handing over of the government of Tangier to Spain. Now the feeling in favour of such action is certainly increasing among the trading classes. One scheme advocated is that the present International Legislative Assembly, together with the existing administration, also international, shall in form be retained, but that, apart from these restrictions, Tangier and her zone should become an integral part of the Spanish zone, in which case there would be no Customs or other barrier. The advocates of this arrangement believe that it would satisfy Spain, which has always maintained that, on account of the geographical position, Tangier should belong to her zone. To Spain would then fall the policing of this zone, and as a military base for the policing of the Jeballa tribes its possession would be of great value to her. The advocates of the scheme admit that it would not be feasible until the submission of the Jeballa tribes had been brought about and the safety of Tangier assured. They are of the opinion that, were Spain's aspirations relative to Tangier satisfied, she would be prepared to grant a generous annual subsidy for the development of the place and for the construction of a port worthy of Tangier's geographical situation, which is unrivalled in this part of the Mediterranean.

The obvious reply to all the above is, that since Spain began the occupation of her zone in 1912 she has experienced almost continual warfare with the tribes, and has not yet succeeded in subduing them; that up to the present the security


of Tangier has depended on the fact that Abd-el-Krim and other Riff and Jeballa chieftains have respected Tangier and the zone for the reason that they are neutral and international; also that in the relatively small part of her own zone which Spain actually occupies there is little sign of development of any kind.

As to the suggestion that were Spain predominant at Tangier she would be prepared to grant an annual subsidy to develop the place, such a subsidy would be dependent on the existing Spanish Government, and a change in the Government might lead to its cessation.

The great disadvantage of an international régime, as experienced at Tangier, is that as the place belongs to no single Power, no one of the three States, England, France, or Spain, which signed the Convention of Paris, and claim to be most interested in the town, is prepared to render it any financial support. In the zones of France and Spain ports have been made, roads and railways constructed, and municipal improvements carried out by means of loans and grants from the respective home Governments. Tangier for its development has to entirely rely upon its own meagre resources, derived from the taxation of the inhabitants, who are not gaining by trade sufficient to compensate them for the increased taxation now in force.

The three Powers responsible for the drawing up of the Convention appear to consider that, having endowed Tangier with a Statute, in the framing of which the inhabitants of the place were not consulted, and which, as exemplified by Article 20, is far from perfect, they have done all that can be expected of them, and it remains for the people of Tangier to overcome the manifest difficulties financial or otherwise.

«The Daily Telegraph.»







EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, May 14, 1926.

No. 6325



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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to the Embassy's despatch No. 6279 of April 23, 1926, and to previous despatches concerning French military operations against the Riffian tribes in Morocco, I have the honor to report that the peace negotiations at Oujda proved unsuccessful and that hostilities have now been resumed.

The negotiations, which began on April 18th and terminated on May 7th, appear to have been of the nature anticipated in the Embassy's despatch above-mentioned - largely a bluff on the part of France and Spain on the one hand, as well as of the Riffians on the other. The point of rupture was reached when the representatives of the Riffian tribes demanded a 2 for 1 basis for the exchange of prisoners of war, but the failure of the negotiations was already practically assured by the entire absence of agreement on various essential points at issue.


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The French press received the news of the rupture of negotiations without surprise. There was some difference of opinion as to the wisdom of undertaking the negotiations and the motives which guided the Government in conducting them, but there was almost unanimity in the opinion that the conference was foredoomed to failure and that the Riffian terms could not have been accepted. Only the usually dissenting voice of the communistic HUMANITE accused the Government in screaming headlines of having deliberately endeavored to prolong this "imperialistic" war.

The Riffian delegates left Oujda on the evening of May 7th and hostilities were resumed on the following day. LE TEMPS described the loss of three weeks of valuable fighting time as the sacrifice which France and Spain made to their humanitarian ideals, but more optimistic reports in the French press discount the importance of this setback in view of the fact that the rains continued through the end of April and would have prevented a successful offensive in any case. Subsequent reports indicate a generally successful development of the new French offensive, with gains of ten to twelve kilometers at various points.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,



Myron T. Herrick.

In quintuplicate.

Copy to E. I. C.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, April 23, 1926.

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SECRETARY OF STATE

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PERSONAL.

My dear Mr. Kellogg:

Referring to my letter of March 19th last, in which I advised you of my proposed visit to Morecco, in which you so amiably acquiesced, I am taking the first opportunity to tell you briefly of my most interesting and informing trip.

I felt, in leaving on the 25th, that I was taking a possible chance of the fall of the Ministry in my absence. However, I was of the opinion that the Parliament could not forego its Easter vacation, and that the Ministry would last at least until after Easter. I was, therefore, quite relieved a few days after my departure to note by the Press that an adjournment had taken place until the 20th.

I think that since my return to France in 1921, I have not had an opportunity of doing anything consistent with my position which has been more pleasing to the French Government than to make this journey, since I seem

The Honorable
Frank B. Kellogg,
Secretary of State,
Washington.

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to have made the entire tour without other than my ordinary indiscretions, and, heeding your suggestion, did not "wet my feet."

I called in the American and French newspaper correspondents and gave them in substance the interview which I herewith enclose, which has had a most agreeable reaction in the French and American press. I am glad that I had found the situation so that I could truthfully make such a splendid statement with reference to the French occupation of Morocco.

For obvious reasons, I avoided any discussion whilst there, or since my return, of the Riffian subject. I was accompanied by my daughter-in-law and Colonel and Mrs. Mott. Naturally, we made some observations and drew some conclusions with reference to the Riffian question, en route and in my return journey through Spain, which I will not attempt to trouble you with at present, but which will be put before you in the form of a brief despatch.

I hope at some later day, when you are enjoying a well-earned vacation, that you and Mrs. Kellogg will make this trip.

Believe me, my dear Mr. Kellogg,

Very sincerely yours,

MYRON T. HERRICK.

Enclosure:

As stated.

MEMORANDA OF MY MOROCCAN TRIP.

(This memoranda is for your information, and is not necessarily to be taken literally).

I went to Morocco for a little holiday and I have enjoyed myself hugely. Now that I have been, I wonder why I never took this trip before, for it is such an easy thing to do, and the charm and interest of it all is indescribable. Twenty-six years ago I landed at Algiers and drove ^{with} ~~the~~ horses over the mountains to Tunis. This heightened my desire to return and go to Morocco, for at that time it was before the occupation of the French and was practically impossible. But the romance of this territory had appealed to my youthful recollections and had become a fixture in my mind. For what school-boy has not been thrilled by the blood-curdling tales of the corsairs, of the fierce pirates who infested the Mediterranean, terrorized the Barbary Coast and preyed upon the shipping of all the world. These marauders had been seizing our ships and selling their crews into slavery whilst we were busy with the War of 1812, and our Government determined to put a stop to this. At that particular period, which was before steamships, America had made quite a record on the sea. It was in the days of the clipper ships and of John Paul Jones. Our Government, without hesitation, decided to send our ships over there to chastize these pirates and the records that were there made by Captains Perry, Porter, Preble, Bainbridge and others are a well known part of our history. For a century, the nations of Europe had paid these picturesque pirates tribute to let their commerce alone, and they had become a terror to the world. We promptly sent our ships over and bombarded them into respect for our flag. The lesson was a good one for them and other nations soon followed suit.

You ask about conditions in Morocco. It would be presumptuous for me to judge after a three week's motor trip of anything so vast and so complicated as France's rapid and marvelous work in that country in the few years

of . . .

of her administration, and yet there are some things so evident and so striking as to be inescapable. I would say that the order, progress and the steady material development visible on every hand are accompanied by wide contentment of the native Moroccan. This would seem to arise, aside from the material benefit which both the French and the Moroccans have experienced, from the fact that all the French officials, from the top to the bottom, seem to be carrying out with a sort of fanatical piety Marshal Lyautey's three cardinal principles upon which he founded the French occupation, and which are generosity, sympathy and religious tolerance. The French, as I saw it, do not pretend to rule Morocco. They aid the Sultan in doing so and are really his administrators. Their administration brings to the country the benefits of an organized, up-to-date civilization, and a security which did not before obtain, and these benefits and progress increase with a rapidity absolutely astounding. We are used to immediate results in the United States and pride ourselves upon them. Well, if any American will imagine what the vast country to the south of the ^{Sebu}~~Savon~~ River was ten years ago and compare it with what it is now, and what I saw there only yesterday, he would be proud to think that it had been the work of his countrymen at their very best. From Fez to Rabat, from Rabat to Marakech, and then on to Tangier by different routes we travelled along roads as good as any in the world. Parallel to these ran railroads, finished, building or being altered from narrow gauge to standard gauge. En route to Marakech, we drove out from Casablanca on a beautiful tarred road, with many long straight stretches reaching beyond our vision. Parallel with it is an electric, standard gauge road, a power line, a telegraph line, and the old broad, dusty paths over which the camels pad their way to and from the Sahara desert, and the patient donkey carries his burden, accompanied by countless, barefooted Arabs, Moors and Berbers enveloped in their burnouses, plying their costly trade as they did in the days . . .

days of Mahomet. To the right and left are vast fertile, cultivated fields, orchards and vineyards, and new farms and farmhouses as far as one could see. What a land of contrasts, what a land of hope! What an outlet and what a land of opportunity for those in a crowded country does this vast territory open up! The only parallel that I recall to this development is that of the days of our winning the West.

We were the recipients of the most charming hospitality from the French officials and from the native chiefs. That seems to be the rule of these most hospitable people, but I will tell you a secret as to that. As keen as these people are to have their accomplishments known, no one tried to "propagand" me. Whatever I wanted to see was shown me at once; whatever I asked about, a Frenchman or a native expert was ready to answer.

Morocco was once a land of mystery but it is quite wide open today. It is now a new and easy route for tourists and within the reach of modest pocketbooks. The hotels are exceptionally comfortable and I do not hesitate to recommend this trip to my compatriots. The charm and the cultural value of such a journey is incalculable. They will see there in active operation a new experiment in world progress, a new scheme in the long, long list of efforts made by advanced countries in contact with backward countries. The word "colonisation" is the one usually employed. I don't think it quite accurate, but it will do. French colonisation, then, in Morocco is not marked by the same peculiarities as was the colonisation of Algeria, Madagascar and Tunis. One is tempted to say that the French have tried to avoid all that their experience had proved to be unwise or unfortunate, and to start out on practically new lines and principles. The basis of this is cooperation, coupled with wide tolerance of native customs and of native religion . . .

religion. It is an experiment, with alert watching. It has already produced first rate results and it is being pursued with exemplary patience. Every civilized nation has an interest in helping it to succeed. I believe that it will succeed, especially if the rest of us help rather than obstruct. One thing is certain: the Frenchmen that I met carrying on this work in Morocco, whether military or civilian administrators, seem to have been wisely selected for their inherent qualities of common sense, efficiency and good nature. Much of the work is diplomatic in its character and they are veritable missionaries of civilisation, impregnated with a single purpose and high-minded doctrine. If they fail to continue to make Morocco a happier land for Moroccans, then the old-fashioned methods of persecution will have received a new impetus, and what we like to consider as predominant American principles will have received a setback.

PRESS CLIPPINGS.

Name of Paper **NEW YORK HERALD**

of April 21, 1925.

Date **April 21, 1925.**

Subject **Ambassador Herrick's trip to Morocco.**

HERRICK FINDS MOROCCO NEW LAND OF HOPE

**Order, Progress and Steady
Development Reported by
American Ambassador.**

A pleasant picture of French administration in Morocco was painted yesterday by Ambassador Myron T. Herrick, who returned on Monday evening from a three-week pleasure trip through the French possessions in Northern Africa. Modern methods, followed with careful understanding, are making a record of which any nation might be proud, he declared.

Questioned as to the evidences of the Riffian struggle, Mr. Herrick said that in his journey he kept away from the front and consequently could give no information.

"I can have no opinion from my brief visit," he declared. "Some people believe that the Riffs would be amenable if it were not for their chief, while others believe that an absolute defeat will be necessary to settle the question. Going up through the Spanish zone to Tangier, I saw troops on the roads and on the hills, but they told me that after a certain hour it would be best not to cross the frontier, for a part was left unguarded at that time. But that is all I saw of the military operations."

Wide Contentment.

Then continuing his discussion of conditions in Morocco Mr. Herrick declared: "It would be presumptuous for me to judge after a three-week motor trip of anything so vast and so complicated as France's rapid and marvelous work in that country in the few years of her administration, and yet there are some things so evident and so striking as to be inescapable. I would say that order, progress and the steady material development visible on every hand are accompanied by wide contentment of the native Moroccan. This would seem to arise, aside from the material benefit which both nations have experienced, from the fact that all the French officials seem to be carrying out with almost fanatical piety Marshal Lyautey's principles of generosity, sympathy and religious tolerance.

"The French, as I saw it, do not pretend to rule Morocco. They aid the Sultan and are really his administrators. They bring to the country the benefits of an organized, up-to-date civilization, and a security which did not before obtain, and these benefits and progress increase with a rapidity absolutely astounding.

"We pride ourselves in the United States upon immediate results, but if any American will imagine what the vast country to the South of the Sebu River was ten years ago and compare it with what it is now he would be proud to think it had been the work of his countrymen at their best."

"Land of Hope."

The beautiful new roads, paralleled by power lines, telegraph and electric railways in contrast to their picturesque travellers of all nationalities, and the differences of development everywhere led the Ambassador to exclaim: "What a land of contrasts, what a land of hope! What an outlet and what a land of opportunity for those in a crowded country does this vast territory open up! The only parallel that I recall to this development is that of the days of our winning the West.

"We were the recipients of the most charming hospitality from the French officials and from the native chiefs. No one tried to 'propagand' me. Whatever I wanted to see was shown me at once. Whatever I asked about, a Frenchman or a native expert was ready to answer. Morocco was once the land of mystery, but it is wide open to-day, and I do not hesitate to recommend this trip. Travellers will see there in active operation a new experiment in world progress, a new scheme in the long, long list of efforts made by advanced countries in contact with backward countries.

"One is tempted to say that the French have tried to avoid all that their experience had proved to be unwise or unfortunate and to start out on new lines and principles. The basis of this is co-operation, coupled with wide tolerance of native customs and of native religion. It is an experiment with alert watching. It has already produced first-rate results and I believe that it will succeed, especially if the rest of us help rather than obstruct.

"One thing is certain; the Frenchmen carrying on the work have been wisely selected for their inherent qualities of common sense, efficiency and good nature. If they fail to continue to make Morocco a happier land for Moroccans, then the old-fashioned methods of persecution will have received a new impetus, and what we like to consider as predominant American principles will have received a setback."

Only one lack marred the Ambassador's visit. He recalled the fact that everywhere he saw the representatives of other Governments appropriately housed, but that in Morocco and in Madrid, on his return, he found the American officials handicapped by lack of proper quarters. Mr. Herrick has always advocated the purchase or building of such structures abroad, and the Embassy in Paris is largely the result of his activities.

PRESS CLIPPINGS.

Name of Paper CHICAGO TRIBUNE of Paris
Date April 21, 1926.
Subject Ambassador Herrick's trip to Morocco.

Ambassador Herrick, Back From Morocco, Lauds Work Of French

Ambassador Myron T. Herrick returned to Paris late Monday night by the Sud-Express from Madrid after a three weeks tour of Morocco. He visited Rabat, Fez, Marrakech, and Casablanca, and traversed the Spanish zone from Larache to Tangiers, returning.

The American ambassador said he found opinion divided in the French zone regarding the probability of an imminent peace with the Riff tribes, but everywhere he encountered complete satisfaction with the French administration throughout the protectorate.

In the Spanish zone the road was patrolled with mounted Spanish troops to protect the ambassador's automobile from any roving bands of rebels.

From Tangiers, the ambassador proceeded to Algeciras and after a visit to Gibraltar, he continued to Ronda, and thence to Madrid.

In an interview, Ambassador Herrick said in part yesterday:

"It would be presumptuous for me to judge after a three weeks' motor trip of anything so vast and so complicated as France's rapid and marvelous work in that country, in the few years of her administration, and yet there are some things so evident and so striking as to be inescapable. I would say that the order, progress and the steady material development visible on every hand are accompanied by wide contentment of the native Moroccan. This would seem to arise, aside from the material benefit which

both the French and the Moroccans have experienced, from the fact that all the French officials, from the top to the bottom, seem to be carrying out with a sort of fanatical piety Marshal Lyautey's three cardinal principles upon which he founded the French occupation, and which are generosity, sympathy and religious tolerance.

"This administration brings to the country the benefits of an organized, up-to-date civilization, and a security which did not before obtain, and these benefits and progress increase with a rapidity absolutely astounding. We are used to immediate results in the United States and pride ourselves upon them. Well, if any American will imagine what the vast country to the south of the Sebu River was ten years ago and compare it with what it is now, and what I saw there only yesterday, he would be proud to think that it had been the work of his countrymen at their very best.

"Morocco was once a land of mystery but it is quite wide open today. It is now a new and easy route for tourists and within the reach of modest pocketbooks. The hotels are exceptionally comfortable and I do not hesitate to recommend this trip to my compatriots. The charm and the cultural value of such a journey is incalculable. They will see there in active operation a new experiment in world progress, a new scheme in the long, long list of efforts made by advanced countries in contact with backward countries."

PRESS CLIPPINGS.

Name of Paper **LE MATIN** of **Paris**
 Date **April 21, 1925.**
 Subject **Ambassador Herrick's trip to Morocco.**

**"Ce n'est pas pour elle
 que la France
 a travaillé en Afrique:
 c'est pour le monde"**

**nous déclare M. Myron T. Herrick,
 retour du Maroc**

Je viens de voir un homme enthousiaste de l'œuvre de colonisation de la France. Je n'ai pas besoin de dire que ce n'était pas un Français. Il s'appelle Myron T. Herrick et est ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Paris. Il revient du Maroc, où il a voyagé pendant trois semaines.

— Il n'y a pas un homme, me disait-il, qui, après avoir vu ce que j'ai vu là-bas, puisse ne pas éprouver d'émotion. Mais, quand cet homme est un Américain, l'émotion redouble. Il croit avoir sous les yeux le spectacle qu'avaient ses aïeux, lorsque pied à pied ils s'enfonçaient dans les prairies vers l'ouest et que la civilisation s'y enfonçait avec eux.

Vous entendez, je parle de civilisation, et non de colonisation. Il est possible qu'à Madagascar ou au Soudan la France fasse de la belle et bonne colonisation. Mais en Algérie, au Maroc, le mot est trop faible et trop mesquin. C'est la civilisation elle-même, avec ce qu'elle comporte de plus noble et de plus grandiose que la France a implantée là-bas.

A la base, il y a une méthode très simple et très efficace : la coopération avec l'indigène. On a respecté toutes les coutumes, toutes les traditions. On a respecté

toutes les croyances et toutes les religions. On travaille épaule contre épaule, la main dans la main. Sans doute, on demeure vigilant : il faut toujours demeurer vigilant. Mais la vigilance n'exclue pas la patience. Et la France a su se montrer patiente. Elle a su aussi se montrer habile. Et ses généraux, ses officiers n'ont pas montré moins de diplomatie que ses civils. Le maréchal Lyautey ne fut pas seulement un grand soldat : il fut un grand politique et un grand diplomate.

Résultats : partout j'ai vu des gens confiants et heureux, partout j'ai vu du sourire et de la joie. Un pacha ne me disait-il pas : « Nous vous aimons tous ici, monsieur l'ambassadeur, parce que nous savons que tous les Français vous aiment ? » Peut-on imaginer parole plus symbolique et plus touchante ?

Je souhaite qu'un grand nombre de mes compatriotes suivent mon exemple et aillent au Maroc. Ils y trouveront tout le confort le plus raffiné, aussi bien dans les hôtels que sur les routes où, à côté des autos, court souvent le tram électrique. Ils y trouveront toutes les portes ouvertes : tout, au Maroc, est au grand jour et au grand soleil. La seule chose qu'il n'y trouveront pas, c'est du mystère, car le mystère est parti.

Mais quand ils mettront le pied sur cette terre de lumière et de beauté, qu'ils n'oublient pas les ombres du passé ! Qu'ils se souviennent que, lorsque les corsaires berbères infestaient la Méditerranée, nous avons eu nous-mêmes sur les côtes marocaines des bateaux coulés et des équipages emmenés en captivité ! Qu'ils relisent notre histoire aux environs de 1812, et alors qu'ils comprennent bien que ce n'est pas pour elle que la France a travaillé en Afrique : c'est pour le monde !

Stéphane Lauzanne.

PRESS CLIPPINGS.

Name of Paper **FIGARO** of **Paris**
Date **April 21, 1926.**
Subject **Ambassador Herrick's trip to Morocco.**

LA FRANCE AU MAROC

**Les impressions de voyage
de M. Myron T. Herrick**

L'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis voit dans notre œuvre « une nouvelle expérience de l'avancement du monde ».

M. Myron T. Herrick, ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Paris, qui vient de rentrer d'un voyage au Maroc, a fait part, hier après-midi, de ses impressions.

« Ce serait présomptueux, a-t-il dit tout d'abord, de juger, après une excursion de trois semaines en automobile, une chose aussi vaste, aussi compliquée que le rapide et merveilleux travail accompli par la France au Maroc en quelques années de son administration.

» Il y a cependant des choses tellement évidentes et frappantes qu'on ne saurait ne pas les voir.

» Je veux dire que l'ordre, le progrès et le développement matériel continu, visibles partout, s'accompagnent de la large satisfaction de l'indigène marocain. Ceci me semble provenir, indépendamment du bénéfice matériel que les Français et les Marocains ont expérimenté, du fait que tous les officiels français, du haut en bas de la hiérarchie, semblent réaliser avec une sorte de piété fanatique, *les trois principes essentiels sur lesquels le maréchal Lyautey fonda l'occupation française, et qui sont : générosité, sympathie et tolérance religieuse.*

» Les Français, ainsi que j'ai pu le voir, ne prétendent pas gouverner le Maroc. Ils aident le sultan à le faire et sont, en réalité, ses administrateurs. Leur administration apporte au pays les bienfaits d'une civilisation organisée et moderne et une sécurité que le pays n'avait pas auparavant.

» Ces bienfaits et ces progrès s'accroissent avec une rapidité surprenante. Nous sommes habitués, aux Etats-Unis, aux résultats immédiats et nous en sommes fiers. Eh bien ! si un Américain veut imaginer ce que le vaste pays situé au sud de la rivière Sebou était il y a dix ans, et s'il veut le comparer avec son état actuel, tel qu'il m'est apparu, hier encore, il serait fier de penser que ce serait le travail le meilleur de ses compatriotes.

» Je ne trouve qu'un exemple comparable à celui d'un tel développement, et c'est celui des jours où nous colonisâmes l'Ouest.

» Le charme et la valeur culturelle d'un tel voyage sont incalculables. Mes compatriotes verront dans sa réalité active une nouvelle expérience de l'avancement du monde, un nouvel exemple dans la liste déjà longue des efforts accomplis par les pays avancés en contact avec les pays retardataires. »

May 4, 1926.

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I have received your letter of April twenty-third enclosing memoranda of your Moroccan trip and also the Paris clippings on the same subject. I have noted them with interest and I deeply appreciate your courtesy in writing me.


With kindest regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

FRANK B. KELLOGG

Honorable Myron F. Herrick,
American Ambassador,
Paris,
France.

S WEB:ACS





J.W. 881.00/1218 1/2

No. 95.

American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General.

Tangier, Morocco, May 4th, 1926.



SUBJECT:- Application of Article 20 of Tangier Convention.
Double duties collected on goods entering the
Spanish Zone.



The Honorable,

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:-

I have the honor to recall that, in my Despatch No. 881.00/1148, 16 of September 4th, 1925, (pages 12-14) I pointed out that Tangier, was the natural entrepot for the distribution of imported goods over a considerable area of the neighboring Spanish Zone, and that the formalities inherent to any administrative measures adopted for the enforcement of Article 20 of the Tangier Convention would be detrimental to the trade

trade and interests of Tangier and its merchants.

Article 20 confines the Customs revenue of the Tangier Zone to the duties levied solely on goods actually consumed within the limits of that Zone, and therefore contemplated a system of control over the trade passing between the Tangier and the Spanish Zones, for the purpose of establishing the proportion of Customs revenue due to each Zone.

Upon the enforcement of the Tangier Convention on June 1st, 1925, the French Protectorate Authorities who control the Customs Administration in Tangier, immediately put up a Customs barrier on the frontier between the Tangier and Spanish Zones and proceeded to levy duties on all articles entering Tangier over that frontier notwithstanding the fact that duties had already been collected thereon when entering Morocco through the ports of the French or Spanish Zones. The entire population of Tangier rose in protest against this measure, which was one of the principal causes of the disturbances in Tangier on July 2nd, last year. (See my Telegram No. 12 of July 2nd, 1925, 4 p.m.).

Under the pressure of these protests, the Customs barrier was withdrawn. It was admitted however that the measure could not be condemned as an illegal method of applying the stipulations of Article 20 of the Tangier Convention.

The Tangier Legislative Assembly petitioned however that the adjustment of Customs Revenue Accounts between the three different Zones of Morocco should be effected by means of fixed annual payments to be agreed between
delegates

delegates of their respective Customs Administrations. By this means the objectionable procedure of Customs control on the Zonal frontiers would become unnecessary.

Discussions were pursued on this principle, and a virtual understanding was arrived at by which the Tangier Treasury was to pay over to the Customs Administration of the Spanish Zone an annual sum of 500,000 Spanish Pesetas in compensation for the Customs duties and consumption taxes collected on goods, cleared through the Tangier Customs, but ultimately destined to pass into the Spanish Zone.

Consequently the transit of goods from Tangier into the Spanish Zone continued to be effected without let or hindrance, until April 15th, last, from which date the Spanish High Commissioner at Tetuan, on a few days notice, set up a Customs barrier between the Tangier and Spanish Zones, and the Customs duties, in addition to those already paid at the Tangier Customs House, were again levied at this barrier by the Spanish Zone Customs Officials on all merchandise entering their Zone from Tangier.

Whatever justification for this action the Spanish Authorities may adduce under the terms of Article 20 of the Tangier Convention, their action in demanding a second payment of Customs duties is a distinct violation of the treaties so far as American citizens and protégés are concerned.

I have accordingly pointed out to my Spanish Colleague the position which I take in the matter, and have verbally made all reservations respecting claims which

may

may arise in connection with duties illegally levied on the goods of American citizens and protégés.

There is however a general impression that the situation will receive satisfactory solution within a very short period, as a result of the negotiations now proceeding between the signatories of the Tangier Convention to urge Spain to adopt a reasonable arrangement.

Under these circumstances I have not deemed it advisable to follow up my verbal representations with a more formal action, pending the result of the above mentioned conversations, unless a specific case involving American interests, should demand my intervention.

An article from the local English weekly newspaper " Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa" dealing with the question is annexed hereto.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant



Maxwell Blake.
American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul-General.

✓
Enclosure:-

Newspaper article as
above stated.

Note:-

Copy of this despatch to American Embassy, Madrid.



THE CUSTOMS CORDON.

A customs barrier has been erected in the Spanish Zone, and customs duties are being collected on goods passing into that Zone. There has been a good deal of comment on the action taken by Spain, and as unfortunately happens in international communities, a certain amount of acrimony has been imported into the discussion. We have no intention whatever of entering into a controversial or even critical examination of the case, our object is, if possible, rather to pour oil on the troubled waters, than to do anything to add fuel to the fire.

In matters of this kind, it is always desirable to start with the ascertained facts, before jumping to conclusions. The established facts are, as far as we can ascertain.

1. Only one duty is leviable throughout the Moroccan Empire.
2. The duty is, under the Statute, to be collected in the Zone where the goods are consumed.
3. Spain has erected a barrier and is collecting duty on all imports.
4. Non adherent, Nations are not assessable for these duties under the old Treaties.
5. That an offer of half a million pesetas per annum was offered to Spain in compensation of loss of duty.
6. Spain did not accept the offer.

There are certain points about which there can be no misunderstanding, and the first is clear to demonstration, that no inhabitant in Morocco can be called upon to pay duty more than once, and that if he has paid duty in one Zone and removes goods to another Zone, he is entitled to a refund and in the case of goods of any importance, or for that matter presumably of any goods, machinery has been provided for such refund; the case is really limited to a man having bought duty paid goods of comparatively small value, being assessed for duty a second time on passing the frontier to the Spanish Zone. The French Zone does not arise in this connection as goods can only be imported by sea.

Article 20 which is the villain of the piece has been loosely drafted, and although the intention may be clearly understood, a clause in a treaty can only be construed according to its language, and not in accordance with, what it may be thought, was in the draftsman's mind.

The article in question lays down that "Goods Landed at Tangier and destined for use or consumption in the French or Spanish Zones shall enjoy the benefit of the ordinary rules of transit, warehousing or temporary admission, the proper customs

duties being collected at the custom houses of the Zone of consumption and it is difficult to understand how, in the absence of specific machinery for the purpose, duty

can be collected except by the establishment of customs-barriers.

The actual construction of article 20, is at the moment, a subject of debate, but we are pleased to hear that a suggestion, emanating we shrewdly suspect from a legal mind, which has before now made unobtrusive suggestions, has been made that the various governments represented on the Assembly shall be asked, through the customary channels, to express their views on the construction of the article in question, and in the event of a divergence of opinion that the matter shall be referred, as provided under the Statute, to the Hague.

In the meantime, it is proposed to ask Spain to remove the barriers, pending a settlement of the question.

So much for the legal side, by which we are inevitably bound if both sides insist on a strictly legal interpretation.

We do not presume to express any opinion on the subject, beyond pointing out that the question is considered to be arguable.

Now let us for a moment consider the common sense point of view.

From time immemorial there has been no barrier of this sort established, and it has come as a shock to all traders, regardless of nationality, and if they are to be permanently established, it means, of necessity, the establishment in the International Zone of similar barriers, an enormous expense for a doubtful result, constant friction and a perpetual system of smuggling. All of this for the benefit of no one, and easy of avoidance.

To wait for a decision, more than likely to be submitted to the Hague means a long waste of time, uncertainty of result, and a general disinclination to trade.

We have the highest regard for Spain, and we have an intimate knowledge of her business honour and integrity.

If a Spaniard makes a bargain, he carries out that bargain although it may be a considerable loss, whilst at the same time if you approach the Spaniard as one gentleman to another, and say I am in a hole will you help me, no one in the world is more generously disposed. It seems to us that if we approach Spain in that attitude pointing out that we have no desire to defraud her of her just compensation, but that to insist on what may or may not be finally accepted as a legal interpretation of her rights, is likely to work havoc with Tangier, we have little doubt that Spain will meet us in the most friendly and generous spirit.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

to

FROM

GRAY

Madrid

Dated May 24, 1926


Recd. 10:05 a.m.

Index Bureau
RECEIVED

MAY 24 1926
Dep't. of State

Secretary of State,
Washington.

32, May 24, noon.



I learn from an authority very close to Primo de Rivera and confirmed by other reliable sources that Abdel Krim has sued for peace, that negotiations to this end will commence today, and that they will be concluded by the end of the week.

HAMMOND

WSB



WE
C

INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1220

MAY 27 1926
FIVE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WE
[Signature]

OJC

From ~~me~~en,

RECEIVED

MAY 25 1926

Dep't. of State

Paris.

Dated May 25, 1926.

Rec'd 9.27 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

206, May 25, noon.



881.00/1221
[Handwritten notes and signatures]

Following series of French advances in Riff, Steeg has received communication from Abd-el Krim which press states begs for resumption peace negotiations. Press in optimistic head lines hails this "surrender" as the end of the Moroccan war.

HERRICK

WVC

MAY 27 1926
[Vertical stamp]



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WE
CP

OJC

Index Bureau
RECEIVED

MAY 23 1926

Dep't. of State

Gray.
FROM
Madrid.

Dated May 26, 1926.

Rec'd 3.50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

33, May 26, 6 p.m.



Primo de Rivera's secretary informs me that peace
has just been concluded with Abdel Krim.

HAMMOND

CSB



88.100/1222

MAY 27 1926

U

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

QJC

Green.

INDEXED
MAY 27 1926

MAY 27 1926

Dept. of State



Secretary of State,
Washington.

Office of Economic Adviser
MAY 27 1926
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

211, May 27, 5 p.m.

Note 851.50

Surrender of Abd el Krim has had a great effect here and preceded as it was by the recovery of the franc has been most beneficial in helping to restore the confidence of the French in their own situation.

HERRICK

PT

881.00/1223

JUN 1 1926

NO. 249

Confidential
AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Casablanca, Morocco, May 7, 1926.

AV+CCP
T
SUBJECT: Possible Results of Rupture of Peace Negotiations
at Oudjda.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON

SIR:



INDEX BUREAU

881.00/224

I have the honor to submit herewith certain observations concerning possible developments resulting from the rupture of peace negotiations at Oudjda, which is announced in the papers of this morning.

The Riff commissioners having brought back the practical refusal of Abd-El-Krim to the terms proposed by the Franco-Spanish negotiators, after an ultimatum had been given, it is announced that warlike operations will be resumed immediately. From a military standpoint the Riff leader has gained a month at least by the negotiations, and thus shortened the total possible period of active operations before the fall rains and very much decreased the period before extremely hot weather sets in, handicapping the European forces.

Reports as to conditions in the Riff are extremely contradictory, so that it is very difficult to judge of the exact truth. It would seem, however, that, although many of the border tribes have made submission, more or less permanent, to the French or Spanish, Abd-el-Krim still has at his back practically all of the

(tribes

tribes of the Riff proper. They will be fighting this spring and summer on their own territory, a terrain that will prove terribly difficult for the movement of troops and the bringing up of supplies, and that is far worse than that over which last year's campaign was fought. Many troops will be necessary to guard the lengthening lines of communication, for the submission of the border tribes can not be relied upon, especially if the Franco-Spanish forces meet any reverses.

Fighting this year will of necessity be mainly in Spanish Moroccan territory. There is considerable speculation as to whether the French will be especially desirous of "pulling the chestnuts out of the fire" for the Spanish, unless the latter are willing to make certain favorable concessions. The French Parliament has already refused to increase the credits for the Moroccan campaign, and this will also increase the French reluctance to engage in a venture upon Spanish Moroccan soil.

On the other hand, if the French should be more or less hesitant in aiding the Spanish, the latter may well face the prospect of another disastrous campaign, which would be likely to discourage their government from any further venture, beyond, perhaps, holding Ceuta, Tetouan, Melilla and their immediate environs. Success by the Riffs in this respect would have the effect of once more firing all the mountain tribes and result in another attack, sooner or later, upon the French Protectorate.

The Oudjda negotiations were much handicapped by the fact that neither before nor during the meetings did the Franco-Spanish commissioners seem to have a really settled common program. Dur-

(ing

ing the negotiations the impression gained here was that France for various reasons seemed the more anxious for peace and had a more concrete program of terms to offer. The somewhat negative attitude of the Spanish commissioners may have been partly due to the traditional "mañana" temperament of their people, but was probably also due to the desire of their government to wring certain concessions from France in Morocco, perhaps with regard to Tangier. The French Moroccan press was continually complaining that in the negotiations the French commissioners were constantly obliged to act as "arbitrators" between the Spanish and the Riffs.

Just before the Oudjda negotiations began, there was a great deal heard here concerning a possible re-arrangement of boundaries as regards the Spanish and French Zones. The suggestion was that France might waive in favor of Spain all possibilities of future domination in the International Zone at Tangier, while Spain would "rectify" her southern Moroccan boundary in favor of France to such an extent that the bulk of the Riff would be placed within the jurisdiction of the French Protectorate. Such an arrangement was said to be conditional upon the success of the peace negotiations then about to begin. That such an arrangement, involving a closer approach of French influence and authority to the Mediterranean seaboard of Morocco, might be viewed with much apprehension and meet with every obstacle from Great Britain, on account of the menace to the latter country's control of the Straits of Gibraltar, goes almost without saying. Only recently this point was again emphasized to me in a conversation with my British colleague.

A strong suspicion is growing that the peace negotiations,

(which

which seem to have been initiated by the ~~French~~ Abd-el-Krim, were dictated not so much by sheer necessity as a desire to gain time and, quite possibly, to conciliate certain elements among his tribesmen, with the possibility in the offing of obtaining practically his own terms without further fighting, if the necessities of his adversaries drove them to acceptance. This suspicion is to a certain extent borne out by the counter-terms offered by Abd-el-Krim, which would have left his tribesmen largely to look after their own affairs, owing only a nominal spiritual allegiance to Sultan Moulay Youssef.

The resumption of hostilities in the Riff will again postpone, at least for another year, any action by the French in pacifying other parts of the Protectorate, that are still unsubdued. This Consulate was recently informed by an American citizen, who is a lieutenant in the French Foreign Legion and has been stationed for a long time in the district between Fez and Taza, that, if the Oudjda peace negotiations were successful, the French had planned to march southward into the Middle Atlas and to subdue the tribes there that have defied the Protectorate Government from the beginning and that assumed an especially threatening attitude last year, when the Riff campaign was at its most critical stage.

The same thing may be said of the situation in the Grand Atlas regions, especially east, northeast and southeast of Marrakech, and in the Souss region. It has been reported recently on good authority that the great Caids of these regions have been petitioning the Residency General for practically a "Home Rule" type of government, involving almost complete withdrawal of French troops and almost complete restoration of the powers of the native chiefs, tempered by the counsel of French ad-

(visers

visers. Naturally, this project is being put forward at a moment when the Caids think that there is a maximum chance of its acceptance by the Residency, in order to stifle any possible uprising in the South. It is probable that the Government will play for delay until the situation in the North is more clearly defined.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "H. Earle Russell".

H. Earle Russell
American Consul.

IN QUINTUPLICATE

COPY TO TANGIER

800/820

HERLR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

OJC

INQUIRY Bureau
RECEIVED

JUN 2 1926

Dept. of State

Rome.

FROM
Dated June 1, 1926.

Rec'd 4.28 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

61. June 1, 4 p.m.

Paulucci, principal private secretary to Mussolini has left for Madrid where his father is Italian Ambassador. Object of visit thought to be connected with Italian desire to be included in Morocco settlement. Repeated to American Embassy Madrid.

FLETCHER

CSB

This cable
was received
in the Depart-
ment's Confiden-
tial Code

It should be
closely para-
phrased before
being communi-
cated to anyone

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

file
W
JUN 2 1926
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1225
JUN 2 1926



PTT 67



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

London, May 25, 1926.

No. 1040



INDEX BUREAU
881.00/1226

JUN 10 1926

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

As of possible interest to the Department, I have the honor to transmit herewith clippings in triplicate of an article published in the DAILY TELEGRAPH of May 19, 1926, entitled FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Ambassador:

F. A. Sterling
F. A. STERLING
Counselor of Embassy.

Enclosure:
As stated. *W*

COPY SENT TO E. I. C.

CITY: LONDON.

FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

THE MOROCCAN PROTECTORATE.

By HENRY D. DAVRAY.

British observers have given testimony to the lamentable condition in which Morocco was stagnating at the beginning of this century, and it would be easy to collect identical impressions from the travellers and residents belonging to other nations. But as to the changes which have taken place, let the facts as they are to-day speak for themselves. In March, 1912, France established her protectorate over the Shereefian empire, and the Resident-General, Marshal Lyautey, began his work. His policy of penetration was both clever and prudent. It consolidated the power of the Sultan, whose prestige increased with the growth of his power. Each day the authority of the Maghzen was extended, and the rapidity with which year by year new territories came under its sway was really astonishing.

During the European war, which supervened after France had been exercising her tutelage over Morocco for a couple of years, Marshal Lyautey not only maintained intact the still somewhat fragile results of his activity and put down various rebellions fomented by German agents, but he even brought new regions under allegiance to the Sultan.

It is not too much to say that Morocco to-day "is no more an African, but a European country, with the same economic laws, the same method of life almost (with the differences of religion) to be observed there as are to be observed in Southern Europe; in fact, the country has entered the great family and polity of European nations." That, at any rate, is the opinion and those the words of Mr. R. B. Cunninghame Graham. And for the rest, from the physical and ethnological point of view, is not the country more European than African?

"A EUROPEAN ISLAND."

Returning to the comparison of Ibn Khaldoun and extending it to Algeria and Tunis, Sir Harry Johnston repeats that North Africa forms a European island separated by the Atlas from the true African Continent. Despite Asiatic contributions, the population itself has a majority of European origin. The most recent anthropological researches point to the conclusion that North Africa, and in particular Morocco, is predominantly inhabited by Caucasian races which adverse circumstances have kept away from the great current of Mediterranean civilisation. This return of North Africa to Europe is being accomplished by the intervention of a European nation. Is it permissible to hope that the geographical conditions and the origins of the native population may favour the task of Europeanisation which falls to the lot of France?

To this question the reply rests with the future. For the moment we will confine ourselves to what we have seen and heard in the course of a journey of investigation which lead us from one end of the country to the other, often away from the beaten tracks.

At the very outset, and throughout his peregrinations, the traveller is astonished by the development of means of transport and communications. An immense network of roads stretches in every direction all over the country. The roads are wide, well metalled, and well maintained, very often tarred over immense distances, and wherever the soil affords a sufficient amount of moisture, they are bordered by trees suitable to the particular climate. These plantations are, generally speaking, respected by the natives, and they suffer very little from the damage which might be done by sheep or cattle. The Kaids freely use their authority in enjoining respect for the trees upon the tribes.

PRESERVING THE FORESTS.

In the opinion of the rangers the deforestation is, at least in part, the cause of the

and of which the plans had to be submitted for the approval of the special service, as well as that of the sanitary authorities. Here you find the residential quarter, reserved for private dwellings, surrounded by gardens; there is the industrial quarter, with its factories, workshops, electric power station, warehouses; elsewhere is the business section, with its offices, shops, banks, restaurants, cafés; further on are the municipal buildings and administrative offices. And among all this are public gardens, spacious squares, and open spaces.

VIOLENT CONTRASTS.

Assuredly the unexpectedness of this juxtaposition of aspects causes some surprise, but there is no need to take offence at it. Why rail at the anachronism? Is it not far better to recognise the interest in this contact of two civilisations, in these fundamental transformations, and to recognise their historical importance? Wherever one goes Morocco awakens unexpected impressions. The motor-car traverses a region where everything attracts the attention, or where the contrasts disconcert the imagination. In the "bled" a native works with his primitive plough, drawn by an ass or a camel when it is not by a woman. Further along a colonist with a motor-plough is breaking up a piece of ground covered with "doun," or ploughing the soil for future crops. In May or June bands of natives—men, women, and children—scatter themselves over the ripe barley or wheat and cut it with sickles under the superintendence of the master, perched high on his mule. Not far distant on the estate of a European farmer, reaping machines are at work.

The motor-car passes through a forest, and not far from the native woodcutter, wielding his primitive axe, high-speed motor-driven saws are in operation. Further still, in the green valleys of the Atlas, a viaduct leaps a gorge at the bottom of which boils the "oued," whose waters give light and power to the whole region, yet there is not a drop the less in the crude channels which operate the tiny mills of the natives, nor in ditches where tortoises swarm.

In the towns the contrasts are more numerous and more violent. The "medina" displays its teeming "souks," and narrow streets in which porters, veiled women, peasants, and citizens elbow each other while trying to avoid heavily-laden horses or the richly-saddled mules on which opulent bourgeois are enthroned. In the wide streets of the European town are taxis, motor-buses, electric trams, and busy crowds in the shops, while the cinema placards shout their programmes, in which puerile, sentimental, or absurd American films have the predominance.

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are bordered by trees suitable to the particular climate. These plantations are, generally speaking, respected by the natives, and they suffer very little from the damage which might be done by sheep or cattle. The Kaids freely use their authority in enjoining respect for the trees upon the tribes.

PRESERVING THE FORESTS.

In the opinion of the rangers the deforestation is, at least in part, the cause of the infidelity from which many regions of Morocco are now suffering. The fact of the matter is that from time immemorial, from one end of North Africa to the other, the natives have never planted anything but olive, fig, and other fruit trees. According to ancient writers immense regions now desert were formerly covered with forests, but of these only a very few remain at the present day.

One of the first cares of the Protectorate was to "protect" these remains, and this matter was organised on scientific lines by the Department of Waters and Forests. While respecting the rights acquired by the natives it takes good care that the charcoal burners in the cork-tree forest of La Mamora, for example, fell trees bearing the Department's mark which have reached the term of their profitable yield.

Another example. South of Fez and Meknes the summits of the Middle Atlas are covered with most beautiful cedars, which owe their existence to the fact that they have not ceased to reproduce themselves naturally. Formerly, when proceeding to felling, the native woodman simply laid fire to the foot of these superb trees, and thus the largest and best part of the trunk, was destroyed. By no means infrequently the flames spread around, and large numbers of trees became involved in a conflagration. These disastrous practices have now been stopped, and the replanting of the mountains has been methodically taken in hand.

Naturally it has been necessary in this connection to provide means of transport, and this is being done. A road flanked by telegraph-poles is the irresistible arm of pacific penetration. Doubtless one cannot construct roads in rebellious country without military protection; but the troops employed are not offensive but defensive forces. The dissident tribes allow the work to proceed, and the military posts remain behind to ensure the security of traffic; they maintain pacific relations with the populations, do business with them, and procure their provisions from the tribesmen—even from the dissidents.

The latter become reassured, and soon they take the road to the markets in the plain to barter their goods against others. There are no more armed attacks, no more fusillades between tribes, no raids on live stock, no pillage of crops or destruction of douars and villages. The invisible protection of the Maghzen extends over the submitted country, and the road, with its telegraph poles and telephone wires, is the symbol of security.

ADMIRABLE ROAD SYSTEM.

Quite rightly, the road system of Morocco claims and secures the admiration of the traveller. For it is by road that all travel and the transport of mails and merchandise are conducted. But this does not apply to the native, who still uses the ancient tracks—dusty in summer, muddy in winter. He walks barefooted, with his asses and camels heavily laden with sacks of barley, baskets of stone, sand, or chalk, or voluminous bundles of straw or "doum"—dwarf palm leaves which will be transformed into fibre. The passage along the road of noisy lorries, the big passenger-carrying motor coaches or private motor-cars, barely causes him to turn his head. But while he sticks to animal transport for his produce the native is infatuated with the motor for the purpose of personal travel. In the public vehicles many seats are always occupied by natives, who are not infrequently accompanied by women and children. In addition to the big road transport companies, whose passenger services are as punctual as those of the railways, there are numerous enterprising proprietors of ancient vehicles into which ten or a dozen natives will cheerfully crowd in the hope of eventually reaching their villages.

Every effort is made to respect the past, and to adapt modernity to the local tradition. A special service has been created in the towns, under the authority of the Resident-General, without the sanction of which nothing can be either demolished or constructed. In the first place, this service sees that the native towns are kept in the condition in which the Protectorate found them, and that no disfiguring changes are made in them. It is not permissible to erect any building in the European style of architecture. It is necessary, however, to build dwelling-houses, warehouses, factories, stations, hotels, Government and municipal offices, hospitals and schools, churches and theatres, courts and prisons—in a word, to create new towns. Quite so, says the Protectorate, and itself sets the example.

Thus at Casablanca, Rabat, Fez, Marrakesh, Meknes, and a score of other places, outside the walls of the "medinas," or native towns, groups of buildings have arisen the plans of which have been drawn up according to all the rules of "urbanism." Wide avenues with several rows of trees, spacious roads are flanked by buildings the architecture of which derives its inspiration from Moorish art,

they must respect the customs of the country, respecting their beliefs and their customs, gives them an assurance of that security which is followed by prosperity. Will they co-operate? Or, one of these days, when they are better educated, may they not demand the right to continue the work of their fathers?

CITY: LONDON.

FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

THE MOROCCAN PROTECTORATE.

By HENRY D. DAVRAY.

British observers have given testimony to the lamentable condition in which Morocco was stagnating at the beginning of this century, and it would be easy to collect identical impressions from the travellers and residents belonging to other nations. But as to the changes which have taken place, let the facts as they are to-day speak for themselves. In March, 1912, France established her protectorate over the Shereefian empire, and the Resident-General, Marshal Lyautey, began his work. His policy of penetration was both clever and prudent. It consolidated the power of the Sultan, whose prestige increased with the growth of his power. Each day the authority of the Maghzen was extended, and the rapidity with which year by year new territories came under its sway was really astonishing.

During the European war, which supervened after France had been exercising her tutelage over Morocco for a couple of years, Marshal Lyautey not only maintained intact the still somewhat fragile results of his activity and put down various rebellions fomented by German agents, but he even brought new regions under allegiance to the Sultan.

It is not too much to say that Morocco to-day "is no more an African, but a European country, with the same economic laws, the same method of life almost (with the differences of religion) to be observed there as are to be observed in Southern Europe; in fact, the country has entered the great family and polity of European nations." That, at any rate, is the opinion and those the words of Mr. R. B. Cunninghame Graham. And for the rest, from the physical and ethnological point of view, is not the country more European than African?

"A EUROPEAN ISLAND."

Returning to the comparison of Ibn Khaldoun and extending it to Algeria and Tunis, Sir Harry Johnston repeats that North Africa forms a European island separated by the Atlas from the true African Continent. Despite Asiatic contributions, the population itself has a majority of European origin. The most recent anthropological researches point to the conclusion that North Africa, and in particular Morocco, is predominantly inhabited by Caucasian races which adverse circumstances have kept away from the great current of Mediterranean civilisation. This return of North Africa to Europe is being accomplished by the intervention of a European nation. Is it permissible to hope that the geographical conditions and the origins of the native population may favour the task of Europeanisation which falls to the lot of France?

To this question the reply rests with the future. For the moment we will confine ourselves to what we have seen and heard in the course of a journey of investigation which lead us from one end of the country to the other, often away from the beaten tracks.

At the very outset, and throughout his peregrinations, the traveller is astonished by the development of means of transport and communications. An immense network of roads stretches in every direction all over the country. The roads are wide, well metalled, and well maintained, very often tarred over immense distances, and wherever the soil affords a sufficient amount of moisture, they are bordered by trees suitable to the particular climate. These plantations are, generally speaking, respected by the natives, and they suffer very little from the damage which might be done by sheep or cattle. The Kaids freely use their authority in enjoining respect for the trees upon the tribes.

PRESERVING THE FORESTS.

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and of which the plans had to be submitted for the approval of the special service, as well as that of the sanitary authorities. Here you find the residential quarter, reserved for private dwellings, surrounded by gardens; there is the industrial quarter, with its factories, workshops, electric power station, warehouses; elsewhere is the business section, with its offices, shops, banks, restaurants, cafés; further on are the municipal buildings and administrative offices. And among all this are public gardens, spacious squares, and open spaces.

VIOLENT CONTRASTS.

Assuredly the unexpectedness of this juxtaposition of aspects causes some surprise, but there is no need to take offence at it. Why rail at the anachronism? Is it not far better to recognise the interest in this contact of two civilisations, in these fundamental transformations, and to recognise their historical importance? Wherever one goes Morocco awakens unexpected impressions. The motor-car traverses a region where everything attracts the attention, or where the contrasts disconcert the imagination. In the "bled" a native works with his primitive plough, drawn by an ass or a camel when it is not by a woman. Further along a colonist with a motor-plough is breaking up a piece of ground covered with "doun," or ploughing the soil for future crops. In May or June bands of natives—men, women, and children—scatter themselves over the ripe barley or wheat and cut it with sickles under the superintendence of the master, perched high on his mule. Not far distant on the estate of a European farmer, reaping machines are at work.

The motor-car passes through a forest, and not far from the native woodcutter, wielding his primitive axe, high-speed motor-driven saws are in operation. Further still, in the green valleys of the Atlas, a viaduct leaps a gorge at the bottom of which boils the "oued," whose waters give light and power to the whole region, yet there is not a drop the less in the crude channels which operate the tiny mills of the natives, nor in the ditches where tortoises swarm.

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
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581.00 No. 103.

American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General.

Tangier, Morocco, May 22nd, 1926.



Copy in WE. SH

SUBJECT:

Compromises before the Conference. The complex relationships at Oajda. Results and possible readjustments.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:-

Without the wish of dragging into the realm of tumult and controversy the topic of potential disorder in Morocco, I had the honor in a recent Despatch (No. 96 of May 5th, 1926), without contradicting the facts, to point out reasons adequate to convince all but unbelievers that there was a distinct movement amongst the

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CHAS. E. SMITH

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the natives in the direction of sympathetic unity and this was explained as comprehensible upon a common instinct of self-preservation. I stated that both practice and the growing threat of policy in this country to deprive the native of his material possessions, and not to accord him fair play, were introducing problems new and certainly contrary to the first conceptions of foreign intervention, which the innocent and trustful were persuaded to accept as a philanthropic and beneficial form of rule offered as an alternative, if not an antidote, to the amalgam of arrogance and vice under which his ancestors had existed from time immemorial. I concluded my survey of affairs with the suggestion that the realities therein reviewed somewhat explained the ardent proposals recently put forward for peace by France at Oojda.

Seeing the disproportion of events however, Spain, in an excited humor, was from the first ill-disposed to attend any such conference but when captured, she was found to be more difficult than usual to manage and this constituted something more than a petty inconvenience to France.

The disputes which took place in Paris and Madrid before Oojda first grew out of the breezes of suspicion in Spain that France had negotiated a secret understanding with Abdelkrim before putting forward her proposal for a conference at that place and Spain expressed her detestation of this procedure and denounced the dis-

disloyalty

disloyalty thereby implied to the agreement of last June made between the two Powers in a contrary sense. The French denied the charge without conviction and it may be affirmed with confidence that the crisis which then arose was aggravated by the fact that the situation appeared but a duplication of the irregularities which had so frequently in the past characterized the relations of these two Powers over their respective ambitions in Morocco.

Finally, Primo de Rivera completely upset matters by categorically refusing to hear further explanations or even examine the question of a conference except upon the basis of a program which he would elaborate and which would liberally take into account both the strengthened military situation of Spain in Morocco and the political sentiment and inclinations of his own country.

This for a time put an end to all controversy, but as France without the presence of Spain was unable to negotiate the terms of a peace settlement with Abdelkrim affecting territory lying within the mandated area of that Power, the French Government gave way and authorized its agents to embark on a discussion concerning the agenda of the conference.

France capitulated very reluctantly on this point but was compelled to do so to save her face since she had deliberately committed the mistake of publicly announcing that a conference was impending with Abdelkrim
before

before having received assurance that Spain was ready to attend.

We must recall that the situation now was quite different from that existing a year ago when Spain consented to renew her military activities in Morocco to help out the French embarrassment at the time in exchange for complete military collaboration. Spain felt therefore that after the heavy responsibilities which she was induced to undertake under this agreement the present was no time to suggest a peace with Abdelkrim to be carried out altogether at her expense and solely for the purpose of accommodating French political requirements, for Spain was aware that Abdelkrim would never accept from her hands terms satisfying to the demands of her public policy at home.

It is believed on good authority that, to reach a compromise, Spain expressed her willingness to rectify the boundaries of her Zone in favor of France to the extent of throwing practically the entire Riff under French control, if compensation were given her in regard to Tangier. Her overtures in this regard were rejected, however, with the result that Spain's coolness and reserve grew and her demands became more uncompromising from hour to hour.

Finally, with the assistance and the support of his advisors, Primo de Rivera laid down three inexorable conditions on the acceptance of which by France, Spain would alone associate herself with the Oojda conference:

(a).

(a) a time limit within which there should be a "yes" or "no," (b) the exile of Abdelkrim from Morocco, and (c) the complete disarmament of the tribes, the latter two being points which the Spaniards knew in advance would never be accepted. Then, following the innovation of France ever consenting to the Spanish point of view on anything regarding Morocco, Primo de Rivera sent his delegates to Oojda to break the peace between France and Abdelkrim with which Spain had been threatened.

The failure at Oojda, which was foredoomed from the start, was therefore comparatively only, for the Spanish delegates were not authorized to record any independent views but simply to observe relations and to make objections to any departures from the terms that bound them. They were not, in other words, independent arbitrators but a delegation of immature and raw novices charged to intervene only when the circumstances of the dispute afforded an opportunity of impressing upon their coadjutors the water-tight nature of their orders.

The French delegates were given a wider latitude of power and were charged to break down Spanish opposition if possible, but their labors in this direction were in vain. In spite of the turn of affairs which events had taken, however, France was not entirely outwitted, for regardless of the uncertainties of Oojda it could not under any circumstances ever prove to be a precipice for her.

The French object was to quiet the tribes along her front and her only demands at Oojda would be for

an exchange of prisoners and the recognition by Abdelkrim of the temporal and spiritual sovereignty of the Sultan. To soften any reluctance on their part in this matter, however, the Riffs had been secretly informed that this requirement was a mere political technicality affecting French prestige in Europe alone, but entirely meaningless in its effects and application to the Riff.

If the conference, therefore, should produce a surprise in the form of a success, France had all to gain without even sacrificing a discard. On the other hand if it should fail, she would still be holding two trumps in her hand yet to be played. The first card would be to convince the opposition in the French Parliament that Abdelkrim was still too obdurate for compromise and thus enable her to demand fresh credits to pursue the war. If this proposition did not go down, then she would be in a position with better grace to intimate to Spain that the larger requirements of the Moroccan situation were beginning to demand more flexibility and less formality than the Madrid agreement of last year permitted. France, therefore, without either pride or emotion, (although still adhering to the terms of her accord with perfect loyalty), contemplated a peace with the tribes not prohibited by the secret agreement between the two Powers, and although she would hold her lines to prevent the passage of contraband she would undertake no more forward movements in the Spanish Zone. She would

add

add that public opinion in France would not support the proposition of her troops pacifying a Zone, whose pacification Spain has been unable to accomplish with her military efforts extending over 16 years, and from which when her objects had been achieved she would be compelled to retire.

It should be noted, however, that the Spanish diplomatic victory for harsh peace terms at Oojda, in spite of some disappointments, was acclaimed with almost a delirious joy by the French army and by the conservative party in Parliament, although it was grieved over with equal hysteria by Mr. Steeg and his followers, against whom reproaches are being levelled and protest registered denying in advance their leader's title ever to wear the obsidional crown of his distinguished predecessor. But without further pursuing the personality involved in this controversy we will proceed.

Turning to Oojda, it had been arranged that the French were to be entrusted with the conduct of the conference. As a consequence of this direction, it came as a surprise to the Moorish delegation—after their past impressions and their expectations—to observe the mysterious coincidence of a curious French and Spanish combine now opposing them, although it is believed that they were not long in conjecturing the immediate causes of this phenomenon. The French undoubtedly possess a better and more accurate knowledge of native character than do the Spaniards. Consequently, although convinced
that

that the Moor is devoid of any faculty for anticipating circumstances, they are at least satisfied that he is sufficiently intelligent to understand that allies, who together have never trusted one another, can never for long treat in confidence in front of a common foe who is not ignorant of their divergent points of view. Therefore under the circumstances verbal explanations were deemed unnecessary.

Mixed sentiments prevailed during the deliberations and jealousies were engendered. The Moorish members, very self-possessed, and showing no signs of any haste or distress, were constantly manoeuvring for sufficient time to permit the gathering of the crops. This delay aggravated, in the form of a futile wrath, the temper of the Spanish delegates, but they appeared to accept it as one of the inevitable conditions incidental to their dangerous and disagreeable task.

Not only was the French delegation selected by the Riffs as being individually the most companionable as far as membership was concerned, but the French policy of reticence throughout the conference, deep and full of understanding, gained the tribute of all in the end as deserving the freest confidence, because Spanish interests were not represented by anything constructive or even sociological, much less vivid or imaginative. The success they sought was a pathetic one, not formed for any advancement but only to be put forward as a defense or perhaps as an excuse for an impotency of result.

In

In conclusion, the point to be put is this, all invitations to the Oojda Conference were accepted with equal insincerity. Since nothing real was anticipated by anybody, it terminated as an exasperation to all concerned and even the alleged results which have been so well advertised are nothing more than political illusions. The fact remains that the problems of France and Spain in Morocco are irreconciliable.

The Oojda Conference is over. Conditions remain the same. Abdelkrim, in spite of the propaganda against him in the foreign press, is perhaps as strong as ever. It is a case not entirely of his personality, but essentially it is a question of tribal support. France will gradually relax her military pressure. The submitted tribes along her border will become intermediaries and in exchange for the rural commodities of life, they will give tea, sugar and ammunition. Spain ultimately will be left to fight alone the forces of Abdelkrim which she will never be able to overcome. The continuation of war in Morocco will not depend on the harvest, and the possibility of an international conference over territorial rearrangements in North Africa is not a possibility yet to be safely dismissed.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,


Maxwell Blake.
American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul-General.

NOTE:-

Copy of this Despatch for E. I. C., Embassy, Paris.
.. .. . Embassy, Madrid.

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE
Madrid, Spain

May 4, 1926

881.00
Index Bureau
RECEIVED

JUN 8 1926

Dep't. of State

Henry C. Carter, Esquire,
Western European Division,
Department of State.



My dear Carter:

The political pot simmers, though little is cooked.

Sanchez Guerra remains at liberty and the Marques de Valdeiglesias and La Epoca have been forgiven, through the intervention of the pro-government press, on condition of not doing it again; but some 20 students of the Madrid University have been incarcerated and a professor has been exiled for disrespect to the Directorate. An official warning has been issued to the "pseudo-intellectuals" to cease and desist from seditious mutterings, and entrance to university grounds or buildings has been forbidden to everyone not presenting a matriculation certificate. Also the
correspondent

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correspondent of La Nacion of Buenos Aires has been jailed for publicly sympathizing with the ill-starred professor.

The Moroccan peace negotiations seem to have failed, owing, the Spanish delegates say, to the intransigency of Abd-el-krim who would be satisfied with nothing short of being King of the Riff. A seemingly inspired statement declares that he was offered everything compatible with the Act of Alge-ciras and that the haughty Moor replied that the famous Act meant nothing to him. We are, therefore, facing the prospect of a new international conference and a new set of maps to puzzle the innocent brains of future school children, unless France and Spain make good their threat of crushing the Riff this summer.

Armand Guerra in El Debate asserts that "the Riffian bogie will last little longer than the roses if we (French and Spanish) continue to collaborate sincerely". Armand Guerra is notoriously suspicious of France, but in the italicised words he voices a
general

May 4, 1926

general fear, though the Spanish government reiterates daily that the accord between the two countries was never greater.

Very sincerely yours,



AUGUSTIN WM. FERRIN
American Consul

AWF:T

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
Enclosures:

Official Statement of End of
Peace Negotiations

Map of new Franco-Spanish
Positions

MAP OF NEW FRANCO-SPANISH POSITIONS

May 4, 1926



THE MOROCCAN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

Rupture as Officially Explained by Spanish Delegation.

The Dirección General de Marruecos y Colonias in Madrid on May 3 issued the following official statement regarding the peace negotiations in Morocco:

The Spanish and French delegations initiated with the Riffian delegation in Campos Bertoux, April 18, 1926, conversations directed to the maintenance of peace, taking as the accepted base of the negotiations the five points cited in the letter addressed April 11 to Mahomed Aserkane. In this letter was asked, also, that the negotiations should terminate on the first of May. The conversations continued from that date in Ayun as in Uxda have necessitated nine sessions without giving, at the end, an approximation of extremes which permits the assurance, within a reasonable period, of the happy end sought. The disaccord exists not only upon the details of application and the modes of execution, some of which certainly would justify a longer examination and the delay necessary for certain consultations, but upon the principle of the five conditions

conditions which could be considered as agreed upon the 11th of April last,nsince they constituted the accepted base of the conversations, of which note was taken by the governments. These conditions were the following:

First, submission to H. M. the Sultan; second, removal of Abd-el-krim; third, disarmament of the tribes who would receive guarantees to be determined; fourth, exchange of prisoners; and fifth, suspension of hostilities with power for the French and Spanish forces to verify their enlacement in Kert.

To demonstrate clearly their spirit of conciliation, the two delegations have not insisted on the previous acceptance and immediate execution of this last, comprehended, nevertheless, in the definition of the truce.

They had desired that the Riffian delegation should at least give in their turn a proof of good-will, accepting the immediate and total arrangement of the question of prisoners, a question very proper for its humanitarian character, before all, to make manifest the reciprocal sentiments with which these conversations were initiated, since it treated of a solution
which

which interested the captured and interned Riffians as much as the French and Spanish prisoners and interned. The Riffian delegation did not believe that it could respond to the desires of the delegations and go farther than the offer of immediate giving-up of the gravely wounded, the seriously sick, and the women and children interned in the Riff, some 15 in number, and equally the offer of facilitating the sending of a sanitary commission and a convoy of victuals to the prisoners, but without wishing up to now to make the ample gesture expected.

Leaving these points to one side, the Spanish and French delegations agreed to begin the examination of the other conditions. This examination has been actively prosecuted in Uxda for a week without, on the first of May, an accord upon the very principles of the conditions being visible.

The Riffian delegation, in turn, declares that it accepts the recognition of the spiritual power of the Sultan and rejects the term and idea of submission as incompatible with the concept of autonomy as it understands it. The Riffian delegation does not accept any interference of the Sheriffian government nor

recognition

recognition of the Sultan in the Spanish zone, in the matter of internal affairs of the Riff. Neither does it accept, in short, any interventional or tutelary action on the part of the authorities of the Protectorate. The Riffian delegation declares that in the very interest of the desired accord the removal of Abd-el-krim cannot be thought of at present. It is only possible that Abd-el-krim, of his own initiative, may remove himself from power some day and retire to his house in the Riff when the new regime remains implanted. And the Riffian delegation declares that it accepts the principle of disarmament of the tribes and the intervention in this operation of a mixed Franco-Spanish commission, but asks the simultaneous constitution of an armed force purely Riffian, and charged alone with the maintenance of order, with exclusion of all intervention and all external control. It cannot accept the entrance in the Riff territory of any armed force, Spanish or French, which would have as its mission to watch over the security during the transitory period and assure the realization of the
new

new regime.

The Riffian delegation understands by administrative autonomy a regime that, founded upon the new fact of the existence of an inferior government in the Sheriffian Empire, the government of the Riff and the adhering populations will not permit intervention of the protecting power in the internal affairs of the Riff. With respect to foreign relations, although the government of the Riff would not renounce the right of revindicating the benefit which independence bears in itself, will formulate, nevertheless, reserves on the application of the international treaties which could not be respected except in a general manner. The Riffian delegation has not agreed, up to date, that the regime of the treaties which regulate the international regime of the Sheriffian Empire, not only in its relations with Spain and France, but in its relations with the other powers shall be intangible and extend its modifications to the Riff, as it extends to other parts of Morocco.

Such is, objectively exposed, the state of the conversations on the first of May, that is to say, the date fixed for the definitive accord upon the principles of the

of the peace. With grave regret the Spanish and French delegations see themselves obliged to announce that on this date they have not been able to induce the Riffian delegates to accept the conditions, guarantees of reasonable peace, and conforming to the international agreements. And the foregoing note having been read to the Riffian delegation, and it having been asked if it had to formulate any amendment, they manifested that they were in conformity.

OLIVAN

(Head of the Spanish Delegation)

Translated by Consul Augustin W. Ferrin,
Madrid, Spain

Los rifeños no aceptan las condiciones de paz

El Debate, Mayo 4, 1926

Madrid, Spain

No quieren ninguna acción interventora o tutelar de las autoridades del protectorado

Declaran también que no puede pensarse por ahora en el alejamiento de Abd-el-Krim

En la Dirección general de Marruecos y Colonias facilitaron la siguiente nota, entregada el pasado sábado en Uxda a las Delegaciones española y francesa que negocian la paz:

Las Delegaciones españolas y francesas han iniciado con la Delegación rifeña, en Campos Bertoux, el 18 de abril de 1926, conversaciones encaminadas al mantenimiento de la paz, tomando como base aceptada de negociaciones, los cinco puntos citados en la carta dirigida el 11 de abril a Mahomed Aserkane. En esta carta se pedía, además, que las negociaciones debían terminar el 1 de mayo. Las conversaciones seguidas desde aquella fecha, tanto en el Ayun como en Uxda, han necesitado nueve sesiones, sin dar a la terminación una aproximación de extremos que permita asegurar en un plazo razonable el feliz fin buscado. El desacuerdo no existe solamente en el detalle de aplicación y modalidades de ejecución, algunas de las cuales ciertamente justificarían un examen más largo y el plazo necesario para ciertas consultas, sino sobre el principio de las cinco condiciones que pudieran considerarse como convenidas el 11 de abril próximo pasado, puesto que constituían la base aceptada de las conversaciones, de la cual se tomó nota por los Gobiernos. Estas condiciones eran las siguientes: Primera, sumisión a su majestad el Sultán; segunda, alejamiento de Abd-el-Krim; tercera, desarme de las tribus, que recibirían garantías a determinar; cuarta, canje de prisioneros a determinar el orden, y quinta, suspensión de hostilidades, con la facultad para las fuerzas españolas y francesas de verificar su enlace en el Kert.

Para dar una muestra clara de su espíritu de conciliación, las dos Delegaciones no han insistido en la aceptación previa y la ejecución inmediata de esta última, comprendida ya, sin embargo, en la definición de la tregua.

Hubieron, por lo menos, deseado que la Delegación rifeña diera a su vez una prueba de buena voluntad aceptando el arreglo inmediato y total de la cuestión de los prisioneros, cuestión muy propia por su carácter humanitario, ante todo, para poner de manifiesto los sentimientos recíprocos con que estas conversaciones se iniciaban, puesto que se trataba de una solución que interesaba, tanto a los prisioneros e internados rifeños, como a los prisioneros e internados españoles y franceses. La Delegación rifeña no ha creído poder responder a los deseos de las Delegaciones e ir más allá del ofrecimiento de la entrega inmediata de los heridos graves, de los enfermos graves, de las mujeres y los niños internados en el Rif, en número de unos 15, e igualmente el ofrecimiento de facilitar el envío de una comisión sanitaria y de un convoy de víveres a los prisioneros, pero sin querer hasta aquí hacer el gesto amplio esperado.

Dejando de lado estos puntos, las Delegaciones española y francesa han aceptado abordar el examen de las otras condiciones. Este examen ha sido activamente proseguido en Uxda desde una semana, sin que en la fecha de primero de mayo se vislumbre un acuerdo sobre los principios mismos de las condiciones.

La Delegación rifeña, a la vez, declara aceptar el reconocimiento del poder espiritual del Sultán y rechaza el término y la idea de sumisión como incompatible con el concepto de la autonomía, tal como ella la entiende. La Delegación rifeña no acepta ninguna ingerencia del Gobierno sherifiano, ni del reconocimiento del Sultán en la zona española, en la gestión de los asuntos interiores del Rif. Tampoco acepta, en fin, ninguna acción interventora o tutelar de parte de las autoridades del Protectorado. La Delegación rifeña, declara que en el interés mismo de la ejecución del acuerdo deseado, no puede pensarse, por ahora, en el alejamiento de Abd-el-Krim. Sólo es posible que Abd-el-Krim, por su propia iniciativa, se aleje algún día del Poder y se retire a su casa en el Rif, cuando el nuevo régimen quede implantado. Y la Delegación rifeña declara aceptar el principio del desarme de las tribus y la intervención en esta operación de una Comisión mixta hispano-francesa, pero pide la constitución simultánea de una fuerza armada, puramente rifeña, y encargada sólo ella del mantenimiento del orden, con exclusión de toda intervención y todo control exterior. No puede aceptar la entrada en territorio rifeño de ninguna fuerza armada, española o francesa, que tuviere por misión velar por la seguridad durante el período transitorio y asegurar la realización del nuevo régimen.

La Delegación rifeña entiende por autonomía administrativa un régimen que, fundado sobre el hecho nuevo de la existencia de un Gobierno inferior en el imperio sherifiano, El Gobierno del Rif y las poblaciones adictas, no permitiera ninguna intervención de la autoridad de la potencia protectora en los asuntos interiores del Rif. Respecto a sus selecciones exteriores, la Delegación rifeña, si bien no renuncia a reivindicar para el Gobierno del Rif el beneficio que lleva en sí la dependencia, formula, sin embargo, reservas sobre la aplicación de los Tratados internacionales, que no podrían ser respetados de un modo general. La Delegación rifeña no ha acordado hasta la fecha que el régimen de los Tratados que regula la situación internacional del imperio sherifiano, no solamente en sus relaciones con España y Francia, sino en sus relaciones con las otras potencias, sea intangible y se extienda al Rif sus modificaciones, como se extiende a las otras partes de Marruecos.

Tal es, objetivamente expuesto, el estado de las conversaciones el día 1 de mayo, es decir, la fecha fijada para el acuerdo definitivo sobre los principios de la paz. Con gran sentimiento, las Delegaciones española y francesa se ven en la obligación, de hacer constar que en este día no han podido decidir a los delegados rifeños a aceptar las condiciones, garantías de paz, razonables y conformes con los acuerdos internacionales. Y leída la anterior nota a la Delegación rifeña y preguntada si tenía que formular algún reparo, manifestaron estar conformes.—Oltvan, 1 de mayo.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ACE

INDEX BUREAU
RECEIVED
JUN 9 1926
Dep't. of State

was received
in the Depart-
ments Confidential
Code

Rome,

Dated, June 9, 1926.

Received, 11.18 a.m.



Secretary of State,ted to anyone
Washington.

62, June 9, noon. (green)

POPOLO d' ITALIA published Tuesday strong article
insisting on the right and determination of Italy to be
included in conference on status of Tangier which it
insists must be held. Confidential. (end green) I
believe with help of Great Britain, Italy will force
France to agree. Spain probably already agreeable.
June 9, 1 p.m.

EM

FLETCHER

881.00/1229
JUN 10 1926
FTT:ED



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, June 4, 1926.

No. 6288



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INDEX BUREAU
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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to submit the following observations on the situation resulting from the surrender of Abd-el-Krim and his Riffian followers in Morocco:

Before commencing the spring campaign, the French Government, for internal political reasons, felt impelled to make a last effort to secure peace by negotiation, and after considerable correspondence with Madrid, the Spanish Government acquiesced in this procedure and the Oujda Conference took place on April 18th.

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The Riffian emissaries are said to have insisted upon complete autonomy for the Riff, under Abd-el-Krim, a sine qua non which the French and Spanish were unwilling to consider, and the conference adjourned without any agreement having been reached.

Upon the termination of the negotiations on May 7th, the French and Spanish immediately resumed operations and launched a new and more determined offensive. The tribes were now driven back with astonishing rapidity and hemmed in by the steadily advancing forces. By May 11th, the French forces in the East sector, North of Kifan, and the Spanish forces South-west of Azib-el-Mider, met at Souk-el-Steta-d'Azlef and pinched off what had been a large Riff salient between the Spanish and French forces.

The rapid success of the new offensive apparently even exceeded the hopes of its leaders, and within a fortnight the incipient collapse of the Riff was suggested by a sudden and growing movement for submission among scattered Riffian tribes. On May 26th, Abd-el-Krim himself appeared to be shaking. In a letter addressed to M. Steeg, the French Resident-General, he requested a resumption of peace negotiations.

The only reply evoked by Krim's letter was a telegram of congratulations addressed to the French officers and men in the field for the "humane and rapid manner" in which their operations had been carried out.

The contemptuous manner in which the Government dealt with the Krim letter indicated that it was satisfied that a complete surrender of the Riffian leader was imminent. In extreme communistic circles, such as that represented by L'HUMANITE, there was a tendency to reproach the Government for not responding formally to Krim's new overture, but the majority of the press now assumed that victory was at hand and approved the policy of the Government in treating Krim as an outlaw.

Two more days of rapid advance, accompanied by an increasing stream of submitting tribesmen, and, on May 27th, the end came.

The prisoners of war in Riffian hands were now released, Six French officers, eight French non-commissioned officers, twenty-seven French soldiers, one hundred and fifty-five Spanish soldiers, and one hundred and twelve Algerians, including twenty-five civilians, were all who had survived the rigors of captivity.

The French Ministry of War, regarding Abd-el-Krim's capitulation as in a general sense a termination of the campaign, issued the following statement of French casualties during the thirteen months of warfare against Abd-el-Krim:

"The total number of French and of soldiers of the Foreign Legion killed in Morocco from April 15, 1925, to May 25, 1926, is 1,306; the number of missing is 294; the number of deaths from sickness is 562, total: 2,162.

"Inasmuch as many members of the Legion are of foreign nationality, the total number of French dead in Morocco from April 1925, is less than 1,500."

The French press, with the exception of the extremely radical HUMANITE, was uniformly elated at the success of French arms in Morocco and the apparent removal of the Riffian thorn in the side of France. A large amount of praise was bestowed upon M. Steeg, General Boichut (who was promoted to the Superior Council of War), M. Painlevé and Marshal Petain, - distributed according to the political persuasion of each paper.

Otherwise the comments of the press were rather obvious, although attention should be called to the matter emphasized by LE TEMPS and the London TIMES of foreign support and collusion with Abd-el-Krim. Abd-el-Krim had Germans on his staff; the Third International undoubtedly encouraged him, and there were suspect emissaries whom he used. The London TIMES correspondent at Tangier, said to be a shrewd and reliable expert on Riffian affairs, declares that foreigners of many nationalities were intriguing in the Riff, and adds that if Abd-el-Krim's correspondence with

Europeans

Europeans could be obtained and examined, astounding revelations would be made. A copy of this much-discussed article, which appeared in the TIMES of May 27th, is transmitted herewith in order that the Department may have it conveniently at hand. There are likewise enclosed herewith a copy and translation of an excerpt from a leading article in LE TEMPS of May 28th, in which it asserts that there is a complete policy directed "at raising up difficulties for France in all spheres, in order that her influence in the world may not affirm itself with all the force and all the prestige resulting for her from her victory in the Great War", and asks for full light to be thrown on this matter.

Not even L'HUMANITE could find any violent reason to lament the termination of hostilities in Morocco. This paper, voicing the sentiments of the communistic bloc in the Chamber of Deputies, had from the very beginning attacked the French policy in the Riff to the extent of openly sympathizing with the enemies of France. Until the last sign of Riffian hopes had flickered out, L'HUMANITE protested that the Riff should be treated as a sovereign state. Even after the arrival of the last Krim letter, it referred optimistically to the Riffian strength and held forth the prospect of continued Riffian resistance.

L'HUMANITE's comment on the final Riffian debacle, however, is inconspicuous and, compared with its usually vituperative style, a little shamefaced. Its article, signed by Jacques Doriot, which is devoted entirely to eulogizing the defeated enemy, is, in fact, rather temperate, and throwing as it does a light on the courage of the Riffians and the odds with which they contended, it is transmitted herewith in copy and translation for the Department's information.

The muffling of L'HUMANITE's groans for the persecuted Riffians is indicative of a beneficial effect which the termination of the

Riffian

Riffian war should have on the political situation in France. Not only the extreme Communists, but more moderate Socialists and liberal elements have objected to the Moroccan campaign which they were sometimes inclined to regard as an imperialistic adventure, and it has aroused frequent and bitter discussion, both in Parliament and in the press. This fire of discord, for which despatches from Morocco furnished fuel almost daily, would now appear to have been extinguished, and in a manner both creditable to the present Government and favorable to the cause of orderly government in general.

A more tangible immediate gain for the Government and for France lies in the removal of the heavy financial burden of carrying on the Moroccan campaign. Expenditures under the 1925 Budget to cover the maintenance of troops of occupation in Morocco amounted to 339,824,829 francs, and to this same account, for the 1926 exercise up to July 1st, was appropriated 388,935,001 francs, (See Pages 432-434 of the 1926 Budget Bill No.225, accompanying this Embassy's financial despatch No.6235 of April 16,1926.). Had the war continued, it had been the Government's intention to apply reparations received from Germany under the Rhine Agreement to defray the Moroccan expenses after July 1st, but these funds will now probably be available to meet other needs. During the immediate period of pacification and re-organization of the Riff, however, there will still be abnormal expenses to be met and it is doubtful whether any saving can be made from the amount already appropriated for 1926. Nevertheless, there should be a gradual decline in the daily outlay until the normal level of the cost of administering the Protectorate is reached and in the estimates for 1927 it may be possible to omit entirely this large item for the maintenance of troops of occupation in Morocco.

The French authorities are proceeding with the work of pacification in a generous and conciliatory spirit, while the press engrossed

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in self-congratulation, is giving vent to very little bitterness against Abd-el-Krim and his followers, and there is no apparent sentiment ~~in~~ crying for any vindictive policy toward the conquered foe. Abd-el-Krim is now a prisoner of honor in the Governor's House at Taza. By strict order he has been received "in the manner in which France knows how to welcome a conquered enemy who has given proof of military qualities", and, while the manner in which he will be disposed of remains to be determined, it is evident that France intends to treat him with the minimum of severity compatible with the peaceful reorganization of the Riff.

The rank and file of the Riffian tribesmen are being welcomed back to allegiance to the Sultan and his protectors with open arms. The Resident General appears to have proceeded in this task with particular tact and skill, receiving the submitting tribesmen with kindness and at the same time in a manner calculated to inspire them with respect for French authority. On May 27th, six thousand submitting tribesmen were received with elaborate ceremonies at Taunat and on the 29th another ten thousand were received at Zawai of Amjot. Oxen are reported to have been sacrificed in accordance with native rites while the tribesmen were told that they had been misled by Abd-el-Krim and that France, whose victory "Allah" had ordained, now offered them protection and succor after the ravages of war.

General Simon, who was the chief French delegate at Oujda has been sent from Paris at the head of a mission to discuss military and tribal questions at Alhucemas with General Sanjurjo, the Spanish High Commissioner, and his officials. The larger questions arising out of the conclusion of the Riffian war will be dealt with at a Franco-Spanish conference which is expected shortly to be held in Paris.

The victory brought forth a cordial exchange of congratulations between France and Spain and these two Powers appear to be co-

operating

operating in the friendliest fashion. In fact the happy co-operation of France and Spain throughout the struggle of the past ten months seems to have removed certain suspicions and prejudices which had existed heretofore and tended to have brought the two nations appreciably closer together.

It should be borne in mind, however, that it has been thus far largely a military co-operation, the mutual benefits of which were constantly obvious. The Military campaign having largely terminated, the two countries now approach certain questions more capable of producing discord, among which the following may be noted:

1. The disposition of Abd-el-Krim;
2. The degree of harshness with which the former rebel leaders and tribes are to be treated;
3. The share to be borne by the French and Spanish forces in the further occupation and pacification of the Riff;
4. The form of reorganization of the Riffian tribes and the preparation of the future statute of the Riff;
5. The complete evacuation by the French forces of the Spanish zone of influence;
6. The complete occupation of the frontier area between the French and Spanish zones and the further delineation of the frontier;
7. The remote possibility of a revision of the frontier.

The feeling in Spain toward Abd-el-Krim and his followers is believed to be very different from the spirit of conciliation prevalent in France. The Spanish war against the Riffians, which lasted so much longer than the French and proved proportionally a much greater strain on the national resources, accompanied as it was by barbarous cruelties to Spanish prisoners of war and others, engendered toward the enemy a deep-rooted national bitterness, the consequences of which it will be difficult for the French to restrain. There is a clamor from Spanish quarters for a trial and punishment of Abd-el-Krim on various scores as well as for a

rigorous

rigorous treatment of some of his followers. Although it is difficult to conceive of a serious breach between France and Spain on this point, a considerable amount of negotiations and compromises may be necessary in order to arrive at a mutually satisfactory arrangement.

France has also been given reason for questioning the future ability of Spain to preserve order in the Riff, which lies chiefly within her zone of influence, and of preventing Riffian tribes from marauding on the French side of the frontier and using the Spanish zone as a base. It would appear to be incumbent upon Spain to remove this menace by proceeding with alacrity and efficiency to the restoration and maintenance of order throughout her Protectorate if she wishes to remain supreme in it.

However, judging from the French end, at least, it appears certain that the questions at issue will be approached in a friendly and conciliatory spirit, with interest centered on means of abolishing the Riffian menace. The Government is by no means in a mood to offend its socialist supporters at home by haggling with Spain for political advantages and certainly does not wish to arouse further international interest by magnifying the points at issue or raising new bones of contention.

From the beginning of French operations against the military tribesmen, the Government has been exposed to constant blasts of attacks from Communist, Radical and Socialist quarters on the ground that it was waging a war of conquest and seeking to extend the political influence or the actual territory of France in Morocco. In self defence it has been obliged repeatedly and emphatically to disavow any aims at territorial expansion or other aggressive intentions in the Riff. It is recalled that in a debate in the Chamber of Deputies on May 29, 1925, described in

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the Embassy's despatch No.5744 of June 5,1925, M. Painlevé at that time President of the Council and still Minister of War in the present cabinet, stated:

"Whatever anybody, anywhere, may say, I declare that no French cabinet has at any time had any intention of encroaching upon territory attributed to Spain."

M. Briand in the same session of the Chamber declared:


"As to penetrating into the Riffian territory, I say to you that the French Government has never had this intention and I repeat that we are not going to move one foot into it. Abd-el-Krim knows that we will never move an inch into the Spanish zone."

Questioned on May 29th in connection with General Simon's mission, M. Painlevé again assured the press that "there is no question of modifying the frontier of the two zones."

Moreover, a revision of the frontier would amount to a change in the Moroccan status quo in which other European Powers might take a lively interest. It would not be likely to benefit either France or Spain to have the matter discussed again by a general conference of European Powers, and the recent blustering of Fascist Italy with regard to her Mediterranean destinies has made it particularly undesirable to revive the question at this time. In this connection, although not within this Embassy's direct field of observation, the Department's attention is invited to the interest which Italy is taking in the Riffian denouement and to the suggestions from the AVARO D'ITALIA, the RESTO DEL CORLINO, and other Italian quarters that the moment is ripe for a re-examination of the Moroccan arrangements by a conference of interested Powers, in which Italy should be included.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,



Myron T. Herrick.

Enclosures:

1. Excerpt from London TIMES, May 27, 1926.
2. Excerpt from LE TEMPS, May 28, 1926, (with original only).
3. Translation of Enclosure #2.
4. Excerpt from L'HUMANITE, June 1, 1926, (with original only).
5. Translation of Enclosure #4.

In quintuplicate.

COPY TO E.I.C.

ARTICLE FROM "THE TIMES" (LONDON) DATED MAY 27th, 1926.

RIFI APPEALS TO THE BRITISH.

KRIM'S EUROPEAN ADVISERS.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

TANGIER, MAY 26.

Abd-el-Krim [whose surrender is reported on the next page] recently appealed again for foreign intervention by the dispatch to Tangier of a confidential messenger.

Now that the time is approaching when much of the secret history of the Rif war will no doubt be disclosed it may be stated that on two occasions previously Abd-el-Krim has asked for the good offices of the British Government in the interests of peace. On both occasions his request was, for adequate reasons, refused.

The first time was on June 15, 1925, when a confidential messenger brought me a letter from Abd-el-Krim for publication in *The Times*, which stated the objects and aims of his campaign. His messenger, who enjoyed Abd-el-Krim's full confidence, at the same time made a fervent appeal on his master's behalf for the good offices of the British Government. Naturally this was impossible. There were no grounds upon which British intervention could have been offered. It was, of course, refused.

A SECOND REQUEST.

The second occasion was on July 22, 1925, when another confidential messenger brought me a long written statement of Abd-el-Krim's policy and intentions. He again asked for the good offices of the British Government. This messenger, like all those of whom Abd-el-Krim makes use, was well trained and well instructed. His long request, based on many arguments, had been learned by heart, for the risk of passing such a request through the Spanish lines was too great for it to be committed to writing. It stated that Abd-el-Krim was fully aware that the British Government could accept no responsibility in the matter, and that all he requested was its initiative and good offices. He asserted that it was the only chance for peace and begged that the matter might receive consideration. He appealed to British feelings of humanity and Great Britain's sense of justice. Abd-el-Krim said that he would accept any terms from France and Spain to which Great Britain agreed. His request was naturally refused. It could not be otherwise. It was evident that the British Government could in no circumstances intervene in a question that was essentially one between France and Spain and the Rif, and even if its good offices had been possible the situation in the Rif and uncertainty as to its future would have rendered any form of intervention undesirable.

On this occasion Abd-el Krim made a curious confession. He stated that he was alone and had no one to turn to for advice, and did not know what terms he ought to accept or offer. He did not, he said, consult his Rifi chiefs on these questions nor any European in the Rif. Politically he was at a complete loss what to do. Such Europeans as were with him, he said, were adventurers or deserters and, beyond teaching his soldiers to drill and to dig trenches, were useless to him. It was the only confession of weakness Abd-el-Krim ever made to me till his letter published in *The Times* of the 17th of last March.

The reasons why his request for intervention could not be considered were communicated in writing to Abd-el-Krim in a letter which at the same time advised him to negotiate with the French and Spaniards direct on the advantageous terms which they were offering him. This desire of Abd-el-Krim for British intervention was communicated at the time to the French authorities, together with the reply.

FOREIGN ADVICE.

Abd-el-Krim was much distressed at this failure to obtain intervention, and, undeterred, he turned his efforts in other directions. He received, from sources which there is reason to believe will before long be made public, encouragement to maintain the fight against France and Spain, and was advised in no circumstances to negotiate with those two Powers, which were described as incapable of good faith and desirous only of obtaining a cessation of hostilities in order to catch the Rifis in a trap. In these communications every hope was held out of ultimate intervention. Confident that certain important names connected with this correspondence carried great weight, Abd-el-Krim decided to continue the struggle and refused to negotiate on the basis of the generous terms then offered. My message published in *The Times* of April 5, previous to the Ujda Conference, called attention to the cruel injury done to the Rifis by this raising of false hopes.

The French and Spanish Governments would be well advised to include in the conditions of peace the demand that all Abd-el-Krim's correspondence with Europeans be handed over to those two Governments for examination and publication. Some astounding documents would be found to which not a little of this last year's bloodshed and devastation is due. The existence of possible mines in the Rif, the awakening of cupidity in the Rifis, and the action of foreign financial interests have resulted in the sacrifice of a vast number of lives—French, Spanish, and Rifi.

MARCI T. F. "LE TEMPS" OF

May 28, 1926.

BULLETIN DU JOUR

LA SOUMISSION D'ABD EL KRIM

Abd el Krim a fait sa soumission. Après avoir libéré, en les faisant ramener dans nos lignes, les Français et les Espagnols faits prisonniers au cours de la campagne, et dont il était directement responsable, le roghi a fait demander mercredi matin au commandant de la division marocaine, qui opère dans la région de Targuist, la protection de la France pour lui, sa famille et ses biens. Cette nuit même, le vaincu a dû franchir nos lignes, et il est dirigé à cette heure vers Taza, d'où il sera conduit immédiatement à Fez. Ainsi se termine, en ce qui concerne Abd el Krim, le drame politique qui se déroule depuis un an dans l'empire chérifien et qui ne pouvait avoir d'autre conclusion que la victoire décisive des armées espagnole et française.

Le rêve de grandeur d'Abd el Krim, qui voulait se faire proclamer sultan à Fez, s'achève pour lui de façon lamentable. Ce rêve absurde, qui a coûté beaucoup de sang, aboutit à la démonstration que notre protectorat est solidement établi au Maroc et que toute agression contre les territoires confiés à notre protection est immédiatement châtiée comme elle mérite de l'être. Les populations marocaines savent désormais qu'on ne provoque pas impunément la France et que toute tentative de porter atteinte à son autorité trouve aussitôt une réplique foudroyante par la claire affirmation de la puissance de nos armes. Elles savent également qu'on ne réussira pas à séparer la France et l'Espagne dans la défense de leur cause commune. C'est une leçon que les tribus qui se laissèrent égarer par Abd el Krim et qui se lancèrent à sa suite dans une guerre d'agression à laquelle il n'y eut aucune excuse, n'oublient pas de sitôt.

La soumission d'Abd el Krim ne vaut que pour lui et sa famille, et le roghi n'apporte pas à Taza la reddition sans conditions des tribus qui tiennent encore la campagne; mais cela confirme bien qu'il est abandonné en fait par l'ensemble de ses partisans et qu'il ne représente plus que lui-même. On peut mesurer toute l'étendue de la faute qui eût été commise si l'on avait eu la faiblesse de consentir, comme le voulaient certains, à répondre à la demande de suspension des hostilités formulée par Abd el Krim et qui eût impliqué l'éventualité d'une reprise des négociations avec un « chef de guerre » vaincu, nullement qualifié pour traiter au nom des Rifains et qui n'a même plus derrière lui les gens de sa propre tribu. Les conditions dans lesquelles s'accomplit la capitulation de celui qui se faisait appeler le « sultan d'Ajdir » confirment la thèse que nous n'avons cessé de soutenir ici et suivant laquelle aucune prise de contact n'était plus possible avec Abd el Krim, si ce n'est celle indispensable pour recevoir sa soumission, tandis que la guerre s'éteindra d'elle-même, sans pourparlers d'ensemble d'aucune sorte, par la soumission des tribus au fur et à mesure que nos troupes avancent dans des régions où l'ennemi se retire presque sans combattre. En fait, la guerre s'achève au Maroc par une opération de police dont les résultats immédiats ne sauraient plus faire aucun doute pour personne, et il appartient maintenant à la politique à la fois habile et prudente de notre résident général, M. Steeg, de faire le reste en réalisant dans la pratique des choses un état de paix s'adaptant exactement à ce qu'exigent notre sécurité et le développement normal de la prospérité des populations.

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EXCERPT FROM "LE TEMPS" OF

May 28, 1926.

BULLETIN DU JOUR

LA SOUMISSION D'ABD EL KRIM

Abd el Krim a fait sa soumission. Après avoir libéré, en les faisant ramener dans nos lignes, les Français et les Espagnols faits prisonniers au cours de la campagne, et dont il était directement responsable, le roghi a fait demander mercredi matin au commandant de la division marocaine, qui opère dans la région de Targuist, la protection de la France pour lui, sa famille et ses biens. Cette nuit même, le vaincu a dû franchir nos lignes, et il est dirigé à cette heure vers Taza, d'où il sera conduit immédiatement à Fez. Ainsi se termine, en ce qui concerne Abd el Krim, le drame politique qui se déroule depuis un an dans l'empire chérifien et qui ne pouvait avoir d'autre conclusion que la victoire décisive des armées espagnole et française.

Le rêve de grandeur d'Abd el Krim, qui voulait se faire proclamer sultan à Fez, s'achève pour lui de façon lamentable. Ce rêve absurde, qui a coûté beaucoup de sang, aboutit à la démonstration que notre protectorat est solidement établi au Maroc et que toute agression contre les territoires confiés à notre protection est immédiatement châtiée comme elle mérite de l'être. Les populations marocaines savent désormais qu'on ne provoque pas impunément la France et que toute tentative de porter atteinte à son autorité trouve aussitôt une réplique foudroyante par la claire affirmation de la puissance de nos armées. Elles savent également qu'on ne réussira pas à séparer la France et l'Espagne dans la défense de leur cause commune. C'est une leçon que les tribus qui se laissèrent égarer par Abd el Krim et qui se lancèrent à sa suite dans une guerre d'agression à laquelle il n'y eut aucune excuse n'oublient pas de sitôt.

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Translation of an excerpt from a leading article entitled "The Submission of Abd-el-Krim," which appeared in LE TEMPS of May 28, 1926.

The early end of the Riffian war will restore to France her freedom of movement in the international sphere. In the face of the unprovoked attack of the Riffians and the suspicious influences that were discovered in the perfidious diplomacy of Abd-el-Krim, one learned that there were in this crisis underlying causes the explanation of which was to be sought elsewhere than in the Riff. The so-called "Sultan of Ajdir" was, to sum up, only an adventurer whose pride and ambition others exploited for purposes of general policy exceeding by far the personality of the roghi and even the future of the Riff. There is a complete policy which aims at raising up difficulties for France in all spheres, in order that her influence in the world may not affirm itself with all the force and all the prestige resulting for her from her victory in the great war. France, already at grips with grave financial difficulties, having to consent to heavy sacrifices of money in order to maintain far away, under particularly onerous circumstances, a long and difficult campaign; France, having to concentrate in Morocco considerable forces in order to carry out there conscientiously the obligations which she has assumed under the terms of the international treaties; France, menaced with seeing jeopardized the immense work which she has realized in North Africa and having the constant anxiety of defending her influence in the countries where she has accomplished the most magnificent effort of civilization which can be conceived of, there was a group of conditions from which hoped to derive the greatest advantage all those who openly or by indirect means are opposed to our action in the international sphere.

It is strange, indeed, that when it is a question of combating French influence, one sees groups themselves so to speak almost spontaneously

ously the most varying elements, those which proceed from the most systematic reaction against the ideas of liberty, justice, and international solidarity, which form part of the tradition of French policy, and those which claim the revolutionary theories by which one would like to create disorder and anarchy throughout the world. Everyone is aware that Abd-el-Krim had Germans on his staff, as everyone is aware of the encouragement which the leaders of the Communist Third International, which has its offices at Moscow, never ceased to give him in addition to the more than suspicious emissaries, such as Captain Canning, associate of an agent of the Mannesmanns, whom Abd-el-Krim used, there were Bolshevik agitators and their not very obliging friends who, obedient to the unavowable preoccupations of internal policy, endeavored to create in favor of Abd-el-Krim a movement of opinion aiming openly at the abdication of France before an adventurer guilty of a criminal attack. There was here, truly, a particularly edifying spectacle at a time when all nations of good faith were trying with all their might to realize a durable peace on a basis of right. The correspondent of the TIMES at Tangier tells to-day how, in reply to requests which he sent the British Government, Abd-el-Krim received from the latter the advice to negotiate directly with France and Spain on the basis of the conditions which one was disposed to concede to him last summer, and he adds that Abd-el-Krim, faced with the failure of his representations to England, directed his efforts in other directions. "He then received," says the correspondent of the TIMES, "from sources which, in all probability, will soon be revealed, encouragement to persevere in his struggle and the advice to negotiate neither with France nor Spain, who, it was said, were incapable of good faith and aimed only at obtaining a cessation of hostilities with the underlying motive of drawing the Riffians into a trap. All this advice was backed up by promises of intervention."

That is why Abd-el-Krim did not wish peace, and it is on those who

save

gave him much advice in this strain that he should lay the blame for his misfortune to-day. France has emerged victorious from the test, but there is an immense interest, from a general point of view, in all the moral responsibilities which are at the bottom of this war in the Riff being made clear. One must know who advised the roghi not to negotiate, who furnished him with money and arms, who promised him intervention. As regards the morality of the European policy, it is important that full light be thrown on it and that one draw away the mask from the face of the perfidious men who, through hatred of French greatness, dared to act as the enemies of peace and civilization.

EXCERPT FROM "L'HUMANITE" OF

June 1, 1926

Les raisons profondes de la reddition d'Abd el Krim

par Jacques DORIOT

Voici les Riffains battus. Laissons exulter la presse nationaliste qui célèbre la grande victoire des armées franco-espagnoles. Laissons celle de gauche vanter les bienfaits du pacifisme réaliste de Steeg.

Laissons-les à leur joie indécente et à leurs chicanes sur les meilleures méthodes d'écraser un petit peuple, et précisons une fois de plus notre pensée sur le problème riffain.

La reddition d'Abd el Krim a paru une trahison pour certains. Nous pensons au contraire que la situation générale la rendait inévitable.

La victoire finale des impérialistes français et espagnols sur les Riffains ne pouvait faire de doute pour personne. Un seul facteur pouvait empêcher l'écrasement du Riff : c'était l'intervention du prolétariat français. Malheureusement, malgré son action vigoureuse contre la guerre, il ne fut pas assez fort pour dicter ses volontés et imposer la paix.

Les Riffains avaient pour eux leur héroïsme, la sympathie de tous les opprimés. Ce n'était point suffisant pour gagner une guerre, qu'au surplus ils n'avaient pas cherchée et pour laquelle ils étaient loin d'être préparés... Par contre, que d'ennemis puissants et de difficultés ils avaient contre eux !

Près de 300.000 soldats français et espagnols aidés par deux marines de guerre, dont l'une, il est vrai, la française, faisait la besogne en rechignant : un outillage militaire puissant : avions, canons, tanks, des munitions à profusion. Pendant tout l'hiver, ces moyens déjà formidables avaient été renforcés. Tout cela s'opposait à quelque 30.000 fusils servis, il faut le dire, par des guerriers remarquables, dans un terrain extrêmement favorable, mais mal ravitaillés en munitions. Cette lutte à dix contre un ne pouvait avoir d'autre issue. On peut même s'étonner qu'elle ait duré aussi longtemps. La « victoire » n'honore nullement ceux qui l'ont remportée.

Depuis septembre 1925, les troupes franco-espagnoles ayant fait leur jonction, le blocus terrestre s'affirma

efficace. Au printemps, le Riff fut entouré d'un véritable cercle de fer et de feu. L'offensive fut conduite avec une particulière férocité. L'aviation surtout qui bombardait de haut, sans danger, détruisait systématiquement tous les douars, les villages, les campements des tribus nomades. Elle n'avancait vers le nord qu'après avoir tout anéanti. Cette action qui précédait l'avance des troupes était particulièrement démoralisante pour les tribus. L'on obtint ainsi un grand nombre de soumissions provisoires, mais importantes pour la période présente.

Les autorités françaises usèrent également de « l'action politique ». Celle-ci consiste surtout à obéir contre certains avantages momentanés, pécuniaires ou autres, la neutralité ou la soumission des tribus. Lyautey était passé maître dans l'art de corrompre. Steeg, vieil Algérien, ignore rien de ces méthodes.

Enfin le Riff lui-même n'était pas exempt de certaines difficultés intérieures. Son unité récente s'était réalisée dans la lutte contre les Espagnols par la réunion de tribus pour la plupart hostiles entre elles. Et cette première tentative de former un petit Etat indépendant n'avait pu être couronnée de succès que grâce à l'autorité, à la fermeté et à la souplesse d'Abd el Krim. Dire que toute rivalité entre les chefs de tribus et le premier pouvoir central n'existait pas ou que la popularité et la rapide ascension d'Abd el Krim ne portaient pas ombrage à certains notables riffains, serait exagéré. Et, si dans la période de succès contre les Espagnols, ces difficultés allaient en s'atténuant, à cause des résultats et du travail intérieur dirigé par Abd el Krim (organisation de l'armée régulière, premiers travaux d'organisation du pays, etc.), dans les derniers mois, elles se firent sentir avec plus de force. N'oublions pas que depuis dix-sept années, les Riffains soutiennent une lutte acharnée contre les Espagnols : douze années de lutte sourde, cinq années de lutte ouverte,

et enfin, la dernière année, la plus dure, contre les Français. Malgré leur bravoure, les Riffains étaient las de la guerre.

Voilà l'ensemble des facteurs qui déterminèrent la situation présente. On peut épiloguer sur la durée des événements et sur la capacité de résistance des Riffains. Sur le résultat définitif, cela est impossible. La défaite, à moins d'un secours extérieur, était inévitable. A Oudjda, les Riffains ont bien compris qu'on leur passait un lacet au cou. Ils savaient qu'ils étaient perdus. Ils croyaient tenir trois mois. L'offensive franco-espagnole ne leur en a pas laissé le temps. La prise de Targuist notamment, position stratégique de premier ordre, constituait un succès militaire décisif pour l'armée française.

Que faire alors ? Prêcher la résistance à outrance ? Faire exterminer jusqu'au dernier les hommes valides du Riff ? Ou dire aux impérialistes : « Vous êtes les plus forts, vous nous avez posé deux conditions : la libération des prisonniers, la reddition d'Abd el Krim. Les voici réalisées. Accordez donc aux tribus l'autonomie administrative que vous leur avez promise. Faites la paix avec les tribus. »

La succession rapide des événements a pu surprendre. L'attitude des Riffains n'en est pas moins compréhensible. Leurs derniers espoirs seront-ils réalisés ? Auront-ils la paix ? Auront-ils seulement l'autonomie administrative ?

C'est ce que nous verrons prochainement.

J. DORIOT.

Translation.

"PROFOUND REASONS FOR THE SUBMISSION OF ABD-EL-KRIM"

by Jacques Doriot

(as appeared in the June 1st issue of
L'HUMANITÉ).

The Riffians are beaten. Let us extol the nationalist press which celebrates the great victory of the Franco-Spanish armies. Let us extol the press of the Left which boasts of the advantages of the pacifism realized by Steeg.

Let us leave them to their indecent joy and to their quibbling over the best methods of wiping out a little people, and let us once more definitely set down our point of view on the Riffian problem.

The submission of Abd-el-Krim appeared treasonable to some. On the contrary we think that the general situation made it inevitable.

The final victory of the imperialistic French and Spanish over the Riffians can leave no one in doubt. But one factor can prevent the destruction of the Riff, and that is the intervention of the French proletariat. Unhappily, in spite of its vigorous action against the war, it was not sufficiently strong to dictate its will and enforce peace.

The Riffians had the sympathy of all the oppressed for their heroism. But that was not sufficient to win a war which, moreover, they had not sought and for which they were far from being prepared. On the contrary, what powerful enemies and difficulties confronted them!

Nearly 300,000 French and Spanish soldiers assisted by two war-ships, of which one, the French, it is true, performed its job savagely: a powerful military machine: aeroplanes, cannons, tanks, munitions in abundance. During the entire winter these implements already formidable had been reinforced. All this set itself up against some 30,000 rifles in the hands of, it must be admitted, remarkable warriors, in a country extremely favorable, but badly munitioned. This struggle at odds of 10 to 1 could have no other issue. It is to be wondered that it lasted as long as it did. The "victory" does not honor those who won.

Since September 1925, the Franco-Spanish troops having effected a junction, the land blockade was acknowledged to have been effected. In the Spring, the Riff was surrounded by a veritable circle of iron and fire. The offensive was conducted with particular ferocity. The aeroplanes, above all, which bombarded from the air, out of danger, systematically destroyed all the villages, towns and encampments of nomadic tribes. They advanced toward the north only after having annihilated everything. This action which preceded the advance of the troops was particularly demoralizing for the tribes. It obtained in this manner a great number of provisional submissions, but important at the moment.

The French authorities equally exercised "political action". This consisted notably in obtaining, in return for certain momentary advantages, pecuniary and otherwise, the neutrality or the submission of tribes. Lyautey was a past-master in the art of corruption. Steeg, an old Algerian, knew nothing of these methods.

Then, the Riff itself was not exempt from certain internal difficulties. Its recent unity during the struggle against the Spanish through the reunion of tribes hostile for the most part to each other. And this first attempt to form a little independent State could only have been crowned with success due to the authority, firmness and versatility of Abd-el-Krim. To state that all rivalry between the tribal chiefs and the first central power did not exist, or that the popularity and rapid ascent of Abd-el-Krim did not bring suspicion to certain notable Riffians, would be to exaggerate. And, if during the period of success against the Spanish, these difficulties were attenuating, due to the results and internal work directed by Abd-el-Krim (the organisation of the regular army, the preliminary work of organising the country, etc.) during the last months, they made themselves felt with more force. Do not forget that for 17 years the Riffians have supported a desperate struggle against the Spanish: 12 years of desultory fighting; 5 years of open warfare, and then, last year, the heaviest, against the French. In

spite of their bravery, the Riffians were war-weary.

Thus have been presented the factors which will determine the present situation. One can dilate on the duration of events and on the Riffians' capacity for resistance. However, it is impossible to dilate on the definite result. Defeat, without outside help, was inevitable. At Oudjda, the Riffians fully understood that a noose had been put around their necks. They knew they were lost. They thought they could hold out another three months. The Franco-Spanish offensive, however, gave them no time. The taking of Targuist, notably, a strategic position of the first order, constituted a decisive military stroke for the French army.

What can be done then? Preach resistance to the death? Have the people of the Riff exterminate themselves to the last living man? Or, say to the imperialists: "You were the stronger, you have imposed upon us two conditions: the liberation of prisoners, the submission of Abd-el-Krim. These have been realized. Accord now an administrative autonomy to the tribes which you have promised. Make peace with the tribes."

The rapid succession of events have come as a surprise. The attitude of the Riffians is no less comprehensible. Will their last hopes be realized? Will they have peace? Will they only have administrative autonomy?

We will soon see what happens.

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

Madrid, Spain

June 1, 1926

UNDER SECRETARY,

JUN 16 1926

DEPT OF STATE.

Index Bureau

RECEIVED

JUN 17 1926

Dep't. of State

Henry C. Carter, Esquire,

Western European Division,

Department of State.

My dear Carter:

All Spain continues excited by the sudden surrender of Abd-el-krim. Its first practical result was a rise in the peseta in one day from 6.85 to 6.50 to the dollar, which seems rather precipitate, since Primo de Rivera himself says: "His submission does not end the Moroccan question, though it facilitates its development and solution"; but doubtless my views on this point are prejudiced by the fact that it means a material reduction in my meager salary. You will recall that I have persistently maintained that Morocco is the key to Spanish politics and finance, and have reiterated my belief that the elimination of Abd-el-krim, which I did not expect so soon, would give the Directorate a new lease of life.

I confess

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June 1, 1926

I confess I do not like dictators, having been bred in the Abraham Lincoln school to believe in government of, for, and by the people; but I think it must be admitted by a sincere critic that Primo de Rivera deserves the title of Primo Africanus. His primarily were the Franco-Spanish accord and the Alhucemas landing, upon which he insisted against great political and military opposition, and which were responsible for the success of the later operations. If he could quit now no number of statues would sufficiently manifest the gratitude he merits of his countrymen. Remaining dictator he will have to face the Constitutionals who, like Sanchez Guerra, have held their hands pending a Moroccan settlement, and many perilous problems, not the least of which is the liquidation of the French alliance.

Already disagreement has arisen between Primo de Rivera and M. Steeg about the disposition of Abd-el-krim. M. Steeg, it is alleged, purposes to grant the vanquished Moor all the honors of war, while Primo de Rivera wants to see him in chains. The following

editorial

June 1, 1926

editorial in the semi-official Debate is believed to express Primo de Rivera's sentiments:

"The last note of the chief of the government relative to Morocco is of great justice. It especially merits applause when it speaks about the manner in which Abd-el-krim has to be treated. It would be truly insensate in receiving the rebel leader to try to emulate the courtesy of Charles V with Francis the First.

"A French daily, radical-left, L'Ere Nouvelle, writes in this connection: 'It is necessary for our prestige and above all for the re-establishment of African order that Abd-el-krim should be treated as an insurgent absolutely subjugated and not as an unfortunate captain whose sword is accepted'.

"This is so. It is ridiculous to speak of the Sultan and the sultanate of the Riff. Abd-el-krim has been but a tribal chief, and, on occasions, captain of a gang of bandits. Monte Arruit, Major Villalar, Captain Saltos, the assassinations of Zeluan, the cruelties of the captivity! We are not trying to fan the coals of vengeance. To do that would not be Christian, but it is necessary to establish the question of the category of Abd-el-krim and his responsibilities in their just terms and not to invoke the norms of international law absolutely inapplicable to the hordes of the Riff and their falcons.

"With the notation, further, that those norms do not exclude the exaction of responsibilities, if we have to recognize the authority given them in the Treaty of Versailles by the most eminent men of the most civilized nations. There it is said: 'Article 227 - The allied and associated powers publicly accuse William II of Hohenzollern, the ex-emperor of Germany, of supreme offense to international morals and the sacred authority of treaties. A special tribunal will be constituted to judge the accused, assuring him the essential guarantees of right of defense'.


"In resume:

June 1, 1926

"In resume: Christian men, civilized nations, have not to use with Abd-el-krim proceedings worthy only of him, but the conquered rebel cannot merit other consideration than that of the criminal."

Several things about Abd-el-krim's submission require explanation, and general rejoicing over it in Madrid is tempered by a strong suspicion that France has put something over on Spain.

Very sincerely yours,



AUGUSTIN WM. FERRIN
American Consul

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Paris, June 4, 1926.

My dear Mr. Secretary:



I send you herewith enclosed a statement so clear and so accurate on the surrender of Abd el Krim that I wish it had been my report to you. It is really worthy of being placed on file as an accurate document. I desire, however, to make some observations in addition to this with respect to what seems to me to be the exact situation relative to the Riffian war.

I found whilst there, in private talks with three important generals, that the Army greatly feared the peace move made by Steeg, the French Resident General in Morocco. It is evident that for political and financial reasons the French Ministry desired to at once end this Riffian warfare. They were, therefore, willing to make concessions which horrified the Army in Morocco, which believed that any agreement giving Abd el Krim recognition

would . . .

The Honorable
Frank B. Kellogg,
The Secretary of State,
Washington.


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would result in disaster eventually, but the political reasons were so great that the French were pressing this. They were fortunately saved by Spain's stand in the matter, who absolutely refused to accept any of the terms for a peace settlement which the French were willing to make. Then, as you know, followed the collapse, which is so wonderfully set forth in this editorial which I present to you.

The ending of this Riffian war is a most fortunate circumstance for France and for the whole situation here, and it has resulted most favorably for Briand and his Ministry.

With kindest regards, believe me, my dear Mr.
Secretary,

Very sincerely yours,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, likely belonging to Raymond Poincaré, is written over the typed name. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Enclosure:

Clipping from the London "Times"
of May 27, 1926.

ABD-EL-KRIM SURRENDERS.

ABD-EL-KRIM has surrendered to his French pursuers near Targuist. So ends his strange adventure after cruel cost in lives and treasure, in the ignominious collapse of the Rifi State. Its political consequences have been considerable. The original Spanish military failure to cope with the sudden and disastrous Rifi insurrection of 1921 brought ABD-EL-KRIM to the undisputed leadership of what had been a congeries of warring tribes, but it also paved the way for the assumption of dictatorial power in Spain by GENERAL PRIMO DE RIVERA and his military Directory, and for the gradual conversion of what had been an ill-organized if exceptionally gallant army into a formidable fighting machine. The Rifi invasion of French Morocco last spring involved the Government of the French Republic in a campaign which has greatly increased its sore financial embarrassments, but has driven home in the minds of a multitude of Frenchmen the necessity of a policy of close and cordial cooperation with Spain in Morocco and the dangers of drift and indecision at the outset of even a "colonial" war. The conquest and death of RAISULI, the famous and picturesque Jabala chief, who was ABD-EL-KRIM's one rival among the clans of Spanish Morocco, have been another important consequence of the Rifi leader's disastrous bid for power. His fall does not necessarily involve the general cessation of hostilities in the Rif; individual chiefs, even whole tribes, may remain for a time in the field, and the problem of their successive pacification by arms or by diplomacy remains to be solved by the French and still more by the Spanish commanders and their Governments. But with the sudden elimination of the chief, who was not only the head of the Rifi State, but was the Rifi State, the whole aspect of the Moroccan problem changes. Even if the unsubdued tribes all remain in arms, which they are unlikely to do, the war in the Rif, in the words of our Paris Correspondent, has ceased to be "a strenuous conflict with a highly organized force under a single leadership." Nor is it in Morocco alone that the news of the downfall of this able, stubborn, ambitious, and ruthless leader will have an impressively sobering effect. Whether or not ABD-EL-KRIM was in direct contact with the Syrian insurgents, his early successes and his pretensions to political and religious leadership in the Islamic world undoubtedly aroused the excited and sympathetic interest of the anti-European elements in the Moslem Mediterranean lands, and even farther afield. In "laicized" Turkey, among Indian "Caliphists," above all in Communist Russia, the natural reluctance of the French and Spanish Governments to incur the expense of a campaign of more than colonial dimensions was interpreted as a sign of the weakness of the West. The revolutionary forces inspired by Moscow built high hopes upon his ambitions and upon the alleged solidity of the African State which was his handiwork.

The end has come very suddenly; a "Republic" when the Rifi were on the defensive, an "Emirate" when offensive operations promised well, a Sultanate *in posse* when the march on Taza and Fez seemed for a brief space to prosper, the Rifi State was not a State at all in the European, or, for that matter, in the Turkish sense. It was a confederation of highland clans animated by the love of loot and liberty, held together partly by religious fanaticism, but mainly by the despotic government of the chief to whom they had entrusted their fortunes, some voluntarily, many under duress. Once head of the most important fighting plans, who for the first time in their history followed one leader, ABD-EL-KRIM had no difficulty in persuading or

sympathizers with the Rifi have aroused suspicion and annoyance in French and Spanish military and colonial circles, and that these suspicions have even been extended to foreign Governments? Our Correspondent in Morocco, in his message, reveals the fact that both in June and again in July last year ABD-EL-KRIM requested the good offices of His MAJESTY'S Government to secure peace with France and Spain. The request was rightly and naturally refused; the British Government had neither the right nor the duty to interfere in a question which concerned the French and Spanish Governments in their capacity of internationally recognized delegates of the SULTAN of Morocco; had it possessed any such right, its exercise thereof would have been an international indiscretion comparable with the worst excesses of the ex-KAISER. Rumours of this attempt to enlist British moral support filtering through interested channels may explain, though they do not justify, the insinuations of certain credulous organs of the French and Spanish Colonial Press. On this subject the Governments of Paris and Madrid are better informed, and the suspicions which seem to have affected a small section of their subjects will doubtless vanish when the truth is made public, amid the joyful relief with which both nations hail the victory won by the skill of MARSHAL PÉTAIN and the stubborn courage of the MARQUES DE ESTELLA.

Useless Delays.

If there is to be a settlement worth having in the coalmining industry it must be a settlement by consent, and not by compulsion. But consent seems as far off as ever. There is not the least indication that the two national organizations of the colliery owners and the miners are at this moment either directly or indirectly seeking such a settlement. The miners stand where they did, refusing to make any concession on wages or hours of work, and the owners have gone back a little on their original qualified acceptance of the Commission's Report. A desire for an agreement of good will is, indeed, much more pronounced outside the coal industry than within it. In some districts particularly the miners are suffering privations which serve to illustrate once again the harsh consequences of a trial of strength in an industrial dispute, but where they have recourse to Poor Law relief, for their families if not for themselves, they can, no doubt, continue a hopeless struggle for a period long enough to do serious injury to all our manufacturing industries. The owners, on their part, are losing less in many cases while the mines are closed than they would be if, with no subsidy to help them, they were employing the men on the terms required by the Miners' Federation. Neither side has yet reached the point of recognizing the folly of continuing a stoppage that can be ended at once on terms equally honourable and fair to both. What is more, neither is prepared to accept even the broad principles of the PRIME MINISTER'S own proposals, while possibly suggesting modifications that would not detract from the merits which those proposals possess in the view of the country. The anxiety of the country is for a settlement that will, in fact, settle the matters in dispute between the owners and the workmen and not leave them fundamentally unchanged to break out in further trouble at no distant date. The Coal Commission was the means chosen to bring about that desirable result, and it is unthinkable that the inquiries, the researches, and the proposals of the Commission should be permitted to go to waste because the colliery owners and the miners are unable even at this hour to make a peace that will embody the results of the Commission's work. The day will come, sooner or later, when either the miners or the owners will want to come to terms. Undoubtedly on that day an appeal will

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It is recognized on every hand that there is little hope of a direct settlement between the owners and the miners, and that the Government's intervention will again be needed at the appropriate time. Such intervention would be possible at once if the miners were prepared to admit the inevitability of a reduction of wages. The suggestion made in our columns yesterday by MR. W. T. LAYTON and others was clearly in anticipation of the time when the miners will have abandoned their unyielding attitude. What MR. LAYTON and the other signatories proposed was that, "without wasting time on further fruitless negotiation," Parliament should pass legislation enforcing minimum rates of wages for the various grades of labour in the mines; the minimum percentage additions to standard rates to be reduced to those of the 1921 Agreement, subsistence rates being unchanged, pending a review of the wages by a duly constituted national

whose lives he had squandered in the pursuit of his wild dream of power. In spite of the abominable treatment of his French and Spanish prisoners, few indeed of whom have survived their sufferings, he is probably more secure as a captive than as a fugitive.

But if the overweening pride of the ignorant Berber chief has brought misery and disaster to his people, what is to be said of those Europeans who, to satisfy personal interests or political rancour, counselled him to make no peace with France or Spain? In a dispatch which is published on another page, our Morocco Correspondent, whose knowledge of the Rif and of its inhabitants is unsurpassed, refers with justifiable severity to the abominable conduct of the would-be mining concessionaires and other financial intriguers who have exploited the cupidity of Rifi chiefs and the fanaticism of the Rifi tribesmen for their own ends. The identity and the activities of these sinister personages will, it is to be hoped, be revealed by the surrender and publication of ABD-EL-KRIM's correspondence. The fact that many nationalities are represented among them is notorious. Their efforts to influence the Press in many European countries and thus to work upon the sympathies of the unsuspecting public have met with a certain measure of success. ABD-EL-KRIM has been invested with the picturesque attributes of a "Sheikh" of the cinematograph; a fictitious Rifi State has been illuminated with a fictitious Oriental glamour; journalists ignorant of Arabic and Berber have been personally conducted through the fastnesses of the Rif, have seen what they were intended to see, have absorbed much Rifi propaganda, and on their return have on occasion informed the world that the French and Spanish prisoners were well treated and that a civilized ABD-EL-KRIM was ruling a sort of African Japan. Is it surprising that such publications and the utterances of perfectly genuine if ignorant sympathizers with the Rifi have aroused suspicion and annoyance in French and Spanish military and colonial circles, and that these suspicions have even been extended to foreign Governments? Our Correspondent in Morocco, in his message, reveals the fact that both in June and again in July last year ABD-EL-KRIM requested the good offices of HIS MAJESTY'S Government to secure peace with France and Spain. The request was rightly and naturally refused; the British Government had neither the right nor the duty to interfere in a question which concerned the French and Spanish Governments in their capacity of internationally recognized delegates of the SULTAN of Morocco; had it possessed any such right, its exercise thereof would have been an international indiscretion comparable with the worst excesses of the ex-KAISER. Rumours of this attempt to enlist British moral support filtering through interested channels may explain, though they do not justify, the insinuations of certain credulous organs of the French and Spanish Colonial Press. On this subject the Governments of Paris and Madrid are better informed, and the suspicions which seem to have affected a small section of their subjects will doubtless vanish when the truth is made public, amid the joyful relief with which both nations hail the victory won by the skill of MARSHAL PÉTAINE and the stubborn courage of the MARQUES DE ESTELLA.

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(p. 21)

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ABD-EL-KRIM has surrendered to his French pursuers near Targuist. So ends his strange adventure after cruel cost in lives and treasure, in the ignominious collapse of the Rifi State. Its political consequences have been considerable. The original Spanish military failure to cope with the sudden and disastrous Rifi insurrection of 1921 brought ABD-EL-KRIM to the undisputed leadership of what had been a congeries of warring tribes, but it also paved the way for the assumption of dictatorial power in Spain by GENERAL PRIMO DE RIVERA and his military Directory, and for the gradual conversion of what had been an ill-organized if exceptionally gallant army into a formidable fighting machine. The Rifi invasion of French Morocco last spring involved the Government of the French Republic in a campaign which has greatly increased its sore financial embarrassments, but has driven home in the minds of a multitude of Frenchmen the necessity of a policy of close and cordial cooperation with Spain in Morocco and the dangers of drift and indecision at the outset of even a "colonial" war. The conquest and death of RAISULI, the famous and picturesque Jabala chief, who was ABD-EL-KRIM's one rival among the clans of Spanish Morocco, have been another important consequence of the Rifi leader's disastrous bid for power. His fall does not necessarily involve the general cessation of hostilities in the Rif; indivi-

Useless Delays.

If there is to be a settlement worth having in the coalmining industry it must be a settlement by consent, and not by compulsion. But consent seems as far off as ever. There is not the least indication that the two national organizations of the colliery owners and the miners are at this moment either directly or indirectly seeking such a settlement. The miners stand where they did, refusing to make any concession on wages or hours of work, and the owners have gone back a little on their original qualified acceptance of the Commission's Report. A desire for an agreement of good will is, indeed, much more pronounced outside the coal industry than within it. In some districts particularly the miners are suffering privations which serve to illustrate once again the harsh consequences of a trial of strength in an industrial dispute, but where they have recourse to Poor Law relief, for their families if not for themselves, they can, no doubt, continue a hopeless struggle for a period long enough to do serious injury to all our manufacturing industries. The owners, on their part, are losing less in many cases while the mines are closed than they would be if, with no subsidy to help them, they were employing the men on the terms required by the Miners' Federation. Neither side has yet reached the point of recognizing the folly of continuing a stoppage that can be ended at once on terms equally honourable and fair to both. What is more, neither is prepared to accept even the broad principles of the PRIME MINISTER'S own proposals, while possibly suggesting modifications that would not detract from the merits which those proposals possess in the view of the country. The anxiety of the country is for a settlement that will, in fact, settle the matters in dispute between the owners and the workmen and not leave them fundamentally unchanged to break out in further trouble at no distant date. The Coal Commission was the means chosen to bring about that desirable result, and it is unthinkable that the inquiries, the researches, and the proposals of the Commission should be permitted to go to waste because the colliery owners and the miners are unable even at this hour to make a peace that will embody the results of the Commission's work. The day will come, sooner or later, when either the miners or the owners will want to come to terms. Undoubtedly on that day an appeal will be made to the PRIME MINISTER, whose unsparing and transparently impartial efforts to bring about an agreement are thwarted and almost spurned to-day. He will be asked to renew his good offices; and it is obvious that it will then be impossible to propose anything better in substance than can be had now for the asking, and that even so much will be less easy to obtain. It must not be forgotten that the time limit for acceptance of the £3,000,000 additional grant from the State expires in four days.

It is recognized on every hand that there is little hope of a direct settlement between the owners and the miners, and that the Government's intervention will again be needed at the appropriate time. Such intervention would be possible at once if the miners were prepared to admit the inevitability of a reduction of wages. The suggestion made in our columns yesterday by Mr. W. T. LAYTON and others was clearly in anticipation of the time when the miners will have abandoned their unyielding attitude. What Mr. LAYTON and the other signatories proposed was that, "without wasting time on further 'fruitless negotiation,' Parliament should pass legislation enforcing minimum rates of wages for the various grades of labour in the mines; the minimum percentage additions to standard rates to be reduced to those of the 1921 Agreement, subsistence rates being unchanged, pending a review of the wages by a duly constituted national

ABD-EL-KRIM's one rival among the clans of Spanish Morocco, have been another important consequence of the Rifi leader's disastrous bid for power. His fall does not necessarily involve the general cessation of hostilities in the Rif; individual chiefs, even whole tribes, may remain for a time in the field, and the problem of their successive pacification by arms or by diplomacy remains to be solved by the French and still more by the Spanish commanders and their Governments. But with the sudden elimination of the chief, who was not only the head of the Rifi State, but was the Rifi State, the whole aspect of the Moroccan problem changes. Even if the unsubdued tribes all remain in arms, which they are unlikely to do, the war in the Rif, in the words of our Paris Correspondent, has ceased to be "a strenuous conflict with a highly 'organized force under a single leadership.'" Nor is it in Morocco alone that the news of the downfall of this able, stubborn, ambitious, and ruthless leader will have an impressively sobering effect. Whether or not ABD-EL-KRIM was in direct contact with the Syrian insurgents, his early successes and his pretensions to political and religious leadership in the Islamic world undoubtedly aroused the excited and sympathetic interest of the anti-European elements in the Moslem Mediterranean lands, and even farther afield. In "laicized" Turkey, among Indian "Caliphists," above all in Communist Russia, the natural reluctance of the French and Spanish Governments to incur the expense of a campaign of more than colonial dimensions was interpreted as a sign of the weakness of the West. The revolutionary forces inspired by Moscow built high hopes upon his ambitions and upon the alleged solidity of the African State which was his handiwork.

The end has come very suddenly; a "Republic" when the Rifi were on the defensive, an "Emirate" when offensive operations promised well, a Sultanate *in posse* when the march on Taza and Fez seemed for a brief space to prosper, the Rifi State was not a State at all in the European, or, for that matter, in the Turkish sense. It was a confederation of highland clans animated by the love of loot and liberty, held together partly by religious fanaticism, but mainly by the despotic government of the chief to whom they had entrusted their fortunes, some voluntarily, many under duress. Once head of the most important fighting clans, who for the first time in their history followed one leader, ABD-EL-KRIM had no difficulty in persuading or terrorizing the rest into obedience. But the character of his followers as well as his own unbounded ambition and ignorant self-confidence compelled him to adopt a policy of adventurous aggression. Doubtful perhaps of his capacity to maintain his hold in peace upon subjects whose favourite pastime was tribal war, he sought to enhance his prestige and to confirm their obedience by further conquests. Arrogance and evil counsels impelled him to court disaster by his invasion of French territory. The flower of his troops fell in the dearly bought successes over the French outposts that accompanied his invasion of the Wergha Valley. Yet fortune, which he had tempted, gave him two more chances to escape disaster. He refused the offer of very favourable terms before the opening of the great French offensive last July; less than a month ago his obstinacy brought about the failure of the negotiations at Ujda. Within three weeks he was a prisoner; the invasion by the French and Spanish armies of the territory which had been his particular stronghold crushed the resistance of the Beni-Uriaghel and the Melilla tribes; the Rifi confederacy collapsed in a series of surrenders; the sword which he had forged had broken in his hand. His surrender with his family and property to his enemies may have been his one way of escape from death at the hands of the disillusioned tribesmen whose interests he had betrayed at Ujda and

L. B.
File

June 16, 1926.

My dear Herriek:

I have received your letter of June fourth concerning your visit to Morocco together with the newspaper statement of the surrender of Abd el Krim which I have read with interest.

With kind regards, I am,


Very sincerely yours,

FRANK B. KELLOGG

881.00/1232

Honorable Myron T. Herriek,
American Ambassador,
Paris,
France.

S WHB:ACS



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

June 18, 1926

✓
~~Mr. Castle:~~

Something is in the air though it is hard to say just what. I have no doubt that the French are working hard to avoid a conference, but it may be that the cold facts of the situation will be too much for them. However if the reported exchanges of views between Paris and Rome are substantially true, it would appear that France was tacitly admitting Italy's right to be consulted on Tangier and Morocco.

The Italian press is a little optimistic about British support, as, while British sympathy probably is with the Italian position, the treaties with France will preclude England from taking a firm or definite stand on the question of a conference.

the

However, that part of report which denies that Italy has made a demarche in London has all the earmarks of a diplomatic denial-- the statement may be technically correct but if Italy has not sounded the British Foreign Office on the question I am a poor guesser.

WE:HC

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PT

Green

UNDER SECRETARY
RECEIVED

JUN 17 1926

Dep't. of State

Rome
FROM

Dated June 16, 1926

Recd. 11.32 am.

JUN 18 1926

Telegram to Paris
6/18/26 - H.C. H.H.O.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

UNDER SECRETARY,
JUN 19 1926
DEPT OF STATE.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JUN 17 1926

DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

64, June 16, 6pm. 881.00/1229

My telegram number 62, June 9, noon. Extreme

Fascist newspapers are still insisting that Italy cannot be excluded from the settlement of the Morocco and Tangier questions. Local newspapers ^{quote} a story from the LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH to the effect that Italy will not press for a complete revision of the Morocco question provided she is assured economic advantages at Tangier and that the French Government has informed Musolini that while his request will be sympathetically considered desires the revision of the Tangier convention to be treated through diplomatic channels and not in an international conference.

According to cable despatch from London no conversations have yet been held between British and Italian Governments regarding Italy's participation in a Tangier conference although in Italy it is believed that Italians demand for participation now more

881.00/1229

JUN 19 1926

FTT:HD

PT

-2- No. 64 from Rome

insistent than ever will when made receive British support. It is added that regarding Morocco no demarche has been made by the Italian Government.

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FLETCHER

WSB

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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OR

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Green
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

APPROVED

June 18, 1926.

RECEIVED

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JUN 18 1926 4

AMEMBASSY

PARIS (FRANCE)

178

INDEX BU.
TELEGRAPH

In view of recent developments in the Moroccan situation the Department wishes to renew its mail instruction No. 1527, of June 2, 1925.

Please repeat by mail to London, Rome, Madrid, Tangier and Berlin, sending Berlin a copy of the instruction of June 2, 1925.

Kelly

Rls

DISTRIBUTED

WE: ~~17~~:NNB

WE: 881.00/1233

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53

CL
June 18, 1926
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Sent by operator M., 1926

10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

W

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

June 22, 1926

~~Mr. Castle:~~

~~Mr. Grew:~~

UNDER SECRETARY,

JUN 23 1926

DEPT OF STATE

The attached despatches from Tangier, Madrid, and Casablanca give a very interesting and suggestive picture of the surrender of Abd-el-Krim and the implications of the situation caused thereby.

I think that Blake's despatch gives the best survey, although Mr. Hammond's description of the reaction of Madrid is distinctly interesting.

Your attention is particularly called to the postscript to Blake's despatch.

*Certainly a most interesting
and suggestive - but must be read
carefully*

WE:HC

881.00

No. 105.

American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General.

Tangier, Morocco, June 5th, 1926.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.



SUBJECT: Invisible Diplomacy. Peace between Abdelkrim and nameless negotiators.

881.00/1234
INDEX BUREAU

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:-

For years past Morocco has presented a problem to the world replete with excitements, disturbances and detonations. Experienced observers consequently expressed but a mild surprise at the turn of events, which led to the abdication of Abdelkrim, and the sudden cessation of the whirlwind, which has been blowing over the Riff with little interruption during the past five years. Although the facts latent in the situation

have

JUN 1 1926

CONFIDENTIAL

have foreshadowed for some time the issue of affairs as they have actually transpired, (see my No. 103 of ^{881.00/227} May 22nd, 1926), as the age of miracles has passed, something more than a subsidiary interest, or a speculative curiosity, prevails to account for the causes of the chaos that broke out among the supporters of the Riffian Chieftain, following the conference at Oojda.

In my Despatch above mentioned, all of the deductions therein drawn have been demonstrated to be correct, with what might seem an apparent exception in regard to the strength of Abdelkrim and the unity of the tribal forces supporting him. Although the aspect of conditions described in that Despatch is susceptible—in the minds of persons unfamiliar with the true facts—of being construed as a miscalculation, there is in reality proof that the situation was accurately analysed, since it is now beyond doubt that the power of Mammon, rather than the threat of military pressure, brought about the disintegration of the Riffian organization, Abdelkrim having been bought outright by the negotiators of France.

The true character of Abdelkrim was revealed to his adversaries for the first time at Oojda and it is now known that, if the Spanish negotiators had consented to recognize the contracts he had made with foreign concessionnaires for the sale of mineral rights in the vicinity of the rebel capital, Targuist, peace could

have

have been concluded practically on any terms which the French and Spanish delegates might have imposed.

Mr. Steeg, who had gotten himself into trouble over the breakdown at Oojda, having previously annoyed the military and conservative groups in France by forcing through his program for a premature conference, was now being slandered by his adversaries as a man led astray in his search for the lime light, or pointed to and proclaimed as another dead apostle of political humanitarianism in France. His enemies assumed that his gigantic miscalculations had eliminated him for all time to come from any prospect of ever realizing the ardent ambitions for high office at home to which he is known to aspire.

Mr. Steeg—it might be fancifully supposed—understanding the issues involved, and weighing the forces of good and evil, concluded it wiser to be active rather than to be awed by the situation, and having quickly anticipated the possibility of his discoveries at Oojda, he secretly decided to abbreviate his former peace program by the elimination of Spain from his calculations, hoping in the end to have his conduct in this regard condoned, under the benefits of the practical but spectacular results he contemplated achieving.

Since Mr. Steeg is a man of great public experience, it may be asked here whether he compromised with his conscience out of self-considerations, or based his proposed action on the broader and more moral grounds

of

of what he thought to be the public good, but this question we will leave unanswered.

In any event after the break-down of the Oojda conference the Riff Medical Mission was one intermediary still available to Mr. Steeg, but there were other channels open for illicit contact with the tribes, whose receptive attitude towards France had become manifest, as described in my Despatch above referred to.

The plan which Mr. Steeg now devised and decided to pursue, upon his own initiative, and which he did not reveal even to his own partisans, most of whom had shown their open hostility to him since his arrival in Morocco, was successfully worked out on ^{the} following lines: On the return of the Moorish delegates to the Riff, means were found to spread the news among the tribes that Abdelkrim had been ready to betray their freedom at Oojda for material considerations, and this aptly timed propaganda, and the state of affairs which it created, was further fomented by gifts, promises and gestures of goodwill to those who were ready to desert him. Abdelkrim became alarmed at the discussions that then took place in his camp, and acting on the advice of foreign agents, in the interest of his own safety, he was induced to attempt a disarmament of the tribes, a decision which further excited the hostility of his supporters.

As his situation grew more precarious, he then learned from reliable sources, that France was disposed to receive his submission under the most liberal conditions

conditions and was even prepared to ensure his safety, under the protection of her own forces, against the attack of his partisans, should he be willing to capitulate.

It was known to Abdelkrim that the objective of the Spanish manoeuvre was the occupation of Targuist. Since Spain had occupied, at great cost, his first capital at Axdir, it would have aroused great popular rejoicing in Spain if the army of that Power could have entered Targuist—the second stronghold of the Riff army—as this would have atoned, and gone very far toward wiping out memories of her great disaster at Annual in 1921.

If Spain however had occupied Targuist, the escape of Abdelkrim would have been rendered more difficult; it therefore appeared prudent to prevent this end, and practically the last commands given by the fallen leader to his discouraged followers, were to concentrate all their forces against the Spanish advance and to permit the French to enter Targuist without opposition.

It is believed that Abdelkrim was promised exile in France, and that he would be permitted, if he desired to surrender, to depart from his capital with his treasure, his kinsmen, and retinue, providing he brought with him the chest of correspondence which he had exchanged with the agents of European Powers, not only with regard to mineral concessions, but all else that had formed the

subject

subject of his intercourse abroad.

Events developed according to Mr. Steeg's program. Abdelkrim asked the "Aman" and before this fact had leaked out to the world, 200 mules were placed at his disposal to carry himself and cargo to Tazza where, upon arrival, he was installed in the house of the Basha, having been received more in the manner of a "Ras" than of a "Roghi."

The events developed with a suddenness that made the Spaniards gasp with surprise. With the usual slipshod manner of Spanish diplomacy, no agreement had been concluded between France and Spain covering the contingency which Mr. Steeg had manoeuvred for, as the Spanish Generals were confident that their armies would effect the capture of Abdelkrim.

Mr. Steeg, the French Resident-General, whose fortunes had been suddenly restored by these events, announced in vague terms the liberality of treatment which he proposed to accord Abdelkrim, and this further aroused animosity and deepened surprise in Spain.

When the Spanish Dictator learned of these events, he was not long in deciding upon his course of action, and his Ambassador in Paris was instructed to inform the French Foreign Office that Spain refused to submit to this betrayal and forthwith to demand the surrender of Abdelkrim to the Spanish Military Authorities, as a rebel to be judged by Court Martial. The French declined to surrender Abdelkrim because of the conditions under which

his

his capitulation had been effected, following which, it is opined that Primo de Rivera informed the French Government that Spain, without some satisfactory agreement as to the treatment of Abdelkrim, would proceed to the denunciation of her treaties with France over Morocco, and would call for an international conference to reconsider the entire Moroccan problem.

Under these threats, the French Government telegraphed Mr. Steeg to put on the soft pedal, instructed him to consider Abdelkrim as a prisoner of war, to withhold him from all outside communication, and to change the tone of the press in Morocco, which was attributing to Abdelkrim the honors of a fallen but chivalrous foe.

General Jordana was then despatched to Paris to negotiate with the French Government, and General Sanjurjo, the Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco, was instructed to proceed to Rabat to remain in communication with Mr. Steeg, pending the negotiations which would take place in Paris between France and Spain.

With the collapse of Abdelkrim's resistance, the difficulties of the Riff problem are modified in their aspect, but have not disappeared, and the direction which developments will follow is a subject of speculation.

The immediate result of the surrender of the Riff Chieftain has undoubtedly been to produce a firmer position for France, and an increase of her prestige in the native mind, not only in Morocco but throughout the whole of North Africa, and it has brought one element of relief

to

to the present French Government among its multiple embarrassments.

In well-informed circles in Spain, the revelation of the conditions leading to the present issue are considered to indicate that Spain has been both hoodwinked and humiliated, and it is only the concealment of the facts, by means of stringent press censorship, that enables the public at large to look upon recent events with any complacency or satisfaction.

The task of pacification of the Spanish Zone may be said now to have recommenced again. There still remain important centers of rebel resistance in the Riff province, and the capitulation of Abdelkrim has produced as yet no effect whatever upon the "Jebala" or Mountain tribes in the Western section of the Spanish Zone, where a recrudescence of fighting is noted. It may well be that the principal focus of the rebellion may become transferred from the Riff to this district, and that some Mountain Kaid will be found, around whose figure the dissident tribes will rally, as a successor of Abdelkrim, in their continued struggle to throw off the Spanish yoke.

It is evident that the pacification of the Spanish Zone can be carried to a successful issue only through co-operation of the French and Spanish Administrations in Morocco, or at least with a sympathetic neutrality towards Spain on the part of France, the latter Power having now acquired great influence over the natives,

which

which can be manoeuvred at will in any given direction.

The official relations between France and Spain, as the outcome of their recent joint adventure in the Riff, under the circumstances above set forth, have become extremely strained, (as they have been before), and unless their efforts and policies can be co-ordinated without conspiracies and under mutually trustful co-operation, it is inevitable that all understanding between the two Powers in the future will become impossible, with the result that the animosity thus created will constitute a graver menace to peace in Morocco than was the presence of Abdelkrim.

The above is a rapid survey of events, and the information herein reported is the result of my recent journey throughout the French Protectorate, from May 27th to June 3rd, in which all parts of the French Zone were visited.


There are various issues arising from the present situation, with which I have not attempted to deal in the present Despatch, such as the question of the rectification of the present boundaries between the French and Spanish Zones, and the effect that these discussions may have upon existing treaties, the possible provocation, by Italy or Great Britain, of a new conference over Morocco, and whether Spain will receive compensation for territorial concessions, by accomodation of her aspirations in regard to Tangier. It can be taken for granted however that the first question to be settled

between

between the two countries will be the treatment of Abdelkrim.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Maxwell Blake', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Maxwell Blake.
American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul-General.

POST SCRIPTUM.

In connection with my reference to the correspondence delivered to the French by Abdelkrim, it cannot be supposed that the contents of this casket would be counted otherwise than as a precious possession especially to those endowed with the political curiosity of the French. With miscellaneous matter from Russia, Turkey, Syria, Egypt, India (and perhaps from some of the more neighboring Powers of France in Europe) secrets and signatures will be found identifying those who have fixed their eyes on forbidden fruit, and a general appraisal can be made of the forces which have either been extenuating or advocating violence in Morocco for the achievement of political ends.

I might further add in this post-script that on one occasion, during the hours of his recent tribulation, Primo de Rivera gave full vent to his feelings before the Italian Ambassador in Madrid, stigmatizing Mr. Steeg the French Resident-General in Morocco, as a charlatan
willing

willing to betray the sacred obligations of his Government, for applause and a mess of pottage from the mob. The Spanish Dictator observed that, if the affairs of democratic states were to be entrusted to men of such principles, it was his opinion that the honor of France might be more safely preserved under a régime of personal rule similar to that which public conditions have forced upon Spain and Italy.

On the following point I am informed by the most reliable authority that, during conversations held at Algeciras last July between Primo de Rivera and Marshal Petain, the latter stated that, if conditions in France did not soon undergo some radical change, he, Petain, might, in the near future be playing in France, the same part as Primo de Rivera in Spain.

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
NOTE:-

Copy of this Despatch for E. I. O., Embassy, Paris.
,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Embassy, Madrid.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 6407



Paris, June 11, 1926.



For Distribution	
YES	NO
	✓

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to the Embassy's despatch No. 6388 of June 4, 1926, concerning developments in the Riff, I have the honor to report that the French newspaper writers on Morocco have been occupied during the past week chiefly with speculations on the outcome of the negotiations and the measures which will be taken by France and Spain for the pacification and reorganization of the conquered territory.

Reports from Madrid to the effect that Spain now contemplates a complete occupation of the Riff and its reorganization in a manner similar to the adjoining French zone were received with general approval, and the Embassy has observed no indications in the press of a desire to oppose Spanish plans for strengthening her hand in her own zone. It is, however, suggested that France should extend her

permanent

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
JUN 30 1926
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permanent military occupation north of the Ouergha and keep a stronger watch there in the future against possible incursions from the Riff.

L'HUMANITE holds forth on the international scramble which it now predicts will be made to devour what remains of the conquered Riffians, and there is a note of mild alarm in the press as a whole at the increasing interest shown by Italy and Great Britain in the Riffian dénouement. There are enclosed herewith a copy and translation of an article from LE QUOTIDIEN with regard to Italy's designs on Morocco.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,



Myron T. HERRICK

Enclosures:

1. Article from LE QUOTIDIEN
of June 5, 1926.
2. Translation of No. 1.

In quintuplicate.

Copy to E. I. C.

Article which appeared in LE QUOTIDIEN of Paris, France,
dated June 5, 1926.

L'ITALIE S'INTÉRESSE BEAUCOUP AU MAROC

L'accord que l'Angleterre conclura aujourd'hui avec la Turquie au sujet de Mossoul sera accueilli avec satisfaction dans toutes les capitales, sauf cependant à Rome.

Le gouvernement italien n'avait pas caché que si une guerre éclatait entre Turcs et Anglais, il ne demeurerait pas neutre ; il se rangerait aussitôt aux côtés de la Grande-Bretagne.

C'est même parce que les dirigeants d'Angora redoutaient un débarquement italien à Adalia et à Smyrne qu'ils se sont départis de leur première intransigeance dans leurs négociations avec Londres.

Les menaces fascistes à l'égard de la Turquie n'auront donc pas été sans efficacité, seulement c'est l'Angleterre qui en aura bénéficié !

Pour se consoler de cette déception, la presse italienne s'est depuis quelques semaines mise à parler avec insistance du Maroc. Elle assure d'abord que, bien que puissance musulmane, l'Italie ne retirera aucun profit de la reddition d'Abd-el-Krim : l'ordre règne, en effet, en Tripolitaine jusqu'aux confins du pays des Senoussi.

Par contre, la soumission du Riff ne constitue-t-elle pas, à l'avantage de la France, une modification de l'équilibre méditerranéen et l'Italie ne serait-elle pas en droit de réclamer de ce fait des compensations ?

Quelles compensations ? Les indications demeurent encore imprécises, mais d'après le Resto del Carlino, l'organe fasciste de Bologne, il s'agirait, au minimum, de garanties supplémentaires pour les Italiens de Tunisie — qui, en vertu des stipulations de 1896, jouissent cependant d'une liberté à peu près entière.

On le voit, la presse italienne adopte, au sujet du Maroc, un langage semblable à celui des journaux nationalistes allemands avant le coup d'Agadir. Elle oublie que, au regard des traités, qu'a signés aussi le gouvernement de Rome, Abd-el-Krim n'était qu'un rebelle, sans « existence internationale ».

Que sa soumission soit pour la France — protectrice du chérif — un événement heureux qui augmente notre autorité dans l'Afrique du Nord, nous ne le nions pas.

Mais que ce succès puisse expliquer et justifier le moins du monde un déchaînement des appétits fascistes, c'est ce que personne, non seulement en France, mais presque partout hors d'Italie, refusera catégoriquement d'admettre.

MICHEL NÈGRE.

Translation of an article which appeared in LE QUOTIDIEN
of Paris, France, dated June 5, 1926.

ITALY IS MUCH INTERESTED IN MOROCCO.

The accord that England will conclude today with Turkey regarding Mosul will be received with satisfaction in all capitals except Rome.

The Italian Government has not hidden the fact that, were a war to break out between the Turks and the English, it would not remain neutral; it would promptly take sides with Great Britain.

In fact, the Angora leaders forsook the attitude of intransigency which they first took in their negotiations with London because they dreaded an Italian landing at Adalia and Smyrna.

The Fascist threats hurled at Turkey will not have been, therefore, without effect. However, it is England that will profit thereby!

In order to calm this disappointment, the Italian press has for the last few weeks been talking with ardor about Morocco. It affirms first that, although a Mussulman power, Italy will derive no benefit from the surrender of Abd-el-Krim: order reigns, in fact, in Tripoli to the confines of Senoussi.

On the other hand, does not the submission of the Riff constitute, to France's advantage, a modification of the Mediterranean equilibrium, and could not Italy claim compensations because of this fact?

What compensations? They are not yet outlined, but according to the RESTO DEL CARLINO, the Fascist organ of Bologna, it would be a question, at the least, of supplementary guarantees for the Italians of Tunis - who, by virtue of the stipulations of 1896, enjoy in the meantime almost complete liberty.

It is seen that the Italian press is using the same kind of language about Morocco that the German nationalistic newspapers used before the Agadir affair. It is forgotten that, as regards treaties signed also by the Government at Rome, Abd-el-Krim was only a rebel without "international existence".

It is not denied that Abd-el-Krim's surrender is for France, the protector of the Sultan, a happy event which increases our authority in northern Africa.

However, any one, not only in France but almost anywhere outside of Italy, will categorically refuse to admit that this success can explain and justify the least in the world a letting loose of Fascist appetites.

Michel Nègre.

No. 106.

American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General.

Tangier, Morocco, June 5th, 1926. STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JUL 22 1926

WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SOLICITOR'S OFFICE
JUN 23 1926
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of Economic Adviser
JUL 2 1926
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

July 1, 1926.

SUBJECT:- Application of Article 20 of the Tangier Convention. Double duties collected on goods entering the Spanish Zone.

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:-

In further reference to my Despatch No. 95 of May 4th, 1926, on the above subject, I have the honor to inform the Department that, contrary to the expectations which I then foreshadowed, no satisfactory modification has been made to the dispositions adopted by the Spanish Authorities, in their enforcement of Article 20 of the Tangier Convention, and import duties, in addition to those

881.00/1236

881.00/12

JUL 8 1926

those collected by the Tangier Customs, continue to be levied by the Spanish Authorities, on goods conveyed by land from Tangier into the Spanish Zone.

Indeed the position has recently become aggravated by the fact that the export duties on Moroccan produce proceeding from the Spanish Zone for shipment from Tangier are now also collected by the Hispano-Shereefian Customs Administration at the barrier on the frontier of the Tangier Zone, and again by the Tangier Customs Administration when the produce is shipped at this port.

When making to my Spanish colleague the verbal representations on the matter reported in my despatch above mentioned, it was understood that he would communicate them to the competent Spanish Authorities and request them to make such administrative arrangements as would eliminate a violation of treaty provisions, in the premises, in regard to the interests of American citizens and protégés.

No response however has been received, and it would appear no longer possible to defer an explicit and formal protest on the part of the Department to the Spanish Government against measures adopted by the Spanish High Commissioner at Tetuan in violation of American treaty rights.

No specific complaint has so far been received from American citizens or protégés in Tangier, who are apparently endeavoring to route their goods into the Spanish Zone in such a manner as to avoid the inland customs barrier, but it is not possible to expect them indefinitely

indefinitely to refrain from utilizing the conveniences of the Tangier land communications, and an incident must inevitably arise in the near future.

It is therefore respectfully suggested that the Department instruct the Embassy at Madrid to protest to the Spanish Government against the levy, by the Spanish-Moroccan Customs Administration, on the confines of the Spanish and International Zones, of any import or export duties on the goods of American citizens and protégés, and to demand the immediate refund of any such duties as may have been collected thereon prior to the notification of this protest.

The note to the Spanish Government should include reference to the following points.

(1) The application of Article 20 of the Tangier Convention by means of the measures adopted by the Spanish Authorities violates the customs unity of Morocco and is contrary to the basic principle of the economic integrity of the Shereefian Empire, as provided in the Act of Algeciras.

(2) The measures edicted by the Spanish Authorities in their application of Article 20 of the Tangier Convention involves the double payment of customs duties already levied upon American citizens and protégés by the Authorities of the customs at Tangier.

(3) The action of the Spanish High Commissioner at Tetuan in the premises is based upon an article of a convention to which the American Government has not adhered.

(4)

(4) The Spanish Government should be reminded that no formal recognition of the Spanish Authorities in Morocco has been made by the Government of the United States.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Maxwell Blake', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Maxwell Blake.
American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul-General.

Copy of this Despatch sent to
American Embassy, Madrid.

No. 386

July 1, 1926.

Maxwell Blake, Esquire,

American Diplomatic Agent and Consul General,

Tangier.

Sir:

With reference to your despatches of May 4, 1926, and June 5, 1926, regarding the establishment, by the Spanish authorities, of a customs barrier between the Tangier Zone and the Spanish Sphere of Influence in Morocco, there is transmitted herewith, for your information, copy of an instruction which has been sent to the American Embassy at Madrid in the premises.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:

WILLIAM HARRISON

Enclosure:

Copy of instruction to the
Embassy at Madrid.

WE: 881.00/1236
WE: 881.00/1236
WE: 881.00/1236

CR. *Wb*
July 1, 1926

30
True
[Signature]

A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal.

881.00/1236

881.00/1236

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

June 22, 1926

Mr. Castle:

SO:

SOLICITOR'S OFFICE
JUN 23 1926
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Although I am in complete agreement with Blake the Spanish Customs barrier around Tangier is in theory a violation of American rights in Morocco, and while I think he has correctly indicated the lines upon which a protest, when made, should be based, it seems preferable to await for a concrete instance before approaching the Spanish Government.

The Customs barrier is doubtless a move in the game the Spaniards are playing the object of which is control of Tangier. At present the whole matter is presumably under discussion in Paris, and it may well be that by the time this despatch is answered the necessity for a protest will have disappeared.

If we make our protest now, we will be on weak ground as having yelled before we were hurt, whereas with a definite instance on which to hang our protest we will be in a strong position. Blake has apprized the Spanish Consul in Tangier of our attitude and I do not think we need go beyond that at this time.

I should appreciate your comments.

~~WE:HC~~

9 copies only

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Draft instruction to Madrid.

There are transmitted herewith for your information copies of two despatches dated May 4, 1926 and June 5, 1926 from the American Agent and Consul General at Tangier concerning the establishment by the Spanish authorities of a customs barrier between the Tangier Zone and the Spanish Sphere of Influence in Morocco.

The Department is in full agreement with Mr. Blake that this Customs barrier, if applied to American citizens or proteges constitutes an invasion of American rights in Morocco, although no specific complaints have as yet been received by this Government.

In the absence of such complaints this Government hesitates to make formal protest to the Spanish Government. However the Department desires that you bring the position of this Government as outlined above ^{informally} to the attention of the Spanish authorities ~~by informal Note,~~ and that you express the hope that that the customs barrier will be ~~so~~ ^{not} administered as to ~~avoid the imposition of~~ ^{impose} duties upon the goods of American citizens and proteges passing ~~from Tangier~~ ^{between} Tangier and the Spanish Sphere of Influence in Morocco, thus ~~obviating~~ the necessity of a formal protest on the part of this Government. ^{will}

be obviated

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SOLICITOR



June 26, 1926.

NE

Mr. Carter:

We have sometimes protested before an actual incident involving an American national or protégé has arisen in Morocco. This has often been caused by reason of the fact that our position must necessarily be largely academic.

Though I do not wish to take a stand against the position outlined in your memorandum to Mr. Castle, I did wish to convey to you the slight doubt that was in the back of my mind as to whether it might not be, on second thought, desirable to follow Blake's suggestion.

SO:FMA:JR

[Signature]
881.00/1236

July 2, 1926.

No. 53

The Honorable

Ogden H. Hammond,

American Ambassador,

Madrid.

Sir:

There are transmitted herewith for your information copies of two despatches, dated May 4, 1926, and June 5, 1926, respectively, from the American Agent and Consul General at Tangier concerning the establishment by the Spanish authorities of a Customs barrier between the Tangier Zone and the Spanish Sphere of Influence in Morocco.

The Department is in full agreement with Mr. Blake that this Customs barrier, if applied to American citizens or proteges, constitutes an invasion of American rights in Morocco, although no specific complaints have as yet been received by this Government.

In the absence of such complaints, this Government hesitates to make formal protest to the Spanish Government. However, the Department desires that you bring the position of this Government, as outlined above, informally to the attention of the Spanish authorities, and that you express the hope that the Customs barrier will not be administered so as to impose duties upon the goods of American citizens and proteges passing between Tangier and the Spanish

Sphere

100-108

Sphere of Influence in Morocco and that thus the necessity of a formal protest on the part of this Government will be obviated.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Secretary of State:

LELAND HARRISON

Enclosures:


Copies of two despatches
from the American Agent
and Consul General at
Tangier, Morocco.

881.00/1236.

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WE:AO:LO:SS

CR *[initials]*
July 1, 1926

30
[Handwritten signature]



No. 256

Office of Economic Adviser
JUL 1 1925
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Casablanca, Morocco, June 1, 1925.

SUBJECT: Effect of Capture of Abu-el-Krim, Riff leader.

1-1055



THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SIR:

I have the honor to report to the Department that the short sharp campaign that has been fought since the rupture of the peace negotiations at Oudjda between the Riff forces on the one hand and the allied Franco-Spanish troops on the other has resulted in the surrender of Abd-el-Krim, the Riff leader, to the French on May 27th at a point a little north of Tarfust.

The result had not been unexpected for several days. The resistance of the Riff tribesmen had been much less than generally expected, and had seemed to indicate either that they were in a much more desperate condition than generally supposed or that they were suffering from dissension among them. When Tarfust fell last week into the hands of the French, it was generally felt that the end was not far off.

Except for the operations around Tarfust, French troops had taken only a small part in the campaign, although it is true that a terrific bombardment by artillery and planes along the entire French line and a series of false manoeuvres at various points had kept the Riff attention strongly on their southern front. The Spanish bore the brunt of the heavy fighting, however, and it was the encircling movement of their columns moving south from Melilla and from Ajdir and of the mixed franco-Spanish column from Ouezzen that brought matters to a climax. The bold movements of the

(first

first two mentioned columns in practically ignoring certain sections of the Riff country were calculated upon the dissension in those districts brought about by the plentiful use of money and propaganda during the past winter. The Spanish calculations proved correct, for these columns were very little molested in reaching their objectives in the portion of the Riff country where resistance was to be encountered. Several days before his surrender, it had been reported that Abd-el-Krim had left his headquarters and was fleeing southward towards the boundary of French Morocco.

It will probably be another month before it is definitely known whether the surrender of the Riff leader really means the end of hostilities in that region. His action was a personal one, for he was accompanied only by his family and retinue and a single Moorish Gaïd who had been instrumental in arranging for his submission. While a number of the tribes have presented their submission, a considerable number still remain dissident, and a number of important chieftains, including the brother and uncle of Abd-el-Krim, the former of whom has all along been considered by many as the real leader, have not yet submitted, although there are rumors to the effect that they are negotiating along this line.

It seems likely that dissatisfaction of the tribes with Abd-el-Krim may have forced him from his position of leadership. For some time rumors have been afloat that he was engaged in selling important mining concessions-and pocketing the money-and also that the French had made very handsome offers to him for his submission. It is quite possible that the latter reports at least may be true, as the French have always used this method

(with

with much success in the case of rebel leaders in Morocco and other parts of the French Empire of Northern Africa. Whether true or false, the dissemination of such reports may have made him persona non grata with his followers.

All parties seem to recognize the fact that his action in surrendering to the French makes him liable to the French alone. The latter have already announced that no effort would be made to have him formally submit to the Sultan, and have quite chivalrously rendered the full military honors according to his position. Abd-el-Krim openly stated that he would never have surrendered to the Spanish, whom he hates far more than the French, largely because of his early experiences with them and for their more recent alleged use of poison gas in the campaign.

The conclusion of the recent fighting found the French forces firmly entrenched on Spanish Moroccan soil around Tarruist, which is said to be the center of the rich mineral district of the Riff. There is considerable speculation as to their withdrawal. The Spanish have lost heavily in prestige in the last few weeks, in spite of the improved fighting qualities shown, on account of their obstinate attitude in the Oudjda negotiations, which was generally considered the cause of their rupture, and more recently by the surrender of their arch-enemy to the French alone. It is generally being wondered just what the Spanish will have to offer as a quid pro quo for the French assistance. In some quarters it is believed that they may be willing to surrender a substantial portion of the Riff to the French, receiving in return control of the International Zone around Tangier.

As regards the natives, this would be a good thing, as

(the

the French have proved far better administrators in Morocco than the Spaniards. The control of Tangier by the latter would of course unite the present International and Spanish Zones and would inevitably revive the trade of that port which is now being rapidly stifled.

On the other hand, various complications are apt to ensue, if the Riff should come under French control. Great Britain's apprehension would be aroused by a nearer approach of French power to the Mediterranean shores of Morocco, possibly endangering her control of the Strait of Gibraltar. Also there are said to be numerous valid German and English mining concessions in the Riff that might be jeopardized by such a change, especially the former, since in the zone of French control in Morocco the Treaty of Versailles has practically outlawed German commercial rights.

All in all, the present situation in Morocco is such that, even in the native insurrection in the North has been subdued, it must be handled most delicately in order to avoid a serious clash of various national interests in the country. The most serious present danger seems to me to lie between France and Spain. The French despise and dislike the Spaniards extremely, though for the present they are working together in this country, and the former have a great contempt for Spanish methods and ideas. The latter are fully aware of these sentiments and return them in kind. That France desires and expects to dominate the whole of Morocco in the future is no secret at all, and consequently that country regards the Spanish dominion in a part of Morocco as an obstacle to the fulfilment of this ambition. Of course, Great Britain can not be expected to turn an indifferent eye upon such developments for

(both

both strategic and commercial reasons, and Germany also for commercial reasons. There is, therefore, the material for another great international embroiglio in the Moroccan situation.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

H. Earle Russell

H. Earle Russell
American Consul.

IN QUINTUPLICATE

COPY TO TANGIER

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HER:R

RECEIVED

Rome.

JUN 23 1926

Dep't. of State

Personnel

June 10, 1926.

My dear Mr. Secretary -

As you will have seen from my telegrams and despatches it is evident that the Italian Govt believes that as a result of the surrender of Abd-el Krim a new Moroccan situation has arisen which affects or may affect Italian interests in the Mediterranean.

Italy, like ourselves, has never accepted the French -

British - Spanish "international" regime for Tangier and Ceuta. Knowing it to have failed will insist on having a voice in any new arrangement. They expect and press comment indicates that England expects that another Conference of the "Algeciras" Powers will be called to deal with this new state of affairs.

Italy now regrets very keenly her Morocco Agreement with France and while she has not much ground for claiming political compensations - I believe she will

try to secure some economic advantages or at least safeguards if France and Spain extend their effective spheres in North Africa.

As to Tangier - Italy feels that she has a similar but even greater interest than England in keeping open and free the Atlantic entrance to the Mediterranean - and especially in preventing France from converting it into an African Gibraltar.

We, as signatory of the Algiers Convention, will have the right to participate in any Moroccan Conference which may be held - and while we have no political interest we do have a very important economic

interest in the Open Door in
Northern Africa ~ and if you will
allow me to say so - I think we
should be represented as we
were at the former Conference.

I have not mentioned this to
Mussolini or anyone as I did
not want to do anything which
might embarrass you ~ but I
would appreciate a confidential
word from you, for my guidance,
as to our probable attitude re.
garding such a conference.

I believe Italy would welcome
our participation.

Very Sincerely ~

Henry P. Fletcher

Copy ACS

Personal

My dear Mr. Secretary:

As you will have seen from my telegrams and despatches it is evident that the Italian Government believes that as a result of the surrender of Abd-el Krim a new Moroccan situation has arisen which affects or may affect Italian interests in the Mediterranean.

Italy, like ourselves, has never accepted the French-British-Spanish "international" regime of Tangier and believing it to have failed will insist on having a voice in any new arrangement. They expect and press comment indicates that England expects that another Conference of the "Alge~~ci~~ras" Powers will be called to deal with this new status of affairs.

Italy now regrets very keenly her Morocco Agreement with France and while she has not much ground for claiming political compensations, I believe she will try to secure some economic advantages or at least safeguards if France and Spain extend their effective spheres in North Africa. As to Tangier, Italy feels that she has a similar but even greater interest than England in keeping open and free the Atlantic entrance to the Mediterranean and especially in preventing France from converting it into an African



Rome, ~~London~~ ~~Paris~~

RECEIVED

7/8/26
FEB 23 1929

Dept. of State

July 9, 1926.

INDEX RECORDED
881-00/1237/2

RECEIVED
FEB 23 1929

Gibraltar.

We, as signatory of the Algeciras Convention, will have the right to participate in any Moroccan Conference which may be held and while we have no political interest, we do have a very important economic interest in the Open Door in Northern Africa and if you will allow me to say so, I think we should be represented as we were at the former Conference.

I have not mentioned this to Mussolini or anyone as I did not want to do anything which might embarrass you but I would appreciate a confidential word from you, for my guidance, as to our probable attitude regarding such a conference.

I believe Italy would welcome our participation.

Very sincerely,

Henry P. Fletcher.

July 9, 1926.

My dear Mr. Fletcher:

I have received your letter of June 10th concerning the possibility of a conference on Moroccan matters.

Since that letter was written I understand that there is less probability that such a conference will be called in that some agreement between the interested nations may be reached without it. I agree with you, however, that if there is a further conference of signatories of the Algeiras Convention, the United States would very probably feel it necessary to

The Honorable
Henry F. Fletcher,
American Ambassador,
Rome.

881.00/1237 1/2

to be represented. I, of course, cannot say that we should be represented for the reason that we should have to know clearly in advance what the agenda of the Conference was to be.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK B. KELLOGG

WRC/AD

WRC

A true copy of
the signed original.

ch
JUL 9 1926
me

yes



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 74.

Madrid, June 7, 1926.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

S i r:

With reference to the Embassy's weekly report of May 31st and today's date, in which is set forth all official news available regarding the unconditional surrender of Abd-el-Krim to the French military authorities, I have the honor to inform the Department that unofficial but apparently reliable information here would seem to lend the following significance to the surrender:

The French Government was extremely desirous that the peace negotiations recently instituted at Taza should terminate successfully. The Spanish Government took the contrary attitude and was unwillingly dragged into the conference. Abd-el-Krim's representatives, who were

manifestly....

CONFIDENTIAL
JUL 1 1926
FBI

manifestly unfit for the conduct of difficult diplomatic negotiations, adopted such an intransigent attitude (based on nothing more than "bluff") that the Spanish desire was realized by the breaking off of negotiations and the resumption of the offensive. It is believed that, in addition to the ineptitude of the Riffian representatives at the conference, the existence of real fear on the part of Abd-el-Krim that acceptance of the Franco-Spanish demands would place the lives of himself and members of his family in danger from his own followers led to this signal diplomatic failure on the part of the Riffian spokesmen, so eagerly desired by the Spaniards.

The French authorities, however, partly as the result of financial considerations and other exigencies of the internal political situation in France, were determined to make every effort to avoid the prolongation of hostilities. In their opinion the French objective had been attained and the frontier of the Protectorate was safe; it appeared to them that a further use of French troops for the pacification of the interior of the Riff was extremely undesirable from the French point of view, since French sacrifices would redound only to the advantage of Spain. They are, therefore, reported to have remained in contact with Abd-el-Krim through their Intelligence organization, which is infinitely superior to that of the Spanish Army, and by the use as intermediaries of Moors who were French partisans, convinced Abd-el-Krim that his only safety lay in a secretly arranged surrender, which was the policy he finally adopted after his last military efforts...

efforts had failed and the discontent of the Riffian tribes was becoming acute.

The enthusiasm with which the surrender was hailed in Spain was, therefore, tempered by a feeling of uneasiness on the part of many Spaniards. That the Government appears to have recognized this and tried to counteract it is indicated by the wording of Primo de Rivera's telegram of congratulation to the Command in Morocco, in which it was felt necessary to say "We are in no degree disturbed that the surrender should have been made to the French High Command nor that the latter should reap the result of the recent loyal and vigorous campaign." Nevertheless, the anti-French feeling in Madrid continues to increase and the Military Attaché of this Embassy, who returned a few days ago from the Spanish zone of Morocco, reports a similar feeling among the officers and men of the Spanish forces there.

For a week rumors have been current in Madrid which are apparently corroborated by reports of the LONDON TIMES' correspondent at Tangier, to the effect that Abd-el-Krim's archives, together with a large treasure belonging to the Riffian chieftain, are now in the possession of the French authorities. It is believed that evidence exists in these archives that Abd-el-Krim received direct encouragement, if not substantial aid, from "four great powers". It was at first said that the powers referred to were Russia, Germany, Italy and Great Britain. The Spanish Government is believed to have requested copies of these documents, but the French authorities are reported to have withheld the desired information, the effect of which....

which has been to lend strength to new rumors, according to which evidence exists in the archives of French assistance to Abd-el-Krim up to the time the Franco-Spanish agreement was entered into (last year).

The proposed conference in Paris mentioned in the weekly report of today's date has been postponed (ostensibly for a few days but probably for at least two weeks) in order to give General Gomez Jordana, Chief of the Morocco and Colonies Section of the Ministry of State, an opportunity to confer with General Sanjurjo, Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish Army in Morocco, who is at present in Rabat discussing Moroccan questions with Mr. Steeg, the French Resident General. Señor Quiñones de Leon, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, arrived in Madrid last night for a conference with his government, and it would appear that the Spanish authorities expect to meet very great difficulties at the Paris conference.

It is believed by everyone that the question of Tangier will have to be discussed in Paris in connection with proposed rectifications of the Franco-Spanish frontier in Morocco. This question, as the Department is aware, is exceedingly thorny and has been further complicated by evidences of increasing interest on the part of Italy. The arrival in Madrid of the Chief of Mussolini's diplomatic cabinet and his recent interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in which the Tangier question is believed to have been the principal matter discussed, would appear to indicate a determination on the part of Italy not to be behindhand in urging her interests in Morocco in general and in Tangier in particular. Thus,

Abd-el-Krim's...

Abd-el-Krim's surrender, while it has to a certain extent cleared up the military situation, has left the political horizon obscured by so many clouds that it appears not wholly improbable that Tangier may once more prove to be a diplomatic storm center.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Ogden H. Hammond". The signature is written in dark ink and has a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

Ogden H. Hammond.

This cable

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RECEIVED
OJC
JUN 24 1926
Dept. of State

in the Department.

ments Confidential

tial Code

FROM

Dated June 23, 1926.

It should be Rec'd 5.43 p.m.

closely para-

phased before

being communica-

ted to anyone

Secretary of State

Washington.



68, June 23, 4 p.m. ~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.~~

Morocco and Tangier.

British Ambassador
~~Chamber~~

informs me in strict confidence that while Italian Government did have some hope that a conference regarding Morocco might be held they were now convinced that this is out of the question. As to Tangier, British Government has been trying for a long time to get Italy to adhere to tripartite convention and to state her conditions, in other words her price. Ambassador believes that Italy will now do so but fears that on account of the recent press campaign she may ask as a matter of prestige for more than can be granted though he is hopeful of reaching a settlement. I have not mentioned subject at the Foreign Office.

FLETCHER

CSB

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881.00/1239

JUN 25 1926

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

June 24, 1926

UNDER SECRETARY,

JUN 25 1926

DEPT. OF STATE.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JUN 28 1926

DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

~~Mr. Castle:~~

Mr. Grew:

881.00/1239
This telegram seems to indicate that there will be no

general Moroccan Conference, at least in the immediate future, and that its place will be taken by a complex series of diplomatic deals envisaging:

- 1). Maintenance of the political status quo in Morocco
- 2). Italian adhesion to the Tangier Statute.
- 3). Compensation to Italy presumably at the expense of England, perhaps by the cession of Somaliland.

It is difficult to see what England gets out of such an arrangement but it is safe to assume that she will get a quid pro quo, perhaps in being given a share of the Mannesmann concessions.

However I cannot believe that the Tangier Statute, even with Italian adherence, is destined for a long life, as it is inherently unworkable and places a burden of taxation on Tangier which will sooner or later be intolerable.

The next developments with regard to the Tangier Statute and the Mannesmann Concessions should be closely scrutinized for indications ~~for~~ what may be a new orientation in European politics of a major importance.

INDEX BUREAU

JUN 28 1926
FBI

Confidential File

WE:HC




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ROME, June 11, 1926.

No. 887.

only to WE.



881.00/1240
INDEX BUREAU

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to my telegrams No. 61 dated June 1st and No. 62 dated June 9, 1926, in connection with the Italian attitude toward Tangier and Morocco, I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy and translation of the "POPOLO D'ITALIA" article mentioned in the second of the above telegrams. Similar articles appearing in the Italian press and showing Italian and British interest in this question are also enclosed.

It is understood that the British Foreign Office, while refusing to intervene diplomatically in the solution of the internal problems of Morocco, has let it be

known

known that it looks with favor upon the Italian thesis, namely, that a conference for the revision of the status of Tangier must be held. The apprehension with which such a conference is regarded by France and Spain, who are now apparently disposed to admit Italy to the administration of Tangier, may be attributed to Italy's insistence that her participation be extended to the solutions of all the problems regarding the whole of Northern Morocco, giving as her reason her inability to foresee what repercussions these solutions may have on the balance of power in the Mediterranean.

It is reported that Italy is relying on the theory that the participation of a country in a conference which affects the interests of that country either directly or indirectly raises a juridical problem to which the principles of international law are applicable. The exclusion of this country would be dangerous in that such action would favor the conclusion of secret treaties.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Ambassador:



Warren D. Robbins
Counselor of Embassy.

✓
Enclosures:

Copy and Translation of Article
together with pertinent clip-
pings.

(Translation of Article appearing in
"IL POPOLO D'ITALIA" of June 8, 1926).

TANGIER

The reasons which prompt Italy to vindicate with firmness her own right to intervene in the so-called "international" regime of Tangier may be divided into two categories: general and particular.

Above all, Italy can not, and does not, expect to be excluded from a solution which has a direct bearing upon the general situation and the international influence in the Mediterranean. When, in 1923, Italy was arbitrarily and unjustly excluded from the Tangier

agreement

agreement the "MATIN" held, with unveiled artifice, that there could be no question of the Mediterranean since Tangier is situated on the Atlantic coast. This point of view cannot be upheld since Tangier, because of its position, dominates the entrance to the Straits of Gibraltar, and the Straits of Gibraltar are the western doorway of the Mediterranean. We are thus confronted with an important and delicate Mediterranean problem. This is so true that while Morocco was divided between France and Spain into zones of influence, the city and the territory of Tangier were withheld from both these powers and were given an international regime, regarding which England wished to have her say, because of the importance of that port in connection with Gibraltar and with the Mediterranean. It was not intended that Tangier should come under the particular domination of a single power. This would have resulted, in the course of time, in armaments and fortifications, as in the case of Biserta on the Tunisian coast. And it was desired to avoid the dangers of future armaments and fortifications precisely in connection with Gibraltar and the Mediterranean.

Consequently, an agreement of a purely Mediterranean character must be of interest to Italy. As a matter of fact, Italian interest here is greater than French, Spanish, or English. It is necessary henceforth that Italy be adequately appreciated and be kept informed of events, particularly with respect to the Mediterranean questions, because she, of all the great powers, is the most Mediterranean. Spain and France have great possibilities for

commerce and supplies on the Atlantic and, in case of complications arising on the Mediterranean, could always reach the open sea by means of their ports on the Atlantic. England has merely a transitory interest in the Mediterranean, in order to insure her imperial communications with India and Australia; and the bases providing this insurance are Gibraltar, Malta, and the Suez Canal, which might be defined as fortified coaling stations guaranteeing the maritime paths of communication between Great Britain and the Eastern sections of her great empire. Italy is bearing in mind the imperial function of these English bases in the Mediterranean, which have never aroused suspicions of hostility or menace toward us nor have they endeavored to exert control over us. This is so true that the English newspapers, and particularly the DAILY TELEGRAPH, are displaying a friendly disposition to recognize and to support the right of Italy to intervene in the Tangier regime. Inasmuch as Italy is shut in in the Mediterranean, the English press does not forget that the paths of access to this sea are our own paths of breath and life.

On the other hand, the French have not the same attitude toward our own just right. Very often, it is our regrettable duty to come to the conclusion that certain friendships are continental rather than Mediterranean, and Rhenish rather than colonial. But the new Italy, aware of her great sacrifice during the war and of the injustices suffered by her at the time that peace was declared, is substantially friendly with everybody. But this friendship does not take the form of serenades on particular

occasions

occasions to be thereafter forgotten in the repartitions of territory and in the practical recognition of rights.

The French press maintains that by the secret accords of 1902 Italy renounced every right of participation in Moroccan questions. Now, it is true that Italy, because of the good nature, of the ineffectiveness, and of the carelessness of the old political class of past generations, gave France her liberty of action in the territory which was thereafter effectively occupied by this power in Morocco. But she did not renounce the right of intervention in Tangier, which is not French territory. She should derive similar rights in the event of any changes in the political areas or in the religious, customs, commercial, mining, and other influences in the Spanish zone in the Riff which may take place as a result of new agreements following the events which caused Abd El Krim to disappear from the political stage. There is one fact which, as we say in good and efficacious Italian, "cuts the head of the bull", namely, that in spite of agreements between France and England, giving France a free-hand in Morocco in return for Great Britain's free-hand in Egypt, the London Government, intervened in the administration of Tangier. This is the overpowering argument. Was the British representation recognized as a right or because England was strong? The French, who always love to talk about a nation's right, do not wish to emphasize the strength of a nation by belittling this right, and here the right looms clear, precise, and incontrovertible in favor of Italy.

In addition to the unfortunate secret accords concluded by the old unthinking Italian liberalism, it is necessary to refer to the precedents in Italo-French Mediterranean relations. France, as is known, occupied Tunisia by surprise, taking advantage of the good nature of Benedetto Cairoli; it was declared, however, that Biserta would not be fortified. Crispi took a firm stand in objecting to the fortification of that port, and endeavored to create reasons for Italian compensation in Morocco, beginning by building at Fez a munitions factory and an Italian mint. The result was compensation in Tripoli, although afterwards, during the period of conquest, Poincaré did not interpret the accords in an entirely friendly manner. But our statesmen were doubly weak in permitting the fortification of Biserta and in paying twice for Tripoli, first by letting France have Tunisia, and second by giving up our work of effective penetration in Morocco.

Now, the meagre acquisition of Tripoli cannot be paid for a third time by consenting to our exclusion from Tangier, a zone which is not French, we repeat, but international.

Mediterranean situations are particularly delicate for Italy. It is enough to remember that the alliance between Italy and Germany began to crack not only because of Alpine and Adriatic questions, but also because of Mediterranean questions.

We trust, therefore, that the opposition to the evident Italian right of intervention in the Tangier regime will disappear through Italy's good reasoning and above all because of her firm will, which is capable of appraising practical values and real friendships.

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ROME.

TANGERI

ROMA, 7 notte.

(G. P.) - Le ragioni che muovono l'Italia a rivendicare con fermezza il proprio diritto di intervento nel regime cosiddetto « internazionale » di Tangeri possono essere precisate in due ordini, l'uno generale e l'altro particolare.

Innanzi tutto l'Italia non può e non intende restare esclusa da un regolamento che interessa la situazione generale e l'influenza internazionale nel Mediterraneo. Allorché nel 1923 l'Italia rimase arbitrariamente e ingiustamente esclusa dall'accordo, il Matin, con artificiosa sottigliezza, pretese di sostenere che non si può parlare di questione mediterranea, Tangeri trovandosi sulla costa atlantica. L'argomento è insostenibile, perché Tangeri, per la sua posizione, domina l'imboccatura dello stretto di Gibilterra, e lo stretto di Gibilterra è la porta occidentale del Mediterraneo. Siamo, dunque, di fronte a un problema di delicata importanza mediterranea. Ciò è tanto vero che, mentre il Marocco fu diviso in zone di influenza tra Francia e Spagna, la città e il territorio di Tangeri furono sottratti all'una e all'altra Potenza ed ebbero un regime internazionale, in cui l'Inghilterra volle intervenire, per l'importanza che quel porto ha in riferimento a Gibilterra e al Mediterraneo. Non si volle che Tangeri cadesse sotto il dominio particolare di una sola Potenza, ciò che avrebbe potuto portare, col procedere del tempo, ad armamenti e fortificazioni, come fu il caso di Biserta sulla costa tunisina. E si vollero evitare i pericoli di futuri armamenti e fortificazioni, precisamente in rapporto alla città di Gibilterra e al Mediterraneo.

Di conseguenza, un accordo che ha valore squisitamente mediterraneo non può non interessare l'Italia. Anzi l'interesse italiano è, al riguardo, maggiore che non quello francese, spagnolo o inglese. E' necessario ormai che l'Italia sia adeguatamente valutata e tenuta presente, in modo particolare nelle questioni mediterranee, perché essa è, fra le Grandi Potenze, la più mediterranea. La Spagna e la Francia hanno larghe possibilità di commerci e di rifornimenti sull'Atlantico e, in caso di complicazioni mediterranee, potrebbero sempre raggiungere il mare libero attraverso i loro porti sull'Oceano. L'Inghilterra ha nel Mediterraneo un semplice interesse di transito per assicurare le comunicazioni imperiali con le Indie e coll'Australia; e a questa assicurazione di passaggio provvedono le basi di Gibilterra, di Malta e del Canale di Suez, che si potrebbero definire stazioni carbonifere fortificate a garanzia delle vie marittime di comunicazione fra la Gran Bretagna e le terre orientali del suo grande Impero. L'Italia, si rende ben conto della funzione imperiale di queste basi inglesi nel Mediterraneo, le quali non hanno mai avuto un riferimento che potesse essere sospettato di ostilità, o di controllo, o di minaccia contro di noi. Ciò è tanto vero che i giornali inglesi, e particolarmente il Daily Telegraph, dimostrano una amichevole disposizione a riconoscere e a sostenere il diritto di intervento italiano nel regime di Tangeri. Poiché l'Italia è tutta chiusa nel Mediterraneo, la stampa inglese non dimentica che le vie di accesso di questo mare sono le nostre vie di respiro e di vita.

I francesi, invece, non dimostrano uguale atteggiamento verso il nostro buon diritto. Molto spesso spiace di dover constatare che talune amicizie sono piuttosto continentali che mediterranee, piuttosto renane che

coloniali. Ma la nuova Italia, cosciente del formidabile sacrificio compiuto in guerra e delle ingiustizie patite nella pace, tiene ormai verso tutti a una amicizia sostanziale, che non sia affermata solo nelle serenità dell'occasione, per essere poi dimenticata nelle ripartizioni e nei riconoscimenti pratici.

La stampa francese oppone che l'Italia con gli accordi segreti del 1902 abbia rinunciato a ogni diritto di ingerenza nelle questioni marocchine. Ora è vero che l'Italia, per la dabbennaggine, l'insufficienza e l'incoscienza della vecchia classe politica delle generazioni passate, diede libertà di azione alla Francia per la zona effettivamente poi occupata da questa Potenza nel Marocco; ma non rinunciò al diritto di intervento a Tangeri, che non è territorio francese. Uguale diritto le deriverebbe per ogni variazione di possesso politico o di influenza religiosa, doganale, commerciale, mineraria e di altre che per nuovi accordi si verificasse nella zona spagnola del Riff in seguito agli avvenimenti che hanno condotto Abd el Krim alla scomparsa dalla scena politica. Vi è un fatto che, come si dice in buona ed efficace lingua italiana, taglia la testa al toro; ed è che, malgrado uguali accordi di disinteressamento per la zona francese del Marocco conclusi dall'Inghilterra in compenso del disinteressamento francese per l'Egitto, il Governo di Londra intervenne nel regolamento di Tangeri. L'argomento, come direbbero i francesi, schiaccia gli occhi. La rappresentanza britannica fu riconosciuta per una ragione di diritto o per una ragione di forza? I francesi, che amano sempre parlare di diritto, non vorranno, per negare il diritto, parlare di forza. Ed ecco la ragione del diritto sorgere evidente, precisa, incontrovertibile in favore dell'Italia.

Ma, oltre che alla lettera dei disgraziati accordi segreti conclusi dal vecchio incosciente liberalismo italiano, occorre richiamarsi ai precedenti delle relazioni mediterranee italo-francesi. La Francia, come è noto, approfittando della dabbennaggine di Benedetto Cairoli, occupò di sorpresa Tunisi; ma fu dichiarato che Biserta non avrebbe avuto fortificazioni. Crispi tenne fermamente a impedire che opere militari si facessero in quel porto e provvide a creare ragioni di compenso italiano nel Marocco, cominciando col far sorgere a Fez una fabbrica d'armi e una zecca italiane. Si finì invece per trovare un compenso a Tripoli, benché poi nel periodo di realizzazione della conquista, Poincaré interpretasse gli accordi in modo non del tutto amichevole. Ma i nostri uomini di Governo furono doppiamente deboli, rinunciando alla demilitarizzazione di Biserta e pagando Tripoli due volte, non solo con la presa di possesso francese su Tunisi, ma anche rinunciando alla nostra opera di efficace penetrazione nel Marocco.

Ora il magro acquisto di Tripoli non può essere pagato una terza volta, con la nostra defenestrazione da Tangeri, zona non francese, ripetiamo, ma internazionale.

Le situazioni mediterranee hanno una

particolare delicatezza per l'Italia, basta ricordare che l'alleanza fra Italia e Germania cominciò a incrinarsi non solo per le questioni alpine e adriatiche, ma anche per quelle mediterranee.

Confidiamo dunque che le opposizioni all'attuale diritto italiano di intervento nel regime di Tangeri cadranno, per le buone ragioni dell'Italia e soprattutto per la sua stessa volontà, la quale saprà valutare i riconoscimenti pratici e le amicizie sostanziali.

ROME.

UN DELICATO PROBLEMA MEDITERRANEO

Tangeri e l'assestamento del Riff

La necessità di una nuova Conferenza internazionale e il diritto dell'Italia all'intervento come firmataria del Patto di Algeiras

Londra, 8.

La sistemazione del Riff dà oggi argomento al Daily Telegraph di riesaminare la posizione dell'Italia nei confronti del problema marocchino. E' già da tempo evidente — scrive il giornale — che non si può limitare ad un semplice aggiustamento del Riff da parte delle due potenze protettrici e di esse soltanto.

Il nostro collaboratore diplomatico ha ripetutamente richiamato l'attenzione sul vigile atteggiamento del Governo italiano, il quale ha già affermato le sue rivendicazioni.

Il sig. Mussolini ha già fatto conoscere così a Parigi come a Madrid che l'Italia ha diritto di essere consultata nella eventuale di qualsiasi modificazione dell'assetto politico territoriale del Marocco, diritto che appartiene a tutte le potenze firmatarie del patto di Algeiras e che l'Italia, da lungo tempo malcontenta della sua pratica esclusione dalla cerchia delle potenze amministratrici della zona internazionale di Tangeri cercherà di far valere in questa occasione.

Verso una nuova Conferenza

Ma non l'Italia soltanto è toccata dalla prospettiva di una riorganizzazione da compiersi nel Marocco dal consesso militare ed economico franco-spagnolo.

Nel campo strategico tutto quello che può avere attinenza diretta o indiretta con la esistente neutralizzazione della costa del Riff e dell'enclave di Tangeri interessa seriamente non solo l'Italia, ma anche la Gran Bretagna.

Nel campo economico il Governo degli Stati Uniti ha un geloso rispetto del principio della porta aperta nelle faccende finanziarie e commerciali del Marocco e vorrà assicurarsi circa le possibili ripercussioni di un nuovo consorzio franco-spagnolo.

Vi sono altri Stati i quali hanno interessi eguali alla Francia ed alla Spagna, ed ai quali non si può negare il diritto di farsi valere.

Non è improbabile quindi che l'avvenuta di Abd El Krim nel Riff abbia fra le sue conseguenze più notevoli la convocazione di una nuova conferenza internazionale sugli affari marocchini nella quale la Francia e la Spagna si unirebbero alla Gran Bretagna, all'Italia, agli Stati Uniti, al Belgio, all'Olanda ed al Portogallo come firmatari del Patto di Algeiras.

Vi sono del resto varie questioni che debbono essere risolte con un tale mezzo, all'infuori di quella che riguarda il Riff. Le principali sono connesse allo statuto ed all'amministrazione della zona internazionale di Tangeri, dove le cose sono andate di male in peggio sotto il regime istituito con la convenzione del 1923.

Si è aggiunta di recente un'altra difficoltà: la erezione di una barriera doganale fra l'enclave di Tangeri ed il protettorato spagnolo per la esazione di dazi sulle merci assicurate sul mercato di Tangeri.

Il Governo spagnolo così facendo ha esercitato indubbiamente un diritto riservatogli dalle convenzioni di Tangeri, ma in sei settimane da che il cordone doganale è stabilito si sono già rilevate conseguenze disastrose per il commercio di Tangeri, una

particolare. Anzitutto l'Italia non può e non intende restare esclusa da un regolamento che interessa la situazione generale dell'influenza internazionale nel Mediterraneo.

Ingiusta esclusione

Allorché nel 1923 l'Italia rimase arbitrariamente ed ingiustamente esclusa dall'accordo, il « Matin » con artificiosa sottigliezza pretese di sostenere che non si può parlare di questione mediterranea per Tangeri trovandosi sulla costa atlantica.

L'argomentazione è insostenibile perché Tangeri per la sua posizione domina l'imboccatura dello stretto di Gibilterra e lo stretto di Gibilterra è la porta occidentale del Mediterraneo.

Siamo dunque di fronte ad un problema di delicata importanza mediterranea.

Ciò è tanto vero che mentre il Marocco fu diviso in zone di influenza fra Francia e Spagna, la città ed il territorio di Tangeri furono sottratti all'una ed all'altra potenza ed ebbero un regime internazionale, in cui l'Inghilterra volle intervenire per l'importanza che questa porta ha in riferimento a Gibilterra ed al Mediterraneo.

Non si volle che Tangeri cadesse sotto il dominio particolare di una sola potenza, ciò che avrebbe potuto portare col procedere del tempo ad armamenti e fortificazioni come fu il caso di Biserta sulla costa tunisina e si vollero evitare i pericoli di futuri armamenti e fortificazioni precisamente in rapporto alla città di Gibilterra ed al Mediterraneo. In conseguenza un accordo che ha valore squisitamente mediterraneo non può non interessare l'Italia. Anzi l'interesse italiano è al riguardo maggiore che non quello francese, spagnolo o inglese. E' necessario ormai che l'Italia sia adeguatamente valutata e tenuta presente. In modo particolare nelle questioni mediterranee perché essa è, fra le grandi potenze, la più mediterranea.

La solidarietà inglese

La Spagna e la Francia hanno larghe possibilità di commercio e di rifornimenti su l'Atlantico ed in caso di complicazioni mediterranee potrebbero sempre raggiungere il mare libero attraverso i loro porti su l'Oceano. L'Inghilterra ha nel Mediterraneo un semplice interesse di transito per assicurare la comunicazioni imperiali con le Indie e con l'Australia ed a questa sicurezza di passaggio provvedono le basi di Gibilterra, di Malta e del Canale di Suez che si potrebbero definire stazioni carbonifere fortificate a garanzia delle vie marittime di comunicazione fra la Gran Bretagna e le terre orientali del suo grande impero.

L'Italia si rende ben conto delle funzioni imperiali di queste basi inglesi nel Mediterraneo, le quali non hanno mai avuto un riferimento che potesse essere sospetto di ostilità o di controllo o di minaccia contro di noi. Ciò è tanto vero che noi. Ciò è tanto vero che i giornali inglesi e particolarmente il « Daily Telegraph » dimostra una amichevole disposizione a riconoscere ed a sostenere il diritto del-

cordi si verificasse nella zona spagnola del Riff in seguito agli avvenimenti che hanno condotto Abd El Krim alla scomparsa dalla scena politica. Vi è un fatto che come si dice in buona lingua italiana « taglia la testa al toro » ed è che, malgrado eguale accordo di disarmamento per la zona francese del Marocco concluso dall'Inghilterra in compenso del disinteressamento francese per l'Algeria, il Governo di Londra intervenne nella regolamentazione di Tangeri. La rappresentanza britannica fu riconosciuta per una ragione di diritto o per una ragione di forza? I francesi che amano sempre il diritto di diritto non vorranno, per negare il diritto, parlare di forza.

Ed ecco la ragione del diritto sorgere evidente, precisa, incontrastante, in favore dell'Italia.

Ciò che la Francia deve sapere

Ma oltre che alla lettera dei disgraziati accordi segreti conclusi dal vecchio intoccabile liberalismo italiano, occorre richiamarsi ai precedenti delle relazioni mediterranee italo-francesi. La Francia, come è noto, approfittando della debbonaggine di Benedetto Cairoli occupò di sorpresa Tunisi, ma fu dichiarato che Biserta non avrebbe avuto fortificazioni. Crispi tenne fermo ed impedì che opere militari si facessero in quel porto e provvide a creare ragioni di compenso per l'Italia nel Marocco cominciando col far sorgere a Fez una fabbrica d'armi ed una zecca italiana. Si finì invece per trovare un compenso a Tripoli, benché poi nel periodo della realizzazione della conquista Poincaré interpretasse gli accordi in modo non del tutto amichevole.

Ma i nostri uomini di Governo furono doppiamente deboli rinunciando alla demilitarizzazione di Biserta e pagando Tripoli due volte, non solo con la presa di possesso francese di Tunisi, ma anche rinunciando alla nostra opera di efficace penetrazione nel Marocco.

Ora il magro acquisto di Tripoli non può essere pagato una terza volta con la nostra defenestrazione da Tangeri, zona non francese, ma internazionale. La situazione mediterranea ha una particolare delicatezza per l'Italia.

Basta ricordare che l'alleanza fra l'Italia e la Germania cominciò ad inclinarsi non solo per le questioni alpine ed adriatiche, ma anche per le questioni mediterranee.

Ri-
e di intervento
adranno, per le
e soprattutto per
quasi sopra-
rattici e gli amici
minimi il paese
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ni di un nuovo consorzio franco-spagnolo. Vi sono altri Stati i quali hanno interessi eguali alla Francia ed alla Spagna, ed ai quali non si può negare il diritto di farsi valere.

Non è improbabile quindi che l'avvenuta di Abd El Krim nel Riff abbia fra le sue conseguenze più notevoli la convocazione di una nuova conferenza internazionale sugli affari marocchini nella quale la Francia e la Spagna si unirebbero alla Gran Bretagna, all'Italia, agli Stati Uniti, al Belgio, all'Olanda ed al Portogallo come firmatari del Patto di Algeiras.

Vi sono del resto varie questioni che debbono essere regolate con un tale mezzo, all'infuori di quella che riguarda il Riff. Le principali sono connesse allo statuto ed all'amministrazione della zona internazionale di Tangeri, dove le cose sono andate di male in peggio sotto il regime istituito con la convenzione del 1923.

Si è aggiunta di recente un'altra difficoltà: la erezione di una barriera doganale fra l'enclave di Tangeri ed il protettorato spagnolo per la esazione di dazi sulle merci assicurate sul mercato di Tangeri.

Il Governo spagnolo così facendo ha esercitato indubbiamente un diritto riservatogli dalle convenzioni di Tangeri, ma in sei settimane da che il cordone doganale è stabilito si sono già rilevate conseguenze disastrose per il commercio di Tangeri, una parte del quale è fatto da ditte britanniche, mentre il porto di Larache nella zona spagnola ha avuto un benefico corrispondente.

L'Amministrazione di Tangeri ha cercato di arrivare ad un accordo con le autorità spagnole offrendo in pagamento una parte delle entrate di Tangeri sulla base del valore delle merci ivi vendute da destinarsi alla zona spagnola, a patto che la barriera doganale venisse rimossa.

Ma le cifre messe innanzi dalle due parti divergono molto e non pare si possa trovare un accordo.

La nuova barriera doganale è stata definita dalla stampa spagnola di Tangeri come una corda al collo di Tangeri e dovrebbe servire a determinare la forzata inclusione della città nel protettorato spagnolo.

Il fatto che un tale movente possa essere sospettato è già di per sé sgradevole, ma esso dimostra che una revisione larga degli accordi marocchini non può essere ritardata a lungo.

Il diritto dell'Italia

Milano, 8.

A proposito della questione marocchina e di quella di Tangeri, il «Popolo d'Italia» riceve dal suo corrispondente da Roma:

Le ragioni che muovono l'Italia a rivendicare con fermezza il proprio diritto di intervento nel regime cosiddetto internazionale di Tangeri possono essere precisate in due ordini l'uno generale e l'altro

mai che l'Italia sia adeguatamente valutata e tenuta presente. In modo particolare nelle questioni mediterranee perchè essa è, fra le grandi potenze, la più mediterranea.

La solidarietà inglese

La Spagna e la Francia hanno larghe possibilità di commercio e di rifornimenti su l'Atlantico ed in caso di complicazioni mediterranee potrebbero sempre raggiungere il mare libero attraverso i loro porti su l'Oceano. L'Inghilterra ha nel Mediterraneo un semplice interesse di transito per assicurare le comunicazioni imperiali con le Indie e con l'Australia ed a questa sicurezza di passaggio provvedono le basi di Gibilterra, di Malta e del Canale di Suez che si potrebbero definire stazioni carbonifere fortificate a garanzia delle vie marittime di comunicazione fra la Gran Bretagna e le terre orientali del suo grande impero.

L'Italia si renda ben conto delle funzioni imperiali di queste basi inglesi nel Mediterraneo, le quali non hanno mai avuto un riferimento che potesse essere sospetto di ostilità o di controllo o di minaccia contro di noi. Ciò è tanto vero che noi. Ciò è tanto vero che i giornali inglesi e particolarmente il «Daily Telegraph» dimostra una amichevole disposizione a riconoscere ed a sostenere il diritto dell'intervento italiano nel regime di Tangeri. Poichè l'Italia è tutta chiusa nel Mediterraneo la stampa inglese non dimentica che le vie di accesso di questo mare sono le nostre vie di respiro e di vita. I francesi invece non dimostrano eguale atteggiamento verso il nostro buon diritto. Molto spesso spiace di dover constatare che talune amicizie sono piuttosto continentali che mediterranee, piuttosto renane che coloniali. Ma la nuova Italia cosciente del formidabile sacrificio compiuto in guerra e delle ingiustizie patite nella pace, tiene ormai verso tutti ad una amicizia sostanziale che non sia affermata solo nelle serenate di occasione per essere poi dimenticata nelle ripartizioni e nei riconoscimenti pratici.

I diritti dell'Italia

La stampa francese oppone che l'Italia con gli accordi segreti del 1902 abbia rinunciato ad ogni diritto di ingerenza nelle questioni marocchine. Ora è vero che l'Italia per la dabbenaggine, l'insufficienza e la incoscienza della vecchia classe politica delle generazioni passate, diede libertà di azione alla Francia per la zona effettivamente poi occupata da questa potenza nel Marocco, ma non rinunciò al diritto di intervento a Tangeri che non è territorio francese.

Eguale diritto le deriverebbe per ogni variazione di possesso politico o di influenza religiosa, doganale, commerciale, mineraria e di altro che per nuovi ac-

quiritano di Biserta e pagando Tripoli due volte, non solo con la presa di possesso francese di Tunisi, ma anche rinunciando alla nostra opera di efficace penetrazione nel Marocco.

Ora il magro acquisto di Tripoli non può essere pagato una terza volta con la nostra defenestrazione da Tangeri, zona non francese, ma internazionale. La situazione mediterranea ha una particolare delicatezza per l'Italia.

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Ri-
al-
e di intervento cadranno per le e soprattutto per equate saprà valutare gli amici
voluti il paese
o 1923

ROME.

UN DELICATO PROBLEMA MEDITERRANEO

Tangeri e l'assetto del Riff

La necessità di una nuova Conferenza internazionale e il diritto dell'Italia all'intervento come firmataria del Patto di Algeiras

Londra, 8.

La sistemazione del Riff dà oggi argomento al Daily Telegraph di riesaminare la posizione dell'Italia nei confronti del problema marocchino. E' già da tempo evidente — scrive il giornale — che non si può limitare ad un semplice aggettamento del Riff da parte delle due potenze protettrici e di esse soltanto.

Il nostro collaboratore diplomatico ha ripetutamente richiamato l'attenzione sul vige atteggiamento del Governo italiano, il quale ha già affermato le sue rivendicazioni.

Il sig. Mussolini ha già fatto conoscere così a Parigi come a Madrid che l'Italia ha diritto di essere consultata nella eventualità di qualsiasi modificazione dell'assetto politico territoriale del Marocco, diritto che appartiene a tutte le potenze firmatarie del patto di Algeiras e che l'Italia, da lungo tempo malcontenta della sua pratica esclusione dalla cerchia delle potenze amministratrici della zona internazionale di Tangeri cercherà di far valere in questa occasione.

Verso una nuova Conferenza

Ma non l'Italia soltanto è toccata dalla prospettiva di una riorganizzazione da compiersi nel Marocco dal consesso militare ed economico franco-spagnolo.

Nel campo strategico tutto quello che può avere attinenza diretta o indiretta con la esistente neutralizzazione della costa del Riff e dell'enclave di Tangeri interessa seriamente non solo l'Italia, ma anche la Gran Bretagna.

Nel campo economico il Governo degli Stati Uniti ha un geloso rispetto del principio della porta aperta nelle faccende finanziarie e commerciali del Marocco e vorrà assicurazioni circa le possibili ripercussioni di un nuovo consorzio franco-spagnolo.

Vi sono altri Stati i quali hanno interessi eguali alla Francia ed alla Spagna, ed ai quali non si può negare il diritto di farsi valere.

Non è improbabile quindi che l'avvenuta di Abd El Krim nel Riff abbia fra le sue conseguenze più notevoli la convocazione di una nuova conferenza internazionale sugli affari marocchini nella quale la Francia e la Spagna si unirebbero alla Gran Bretagna, all'Italia, agli Stati Uniti, al Belgio, all'Olanda ed al Portogallo come firmatari del Patto di Algeiras.

Vi sono del resto varie questioni che debbono essere regolate con un tale mezzo, all'esterno di quella che riguarda il Riff. Le principali sono connesse allo statuto ed all'amministrazione della zona internazionale di Tangeri, dove le cose sono andate di male in peggio sotto il regime istituito con la convenzione del 1923.

Si è aggiunta di recente un'altra difficoltà: la erezione di una barriera doganale fra l'enclave di Tangeri ed il protettorato spagnolo per la esazione di dazi sulle merci assicurate sul mercato di Tangeri.

Il Governo spagnolo così facendo ha esercitato indubbiamente un diritto riservatogli dalle convenzioni di Tangeri, ma in sei settimane da che il cordone doganale è stabilito si sono già rilevate conseguenze disastrose per il commercio di Tangeri, una

particolare. Anzitutto l'Italia non può e non intende restare esclusa da un regolamento che interessa la situazione generale dell'influenza internazionale nel Mediterraneo.

Ingiusta esclusione

Allorché nel 1923 l'Italia rimase arbitrariamente ed ingiustamente esclusa dall'accordo, il «Matin» con artificiosa sottigliezza pretese di sostenere che non si può parlare di questione mediterranea per Tangeri trovandosi sulla costa atlantica. L'argomentazione è insostenibile perché Tangeri per la sua posizione domina l'imboccatura dello stretto di Gibilterra e lo stretto di Gibilterra è la porta occidentale del Mediterraneo.

Siamo dunque di fronte ad un problema di delicata importanza mediterranea.

Ciò è tanto vero che mentre il Marocco fu diviso in zone di influenza fra Francia e Spagna, la città ed il territorio di Tangeri furono sottratti all'una ed all'altra potenza ed ebbero un regime internazionale, in cui l'Inghilterra volle intervenire per l'importanza che questa porta ha in riferimento a Gibilterra ed al Mediterraneo.

Non si volle che Tangeri cadesse sotto il dominio particolare di una sola potenza, ciò che avrebbe potuto portare col procedere del tempo ad armamenti e fortificazioni come fu il caso di Biserta sulla costa tunisina e si vollero evitare i pericoli di futuri armamenti e fortificazioni precisamente in rapporto alla città di Gibilterra ed al Mediterraneo. In conseguenza un accordo che ha valore squisitamente mediterraneo non può non interessare l'Italia. Anzi l'interesse italiano è al riguardo maggiore che non quello francese, spagnolo o inglese. E' necessario ormai che l'Italia sia adeguatamente valutata e tenuta presente. In modo particolare nelle questioni mediterranee perché essa è, fra le grandi potenze, la più mediterranea.

La solidarietà inglese

La Spagna e la Francia hanno larghe possibilità di commercio e di rifornimenti su l'Atlantico ed in caso di complicazioni mediterranee potrebbero sempre raggiungere il mare libero attraverso i loro porti su l'Oceano. L'Inghilterra ha nel Mediterraneo un semplice interesse di transito per assicurare le comunicazioni imperiali con le Indie e con l'Australia ed a questa sicurezza di passaggio provvedono le basi di Gibilterra, di Malta e del Canale di Suez che si potrebbero definire stazioni carbonifere fortificate a garanzia della via marittima di comunicazione fra la Gran Bretagna e le terre orientali del suo grande impero.

L'Italia si rende ben conto delle funzioni imperiali di queste basi inglesi nel Mediterraneo, le quali non hanno mai avuto un riferimento che potesse essere sospetto di ostilità o di controllo o di minaccia contro di noi. Ciò è tanto vero che noi. Ciò è tanto vero che i giornali inglesi e particolarmente il «Daily Telegraph» dimostra una amichevole disposizione a riconoscere ed a sostenere il diritto del-

cordi si verificasse nella zona spagnola del Riff in seguito agli avvenimenti che hanno condotto Abd El Krim alla scomparsa dalla scena politica. Vi è un fatto che come si dice in buona lingua italiana «taglia la testa al toro» ed è che, malgrado eguale accordo di disinsediamento per la zona francese del Marocco, concluso dall'Inghilterra in compenso del disinsediamento francese per l'Algeria, il Governo di Londra intervenne nella regolamentazione di Tangeri. La rappresentanza britannica fu riconosciuta per una ragione di diritto o per una ragione di forza? I francesi che amano sempre parlare di diritto non vorranno, per negare il diritto, parlare di forza.

Ed ecco la ragione del diritto sorgere evidente, precisa, incontrastabile, in favore dell'Italia.

Ciò che la Francia deve sapere

Ma oltre che alla lettera dei ringraziamenti segreti conclusi dal vecchio inconsciente liberalismo italiano, occorre richiamarsi ai precedenti delle relazioni mediterranee italo-francesi. La Francia, come è noto, approfittando della debbonaggine di Benedetto Cairoli occupò di sorpresa Tunisi, ma fu dichiarato che Biserta non avrebbe avuto fortificazioni. Crispi tenne fermo ed impedì che opere militari si facessero in quel porto e provvide a creare ragioni di compenso per l'Italia nel Marocco cominciando col far sorgere a Fez una fabbrica d'armi ed una zecca italiana. Si finì invece per trovare un compenso a Tripoli, benché poi nel periodo della realizzazione della conquista Poincaré interpretasse gli accordi in modo non del tutto amichevole.

Ma i nostri uomini di Governo furono doppiamente deboli rinunciando alla demilitarizzazione di Biserta e pagando Tripoli due volte, non solo con la presa di possesso francese di Tunisi, ma anche rinunciando alla nostra opera di efficace penetrazione nel Marocco.

Ora il magro acquisto di Tripoli non può essere pagato una terza volta con la nostra defenestrazione da Tangeri, zona non francese, ma internazionale. La situazione mediterranea ha una particolare delicatezza per l'Italia.

Basta ricordare che l'alleanza fra l'Italia e la Germania cominciò ad inclinarsi non solo per le questioni alpine ed adriatiche, ma anche per le questioni mediterranee.

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Non è improbabile quindi che l'avvenuta di Abd El Krim nel Riff abbia fra le sue conseguenze più notevoli la convocazione di una nuova conferenza internazionale sugli affari marocchini nella quale la Francia e la Spagna si unirebbero alla Gran Bretagna, all'Italia, agli Stati Uniti, al Belgio, all'Olanda ed al Portogallo come firmatari del Patto di Algeiras.

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Si è aggiunta di recente un'altra difficoltà: la erezione di una barriera doganale fra l'enclave di Tangeri ed il protettorato spagnolo per la esazione di dazi sulle merci assicurate sul mercato di Tangeri.

Il Governo spagnolo così facendo ha esercitato indubbiamente un diritto riservatogli dalle convenzioni di Tangeri, ma in sei settimane da che il cordone doganale è stabilito si sono già rilevate conseguenze disastrose per il commercio di Tangeri, una parte del quale è fatto da ditte britanniche, mentre il porto di Larache nella zona spagnola ha avuto un beneficio corrispondente.

L'Amministrazione di Tangeri ha cercato di arrivare ad un accordo con le autorità spagnole offrendo in pagamento una parte delle entrate di Tangeri sulla base del valore delle merci ivi vendute da destinarsi alla zona spagnola, a patto che la barriera doganale venisse rimossa.

Ma le cifre messe innanzi dalle due parti divergono molto e non pare si possa trovare un accordo.

La nuova barriera doganale è stata definita dalla stampa spagnola di Tangeri come una corda al collo di Tangeri e dovrebbe servire a determinare la forzata inclusione della città nel protettorato spagnolo.

Il fatto che un tale movimento possa essere sospettato è già di per sé sgradevole, ma esso dimostra che una revisione larga degli accordi marocchini non può essere ritardata a lungo.

Il diritto dell'Italia

Milano, 8.

A proposito della questione marocchina e di quella di Tangeri, il «Popolo d'Italia» riceve dal suo corrispondente da Roma:

Le ragioni che muovono l'Italia a rivendicare con fermezza il proprio diritto di intervento nel regime cosiddetto internazionale di Tangeri possono essere precisate in due ordini l'uno generale e l'altro

mai che l'Italia sia adeguatamente valutata e tenuta presente. In modo particolare nelle questioni mediterranee perchè essa è, fra le grandi potenze, la più mediterranea.

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La Spagna e la Francia hanno larghe possibilità di commercio e di rifornimenti su l'Atlantico ed in caso di complicazioni mediterranee potrebbero sempre raggiungere il mare libero attraverso i loro porti su l'Oceano. L'Inghilterra ha nel Mediterraneo un semplice interesse di transito per assicurare la comunicazioni imperiali con le Indie e con l'Australia ed a questa sicurezza di passaggio provvedono le basi di Gibilterra, di Malta e del Canale di Suez che si potrebbero definire stazioni carbonifere fortificate a garanzia delle vie marittime di comunicazione fra la Gran Bretagna e le terre orientali del suo grande impero.

L'Italia si rende ben conto delle funzioni imperiali di queste basi inglesi nel Mediterraneo, le quali non hanno mai avuto un riferimento che potesse essere sospetto di ostilità o di controllo o di minaccia contro di noi. Ciò è tanto vero che noi. Ciò è tanto vero che i giornali inglesi e particolarmente il «Daily Telegraph» dimostra una amichevole disposizione a riconoscere ed a sostenere il diritto dell'intervento italiano nel regime di Tangeri. Poichè l'Italia è tutta chiusa nel Mediterraneo la stampa inglese non dimentica che le vie di accesso di questo mare sono le nostre vie di respiro e di vita. I francesi invece non dimostrano eguale atteggiamento verso il nostro buon diritto. Molto spesso spiace di dover constatare che talune amicizie sono piuttosto continentali che mediterranee, piuttosto renane che coloniali. Ma la nuova Italia cosciente del formidabile sacrificio compiuto in guerra e delle ingiustizie patite nella pace, tiene ormai verso tutti ad una amicizia sostanziale che non sia affermata solo nelle serenate di occasione per essere poi dimenticata nelle ripartizioni e nei riconoscimenti pratici.

I diritti dell'Italia

La stampa francese oppone che l'Italia con gli accordi segreti del 1902 abbia rinunciato ad ogni diritto di ingerenza nelle questioni marocchine. Ora è vero che l'Italia per la dabbenaggine, l'insufficienza e la incoscienza della vecchia classe politica delle generazioni passate, diede libertà di azione alla Francia per la zona effettivamente poi occupata da questa potenza nel Marocco, ma non rinunciò al diritto di intervento a Tangeri che non è territorio francese.

Eguale diritto le deriverebbe per ogni variazione di possesso politico o di influenza religiosa, doganale, commerciale, mineraria e di altro che per nuovi ac-

quopprimamente degli italiani, alla demilitarizzazione di Biserta e pagando Tripoli due volte, non solo con la presa di possesso francese di Tunisi, ma anche rinunciando alla nostra opera di efficace penetrazione nel Marocco.

Ora il magro acquisto di Tripoli non può essere pagato una terza volta con la nostra defenestrazione da Tangeri, zona non francese, ma internazionale. La situazione mediterranea ha una particolare delicatezza per l'Italia.

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Tangeri e l'assetto del Riff

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Londra, 8.

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Ma non l'Italia soltanto è toccata dalla prospettiva di una riorganizzazione da compiersi nel Marocco dal consesso militare ed economico franco-spagnolo.

Nel campo strategico tutto quello che può avere attinenza diretta o indiretta con la esistente neutralizzazione della costa del Riff e dell'enclave di Tangeri interessa seriamente non solo l'Italia, ma anche la Gran Bretagna.

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particolare. Anzitutto l'Italia non può e non intende restare esclusa da un regolamento che interessa la situazione generale dell'influenza internazionale nel Mediterraneo.

Ingiusta esclusione

Allorchè nel 1923 l'Italia rimase arbitrariamente ed ingiustamente esclusa dall'accordo, il « Matin » con artificiosa sottigliezza pretese di sostenere che non si può parlare di questione mediterranea per Tangeri trovandosi sulla costa atlantica.

L'argomentazione è insostenibile perchè Tangeri per la sua posizione domina l'imboccatura dello stretto di Gibilterra e lo stretto di Gibilterra è la porta occidentale del Mediterraneo.

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Ciò è tanto vero che mentre il Marocco fu diviso in zone di influenza fra Francia e Spagna, la città ed il territorio di Tangeri furono sottratti all'una ed all'altra potenza ed ebbero un regime internazionale, in cui l'Inghilterra volle intervenire per l'importanza che questa porta ha in riferimento a Gibilterra ed al Mediterraneo.

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Ed ecco la ragione del diritto sorgere evidente, precisa, incontrastabile, in favore dell'Italia.

Ciò che la Francia deve sapere

Ma oltre che alla lettera dei disgraziati accordi segreti conclusi dal vecchio inconsciente liberalismo italiano, occorre richiamarsi ai precedenti delle relazioni mediterranee italo-francesi. La Francia, come è noto, approfittando della debolezza di Benedetto Cairoli occupò di sorpresa Tunisi, ma fu dichiarato che Biserta non avrebbe avuto fortificazioni, Crispi tenne fermo ed impedì che opere militari si facessero in quel porto e provvide a creare ragioni di compenso per l'Italia nel Marocco cominciando col far sorgere a Fez una fabbrica d'armi ed una zecca italiana. Si finì invece per trovare un compenso a Tripoli, benchè poi nel periodo della realizzazione della conquista Poincaré interpretasse gli accordi in modo non del tutto amichevole.

Ma i nostri uomini di Governo furono doppiamente deboli rinunciando alla demilitarizzazione di Biserta e pagando Tripoli due volte, non solo con la presa di possesso francese di Tunisi, ma anche rinunciando alla nostra opera di efficace penetrazione nel Marocco.

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L'Italia e i problemi del Mediterraneo

Marocco e Tangeri

Il corrispondente del *Matin* a Madrid afferma che il Governo spagnolo sarebbe fermamente deciso ad occupare il Rif, avendo Chechuon come base d'influenza, circa le rivendicazioni; francesi il giornale aggiunge che nessuna difficoltà è da prevedersi. La Francia domanda semplicemente di occupare alcune posizioni a moro dell'Ouerga per garantire la sicurezza di tutta la regione settentrionale. In fine la Francia dovrà prevedere il caso in cui la Spagna sgomberi ulteriormente una parte del Rif.

della questione marocchina potrà essere direttamente liquidato tra francesi e spagnuoli senza bisogno di conferenze internazionali. Noi crediamo invece che presto o tardi la questione della delimitazione delle posizioni politiche francesi e spagnuole nel Marocco prenderà degli aspetti più vasti di quelli che possono essere contenuti nei rapporti diretti tra Francia e Spagna e dovrà perciò portare ad una nuova conferenza internazionale. A questa conferenza dovrebbe certamente partecipare l'Inghilterra, e non potrebbe, ci sembra, non partecipare l'Italia.

Il problema di Tangeri è, abbiamo già ricordato, separato politicamente da quello generale del Marocco, ma vi si riavvicina e vi si ricongiunge oggi per ragioni di tempo. Mentre infatti già si parla della opportunità di rivedere il sistema politico del Marocco, appare sempre più urgente la necessità di una revisione dello Statuto della città di Tangeri che funziona male, anzi non funziona, e rivela così la sua impotenza pratica oltre la sua insufficienza politica per il costante rifiuto a riconoscerlo mantenuto dall'Italia che ne è stata esclusa. Quasi unanimemente i giornali inglesi affermano ora la necessità di una nuova conferenza per Tangeri con la partecipazione dell'Italia. E crediamo di poter dire che non sono smentiti dalla politica ufficiale di Londra, la quale sembra disposta ad accordare all'Italia a Tangeri una nuova posizione non troppo dissimile da quella inglese, francese e spagnuola. Vi si oppone invece ancora la Francia, se pure tempo fa un giornale coloniale francese, la *Dépêche Coloniale*, abbia in un saggio articolo riconosciuto l'errore della esclusione dell'Italia.

Anche in questo interessante problema l'Italia non prende iniziative ed aspetta. V'è da ritenere che presto o tardi esso dovrà riproporsi alla politica pratica dei Governi europei e dovrà ricongiungersi per una trattazione organica e definitiva al generale problema marocchino. Per quel giorno la posizione dell'Italia ha solo da conservarsi intatta quale essa è oggi ed è stata nettamente prospettata ai paesi amici.

Paese mediterraneo, anzi esclusivamente mediterraneo, e Potenza esclusa indebitamente dalle più importanti partecipazioni coloniali, politiche ed economiche, l'Italia non può essere assente da qualsiasi soluzione che venga data a qualunque problema del Mediterraneo. Lo ha già compreso l'Inghilterra. Non dubitiamo che lo comprenderanno la Francia e la Spagna. Poi che la pace e le amicizie politiche riposano anzitutto sul giusto equilibrio creato fra gli interessi riconosciuti di tutti.

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Un passo di Mussolini

Londra, 8 giugno.

Il Daily Telegraph, commentando la notizia che il generale Simon è stato incaricato di studiare insieme con l'alto commissario spagnuolo di Melilla i particolari di una nuova sistemazione del Riff intesa ad ovviare ai gravami economici degli indigeni e che il direttore spagnuolo degli affari marocchini è atteso a Parigi per intendersi con il Governo francese circa la continuazione della cooperazione al Marocco, osserva: «E' già da tempo che non ci si può limitare ad un semplice aggiustamento politico del Riff da parte delle due potenze protettrici e di esse soltanto.

Il nostro redattore diplomatico ha richiamato l'attenzione sul vigile atteggiamento del Governo italiano il quale ha già affermato le sue rivendicazioni. Il signor Mussolini ha già fatto conoscere così a Parigi come a Madrid che l'Italia ha il diritto di essere consultata nella eventualità di una qualsiasi modificazione dell'assetto politico e territoriale del Marocco, ciò che spetta a tutte le potenze firmatarie del patto di Algeiras e che l'Italia, malcontenta della sua esclusione dalla cerchia delle potenze amministratrici della zona inter-

ROME

L'Italia e i problemi del Mediterraneo Marocco e Tangeri

Fummo i primi, sin dalla vigilia delle trattative di pace di Ughia in Marocco, ad avvertire che, conclusa la campagna franco-spagnuola contro Abd El Krim, si sarebbe riaperto il problema politico del Marocco e di Tangeri nel quale doveva ancora essere fatto posto agli interessi italiani. Giornali italiani e stranieri ora riprendono il tema, ma molti di essi esagerano il tono dei loro commenti e deformano la verità dei fatti. Diciamo dunque subito che se l'Italia ha affermato e afferma il suo diritto a non essere esclusa dallo Statuto di Tangeri e a seguire con attenzione lo sviluppo del problema politico generale del Marocco, non intende però prendere alcuna iniziativa per una loro revisione o soluzione. Le informazioni date da alcuni giornali inglesi su un passo che sarebbe stato compiuto dall'on. Mussolini per la questione di Tangeri sono perciò assolutamente infondate. Precisati e affermati i suoi interessi e i suoi diritti, l'Italia vigila e aspetta. Sono gli altri paesi, responsabili in altri tempi dell'esclusione dell'Italia da una partecipazione politica costante e diretta nella sistemazione di Tangeri e del Marocco, che avranno, se credono, da prendere qualche iniziativa.

E in attesa di questa iniziativa straniera dobbiamo ora solo distinguere nettamente le diverse fasi e i diversi aspetti del problema marocchino. Si tratta ora anzitutto — prima fase — di liquidare la guerra e la pace nel Marocco. Il problema interessa solo Francia e Spagna. D'accordo in guerra i due paesi non sembrano perfettamente d'accordo per la pace. La Spagna, che ebbe in un primo tempo a sostenere la più grave pressione degli avvenimenti marocchini e ha creduto poi di essere stata soverchiata dalla Francia, vuole che si consideri e si tratti Abd El Krim come un ribelle; la Francia chiede invece che lo si tratti come un belligerante. Il dissenso qui non è stato ancora superato.

Ma arrivati ad un accordo sulla liquidazione della guerra, Francia e Spagna dovranno poi — seconda fase — definire le loro posizioni politiche nel Marocco e determinare con più precisione i loro confini e possessi. La Spagna, abbiamo già ricordato, vorrebbe anche arrivare ad annettere alla sua zona la città di Tangeri. Si afferma a Parigi che, a parte la singolare domanda spagnuola, anche questo secondo aspetto della questione marocchina potrà essere direttamente liquidato tra francesi e spagnuoli senza bisogno di conferenze internazionali. Noi crediamo invece che presto o tardi la questione della delimitazione delle posizioni politiche francesi e spagnuole nel Marocco prenderà degli aspetti più vasti di quelli che possono essere contenuti nei rapporti diretti tra Francia e Spagna e dovrà perciò portare ad una nuova conferenza internazionale. A questa conferenza dovrebbe certamente partecipare l'Inghilterra e non potrebbe, ci sembra, non partecipare l'Italia.

Il problema di Tangeri è, abbiamo già ricordato, separato politicamente da quello generale del Marocco, ma vi si ravvicina e vi si ricongiunge oggi per ragioni di tempo. Mentre infatti già si parla della opportunità di rivedere il sistema politico del Marocco, una

nazionale di Tangeri cercherà di far sentire in questa occasione, ma non soltanto e toccata dalla prospettiva di una riorganizzazione da compiersi nel Marocco da un consorzio militare ed economico franco-spagnuolo nel campo strategico; tutto quello che può avere attinenza diretta o indiretta con la esistente neutralizzazione della costa del Riff e dell'Euclava di Tangeri interessa seriamente non solo l'Italia ma anche la Gran Bretagna. Nel campo economico il Governo degli Stati Uniti ha un geloso rispetto del principio del ponte aperto nelle faccende finanziarie e commerciali del Marocco e vorrà assicurazioni circa le possibili ripercussioni di un nuovo consorzio franco-spagnuolo. Vi sono altri Stati i quali hanno interessi uguali alla Francia e alla Spagna ed ai quali non si può negare il diritto di farli valere.

Non è escluso quindi che l'avventura di Abd el Krim porti alla convocazione di una nuova conferenza internazionale per gli affari del Marocco, nella quale si troveranno oltre alla Francia e alla Spagna la Gran Bretagna, l'Italia, gli Stati Uniti, il Belgio, l'Olanda ed il Portogallo come firmatarie del patto di Algeiras. Vi sono del resto varie questioni che debbono essere regolate con un tale mezzo.

L'amministratore di Tangeri ha cercato di arrivare ad un accordo con le autorità spagnuole offrendo in pagamento alla Spagna una parte delle entrate di Tangeri sulla base del valore delle merci ivi vendute ma destinate alla zona spagnuola a patto che la zona doganale venisse rimossa; ma le cifre messe innanzi dalle due parti divergono molto e non pare si possa trovare un accordo. La nuova barriera doganale è stata definita dalla stampa spagnuola di Tangeri come « una cor-

da che servirebbe a determinare l'inclusione della città di Tangeri nel Marocco. Il fatto che un altro momento possa essere prospettato è già di per sé sgradevole, ma è sembrato che una revisione degli affari marocchini non può essere ritardata a lungo.

La ripartizione del Riff

Parigi, 8 giugno.

Il Petit Parisien scrive che nelle conversazioni che si svolgono fra i rappresentanti della Francia e della Spagna si cerca di stabilire una identica amministrazione nelle due zone al Marocco.

Il giornale aggiunge: Per evitare di tagliare in due talune tribù, quelle limitrofe saranno comprese integralmente nell'uno o nell'altro territorio, grazie ad un sistema di mutuo consenso tra la Francia e la Spagna. Il solo punto da chiarire è la sorte di Abd El Krim. L'opinione spagnola non comprenderebbe che egli venisse trattato con gli stessi riguardi di un generale vinto che si sia lealmente battuto.

Il corrispondente del *Matin* a Madrid afferma che il Governo spagnuolo sarebbe fermamente deciso ad occupare il Riff, avendo Chechouan come base d'influenza. Circa le rivendicazioni francesi il giornale aggiunge che nessuna difficoltà è da prevedersi. La Francia domanda semplicemente di occupare alcune posizioni a nord dell'Ouerga per garantire la sicurezza in tutta la regione settentrionale. In fine la Francia dovrà prevedere il caso in cui la Spagna sgombri ulteriormente una parte del Riff.

MILAN

La questione marocchina deve essere riesaminata

LONDRA, 8 matt.

Il «Daily Telegraph» riafferma in un articolo editoriale la necessità della convocazione di una conferenza per il riesame della questione marocchina e si schiera di nuovo a fianco dell'Italia nel riconoscere il diritto del governo italiano ad essere consultato per qualsiasi cambiamento nello stato territoriale e militare del Marocco.

E' apparso ormai ovvio — scrive il giornale — e da parecchio tempo che la pacificazione del Marocco non potrà essere raggiunta da accomodamenti puri e semplici fra le due potenze interessate nel Riff nè da queste due potenze soltanto. Nelle nostre note diplomatiche abbiamo più d'una volta fatto presente che il governo italiano ha assunto davanti a tale questione un atteggiamento di vigilanza. L'on. Mussolini ha fatto sentire ben chiaro tanto a Parigi quanto a Madrid che l'Italia ha il diritto di essere consultata riguardo a qualsiasi modificazione territoriale o politica nel Marocco, diritto che spetta indiscutibilmente a tutti i firmatari di Algeiras e che l'Italia, la quale è già amareggiata per essere stata esclusa dal consorzio delle potenze amministranti la zona internazionale tangerina, non può astenersi dal pretendere che venga riveduto.

D'altra parte il giornale rileva che non sarebbe soltanto l'Italia a restare danneggiata dall'esclusivismo di un consorzio economico-militare franco-spagnolo nel Marocco. Dal punto di vista strategico qualunque modificazione diretta o indiretta della zona neutra attualmente esistente sulle coste del Riff e nella zona di Tangeri si riflette seriamente anche sulla Gran Bretagna. Inoltre gli Stati Uniti, che sono vivamente interessati al mantenimento della porta aperta, domanderebbero molte assicurazioni. Così pure vi sono interessi di altri Stati da tenere presenti.

Non è quindi improbabile, continua il giornale, che la caduta di Abd el Krim possa avere, come più notevole conseguenza, una nuova conferenza internazionale per gli affari del Marocco in cui alla Francia ed alla Spagna si aggiungerebbero Gran Bretagna, Stati Uniti, Italia, Olanda e Portogallo, firmatari tutte del patto di Algeiras.

Vi sono molte altre questioni che attendono di essere risolte da una conferenza. La prima è quella riguardante l'amministrazione internazionale di Tangeri, che è andata di male in peggio per il disastrosissimo regime sancito dalla convenzione del 1903.

A questa se ne è aggiunta di recente un'altra molto seria, sorta in seguito alla creazione di una barriera doganale fra il protettorato spagnolo e la zona di Tangeri. Il Governo spagnolo nel creare questa barriera era indubbiamente nel diritto della convenzione di Tangeri, ma le conseguenze per il commercio di Tangeri sono state disastrosissime mentre il porto spagnolo di Larrach ha raccolto messi d'oro. L'amministrazione di Tangeri ha cercato ogni mezzo per arrivare ad un accordo con l'amministrazione della zona spagnola ma la nuova barriera doganale è stata descritta dalla stampa come una corda attorno al collo di Tangeri, da essere stretta per portare evidentemente le risorse di Tangeri nel protettorato spagnolo.

Il giornale conclude dicendo che è da aspettarsi che la gravità di questo fatto sia tale da rendere improrogabile una revisione completa di tutti gli affari marocchini.

La Francia vorrebbe il Riff

PARIGI, 8 matt.

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L'«Information» pubblica: La produzione dei fosfati al Marocco progredisce notevolmente. Era apparso desiderabile che tale sviluppo non si facesse a detrimento della produzione dell'Algeria e della Tunisia. La questione non lascia indifferenti i Governi algerino e tunisino ed è stata esaminata durante la riunione che ha avuto luogo recentemente a Tunisi fra i tre rappresentanti francesi dell'Africa del Nord. E' stato deciso che riunioni semestrali avranno luogo fra i rappresentanti dei servizi relativi alla scala di concretare i provvedimenti necessari a soddisfare i bisogni del consumo, assicurando gli interessi delle imprese produttrici.

TURIN

IL MAROCCO

Abd-El-Krim a Fez

Dichiarazioni di Steeg

Fez, 4, notte.

Abd-El-Krim è stato condotto qui, dove è arrivato stamane alle ore 8, accompagnato da suo fratello e dal suo seguito.

Un alloggio è stato preparato per lui. Egli resterà custodito come prigioniero di guerra ed è proibito a tutti di avvicinarlo. Nessuna disposizione è stata ancora presa per il suo soggiorno futuro.

Il direttore dell'Eco del Marocco ha intervistato Steeg a Rabat. L'Alto Commissario ha dichiarato:

«L'era delle difficoltà incomincia. E' più difficile alle volte profittare di una vittoria che guadagnarla. Ci troveremo al Marocco di fronte a questo problema molto serio». Avendo il giornalista domandato se per la preoccupazione di garantire la zona francese da nuove aggressioni la Francia pensi a nuovi accordi con la Spagna, il residente generale ha risposto:

«Gli accordi particolari fatti fra due nazioni possono subire modificazione quando si tratta di garantire la loro sicurezza comune, e non per procurare vantaggi particolari ad una di esse. Questo è il principio che deve ispirarci per risolvere il problema marocchino, d'accordo con la Spagna. Per quanto riguarda la nostra zona, noi continueremo la pacificazione con la organizzazione della sicurezza e con la istituzione di un regime di giustizia, perchè se gli indigeni sono sensibili alla forza sono tutt'altro che indifferenti alla giustizia».

Le operazioni spagnuole e il viaggio del Gran Visir

Madrid, 4, notte.

I giornali hanno da Melilla che il generale francese Simon si è recato ieri ad Adjir, allo scopo di presentare le felicitazioni del Governo francese all'Esercito spagnuolo e specialmente all'Alto Commissario generale Sanjurjo, il quale ha così brillantemente condotto le sue truppe alla vittoria. I generali Simon e Sanjurjo si sono lungamente intrattenuti su diverse questioni di carattere militare. Il generale Sanjurjo è partito ieri per Rabat a bordo del piroscafo *Princesa de Asturias*, accompagnato dal generale Godet, allo scopo di conferire col residente Steeg e col generale Boicht, comandante in capo dell'Esercito francese al Marocco.

Il generale Sanjurjo ha dichiarato che si fermerà a Rabat due giorni. Il Gran Visir ha intenzione di recarsi a Adjir, accompagnato dalle truppe del Maghzen, per incominciare sul posto lo studio dell'organizzazione amministrativa di questi territori. Il viaggio del primo ministro marocchino nella zona spagnuola dimostrerà agli indigeni che le autorità spagnuole tengono a lasciare loro le antiche tradizioni sociali e le loro ferme consuetudini di governo.

Il generale Simon, che è arrivato ieri a Melilla diretto a Taza, ha dichiarato che durante la visita ad Adjir ha potuto apprezzare l'audacia del Comando e l'opera realiz-

zata dai soldati spagnuoli, i quali, con la loro attività, inspiegabile, hanno saputo vincere il nemico e riorganizzare, nello stesso tempo, i territori occupati.

Un comunicato ufficiale dice: «La colonna del centro ha scoperto tre automobili appartenenti ad Abd-El-Krim e un grosso deposito di benzina. I Beni Touzin hanno consegnato fino a questo momento 1438 fucili».

Il «capestro doganale» spagnuolo a Tangeri

(Servizio speciale della «Stampa»)

Tangeri, 4, notte.

Rimangono tuttora infruttuosi i negoziati fra l'Amministrazione della zona internazionale di Tangeri e l'Alta Commissione spagnuola di Tetuan circa le tariffe doganali imposte dalla Spagna contro le merci che dal mercato di Tangeri passano alcune zone spagnuole. Sei settimane addietro, fondandosi sull'art. 20 della convenzione annessa allo statuto di Tangeri, la Spagna impiantava una barriera doganale fra le due zone per sottoporvi a dazio le merci di transito. Questa barriera risulta ormai disastrosa per tutto il commercio tangerino. I mercanti in possesso di stocks di tè, di zucchero ed altri generi alimentari hanno perduto quasi interamente gli spacci al minuto e non sanno come fare a far fronte ai loro impegni. Il porto di Larache, nella zona spagnuola, sta rapidamente conquistando i traffici tangerini.

Pochissimi sono i mercanti di nazionalità britannica residenti a Larache, mentre una considerevole parte del commercio di Tangeri si trova in mano agli inglesi. L'amministrazione di Tangeri, per ottenere l'abbandono della barriera doganale è disposta a riconoscere i pieni diritti della Spagna in base alla convenzione suddetta, nonchè a versarle una somma annua, che sarebbe defalcata dagli introiti doganali del porto di Tangeri proporzionalmente al valore delle merci le quali, acquistate sui mercati tangerini, proseguono verso la zona spagnuola. E' stato diligentemente calcolato che la Spagna in tal modo incasserebbe il 17,50 % degli introiti doganali di Tangeri, ma le autorità spagnuole di Tetuan pretendono fino al 40 % e non sembrano disposte a transigere per meno del 30 %. Nessun accordo quindi è alle viste, e nel frattempo il tradizionale commercio tangerino gravita sempre più verso Larache.

La *Gaceta De Jébalá* un organo spagnuolo pubblicato a Ceuta, nel numero del 2 corrente scriveva: «Il governo deve mantenere con ogni energia il capestro doganale che sta funzionando da capestro intorno al collo di Tangeri, la cui popolazione sarà costretta a rivolgersi a noi per essere salvata dalla rovina».

(Daily Telegraph).

Anche di là da ogni interesse generale per la pace che si va ristabilendo su le sponde occidentali del Mediterraneo, anche di là dalla importanza di una vittoria diplomatica e militare insieme, che non potrà restare senza ripercussioni su ogni spirito di ribellione — come non senza efficaci e profonde ripercussioni sono già stati gli importanti successi della politica condotta con energia e decisione dall'Italia in Libia — anche di là da tutto ciò, diciamo, la vittoria francese viene accolta dal nostro Paese con sincero compiacimento, per la simpatia e l'amicizia che ci legano alla Francia ed al suo valoroso esercito. Ancora una volta questo è stato pari alla sua gloriosa tradizione ed ancora una volta i suoi capi hanno riaffermato le loro qualità tecniche ed il loro spirito combattivo e animatore.

Nella vetrina di un chinagliere stanno esposte delle artistiche medaglie-mascotte intagliate in San Giorgio. Un cartellino avverte che quel santo è il protettore degli automobilisti.

Un personaggio, intento ad ammirare quei timonieri si volge all'amico che ha al fianco e gli osserva:

— Come diavolo gli automobilisti abbiano l'avevo per protettore San Giorgio, io non riesco!

— Ah! ciò, che ignorante!, Ma gli automobilisti non schiaccia forse qualcuno? Per questo hanno scelto San Giorgio... Non vedi lì, Schiaccia il draghi

X

In ferrovia!

Corbelli et al.

Dott. Uraus,

[illegible]

lla non può non seguire con attenzione la fase diplomatica che oggi si apre nuovamente tra Parigi e Madrid per l'assetto marocchino in seguito alla conseguita pace. Diciamo subito che ogni fatto che si verifichi sulle sponde del Mediterraneo non può non interessare il nostro Paese, e, nella specie, l'assetto marocchino compie problemi non ancora interamente risolti, nel quali si è riconosciuto universalmente il pericolo non aver chiamato alla soluzione l'Italia. Intendiamo alludere al problema di Tangeri. Lo Statuto internazionale di Tangeri, una Conferenza di Tangeri, in cui ha partecipato anche il nostro Paese, non risponde alla natura della città e non tiene conto degli interessi internazionali in essa coinvolti, è stato riconosciuto dalla Francia, dalla Spagna, dalla Inghilterra ed ora si tenta di applicarlo il che non potrà avvenire -- si può fondatamente ritenere -- senza una revisione. Ora non è il caso di confondere il problema di Tangeri con quello dell'assetto marocchino. Ma non si può neppure, aprioristicamente, concludere che l'assetto che sarà per uscire dai negoziati franco-spagnuoli si rifletta, in certo modo, sul problema di Tangeri, e comunque si connetta alla posizione ed alla autorità del Maghzen. Basta enunciare il problema per comprenderlo. Nè crediamo che queste nostre considerazioni possano venire interpretate di là dalla loro legittima misura dalla stampa francese, la quale si è già preoccupata di escludere ogni carattere internazionale alle questioni che si tratta di definire e che essa ritiene doversi definire esclusivamente fra Parigi e Madrid senza bisogno -- aggiunge il *Temps* -- di inscenare nuove conferenze. Ma è evidente che, pur non contestando alla Francia ed alla Spagna di negoziare fra loro le questioni che direttamente le riguardano, non si può egualmente contestare al nostro Paese la opportunità e diremmo la necessità di tenersi al corrente della trattazione e della definizione di quei problemi, riguardanti il futuro regime marocchino, che esorbitino, naturalmente e per il loro stesso carattere, da un definito diritto e da un definito interesse particolare franco-spagnuolo.

Già si delineano, del resto, oltre a ciò, questioni più vaste in conseguenza della resa di Abd-El-Krim che non potrebbero essere considerate nei limiti degli accordi per l'Africa del Nord, e che potrebbero, in un modo o nell'altro, venire a modificare, sostanzialmente, lo *statu quo* ivi esistente.

Se ciò fosse, sarebbe questo un problema mediterraneo aperto, nel quale non potrebbe essere assente la nostra diplomazia.

2-10-1921

Il Marocco e le materie prime

■ I nostri alleati sono esciti dalla guerra non solo accresciuti territorialmente

ideologie di cui i popoli non si nutrono. Il mondo oggi, domani e sempre, sarà fatalmente retto dall'egoismo delle Nazioni in lotta fra loro per la conquista, ciascuna, di un suo più alto benessere. Ma nel limiti saggiamente saputi Imporre a questo egoismo dei popoli e delle Nazioni è il segreto e la condizione della pace. Bisogna, perciò, che tutti ad essa cooperino con il sacrificio di una piccola parte di questo superiore benessere perché dal prevalere fortunato di questo egoismo di alcune Nazioni non derivi un tentativo di soffocazione di altre Nazioni e di altri popoli. Ai popoli con i quali ha combattuto, l'Italia non chiede neppure minimi sacrifici del loro benessere; chiede il loro riconoscimento e l'attuazione di una equa e giusta ripartizione mondiale, offre come contributo di equità materiale, oltre ogni misura, la loro ali' causa. Soltanto il mondo, tutto un elemento ordine in Europa con la disciplina di

suo popolo e con lo
politica di amicizie, di
brío e di chiarificazio
mostrata operante e
una occasione per l
una atmosfera di tran

L'Italia va metten-
tenace opera progressi-
no, tutti i mezzi nazio-
sono in suo possesso
colonie va creando, so-
pulso del Duce, tut-
Intelligente ed animo-
realizzatori. Ma non
solvere che le sue s-
biemi che sono in di-
magnifica crisi di es-
ca e della sua indisce-
terie prime. Chiede f-
alla sua espansione l-
e nuove nazioni; ma
dunque, questo com-
non è un problema di
nazionali.

sul rendiconto generale per l'esercizio
segnala un avanzo di oltre 4

E' stata approvata, dalla Giunte del bilancio, la relazione dell'on. Olivetti sul rendiconto generale dell'Amministrazione dello Stato per l'esercizio 1924-25. Essa costituisce un documento importantissimo per l'analisi della situazione finanziaria del paese. Essa dimostra che vi si fa dell'attuale bilancio dello Stato e dell'attuale situazione finanziaria del paese, e per le vedute che vi si prospettano per il futuro. Essa dimostra che vi si fa dei problemi fondamentali del paese.

Il relatore espone anzitutto, a proposito del bilancio, l'andamento dei ricavi e dei costi, constatando come, nel 1924-25, i ricavi siano stati inferiori del 10 per cento rispetto al 1923-24, mentre i costi sono aumentati del 15 per cento. Il risultato è un avanzo di 417 milioni.

Questo risultato è stato re-
per il fatto che il nuovo clima
ha portato ad applicare anch
no finanziario una nuova dire
Premessi alcuni cenni sulla
del regime tributario

ir la
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concezione economica.

I nostri amici ed ex-alleati si son ormai resi perfettamente conto del nuovo spirito che anima il nostro popolo deciso a veder riconosciuto il suo diritto alla prosperità economica che altri popoli si sono messi in condizione di raggiungere rapidamente. I nostri ex-alleati, cioè, intendono oggi — crediamo di poterlo affermare, per le dichiarazioni pubblicamente fatte in più di una occasione da uomini responsabili dei vari Paesi, a cominciare dall'Inghilterra e dalla Francia — la fondatezza della nostre richieste su questo argomento. Debbono dunque essi inevitabilmente tenere in giusta valutazione quelli che sono i bisogni umani della Nazione italiana; e pare a noi che sia giunto il momento di impostare nei suoi veri termini tale problema, nel momento in cui si torna a discutere in torno alla questione marocchina.

I nostri alleati sono usciti dalla guerra non solo accresciuti territorialmente ma hanno acquistato sterminate fonti di carbone, di potassio, di fosfati, di petrolio, di caucciù e di molte altre materie prime. E' noto che, nel Marocco e in tutto il Nord-Africa, vi sono ricchezze immense di minerali e di fosfati di cui i nostri amici di Francia non hanno bisogno perchè il loro suolo ne è esuberantemente ricco ed essi non sono, per la mancanza di mano d'opera, neppure in condizione di sfruttare completamente tali risorse. E' il momento per tanto ancora una volta e su terreno positivo di richiamare la loro attenzione intorno alle ingiustizie patite dal nostro Paese pur riconoscendo da parte nostra che la complicità degli uomini del passato regime demo-liberale favorì più che gli interessi generali dei nostri alleati, interessi particolari che si inquadravano in tali interessi generali. Ma è indispensabile aprire gli occhi per l'avvenire, e con i negoziatori di oggi di cui il regime dispone e che uniscano ad una fervida reale passione patriottica la completa comprensione del nuovo indirizzo che l'on. Mussolini ha dato alla difesa degli interessi nazionali, far intendere ai nostri ex-alleati che l'amicizia italiana non può essere disgiunta dal riconoscimento di questa necessità ineluttabile del nostro Paese.

Nel Riff ci sono immense miniere di ferro, ve ne sono anche in Tunisia (famose quelle dell'Ouensa); vale a dire ve ne sono a due passi dai nostri porti ed il problema del ferro e della ghisa dovrà inevitabilmente risorgere alla esatta considerazione malgrado la tenace resistenza con cui, ancora sotto il regime che ha salvato e va attuando la restaurazione dell'Italia, si tenta di occultare uno dei problemi fondamentali per la risoluzione definitiva del problema industriale in armonia alla necessaria riduzione dei costi che renda possibile quella esportazione senza la quale l'altro problema, quello massimo, della bilancia commerciale non può uscire dai termini della discussione vana e teorica.

Il problema della pace del mondo è un problema complesso di cui è inutile trattare e discutere fuori dal quadro della realtà soltanto con argomenti tratti dalle

ROME

Il Marocco e le materie prime

Ancora una volta — come già abbiamo rilevato nel nostro articolo di ieri — l'on. Mussolini, fissando i capisaldi della nostra politica estera, delle condizioni del nostro Paese nel giuoco delle Nazioni e le nostre necessità, ha nettamente delineato quello che costituisce il problema fondamentale del nostro popolo: vale a dire il diritto dell'Italia di essere ammessa finalmente a godere di quelle fonti della vita senza le quali un popolo — qualunque sia la sua virtuale potenza — rimane sempre in istato di dipendenza dagli altri Stati di esso più ricchi e provvisti di risorse naturali. Ed ha prospettato la necessità che i nostri ex-allieati della grande guerra vengano incontro alle nostre legittime richieste. Quando, e soltanto quando, queste richieste saranno state accolte e tradotte in realtà, la giovane Italia avrà ottenuto il posto che le spetta nel mondo in condizioni di parità con gli altri popoli. Gli altri Stati, con noi combattenti per la causa comune, otterranno ciò di cui abbisognavano e ciò di cui già avevano abbondanza. Fra questi Stati — la Francia, come sincero compiacimento sottolineavamo, due giorni or fa — la vittoria francese al Marocco. Con la stessa sincerità — a proposito del nostro bisogno di essere ammessi a godere delle fonti della vita ed a proposito del problema marocchino che deve trovare assetto definitivo — crediamo opportuno di esporre il nostro pensiero.

È non sarà facile ricordare anzi tutto come, nei trattati di pace, le Nazioni si assicuravano, non soltanto i vantaggi, l'Italia, con il Trattato di Londra che avrebbe dovuto garantirle la guerra e dopo la guerra, e con i trattati successivi fino al trattato di Versailles, abbandonava, in vece, il problema fondamentale di ogni popolo, cioè quello delle materie prime, sia sul terreno continentale, sia in quello coloniale: problema fondamentale, diciamo, essenzialmente per l'Italia che non le possiede — e non può ottenere per non mantenere in perenne passivo la nostra bilancia commerciale dalla quale dipende, in gran parte, il miglioramento o il peggioramento della nostra situazione monetaria.

È a causa dell'errore base — che fu un delitto contro la Nazione — compiuto a Londra e a Versailles a danno dell'Italia, che il Fascismo, pur nelle sue notevolissime realizzazioni ottenute con prodigioso sforzo in quattro anni, non ha potuto mettere tutta la forza della sua concezione economica.

I nostri amici ed ex-allieati si son ormai resi perfettamente conto del nuovo spirito che anima il nostro popolo deciso a veder riconosciuto il suo diritto alla prosperità economica che altri popoli si sono messi in condizione di raggiungere rapidamente. I nostri ex-allieati, cioè, intendono oggi — crediamo di poterlo affermare, per le dichiarazioni pubblicamente fatte in più di una occasione da uomini responsabili dei vari Paesi, a cominciare dall'Inghilterra e dalla Francia — la fondatezza delle nostre richieste su questo argomento. Debbono dunque essi inevitabilmente tenere in giusta valutazione quelli che sono i bisogni umani della Nazione italiana; e pare a noi che sia giunto il momento di impostare nei suoi veri termini tale problema, nel momento in cui si torna a discutere in torno alla questione marocchina.

I nostri alleati sono esiti dalla guerra non solo accresciuti territorialmente

ideologie di cui i popoli non si nutrono. Il mondo oggi, domani e sempre, sarà fatalmente retto dall'egoismo delle Nazioni in lotta fra loro per la conquista, ciascuna, di un suo più alto benessere. Ma nei limiti saggiamente saputi imporre a questo egoismo del popoli e delle Nazioni è il segreto e la condizione della pace. Bisogna, perciò, che tutti ad essa cooperino con il sacrificio di una piccola parte di questo superiore benessere perché dal prevalere fortunato di questo egoismo di alcune Nazioni non derivi un tentativo di soffocazione di altre Nazioni e di altri popoli. Ai popoli con i quali ha combattuto, l'Italia non chiede neppure minimi sacrifici del loro benessere; chiede il riconoscimento e l'attuazione di una equa giustizia internazionale, offre con sincera disposizione di contribuire, nel dare quanto ancora ha dato, alla causa della pace. Questo un elemento di ordine in Europa con la disciplina dei

suo popolo e con la politica di amicizie, di brio, e di chiarezza mostrata operante e

una occasione per una atmosfera di tra-

L'Italia va mettendone opera progressiva, tutti i mezzi nazionali sono in suo possesso; colonie va creando, se pulso del Duce, l'intelligente ed animo realizzatori. Ma non risolvere con le sue sblemi che sono in di magnifica crisi di estica e della sua indiscutibile prime. Chiede alla sua espansione un e di una azione; ma questo risultato è stato re per il fatto che il nuovo clima ha portato ad applicare anche dopo finanziario una nuova direzione. Premessi alcuni cenni sulla

La relazione del Bil.

sul rendiconto generale per l'esercizio segna un avanzo di oltre 4

È stata approvata, dalla Giunte del bilancio, la relazione dell'on. Olivetti sul rendiconto generale dell'Amministrazione dello Stato per l'esercizio 1924-25. Essa costituisce un documento importantissimo per l'Amministrazione che vi si fa dell'attuale del bilancio dello Stato e del spettiva e per le vedute che vi ste circa i problemi fondamentali periodo.

Il relatore espone anzitutto, con placimento constatando come, i esercizi chiusi costantemente, sovente anche per cifre i esercizio 1924-25 abbia dato un avanzo di 417 milioni.

Questo risultato è stato raggiunto per il fatto che il nuovo clima ha portato ad applicare anche dopo finanziario una nuova direzione. Premessi alcuni cenni sulla

ROME

Tangeri e i diritti dell'Italia

(G. P.) — Gli arrendevoli militari e politici del Riff ripresentano di nuovo sul tappeto i problemi marocchini e particolarmente quelli riferentisi alla sistemazione cosiddetta « internazionale » di Tangeri, da cui l'Italia non intende minimamente rimanere esclusa.

Come è noto, una convenzione per la zona di Tangeri fu stipulata fra Francia, Spagna e Inghilterra. L'Italia fu lasciata all'porte, malgrado il suo indiscutibile diritto di potenza mediterranea, perchè la diplomazia francese sosteneva che noi si fosse fatta completa rinunzia a ogni diritto sul Marocco, per effetto di vecchie stipulazioni mediterranee. In verità il diritto dell'Italia a intervenire nella sistemazione di Tangeri non può essere diminuito o annullato da deduzioni unilaterali e ingiustificate. L'Italia concesse mano libera alla Francia per quella zona che poi effettivamente cadde sotto il controllo francese, ma non fece alcuna rinunzia per il territorio di Tangeri che fu escluso dall'influenza diretta francese e che ha uno speciale regime internazionale.

E ancora si può osservare che gli accordi segreti abilmente conclusi dalla diplomazia francese con l'Italia, in pieno periodo di Triplice Alleanza, rappresentarono un profitto per la sola Francia. Tripoli, infatti, avrebbe dovuto essere magro compenso dell'Italia per l'occupazione francese di Tunisi. Ma Parigi ebbe la finezza di farsi pagare Tripoli una seconda volta con la nostra rinunzia al Marocco. Pretendere un ulteriore pagamento con la nostra esclusione anche dalla zona internazionale di Tangeri, è una troppo evidente esagerazione, la quale non troverebbe facile modo di conciliarsi con le ritornanti dichiarazioni di amicizia.

Il cosiddetto Statuto di Tangeri sembra abbia la speciale virtù di scontentare tutti e di non essere conseguentemente applicabile. Ad ogni modo l'Italia non intende in modo assoluto di riconoscerlo.

Crispi aveva avuto una chiara visione di politica italiana nel Marocco e per suo merito la nostra influenza aveva acquistato una importanza di primo grado presso la Corte di Fez. Il Marocco commise all'Italia la costruzione di un incrociatore e le cose procedevano in modo che, forse, malgrado i forti intrighi internazionali, quello Stato sarebbe definitivamente caduto sotto la nostra influenza politica. Ma, dopo Adua, sotto le pressioni del parlamentarismo ogni volontà di espansione fu mortificata, finché si giunse a quegli accordi segreti che per l'Italia rappresentarono una rinunzia fruttata con una contropartita che invece ci sarebbe spettata come magro compenso di una precedente grande acquisizione della nostra nel Mediterraneo.

Forse l'Italia avrebbe potuto salvare qualche parte del suo diritto mediterraneo alla conferenza di Algeiras allorchè la Francia era sotto l'incubo di Guglielmo II. Ma il nostro rappresentante, marchese Visconti Venosta, era un autentico precursore dei rinunciatari. La nostra stampa democratica, appunto per questa sua tendenza rinunciataria, la esaltò con serenata in si bemolle di tono patetico. Ma per avere in piena luce la figura dell'uomo e anche per avere un po' di necessaria vergogna di quel periodo, bu-

stra influenza politica. Ma, dopo Adua, sotto le pressioni del parlamentarismo ogni volontà di espansione fu mortificata, finché si giunse a quegli accordi segreti che per l'Italia rappresentarono una rinuncia liberata con una contropartita che invece ci sarebbe spettata come magro compenso di una precedente grande acquisizione della Francia nel Mediterraneo.

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E più oltre: «Egli non nascose il suo desiderio di non essere costretto a votare!».

Tuttavia l'Italia non intende rimanere eternamente inchiodata alla croce di error durati un quarantennio, dalle ingenuità di Benedetto Cairoli, alle lagrime di quell'altro Benedetto, che si chiamò Vittorio Emanuele Orlando. Quel periodo di debolezze, nel quale gli altrui imperialismi presero posto nel Mediterraneo, sottraendo all'Italia terre e respiro, si chiude con l'amara esperienza di Versailles. La nuova Italia di Mussolini, pur lontana da atteggiamenti di minaccia o di aggressione, intende fermamente recuperare e salvaguardare il suo diritto di vita e di sicurezza.

Tangeri non è una qualunque trascurabile città. Per la sua posizione, in prossimità dell'imboccatura atlantica dello Stretto di Gibilterra, quel porto ha un'importanza enorme per tutte le potenze vitalmente interessate nel Mediterraneo. Ciò è tanto vero che Tangeri non fu attribuita né alla Spagna né alla Francia, ma sottoposta a un regime internazionale che consentisse una ingerenza di controllo agli Stati maggiormente interessati alle comunicazioni mediterranee. Ora se si riconoscono interessi mediterranei alla Francia ed alla Spagna, che hanno libertà di sbocco anche sull'Atlantico, se si riconosce un diritto di ingerenza e di controllo anche all'Inghilterra, potenza oceanica che nel Mediterraneo ha solo una necessità di transito, è assurdo, ingiusto e non tollerabile negare un diritto per lo meno uguale all'Italia, potenza essenzialmente mediterranea, vivente nel cerchio chiuso del Mare interno.

Quali che siano state le debolezze di un tempo, l'Italia di Vittorio Veneto e di Mussolini chiede alle due grandi Potenze occidentali, di cui fu leale alleata in guerra, e alla Spagna, il riconoscimento del suo diritto di ingerenza e di controllo nell'amministrazione di Tangeri. Amiamo di credere che tale diritto italiano non sia per essere ancora negato o controverso a Londra, a Madrid ed anche a Parigi, dove pure si mostra di comprendere autorevolmente l'importanza acquisita dalla nuova Italia. Secondo le buone norme noi abbiamo discusso a buona grazia e con nacata fermezza.

BOVE

IVANO D: ILY

2° 1082

ROME

Le porte del Mediterraneo

I due punti più sensibili del bacino mediterraneo, l'Egitto e il Marocco, sono all'ordine del giorno. La situazione del primo paese è molto chiara: Zaglul pascià ha vinto nelle elezioni; se non erriamo è la sua terza vittoria, più convincente ancora delle precedenti, dati gli avvenimenti susseguitsi all'uccisione di sir Lee Stack nel dicembre 1924. Il popolo egiziano è per una completa indipendenza; se il principio di autodeterminazione dovesse decidere del destino delle nazioni non vi è più dubbio che l'Egitto avrebbe pieno diritto a governarsi da sé. Ma il problema è problema di forza: dato che la Gran Bretagna per la difesa e per la conservazione del suo impero ha assoluto bisogno di controllare il passaggio del canale di Suez, dato che gli stabilimenti del Lancashire hanno bisogno, per la loro vita, di controllare la produzione del cotone in uno dei centri di massima coltura, bassa valle del Nilo, e in uno dei centri di massimo sviluppo potenziale, Sudan, con quali armi il popolo egiziano può scacciare l'Inghilterra, che possiede navi ed aeroplani? La scheda, il voto non bastano; occorrono dei mezzi reali, concreti, non cartacei. L'Egitto non li ha; quindi deve sottostare alle condizioni che il governo britannico gli impone. Il vecchio leader nazionalista si deve essere reso conto di questa nuda necessità se rinuncia a formare il gabinetto, se lascia ad Adly pascià, capo del partito liberale già accusato violentemente di tradimento, l'incarico non lieve di far fronte alla grave questione dei rapporti anglo-egiziani. Se anche dovessero avvenire dei colpi di scena possiamo esser sicuri che lo stato di cose non ne sarà modificato: le celebri quattro riserve della lettera del Maresciallo Allenby del febbraio 1922 resteranno, magari rafforzate, mai diminuite.

Nel Riff la vittoria su Abd-el-Krim non ha rischiarato la situazione, anzi in un certo senso l'ha oscurata: sono i fatali residui delle guerre e delle vittorie di coalizione. L'astuto emiro arrendendosi al residente francese ha giuocato la sua carta da cui ha tutto da guadagnare. Non dobbiamo dimenticare che l'alleanza franco-spagnola è stata una parentesi nella continua rivalità fra le due potenze per l'influenza nel Marocco. Le truppe francesi hanno occupato tutta la zona che spetta al loro protettorato; le truppe spagnole ancora no e non si sa se le tribù del Djeballa vorranno sottomettersi *sic et simpliciter*. E'

innegabile che prima dell'aprile 1925, epoca dell'offensiva rifiana nella valle dell'Ouergha, i francesi guardavano con simpatia alle difficoltà della Spagna; è innegabile che oltre le frangenti dei ministri e dei generali vi è la tendenza nell'ambiente francese a rivendicare totalmente o quasi a sé il merito della sconfitta dei ribelli. Inoltre le frontiere territoriali fra le due zone non sono state mai ben definite, come pure si presta a varie interpretazioni la vaga riserva sulla superiore autorità spirituale del Sultano di Fez: nel mondo islamico non si conoscono dei confini precisi fra prestigio religioso e prestigio politico.

Nonostante i comunicati che parlano di una sistemazione a due del problema rifiano in istretta osservanza delle precedenti convenzioni internazionali, è certo che dei mutamenti pratici ad una condizione di cose che, si badi bene, esisteva soltanto sulla carta, si imporranno.


A questo punto la questione di Tangeri, non ancora sistemata, si intreccia coll'assetto del Riff. La Spagna mira senza sottintesi al possesso di Tangeri e per ottenere tale scopo sarebbe disposta anche a dei sacrifici nell'interno del Marocco. Basta affacciare una simile ipotesi per comprendere quale profondo turbamento ne deriverebbe all'equilibrio non solo del Marocco ma di tutto il Mediterraneo: se la Francia riuscisse a guardare su questo mare dalle montagne rifiane, realizzando un blocco compatto del suo impero nord-africano dalla Sirte all'Atlantico, non avremmo più possibilità di respiro nel bacino occidentale del Mediterraneo e oltre.

Perciò bisogna vigilare attentamente e non lasciarsi sedurre da buone promesse, da assicurazioni sulla parola che si concedono e si ritolgono molto facilmente: se Francia e Spagna, come proclamano tutti i giorni, vogliono agire alla luce del sole, nulla meglio di una Conferenza internazionale, a cui partecipino le potenze dell'Intesa firmatarie degli accordi di Algesiras, potrebbe essere adatto allo scopo. E trattative di carattere economico potrebbero accompagnare quelle di ordine politico.

Escludere l'Italia dalla sistemazione definitiva del Marocco è un errore che costerebbe caro e che non gioverebbe alla pace del Mediterraneo: un piccolo sintomo dell'importanza della nostra adesione si è avuto a Tangier, dove lo Statuto non approvato dall'Italia non è stato potuto applicare. Che l'intervento non sia stato inutile.

Alfredo Signoretti

No. 110.



American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General.

Tangier, Morocco, June 9th, 1926.



SUBJECT: Transmitting newspaper article on the Tangier Statutes.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:-

I have the honor to transmit to the Department herewith, excerpts from the issue of May 22nd, 1926, of the local English weekly publication "Al-Moghreb Al-Akxa and Tangier Gazette and Morocco" containing one article entitled: "Article 20" commenting upon the Statutes of Tangier.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Maxwell Blake.
American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul-General.

Enclosure:-

One newspaper cutting
as above stated.

JUL 3 1926

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881.00/241



ARTICLE 20.

The Customs Cordon or as one of our contemporaries calls it, the string, is still a barrier to our commerce, and merchants here have large stocks which they are unable to dispose of. It was reported last week that at R'gaia the military authorities had removed the barrier, which we believe is quite correct, but the removal was a case of force majeure, so we are told, and that had it not been removed, violence would have resulted. We share, with all the other inhabitants of Tangier, the desire that this bar to trade shall be removed as soon as possible, and doubtless the efforts of the various Chambers of Commerce to say nothing of the weight of the Assembly, will in good time produce their effect. We are doubtful whether it is wise to insist too much on what your individual construction of article 20 may be.

It does not seem to assist matters very much to say that such a state of affairs was never intended nor contemplated. The same argument might be used with equal force, with regard to a number of enactments in the Statute. It was never contemplated that the Assembly, in order to produce a quorum would solemnly count the heads of people who did not exist. It was not supposed that Gambling would be, not only allowed, but increased a dozen times, when the Statute laid down, for once without possibility of argument, that gambling was prohibited. It was doubtless not foreseen that an increase in the pay of the judicial establishment could only be made with the consent of all the signatories of the Act of Algeciras, and it was found convenient to tacitly repeal that part of the Statute as well as any others that seemed in need of repeal. It reminds us of the Banque d'Etat which according to an ingenious thesis of a French lawyer, has ceased to be an international bank, and become French, whilst the Act of Algeciras has been tacitly repealed. We admit the marvellous convenience of dealing with treaties in this way, but we question the wisdom of going to enormous pains to frame a treaty, if whenever it suits any one, it is to be ignored. If the Statute is to be ignored at will, or invoked at will, where precisely do we stand. If the Assembly, with the tacit agreement of the Committee of Control is to be

at liberty to do as it pleases without regard to the Statute, what precise value is to be placed on that document. If we are to be governed by a Statute, it might be as well to know precisely what that Statute means, when it is to be ignored, and when its provisions are to be insisted upon.

We have been accused both directly and indirectly of advocating the special claims of Spain to Tangier. We have, unquestionably pointed out the logical position, brought about by the geographical position, but we hold no special brief for Spain, any more than any other country. The Statute conceived an international government, with a dual administration, one for the native population, claimed as subjects of the Sultan to whom they had never been under jurisdiction, the other by a sort of Municipal Council appointed by the various governments for the Europeans. It did not take many months to see that the arrangement was unworkable, and even had all the Nations concerned adhered to the Statute, it is very doubtful whether it could work. This being the case it seemed to us, and still seems that a remedy is called for.


Revision has been suggested and has met with most hostile opposition. Abandonment of the Statute has been put forward, and an entirely new régime proposed. This meets with equal hostility. The various Chanceries of Europe tell you that they are working with the greatest energy and devotion to making the Statute a workable document, but they are singularly silent as to how they propose to do this, what their policy is, or whether they have one at all. The one thing they do say with re-iteration, is do be quiet, don't criticise us, we in our wisdom know what is good for you, and in the fulness of time you shall be told, but do not point out methods of dealing with this complicated question, which do not meet with our approval. These pontifical utterances leave us cold. We see no reason why because we are inhabitants of a small place we are to have no say in our destiny, but to wait and see with hands folded. The «wait and see» policy has had its day and we believe in a policy of a greater robustness, and are not inclined to submit to death by slow starvation because some Foreign Office Micawber is waiting for something to turn up.

No. 111.

American Diplomatic Agency.

Tangier, Morocco, June 10th, 1926.

CONFIDENTIAL.



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SUBJECT: Italian anxieties and the Tangier question.
Altering perspectives and elemental issues.
The inconveniences of a Conference.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:-

I have the honor to inform the Department that confidential efforts have recently been made by the British Ambassador in Rome to beguile if not to buy Italian

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881.00/1242

JUL 6 1926

Italian adhesion to the Tangier Statutes, in exchange for an Italian Judge on the Mixed Tribunals here. As this post has been twice vacated by the resignation of British appointees, and a third British candidate has not yet been found, the offer may be described as more grotesque than magnanimous, but it indicates perhaps that influences are at work, in the direction of a less patronizing attitude towards the non-adhering Powers, at least on the part of Great Britain, who now appears to be making belated efforts to bolster up with well meant encouragement an already discredited régime. On the other hand, one of the other presenting States—Spain—takes a posture which very accurately symbolizes the tedium with which that Power regards its share in the bargain, but France remains indifferent to current discussions for revision, entirely evading the question and refusing to obscure a fixed issue by argument, for undoubtedly she is well satisfied with the feather her diplomacy placed in its cap at the Paris Conference of 1923.

It is reported that the solemnity was almost comic, with which the British Government presented its recent proposals for Italian co-operation, and it went far astray, by gravely assuming that the latter Power could now be fobbed off with the promise of the appointment of a petty magistrate,—a poor solace to offer Italian national temper, as a substitute for the rebukes to her dignity, which Italy feels she suffered when, by a league
between

between the Powers, she was excluded from all participation in the Conference at Paris. The point deserves to be recalled in this connection that Italy had made it clear, secretly, to both France and Great Britain at the time, that, if admitted on the basis of full equality to the preliminary conversations over Tangier and permitted, as a Mediterranean Power, to become one of the contracting rather than one of the adhering parties, she would show no inquisitiveness over the contents of the Statutes and would agree, in advance, to accept and apply them, as prepared and presented for signature by her co-partners. In harmony with the taste passing at the time, however, she was snubbed, and her menaces of abstention ignored, for, according to the utopian predictions of the framers of this new International Régime, such advantages would be offered to all, that no form of disapproval, condemnation or even conspiracy on the part of any Power would be able to wreck it. This was a dangerous assumption, from more than one point of view, as was pointed out in my No. 16 of September 4th, 1925, (entitled: "The Tangier Convention, Present History and the Future, Our Problems and Policy"), and time has now shown that this fact is no longer a sensational secret.

The popularity of the Tangier Statute, in short, is a delusion. The first year of its existence has been devoted to a demonstration that there is a conspicuous lack of harmony even among its framers, and has witnessed the novelty not only of an excited exchange of Notes
between

between the Chancelleries of Europe, over the technicalities of the alphabet, but of protests registered repeatedly, concerning the quaint and egotistical prerogatives, which some Powers were assuming, as their particular responsibilities, under a fictitious mandate which they claimed to be conferred upon them by the new order of things.

In the light of these facts therefore the probability is remote, that argument alone will not be sufficiently productive of results to induce Italy to be drawn into the Tangier Statutes, unless her practical and political objectives are obtained, for the days of her servile obedience to the behest of European Powers seems to have passed.

There is no doubt that a sane and workable combination between France and Italy over Mediterranean policy would remove many complex problems now the subject of controversy between them. But it is certainly due to the active resistance of France that the Italian entreaties for a voice in the settlement of Tangier were ignored. The French point of view is that Italy, by agreement, has divested herself of any right of interference in Morocco, while the Italians contend that such agreement concerned only the Zone of the French Protectorate from which the question of Tangier was entirely excluded. Furthermore, France feels that to admit the Italian pretensions over Tangier would constitute a kind of contract which would lead to collision elsewhere, and up to now, she has flatly refused to

share

share her historical Mediterranean association, by the admission of any Italian equality. For France to give way therefore, even passively on this point, would constitute for her a dangerous betrayal of policy.

Behind this argument however other factors are involved. From points of view of racial temperament and physical equipment, Italians and Spaniards are perhaps the only European peoples whose home environments adapt them to the climatic conditions of North Africa, and France already views with apprehension the increasing influx of Italians and Spaniards, contrasting with the dwindling numbers of her own immigrants, into her North African possessions and protectorates. In Morocco where the Italian colonists outnumber French settlers by 3 to 1, Italy is constantly complaining against the discriminations practised against her people, in spite of her accord with France for equality of treatment. She thus feels herself compelled to revive a demonstration of her interest in Morocco, for the protection of her economic and cultural welfare.

Things?

It has been suggested that Italy is provocative for a purpose, and is manoeuvring her real grievances in Morocco only as the barter price for economic gains and compensations elsewhere. It does not sound to me probable however, and it would be a startling prognostication to make, that Italy—unless her struggle to create a more evenly balanced equilibrium in the Mediterranean is but a passing political impulse—could for any material consideration afford to risk an estrangement from
this

this almost emotional ideal, which Mussolini has made it his mission to proclaim to the world as one of the fundamental tenets of Italian policy.

This is the factor therefore that is likely to prevent the adhesion of Italy to the Tangier Statutes, unless her amour propre is satisfied and a revision takes place with Italy sitting as one of the contracting and presenting States.

For strategic and economic reasons, Great Britain until recently has supported the French attitude on the exclusion of Italy but her allegiance in this regard is wavering. During the last few months the British Foreign Office on numerous occasions has pressed the Quai d'Orsay for some relaxation of this attitude, but with negative results. Spain has always been sympathetic towards Italian Mediterranean ambitions and no opposition was raised by that Power against Italian participation in the Paris Conference, and should revision reach the stage of concrete proposals, Spain will urge the admission of Italy to the debates.

It is nobody's secret that Italy is giving great attention at this time, not only to the Tangier question but to the developments of possible territorial rearrangements of the French and Spanish Zones of Morocco, which were expected to follow the surrender of Abdelkrim. The French Government, under this apprehension, will therefore proclaim the Franco-Spanish conversations to be confined to a "rectification of frontiers," whatever
may,

may, in reality be the scope of these modifications.

It seems likely that Spain would not only look with favor upon a proposal, emanating from some other Power, to convoke an international conference over the Moroccan situation, but, as reported in my last Despatch, she has made the threat—if unduly dragooned or pressed too far by diplomatic pantomime—to denounce the various treaties, to which she is a party, concerning Morocco, and thus precipitate a situation rendering inevitable an international discussion of the question. Tactful concessions on the part of France, however, may prevent this eventuality.


The anxiety of Great Britain is to see no disturbance of the strategic status, created by her original understandings with France and with Spain in 1904 and confirmed by various subsequent treaties, notably, the Franco-Spanish Agreement of 1912 and the Tangier Convention of 1923. British policy will therefore tend to deprecate any further conversations of a wider scope and will support the French objection to renewed international conferences, so long as the re-arrangement of territorial jurisdiction in the Riff between France and Spain, does not carry French dominion up to any point of the Mediterranean littoral of Morocco. In this contingency, it is believed that Great Britain will depart from the position of aloofness which she desires to observe in regard to the Franco-Spanish negotiations, will assert her right to direct intervention, and might eventually

eventually be reluctantly led to consider an international conference as an appropriate means of preserving her threatened strategic interests in the vicinity of the Straits of Gibraltar.

In conclusion, to generalize very briefly, the policies directing the Powers principally interested in Morocco are singular and, as formerly, are still separated by more profound than superficial causes. Consequently no one expects any formula will soon be found to cover all conceptions, by reconciling in rational form, the mixed inconsistencies and particular rivalries which have long been obstacle to an international accord over this country.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Maxwell Blake', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Maxwell Blake.
American Diplomatic Agent.

NOTE:-

Copy of this Despatch sent to E. I. C., Embassy, Paris.
,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Embassies in Madrid and Rome.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, June 17, 1926.

No. 6418



(2) Copy in WE.

INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1243

FILED
JUL 1 1926

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the interpellation on Morocco which took place in the Chamber of Deputies on June 11th brought forth no new development in the Moroccan situation other than a stout rejection by the Prime Minister of the idea of a general international conference.

The remarks of Communist members, however, were a significant commentary on the insolently anti-national attitude of that group. M. Doriot, for instance, speaking for the Communist Bloc, stated that had the Riffians been stronger they would have urged them to keep up their fight against France. He was sternly rebuked by the President of the Chamber and answered sharply by MM. Briand and Painlevé, while....

while the vast majority of the Chamber expressed violent disapproval. The jarring remarks of the Communists were likewise denounced by nearly all the Paris press.

With regard to the suggestion of an international conference on Moroccan arrangements, the Prime Minister said: "Nothing, absolutely nothing.....justifies the idea of an international conference".

LE MATIN's account of this unusually interesting interpellation is given in translation as follows:

The socialist, M. Fontanier, first took the floor.

"I want to expose a police machination, of which a certain number of militant socialists and syndicalists of Casablanca and Rabat, who were arrested April 28, 1926, were victims."

A plot was talked of for the 1st of May at the time of the parleys of Oudjda, as was a plan of military rebellion and desertion! Nevertheless, all the detained persons were given their liberty the 29th of April with the exception of two who were not released until two days later.

In order to avoid the recurrence of similar incidents, M. Fontanier asked for full liberty of syndical right for the colonial natives.

Then came M. Doriot. The communist deputy took up again the arguments already developed by him concerning the origin of the Riffian war. Amid the protestations of the big majority of the Chamber, he commenced:

"The war that you wanted....."

M. Painlevé - "You well know that we were attacked."

M. Doriot - "We Communists maintain our point of view."

M. Doriot invokes certain documents (the authenticity of which M. Painlevé contests) and, amid protestations from the assembly, attempts to relieve Abd el Krim from all responsibility as to the origin of the conflict.

M. Doriot demands the publication of the files of Abd el Krim. He assures that sensational revelations are found therein.

Then he adds:

"We....."

"We stand for the defeat of French imperialism."

M. Biré - "Where are the gendarmes?"

M. Doriot - "We have wanted the Riffians to sign peace terms because they were dealing with those stronger than they. If this had not been the case we would have counselled a fight to the finish." (Vigorous protestations - prolonged noise).

M. Herriot raises an energetic protestation:

"I cannot tolerate the declaration by a Deputy in a French Chamber that he would have advised anyone at all to fire on French soldiers. I call you to order. It is abominable." (Loud applause).

M. Soulier - "Censorship."

M. Herriot - "It is not by force that such words are repressed but by the expression of the indignation of the whole Chamber." (Lively applause).

In the tumult, M. Outrey became engaged in a lively argument with the Communists. The noise grows. M. Vaillant-Couturier flings a still more vehement epithet at M. Outrey. This epithet must be taken back, warns the President, threatening to apply the censorship.

Calm once established, M. Doriot speaks of "The Republic of the Riff".

M. Briand - "What do you mean by the term, 'The Republic of the Riff'?"

M. Doriot - "A superior state (laughter) composed of the grouping of tribes with a sultan at the head of the country."

M. Briand - "Apparently you are speaking of the whole of Morocco. You do not fail to realize that there are several tribes in that country. If you believe that ceding to the procedure of civilization of Abd el Krim would have brought a superior state, then your formula for freeing seems a strange one to come from the mouth of a Communist."

M. Doriot maintains nevertheless his theory of "confederation of the tribes".

M. Briand continues:

"Some of the tribes were living with a kind of autonomy under the regime of a free municipal administration. Why do

you.....

you want to give them absolutely a military chief who watches them with his cavalymen and treats them as you know he treats them? (Applause in the center and right).

"The work of civilization that France has accomplished down there is the admiration of all who have travelled over the Protectorate. During the war we were able to withdraw all our troops from Morocco and the Moroccans even left their country to come and spill their blood in France."

Warm applause followed the words of the President of the Council.

M. Doriot continues his exposure and asks for precisions as to the Franco-Spanish accords signed by M. Malvy in behalf of France, and worries over the settlement of the question of peace in Morocco.

M. Malvy - "I shall read these accords to the chair."

M. Doriot asks what will happen to the statute of Tangier, and envisages the reunion of an international conference for the purpose of settling questions affecting northern Africa.

The President of the Council interrupts:

"Nothing that has happened in Morocco, nothing in the Franco-Spanish collaboration, nothing justifies the idea of an international conference. Nothing, absolutely nothing. And it is not a question of that. France and Spain have rigorously observed the treaties, and with common accord have established peace and order in the zones under their control. We have peace from now on. But there is nothing that can justify the conference of which you persist in talking about." (Lively applause).

And as M. Doriot cites excerpts from the foreign press and invokes the opinions expressed, according to him, in other countries, M. Briand continues:

"Let us occupy ourselves with our affairs. If the Riffian rebellion had spread; if it had reached Fez and lighted war in northern Africa, believe me that at that moment, if France had failed, other countries would have taken a hand in the defense of civilization; congratulate yourself, therefore, that your country succeeded and attained victory." (Lively applause).


Thereupon M. Doriot finished in condemning "imperialism", and the remainder of the debate was postponed for a week.

I have.....

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Myron T. Herrick.

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, likely belonging to Myron T. Herrick, is written over the typed name and extends across the middle of the page.

In quintuple.
Copy to E. I. C.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, June 18, 1926.

No. 6426

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
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WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

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INDEX BUREAU

JUN 30 1926

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

With reference to the Embassy's previous despatches concerning Morocco, I have the honor to report that the Franco-Spanish conversations for the settlement of questions arising out of the defeat of Abd-el-Krim began at the Quai d'Orsay on Monday afternoon, June 14th.

The French delegates are General Simon; M. Ponsot, Sub Director of the African Division at the Quai d'Orsay; and Colonel Hellé, General Boichut's Chief of Staff. The Spanish delegates are the Spanish Ambassador, Senor Quinones de Leon; General Count Jordana, Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco; Colonel Orgas; Senor Lopez Olivan, formerly Spanish Consul in Algiers and Morocco and a

Spanish

Spanish representative at the Conference of Ujda; and Senor San Groniz.

The conference has been overshadowed in the public interest by the sensational fall in the franc and the cabinet crisis. The extremely harmonious atmosphere under which the conference met and the growing tendency toward a simplification of its agenda have further tended to withdraw the proceedings from controversial publicity. There is, in fact, no fear expressed in any quarter that the Spanish and French will fail to agree on the important issues and no sensational difficulties are expected to arise.

The important questions to be dealt with have narrowed down to: (1) the fate of Abd-el-Krim; (2) the future regime of the Riff; and, (3) the adaptation of the frontier between the French and Spanish zones to the circumstances that it passes through the middle of three important tribes. It is reported that the Spanish delegation is pressing for an early and severe disposal of Abd-el-Krim. In providing for the reorganization of the Riff, it is believed that the arrangements will follow along lines similar to those of the present administration of the French zone and both parties appear to be substantially in accord. The frontier arrangements will present more complex difficulties, but threaten to give rise to no disagreement between the parties. The conference may arrive at some form of mutual administration of the border tribes which will grant to each of the parties the reciprocal right of pursuit and punishment of marauding bands.

The Government announced the opening of the conference in a brief communiqué which predicted that all questions would be promptly and harmoniously settled. Commissions have been appointed, but no definite accomplishments have yet been announced and some delay is being caused by the necessity of referring numerous

matters


matters to Madrid and to the Residency General at Rabat. It is predicted that the conference will complete its work within about three weeks.

The suggestions in the Italian and British press of an international conference tended to subside last week, but foreign papers have noted a recrudescence of Italian and British and also German interest in the subject during the past few days. An editorial in the London TIMES, declaring that the matter was a purely Franco-Spanish affair, was warmly applauded in the French press. Among papers taking the opposite view, however, the French press mentions the London TELEGRAPH, the WESTMINSTER GAZETTE, and most of the leading dailies of Rome. German activities in connection with the Mannesmann concessions have been reported in the news columns but without editorial comment. Meanwhile, L'HUMANITE has commenced the publication of a series of articles by Pierrefont, purporting to give the inside history of French relations with the Riff, and claiming that the French Government at first supported Abd-el-Krim in his fight against Spain and then turned against him when it suited its imperialistic ends to do so.

A little further resistance is still being offered by Riffian tribes, notably in the Taza district, but the military obstacles in the way of the complete pacification of the Riff are now believed to be insignificant and only temporary.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,



Myron T. Herrick.

In quintuplicate.

COPY TO E.I.C.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, June 15, 1926.

No. 6415



For Distribution

INDEX BUREAU
JUN 20
1926

INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1245-

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to my despatch No. 6407 of June 11, 1926, and
to previous despatches concerning Morocco, I have the honor to trans-
mit herewith a copy and translation of an article from LE TEMPS of
June 11th entitled "The Accomplices of the Roghi."

This article is unusually explicit with regard to the intrigues
of foreigners in the Riff. A half a dozen names are mentioned and
reference is made to a "Miss Z. K.," described as a wealthy American
lady.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Wm. T. Herrick.

Enclosures:

As stated above.

In quintuplicate.

Copy to E. I. G.

THE ACCOMPLICES OF THE "ROGHI"

from LE TEMPS, June 11, 1926

LES COMPLICES DU ROGHI

On en tient un! Qui? Le hadj Klems... Ah! celui-là!

Que n'a-t-on pas dit depuis deux ans sur les amis européens d'Abd el Krim? Nous en avons dépisté ici même quelques-uns et non des moindres, Gordon Canning, Hacklander, Otto Zeitlins, dont l'habileté fut de donner à leurs bons offices des formes telles qu'ils ne tombaient que sous le coup de l'indignation publique. Le prisonnier fait il y a quelques jours par nos partisans est d'un autre genre. Josef Klems, fils d'un petit commerçant, est né à Dusseldorf vers 1890. Il avait quitté l'Allemagne, préférant au *drill* les affaires, et était parti à la conquête commerciale du Proche-Orient. Les profits assez importants qu'il en avait tirés ne résistèrent pas longtemps aux sirènes de la Côte d'Azur; Klems se remit en route, vers le sud-ouest cette fois, traversa l'Espagne, gagna le Maroc. Un jour, à bout de ressources, il se réfugia à la légion étrangère. Ce havre le séduisit au point « d'en reprendre » pour cinq ans après une première période; sa bonne conduite lui valut les galons de sous-officier.

Klems comptait huit ans de service quand un jour il déserte, s'enfonce dans la Tache de Taza, se convertit à l'islamisme et s'agrége, si l'on peut dire, aux Beni-Ouarain insoumis : coup de cafard comme il s'en produit parfois dans l'admirable troupe. Jusque-là, oui, coup de cafard, et dont les victimes reviennent souvent; Klems ne revint pas.

Il y a trois ans, il abandonnait les Beni-Ouarain, traversait le couloir de Taza, gagnait le Rif pour mettre à la disposition du roghi ses connaissances techniques. Cartographe habile, parlant, outre l'allemand, le français et l'anglais, il partageait son temps entre le secrétariat international du roghi, où il rédigeait certaines correspondances pour l'Europe et les Amériques, le rivaige méditerranéen où il « réceptionnait » la contrebande, et le front où son activité se manifestait d'odieuse façon. Qu'on en juge : selon les habitudes locales, il pratiquait l'infiltration, mais une infiltration d'un genre spécial. Il avait rédigé des tracts en allemand dont il parsemait nos lignes pour attirer dans les rangs rifains ses anciens camarades. Il opérait aussi en personne, non pas seulement à la tête des *Stosstruppen* pour l'assaut final, mais en venant, comme on l'a signalé souvent, lors de l'encercllement des postes, évoquer dans la langue de Goethe les joies du Walhalla rifain promis à ceux des assiégés, qui, dénués de tout, assoiffés et voués à la mort peut-être, rejoindraient le tentateur. Ce n'est plus du cafard cela, et les dernières pages de mon vieux livret militaire qualifient d'embauchage pour l'ennemi et pour des rebelles armés ces actes de Klems pour lesquels les articles 208 et 238 du Code de justice militaire édictent la peine de mort avec dégradation militaire.

Klems n'est pas seul; il en est d'autres, comme le téléphoniste Walter Noah, Allemand déserteur de la légion étrangère espagnole celui-là, et qu'on ne tient pas encore; d'autres aussi qui formaient cette tourbe d'aventuriers si durement qualifiés par le roghi lui-même aux dires de M. Harris, correspondant du *Times* à Tanger.

Qu'on trouve des excuses aux indigènes rifains... En trouvera-t-on aussi à leurs complices étrangers? C'est une œuvre de salubrité internationale que de châtier cette pègre attirée dans le nord marocain par la seule odeur du sang. Nul ne protestera, pas même les habituels avocats de la désertion et de la fraternisation : est-ce fraterniser que d'apporter à des révoltés le moyen de prolonger leur rébellion? Cette œuvre d'épuration devra être poursuivie jusqu'au bout et ces individus, qui tombent sous le coup des sanctions du droit commun, recherchés où qu'ils soient, par delà les mers s'il le faut, puisque certains, sentant venir la débâcle, ont disparu sans attendre le cinquième acte, comme ce William Wesley, mulâtre de San-Francisco qui jouait les Vauban auprès du roghi avant de s'éclipser en novembre dernier.

Au reste, les éléments ne manqueront pas pour édifier le réquisitoire, si l'on en croit une dépêche de Madrid datée du 2 juin : « Au cours de l'avance d'hier dans le territoire des Bokkouia les troupes espagnoles ont pénétré dans une maison appartenant à Abd el Krim et y ont découvert des documents importants, de nombreuses bouteilles de vins et de liqueurs, enfin un drapeau de la République du Rif en soie pourpre frangé d'or avec au centre un carré blanc portant une étoile à six pointes et un croissant. » Ce drapeau, et, peu après, le récit de la mort à Londres d'une jeune femme, ont brusquement évoqué une curieuse histoire qu'on m'a racontée il y a six mois.

En 1923, quelques semaines après qu'Abd el Krim eut conclu avec M. Gardiner le contrat que l'on sait, une scène bien curieuse se déroula dans un hôtel de Paris. Une Américaine remit aux représentants du Rifain un drapeau brodé aux couleurs du Rif. Est-ce le drapeau retrouvé hier? Les largesses ne s'arrêtèrent pas là : miss Z. K..., fille d'un financier qui fut président d'une banque aux Etats-Unis, était riche. Elle avait mené une existence assez romanesque depuis l'époque où le décaissement de la vie familiale l'avait conduite à se fixer en Europe. Tour à tour conductrice d'auto sanitaire pendant la guerre, organisatrice d'un hôpital en Italie, elle employait une fortune assez considérable à de nombreuses, discrètes, importantes et parfois imprudentes charités. Comme elle s'occupait d'affaires elle fut assez entourée d'aigrefins qui s'insinuaient auprès d'elle sous les prétextes les plus divers.

Comment fut-elle amenée à s'intéresser à Abd el Krim? Toujours est-il que l'enthousiasme pour la cause du Rifain succéda chez elle à celui qu'elle avait conçu pour la cause de Wrangel. Abouchée avec Mohamed Abd el Krim, frère du roghi, lors de son voyage à Paris, elle lui remit une somme assez rondelette destinée au « Croissant Rouge ». Pour n'être point en reste l'ambassadeur promit une concession de terrains, source de versements plus importants de la part de l'interlocutrice. Plus tard les agents d'Abd el Krim parèrent de mines pour gager d'autres prêts. La pauvre femme était entre bonnes mains...

Ses amis constatèrent au cours des premiers mois de 1924 un inquiétant changement dans les habitudes de miss Z. K... Elle demeurait prostrée des journées entières; son aboulie contrastait avec

son autoritarisme d'autan: elle s'enfermait dans son hôtel, défendant sa porte sous prétexte de suivre un traitement. En fin 1924, brusquement elle partit pour Londres afin d'y subir une opération, changea une ou deux fois de clinique, fut opérée, mourut. Dans ses papiers on trouva une quantité anormale de billets de la Banque du Rif et des reçus signés de noms bien... marocains. Les amis européens d'Abd el Krim perdaient ainsi par malchance une importante commanditaire, et on sait que faute d'avoir réuni en temps utile les fonds promis, le contrat établi en 1923 et par lequel Abd el Krim, on s'en souvient, cédait à M. Gardiner l'exploitation du Rif moyennant 300,000 livres était considéré comme caduc en juin 1924.

Dans les documents recueillis par nos alliés chez les Bokkouia, trouvera-t-on quelques éclaircissements sur cette affaire? Nos confrères de tous les partis insistent pour la publication intégrale des correspondances recueillies. L'heure est venue qu'annonçait en septembre 1925 M. René Thierry dans l'*Afrique française*, lorsque à propos des amis européens d'Abd el Krim il écrivait : « Ils ont sur les mains une bonne partie du sang espagnol, français et même rifain qui coule au Maroc. On se souviendra d'eux à l'heure où le bluff sanglant d'Abd el Krim s'effondrera. » Il est temps de faire toute la lumière sur les agissements de ces complices du roghi qui ne sauraient, comme lui, plaider les circonstances atténuantes. Espagnols et Français ont payé assez cher le droit de demander des comptes aux instigateurs et aux profiteurs de l'agression rifaine.

J. LADREIT DE LACHARRIÈRE.

Translation of Article from LE TEMPS of June 11, 1926

THE ACCOMPLICES OF THE ROGHI

One has been caught. Who? The Hadj Klems Ah, that one.

What has not been said for the past two years about the European friends of Abd-el-Krim? Even we have disclosed some of them here, such as Gordon Canning, Hacklander, Otto Zeltins, who clothed their good offices under guises which only provoked public indignation. The prisoner captured by our partisans a few days ago is of another sort. Josef Klems, son of a petty merchant, was born in Dusseldorf about 1890. He left Germany, preferring business to military service, and became identified with a commercial venture in the Near East. The considerable profits which accrued to him were soon dissipated on the Côte d'Azur; Klems resumed his way, this time toward the south-west, crossed Spain, reached Morocco. One day, his resources nearly exhausted, he took refuge in the Foreign Legion. This refuge tempted him to resume his first service period for five successive years; his good conduct earned him a non-commissioned officer's stripes.

Klems had been in service eight years when one day he deserted, penetrated into the Tache de Taza, was converted to Islamism and admitted, so to speak, among the unsubdued Beni-Ouari; a piece of hypocrisy such as he practiced occasionally in their midst. So far, yes, a piece of hypocrisy, the victims of which often returned; Klems did not return.

Three years ago he abandoned the Beni-Ouari, crossed the Taza corridor, reached the Riff where he placed his technical knowledge at the disposition of the Roghi. An adept copier of maps, speaking French and English in addition to German, he divided his time between the International Secretariat of the Roghi, where he directed certain correspondence for Europe and the Americas, the Mediterranean coast, where he received contraband, and the front, where his activity manifested itself in an odious manner. One can judge for himself: following the local custom, he practiced infiltration, but of a special character. He directed tracts in German, which he scattered over our lines to lure to the Riffian ranks their old comrades. He operated also in person, not only at the head of the Stoestruppen for the final assault, but, as it was often reported, during the encircling of posts, when he would appear in order to evoke in the language of Goethe the joys of the Riffian Walhalla promised to those of the besieged who, deprived of all, athirst and doomed to die perhaps, rejoined the tempter. This was no less than hypocrisy, and the last pages of my old military regulations ascribe these acts of Klems with seduction of the enemy and armed rebels, for which Articles 208 and 238 of the Code of Military Justice imposes the death penalty with military degradation.

Klems is not alone; there are others, such as the telephone operator, Walter Noah, a German deserted from the Spanish Foreign Legion, who has not yet been caught; others still, who formed this mob of adventurers, so hardly styled by the Roghi himself in the reports of Mr. Harris, correspondent of the TIMES in Tangier.

One may find excuses for the native Riffians. But can one excuse their accomplices abroad? It is a work of international hygiene to purge north Morocco of this pest which is only drawn there by the lust for blood. No one will protest, not even the habitual advocates of desertion and fraternisation: does not fraternisation bring to

rebels

rebels the means of prolonging their rebellion? This work of purging should be pursued to the very end.

Moreover, the elements will not permit of failure to pursue the inquiry, if the despatch, dated June 2nd, from Madrid, can be credited: "During the course of yesterday's advance in the territory of Bokkoufa, the Spanish troops penetrated the house belonging to Abd-el-Krim, and there discovered important documents, several bottles of wine and liquor, and a flag of the Riffian Republic in purple silk fringed with gold, in the center of which was a white square bearing a six-pointed star and a crescent." This flag, and the report, issued shortly thereafter, of the death in London of a young woman, recalls to my mind a curious tale which was told me about six months ago.

In 1923, several weeks after Abd-el-Krim had concluded the well-known contract with Mr. Gardiner, a curious scene transpired in a Paris hotel. An American woman gave to the Riffian representatives a flag, embroidered in the colors of the Riff. Is this the flag discovered yesterday? Miss Z. K., daughter of a financial who was President of a bank in the United States, was wealthy. She had led a particularly romantic life since the time when family misunderstandings influenced her to live in Europe. Alternately driving a sanitary motor-car during the war, organizing a hospital in Italy, she devoted a considerable fortune to numerous, discrete, important, and often imprudent charities. While she was occupied in this manner, she was continually surrounded by sharpers who, on one pretext or another, succeeded in gaining her confidence. How was she induced to interest herself in Abd-el-Krim? Is it that the same enthusiasm she espoused for the Wrangel cause was supplanted by that for the Riffian cause? Brought together during his voyage to Paris, Mohamed Abd-el-Krim, brother of the Roghi, procured from her a considerable sum of money for the cause of the "Red Crescent". Not stopping there, the Ambassador promised a concession of lands which would pay big dividends. Later the agents of Abd-el-Krim paid with mines in order to obtain further loans. The poor woman was, indeed, in the grasp of good hands.

Her friends remarked during the course of the first few months of 1924 a disquieting change in the habits of Miss Z. K. She would remain prostrated for whole days; her lassitude sharply contrasted with her authoritative demeanor of the preceding year; she confined herself to her hotel, keeping her door closed under the pretext of taking a treatment. In the summer of 1924, she left suddenly for London in order to undergo an operation, changer her clinique once or twice, was finally operated upon, and died. Among her papers were found a great quantity of the Bank of the Riff notes and receipts signed by Moroccan names. The European friends of Abd-el-Krim in this manner unfortunately lost an important silent partner, and it is well known that failing to collect in suitable time the promised funds, the contract concluded in 1923, by which Abd-el-Krim, it will be recalled, ceded to Mr. Gardiner the exploitation of the Riff in consideration of \$ 300,000, was considered as void.

Will some evidence be found among the documents collected by our allies among the Bokkoufa which will clear up this affair? Our colleagues from all quarters insist upon the full publication of the correspondence discovered. The time has come which was announced by M. René Thierry in September 1925 in L'AFRIQUE FRANCAISE when, apropos of the European friends of Abd-el-Krim, he wrote: "They have on their hands a great deal of Spanish, French and even Riffian blood which flows in Morocco. They will be remembered when the sanguinary bluff of Abd-el-Krim crumbles." It is time to completely illuminate the acts of these accomplices of the Roghi, who, unlike him, cannot plead

extenuating circumstances. The Spanish and French have paid dearly enough for the right to call to account the instigators and profiteers of Riffian aggression.


J. LADREIT DE LACHARRIÈRE.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 82.

Madrid, June 14, 1926.



STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

For Distribution	yes ☐	No ☒

INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1246

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

S i r:

With reference to my despatch No. 74 of June 7, *881.00/1238 conf. file*

1926, I have the honor to report that the Franco-Spanish conference regarding Moroccan affairs mentioned therein was not postponed for two weeks (as seemed probable when that despatch was written) but opens today. It appears that the Spanish Government yielded to the French desire to expedite the conference in order to give less time for the further development of popular opposition to the Government's policy (the beginning of which was reported in the despatch above mentioned). It is now reported that the Spanish Government will make a further concession to the French point of view, and recent official utterances

indicate....

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

JUN 30 1926

indicate that the Directory will not press at this time for the discussion of the Tangier question. This official attitude of the Government I am inclined to accept with reserve and am still of the opinion that Tangier will be one of the subjects discussed, although, in all probability, secretly.

On other aspects of the Moroccan situation, it is reported that Spain and France are not at all in accord. Spain fears that in case of a breakdown in the negotiations France will follow an independent line even to making a separate agreement with Abd-el-Krim. It is believed that at the Conference in Paris the French will attempt to advance the boundary of their zone on the North to include ground susceptible of cultivation. Should they be successful in this, the Spaniards would be left with a barren, mountainous country, incapable of producing revenue (the mineral wealth of this territory is largely a myth), which would necessitate a considerable expenditure of blood and treasure for the establishment and maintenance of order. The latter consideration, however, does not appear likely to prove a deterrent to the Directory, since an evacuation of the country would mean the retirement in Spain of a great many army officers who would add to the element of discontent at home.

The yielding attitude of the Directory in its negotiations with France can only be explained by a lack of confidence in its own strength and stability. The censorship has recently become more severe, especially with regard to Moroccan affairs, and I have been told

confidentially...

confidentially by the representative of the Associated Press that he was not permitted even to send a despatch reporting that the brother of Abd-el-Krim was on his way to Paris. In view of this severity, it would appear of interest to note that "A B C", a paper very close to the Government, is permitted to publish the report that the Spanish forces, on capturing a Riffian ammunition dump, found hundreds of aviation bombs of French manufacture. In addition to the popular discontent with the Franco-Spanish military agreement, the Government must now face the annoyance of the officers of the Artillery and Engineers resulting from the Royal Decree which forces them to accept promotions (reported in the Embassy's weekly despatch of today's date).

The Government is also embarrassed by the failure of its extreme attitude with regard to the League of Nations to impress other powers. Having gone so far, retreat will be most difficult, and the Directory will either have to increase its unpopularity by "climbing down", or withdraw entirely from the League of Nations, which Spaniards feel would injure their position in Europe and Latin America.

The Directory, in contrast to the majority of the Spanish people, is taking a great interest at present in Portuguese affairs and is believed to be doing all in its power to assure the establishment and permanence in Lisbon of a government which, if not modelled on the same pattern as itself, will be bound to it by ties of mutual interest ~~and~~ and Primo de Rivera is reported to be willing to give much more to Portugal than is received by Spain in diplomatic negotiations intended to bring about such a rapprochement between the two governments.

To...

To summarize: The feeling of insecurity at home is likely to prevent the Directory from carrying out any logical and continuous foreign policy designed primarily in the interest of the nation, and the Government may be expected to yield in the face of any danger to its continuance in power.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Ogden H. Hammond". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.


Ogden H. Hammond.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ROME, June 18, 1926.

No. 892.



For Distribution

(2) Copy in file



INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1247

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to my despatch No. 887 of June 11, 1926,
to my telegram No. 64 of June 16th, 6 p.m., and to pre-
vious telegraphic reports regarding the Italian attitude
toward Tangier and Morocco, I have the honor to transmit
herewith copies and translations of articles in this con-
nection which appeared in the "POPOLO D'ITALIA" of June
12, 1926, and in "LA TRIBUNA" of June 15, 1926, the lat-
ter by Francesco Coppola, the well-known fascist writer.

The strong "POPOLO D'ITALIA" article was published
in the same edition which reported Briand's statements
in the French Chamber excluding Italy from the Franco-

Spanish

Spanish negotiations in Paris regarding the Riff, but since then the tone of the Italian press concerning Italy's right to participate in questions regarding Northern Morocco, while still insistent, has become more moderate. On the other hand, Italy remains adamant in her demands to participate in the administration of Tangier.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Ambassador:


Warren D. Robbins
Counselor of Embassy.

Enclosures:

Copies and Translations
of two Articles.

Copy to E.I.C., Paris.

(Translation of Article appearing in the
"POPOLO D'ITALIA" of June 12, 1926).

ITALY IN THE CONTINENT AND IN
THE MEDITERRANEAN.

It is opportune that our former war allies - first, and far more than Spain who moreover values our cordial friendship - take into account the justice of the reasoning which prompts Italy to demand the recognition of her own right to intervene in the Riff question and in the Tangier regime. And it is also opportune that they also take into account the just exigencies of our public

opinion.

opinion.

After having offered, without compensation, the declaration of neutrality in August, 1914; after having made in the war a great contribution of blood and of money; after having won the war for the Allies during the trying days of Vittorio Veneto, Italy emerged from the peace of Versailles unjustly treated and profoundly deluded. She did not obtain equitable solutions in the Adriatic; she did not obtain any share in the inheritance of the former Ottoman Empire, and above all - the greatest among all the injustices - she was not given, in the repartition of the rich German colonial domains, that quota which by a sacred reason was due her in view of her tremendous sacrifices and of her National life necessities. Versailles recognized our reasons for security along the Alps and this was the real acquisition derived from Peace. But the reasons for Adriatic security were not all recognized. Concerning the Mediterranean and colonial situations, Italy was still more sacrificed, just as if the war had been an Anglo-French affair and as if Italy had not acquired at least similar rights in the repartitions of the benefits derived from the war.

The grave delusions and the bitterness of an iniquitous treatment were the principal causes of our political crisis after the war, of the rise to power of those who had advocated neutrality and of the defeatists, and of a national state of mind which still prevails in spite of the "recoveries" which Mussolini has realized through the Dodecanese,

Fiume,

Fiume, Jubaland, and Jarabub. These recoveries, however, cannot adequately satisfy the Italians, considering the enormous colonial acquisitions realized by England, by France, and by Belgium by virtue of a victory obtained through the sacrifices of everybody, but which was decided above all by Italian arms.

Italy's sacrifice at Versailles was made possible because of the old, ineffective, exhausted, and out-of-date politico-liberal class which governed Italy at that time. But from 1919 until 1926 much water has passed under the bridges of the Tiber. The Italy of Mussolini is no longer the little Italy of Orlando who, instead of rising in defence of Vittorio Veneto, became discouraged in his grotesque incomprehension of the languages.

It is no longer the little Italy of Giolitti, a parliamentary bureaucrat, or of Sforza, a mediator of the repast of lions, or of Facta, an exponent of a liberalism henceforth senilely impotent. The Italy of Mussolini - socially disciplined, politically rejuvenated, militarily reorganized - is conscious of her new strength and of the decisive effect which this strength has upon continental relations. At Versailles, she was almost left at the door as a poor relative - an undesirable in the banquet of the rich beneficiaries; but she reappeared at Locarno, sought for and invoked as a necessary element of equilibrium and of guaranty. Excluded in 1919 from the great Anglo-Franco-Belgian banquet, she rose at the Locarno bargaining, by virtue of her strength, to a level with England as a

guarantor

guarantor power of the continental peace.

Today, Italy knows perfectly well that her political and military strength cannot be ignored any longer on the continent. While England regulates with negligible risk to herself the central-western equilibrium, preferring to dedicate her major energies to imperial questions; while France and Germany, in spite of Locarno, remain as two tired warriors watching each other's move, Italy, having solved with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire the problem of her own continental security, is free to use her strength and is perfectly conscious that this strength represents a decisive element in the game of competitions.

The new Italy does not expect, meanwhile, to be ignored any longer in the Mediterranean and in the colonial questions as the old liberal Italy had been.

Italy, third signatory of the Act of Algeiras, expects of England and also of France, as well as of Spain, the recognition of her right to intervene in the Riff questions and in the Tangier regime.

It would be a serious error to endeavor to block the path of Italy's legitimate demands.

Without doubt the continental situation is delicate. The permanent mining crisis in England, the financial crisis in France and Belgium, the symptoms of a return of the monarchical forces in Germany, the uncertain political and military revolutions in Poland, not to mention the phenomena in Portugal and Greece, cause a feeling that great changes are

taking

taking place and that there are slow, inevitable growths which do not permit one to dream of an eternal arcadian idyl. No Joshua can halt the sun over Europe. Above all, the recent Russo-German accord is to be regarded as creating a new situation full of future developments.

Two great forces oppose each other in Europe - one advocating the continuance of the present status in Europe; the other seeking revenge. France and England, loaded with enemy spoils and surfeited with colonies, intend to digest in peace their enormous acquisitions and to enjoy tranquilly their privileges. They are two old nations which have reached the apex of wealth and of power. Germany and Russia represent, on the other hand, energies aiming at a revenge; the former aims to wear down with slow, methodical, and studied obstinence the peace of Versailles and intends, by means of her historic strength, to move against France again in order to obtain the rich western lands; the latter aims to wear away, by means of a similar historic strength and through her insuperable historic-geographic destiny, the imperial dominions of England, especially those in the Levant and in Asia.

Between the entente of conservative forces and the alliance of revolutionary forces, Italy, free and master of her energies, desires to obtain the recognition of her own right to live.

"We must be intelligent", said Mussolini recently before the Senate, "to understand soon and with good

grace."

grace."

Up to now, it was claimed that the Italian was a gendarme on the Continent and a beggar on the Mediterranean who, possibly, could be denationalized. Those times are passed. It is well to make a little room for Italy with good grace.

.....

(Translation of Article appearing in "LA TRIBUNA" of June 15, 1926, by Francesco Coppola regarding the Italian Attitude on Morocco and the Riff).

" There are two questions which, although they may have natural and eventual bonds of inter-dependence, should logically be kept distinct: that of Tangier and that of the Riff. It is true that there was an official attempt to combine them when there was talk of ceding to France a good part of the Riff in exchange for the full possession of Tangier by Spain. But in that case France and Spain would have had to dispose of Tangier, which is international and, therefore, not to do with as they please. This hypothesis is manifestly absurd and does not merit further consideration.

Furthermore,

Furthermore, the international regime of Tangier has been the subject of ample discussion; the right of Italy to participate in it on an equal footing with the others has had exhaustive demonstration. This subject will come up for discussion again soon, as the question is far from being closed. On the other hand, the immediate question is that of the Riff. Here also Italy's legitimate interests have been shown, by so-called specialists, to be valid from a juridical point of view through just interpretations of various treaties and of political events, both local and general. However, without denying the value of these juridical arguments, it would appear more useful for the clarification of the respective positions to place the problem on a political basis, or preferably, on an historical and, perhaps, a geographical basis.

"In the first place, there are two distinct aspects of the Moroccan problem, namely, that of the internal arrangement of the zones of the protectorate and that of the Mediterranean - of the security and freedom of the western gate of the Mediterranean. Whether Italy has or has not renounced, and up to what point, her interests in the former aspect of the problem is open to discussion; but it cannot be maintained for one instant that Italy ever thought of renouncing the smallest part of her natural and vital rights regarding the latter, namely, the Mediterranean. This is an elementary fact which cannot, in good faith, be argued about. Italy is not only a great Mediterranean power, but is the only great

power

power surrounded entirely by the Mediterranean without other means of maritime communication with the world except by means of the Mediterranean. By force of circumstances four-fifths of her commerce is on the Mediterranean." The article goes on to point out other reasons why the freedom and security of the western portal of this sea are vital necessities for Italy. "But today", says Coppola, "two foreign powers are dominating the Straits of Gibraltar: Spain, by virtue of her natural position and England who, by her own force, took the position before Italy, had obtained an authoritative voice in international politics. Italy, if she does not wish to become the prisoner of everything and of everybody, cannot consent to the establishment there of a third great military and naval power like France without concrete ^{and local} territorial compensations which would guarantee the security and liberty of her commerce any time and under any circumstances, in peacetime as well as in wartime.

"The conclusion is that France and Spain are free to agree among themselves regarding the southern slopes of the Riff. But if their negotiations should bring France, openly or secretly, to the Mediterranean slope of the Riff, Italy could not let the matter pass without demanding the concrete and ^{local} territorial guarantees for her security and freedom mentioned above."

.....

L'Italia nel Continente e nel Mediterraneo

ROMA, 11 notte.

(G. P.) — E' opportuno che gli antichi alleati di guerra — prima e ancor più della Spagna, che pur tiene alla nostra cordiale amicizia — si rendano conto delle ragioni di giustizia che muovono l'Italia a richiedere il riconoscimento del proprio diritto di intervento nella questione del Riff e nel regime di Tangeri. Ed è anche opportuno che si rendano conto delle giuste esigenze della nostra opinione pubblica.

Dopo avere offerto senza contropartita la dichiarazione di neutralità nell'agosto del 1914, dopo aver dato in guerra un formidabile contributo di sangue e di danaro, dopo aver donato con le travolgenti giornate di Vittorio Veneto le condizioni decisive di trionfo per tutti gli Alleati, l'Italia uscì dalla pace di Versailles ingiustamente trattata e profondamente delusa. Non ebbe egue soluzioni nell'Adriatico, non ottenne alcuna parte nell'eredità dell'antico Impero Ottomano e soprattutto — massima tra tutte le ingiustizie — non ottenne nella ripartizione del ricco impero coloniale germanico quella quota che di sacrosanta ragione le sarebbe spettata, e per i suoi sacrifici gravissimi e per le sue necessità di vita. Versailles ci riconobbe le ragioni di sicurezza alpina, e questo fu l'acquisto sicuro della pace. Ma le ragioni di sicurezza adriatica non ebbero riconoscimento integrale. In quanto poi alla situazione mediterranea e coloniale, l'Italia fu ancor più sacrificata, quasi che la guerra fosse stata un affare anglo-francese e l'Italia non avesse acquisito diritti per lo meno uguali nella ripartizione dei benefici della guerra.

La grave delusione e le amarezze di un trattamento iniquo furono le cause prime della nostra crisi politica del dopoguerra, dell'ascesa al potere dei neutralisti e dei disfattisti, e di uno stato d'animo nazionale che tuttora permane, malgrado i « recuperi » che Mussolini poté realizzare per il Dodocaneso, per Fiume, per il Giubaland e Giara-bub, recuperi che tuttavia non possono adeguatamente soddisfare gli italiani, in considerazione degli enormi acquisti coloniali realizzati dall'Inghilterra, dalla Francia e dal Belgio per virtù di una vittoria conseguita col sacrificio di tutti e determinata innanzi tutto dalle armi italiane.

Il sacrificio dell'Italia a Versailles fu possibile perchè il potere a Roma era in quel tempo detenuto dalla vecchia classe politica liberale, insufficiente, esaurita e sorpassata. Ma dal 1919 al 1926 molto acqua è passata sotto i ponti del Tevere. L'Italia di Mussolini non è più la piccola Italia di Orlando, il quale invece di ergersi a difesa di Vittorio Veneto, si accasciava nel pianto e nella grottesca incomprendimento delle lingue.

Non è più la piccola Italia di Giolitti, burocrate del parlamentarismo, o di Sforza, mediatore del pasto dei leoni, o di Facta, epigono di un liberalismo ormai senilmente impotente. L'Italia di Mussolini, socialmente disciplinata, politicamente ringiovanita, militarmente riordinata, ha la coscienza della sua nuova forza e della funzione determinante che questa sua forza esercita nei rapporti del Continente. A Versailles essa era stata tenuta quasi alla porta, come una parente povera, non desiderata nel banchetto dei ricchi beneficati; ma a Locarno essa è riapparsa, sollecitata e invocata, come elemento necessario di equilibrio, e di garanzia. Esclusa nel 1919 dal grande banchetto anglo-franco-belga, essa nella pattuizione di Locarno è salita, per virtù della sua forza, in primo piano, a fianco dell'Inghilterra, come Potenza garante della pace continentale.

Oggi l'Italia sa perfettamente che la sua

Due grandi forze si contrastano in Europa, l'una di conservazione, l'altra di rivendicazione. Francia e Inghilterra, cariche di spoglie nemiche e sature di imperi, tendono a digerire in pace i loro enormi acquisti e a godersi in tranquillità i loro privilegi. Sono due vecchie nazioni che hanno raggiunto l'apogeo della ricchezza e della potenza. Germania e Russia rappresentano, in contrapposto, le energie tese alla rivincita. L'una mira a scardinare, con lenta metodica scientifica ostinazione, la pace di Versailles e tende per millenaria forza atavica alla ripresa contro la Francia, verso le ricche terre d'Occidente; l'altra, per forza ugualmente atavica, e per insuperabili fatalità storico-geografiche, mira a scardinare specialmente nel Levante e in Asia, le situazioni imperiali dell'Inghilterra.

Tra l'intesa delle forze conservatrici e l'alleanza delle forze rivoluzionarie, l'Italia, libera e padrona delle sue energie, vuole ottenere il riconoscimento dei propri diritti di vita.

« Dobbiamo essere intelligenti — disse recentemente Mussolini, dinanzi al Senato — per comprendere presto e con buona grazia ».

L'amicizia si rivela non solamente nel ricevere, ma anche nel riconoscere « presto » e « all'unanimità » con buona grazia ».

Sino ad ora s'è preteso che l'italiano fosse un gendarme nel Continente, e un mendicante nel Mediterraneo, da snazionalizzare possibilmente.

Quei tempi sono finiti. E' conveniente fare un po' di posto all'Italia. Amabilmente.

La grave accusazione e le amarezze di un trattamento iniquo furono le cause prime della nostra crisi politica del dopoguerra, dell'ascesa al potere dei neutralisti e dei disfattisti, e di uno stato d'animo nazionale che tuttora permane, malgrado i « recuperi » che Mussolini poté realizzare per il Dodecaneso, per Fiume, per il Giubaland e Giara-bub, recuperi che tuttavia non possono adeguatamente soddisfare gli italiani, in considerazione degli enormi acquisti coloniali realizzati dall'Inghilterra, dalla Francia e dal Belgio per virtù di una vittoria conseguita col sacrificio di tutti e determinata innanzi tutto dalle armi italiane.

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Oggi l'Italia sa perfettamente che la sua forza politica e militare non può più essere ignorata nel Continente. Mentre l'Inghilterra tiene a regolare coi minori rischi l'equilibrio centro-occidentale, preferendo dedicare le maggiori sue energie alle questioni imperiali; mentre Francia e Germania, malgrado Locarno, rimangono come due lottatori neutralizzati in una reciproca vigilanza; l'Italia, avendo col crollo dell'impero austro-ungarico risolto il problema della propria sicurezza continentale, è libera della sua forza e ha perfetta coscienza che questa sua forza rappresenta un elemento decisivo nel giuoco delle competizioni.

La nuova Italia non intende pertanto essere ancora ignorata nel Mediterraneo e nelle questioni coloniali, così come lo fu la vecchia Italia liberale.

L'Italia, terza firmataria dell'atto di Algesiras, attende dall'Inghilterra e anche dalla Francia, come dalla Spagna, il riconoscimento del suo diritto di intervento nelle questioni del Riff e nel regime di Tangeri.

Sarebbe grave errore pretendere di tagliare la strada all'Italia nelle sue legittime richieste.

La situazione continentale attraversa un periodo di cui non si potrebbe non rilevare la delicatezza. La permanente crisi mineraria in Inghilterra, la crisi finanziaria in Francia e nel Belgio, i sintomi di ripresa delle forze monarchiche in Germania, gli incerti rivolgimenti politici e militari di Polonia, per non accennare ai fenomeni periferici di Portogallo e di Grecia, danno il senso di profonda trasformazione e di lente fatali maturazioni che non consentono sogni di un eterno arcadico e statico idillio. Nessun Giosuè può fermare il sole sull'Europa. Soprattutto è da considerare, come situazione nuova, capace di futuri sviluppi, il recente accordo russo-germanico.

MILAN.

L'Italia nel Continente e nel Mediterraneo

ROMA, 11 notte.

(G. P.) — E' opportuno che gli antichi alleati di guerra — prima e ancor più della Spagna, che pur tiene alla nostra cordiale amicizia — si rendano conto delle ragioni di giustizia che muovono l'Italia a richiedere il riconoscimento del proprio diritto di intervento nella questione del Riff e nel regime di Tangeri. Ed è anche opportuno che si rendano conto delle giuste esigenze della nostra opinione pubblica.

Dopo avere offerto senza contropartita la dichiarazione di neutralità nell'agosto del 1914, dopo aver dato in guerra un formidabile contributo di sangue e di danaro, dopo aver donato con le travolgenti giornate di Vittorio Veneto le condizioni decisive di trionfo per tutti gli Alleati, l'Italia uscì dalla pace di Versailles ingiustamente trattata e profondamente delusa. Non ebbe egue soluzioni nell'Adriatico, non ottenne alcuna parte nell'eredità dell'antico Impero Ottomano e soprattutto — massima tra tutte le ingiustizie — non ottenne nella ripartizione del ricco impero coloniale germanico quella quota che di sacrosanta ragione le sarebbe spettata, e per i suoi sacrifici gravissimi e per le sue necessità di vita. Versailles ci riconobbe le ragioni di sicurezza alpina, e questo fu l'acquisto sicuro della pace. Ma le ragioni di sicurezza adriatica non ebbero riconoscimento integrale. In quanto poi alla situazione mediterranea e coloniale, l'Italia fu ancor più sacrificata, quasi che la guerra fosse stata un affare anglo-francese e l'Italia non avesse acquisito diritti per lo meno uguali nella ripartizione dei benefici della guerra.

La grave delusione e le amarezze di un trattamento iniquo furono le cause prime della nostra crisi politica del dopoguerra, dell'ascesa al potere dei neutralisti e dei disfattisti, e di uno stato d'animo nazionale che tuttora permane, malgrado i « recuperi » che Mussolini poté realizzare per il Dodecaneso, per Fiume, per il Giubaland e Giara-bub, recuperi che tuttavia non possono adeguatamente soddisfare gli italiani, in considerazione degli enormi acquisti coloniali realizzati dall'Inghilterra, dalla Francia e dal Belgio per virtù di una vittoria conseguita col sacrificio di tutti e determinata innanzi tutto dalle armi italiane.

Il sacrificio dell'Italia a Versailles fu possibile perchè il potere a Roma era in quel tempo detenuto dalla vecchia classe politica liberale, insufficiente, esaurita e sorpassata. Ma dal 1919 al 1926 molta acqua è passata sotto i ponti del Tevere. L'Italia di Mussolini non è più la piccola Italia di Orlando, il quale invece di ergersi a difesa di Vittorio Veneto, si accasciava nel pianto e nella grottesca incomprensione delle lingue.

Non è più la piccola Italia di Giolitti, burocrate del partito liberale, o di Sforza, mediatore del patto dei leoni, o di Facta, epigono di un liberalismo ormai senilmente impotente. L'Italia di Mussolini, socialmente disciplinata, politicamente ringiovanita, militarmente riordinata, ha la coscienza della sua nuova forza e della funzione determinante che questa sua forza esercita nei rapporti del Continente. A Versailles essa era stata tenuta quasi alla porta, come una parente povera, non desiderata nel banchetto dei ricchi beneficati; ma a Locarno essa è riapparsa, sollecitata e invocata, come elemento necessario di equilibri, e di garanzia. Esclusa nel 1919 dal grande banchetto anglo-franco-belga, essa nella pattuizione di Locarno è salita, per virtù della sua forza, in primo piano, a fianco dell'Inghilterra, come Potenza garante della pace continentale.

Oggi l'Italia sa perfettamente che la sua

Due grandi forze si contrastano in Europa, l'una di conservazione, l'altra di rivendicazione. Francia e Inghilterra, cariche di spoglie nemiche e sature di imperi, tendono a digerire in pace i loro enormi acquisti e a godersi in tranquillità i loro privilegi. Sono due vecchie nazioni che hanno raggiunto l'apogeo della ricchezza e della potenza. Germania e Russia rappresentano, in contrapposto, le energie tese alla rivincita. L'una mira a scardinare, con lenta metodica scientifica ostinazione, la pace di Versailles e tende per millenaria forza atavica alla ripresa contro la Francia, verso le ricche terre d'Occidente; l'altra, per forza ugualmente atavica, e per insuperabili fatalità storico-geografiche, mira a scardinare specialmente nel Levante e in Asia, le situazioni imperiali dell'Inghilterra.

Tra l'intesa delle forze conservatrici e l'alleanza delle forze rivoluzionarie, l'Italia, libera e padrona delle sue energie, vuole ottenere il riconoscimento dei propri diritti di vita.

« Dobbiamo essere intelligenti — disse recentemente Mussolini, dinanzi al Senato — per comprendere presto e con buona grazia ».

L'amicizia si rivela non solamente nel ricevere, ma anche nel riconoscere « presto » e « nell'acconsentire » con buona grazia ».

Sino ad ora s'è preteso che l'italiano fosse un gendarme nel Continente, e un mendicante nel Mediterraneo, da snazionalizzare possibilmente.

Quei tempi sono finiti. E' conveniente fare un po' di posto all'Italia. Amabilmente.

ROME.

Il Riff e l'Italia

Si iniziano oggi a Parigi le trattative franco-spagnole per la liquidazione della vittoria del Riff. Venerdì alla Camera dei deputati Briand escludeva l'ipotesi di una conferenza internazionale, perchè la Francia, che ha « il suo parere, la sua voce, la sua autorità », vi si opporrebbe. Sabato il *Temps* ribadiva in un lungo articolo la medesima tesi. L'uno e l'altro, però, sia pure soltanto per elogiare la « correttezza », non hanno potuto fare a meno di parlare dell'Italia; tanto anche in Francia è sentito che esiste in tale questione un interesse italiano. Già, del resto, la stampa inglese lo aveva esplicitamente e ripetutamente affermato; più esplicitamente, anzi, e più categoricamente della stessa stampa italiana, che ha preferito tenersi, per ora, in una posizione discreta di attesa. Attesa, tuttavia, discreta ma vigile, e che da nessuno deve venir confusa col disinteresse o con la generica acquiescenza *a priori*, e sulla quale è utile non lasciar nascere equivoci.

Le questioni, anzi tutto, sono due, non senza naturali ed eventuali legami di interdipendenza, ma che, per buon metodo logico, val meglio tener distinte: quella di Tangeri e quella del Riff. Vi è stato, è vero, un tentativo ufficioso di congiungerle più strettamente, quando si è parlato di cessione alla Francia di buona parte del Riff in cambio del possesso integrale di Tangeri alla Spagna. Ma in tal caso Francia e Spagna avrebbero dovuto tra loro due disporre di Tangeri che è internazionale, cioè di cosa non loro: la quale ipotesi è manifestamente assurda, e non merita che vi si insista. A parte ciò, del regime internazionale di Tangeri è stato già ampiamente discusso; il diritto dell'Italia a parteciparvi a parità piena con gli altri è stato già esaurientemente dimostrato, e presto se ne riparerà, giacchè la questione è tutt'altro che chiusa, e deve essere ripresa, e sarà ripresa. Immediatamente attuale invece è la questione del Riff. Anche qui il legittimo interesse dell'Italia è già stato dai così detti specialisti validamente dimostrato dal punto di vista giuridico con la retta interpretazione dei vari trattati e degli avvenimenti politici, generali e locali, sopravvenuti. Tuttavia, senza rinunciare agli argomenti giuridici, è più utile alla chiarezza delle rispettive posizioni impostare il problema su di una base politica, o se meglio piace, storica e specialmente geografica.

In primo luogo, in tutto il problema del Marocco bisogna distinguere due aspetti: quello locale e coloniale, cioè della interna distribuzione delle zone di protettorato, e quello mediterraneo, cioè della sicurezza e della libertà della porta occidentale del Mediterraneo. Si può discutere se l'Italia, con i passati trattati, si sia o non si sia, e sino a che punto, disinteressata dal primo aspetto del problema; non si può neanche per un istante supporre non dico che si sia disinteressata, ma che abbia mai potuto pensare a rinunciare, sia pure in minima par-

ca amicizia, che in questi ultimi tempi sono ridiventate frequenti, ci sono senza dubbio assai gradite. Noi pensiamo anzi che si va sempre più determinando nel mondo un equilibrio di potenza tale che l'interesse storico generale delle due nazioni è destinato sempre più a convergere. Ma gli italiani non possono dimenticare che simili proteste generiche, e gradualmente gradite, venivano loro fatte dalla stessa Francia e dagli stessi governanti francesi anche quando, per esempio, in piena guerra — come dimostrano i documenti russi proprio in questi giorni pubblicati da *Politica* — l'Italia veniva da tutti e tre i suoi alleati concordemente ingannata e spogliata nel Levante; e in parecchie altre occasioni purtroppo analoghe. E non possono nemmeno oggi astenersi dal constatare che ogni volta e in ogni caso che dal generico si passa a questioni specifiche, dal vago al concreto, dall'etereo al pratico, alle amichevoli dichiarazioni succede, sistematicamente, da parte francese, la più ostinata intransigenza. Sarebbe, in verità, estremamente utile che le dimostrazioni di amicizia discendessero alquanto — e al più presto — dall'universale al particolare.

FRANCESCO COPPOLA

generalì e locali, sopravvenuti. Tuttavia, senza rinunciare agli ragamenti giuridici, è più utile alla chiarezza delle rispettive posizioni impostare il problema su di una base politica, o se meglio piace, storica e specialmente geografica.

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


Ai francesi poi, per la bontà dei reciproci rapporti, che stanno certamente a cuore altrettanto agli uni che agli altri, è forse tempo di dire francamente quello che tutti gli italiani pensano appunto di tali rapporti. Le loro proteste di generi-





EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 6443

Paris, June 25, 1926.



FILE



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Franco-Spanish Conference on Moroccan affairs has pursued its labors for another week in apparent harmony and quiet.

If any important decision has been reached, it would appear to be that of a confirmation by the Conference of the determination already manifested by Spain to proceed at once to a complete occupation of the Spanish Riff. A Foreign Office communiqué stated:

"Under these conditions and pursuant to the provisions stipulated in the Madrid Agreement of February 6th, the Spanish troops will ensure within the shortest possible delay the relief of the French troops engaged in this region. This mission is entrusted to General Gonzales Carasco's brigade, which is 6,000 strong and will relieve the Moroccan division."

"This

"This decision is one of the first consequences of the Franco-Spanish Conference at Paris. Its importance must not be underestimated: Spain is establishing herself firmly in the Riff and will herself ensure complete security in the zone assigned to her."


This completion of the Spanish military occupation of the Riff, which is apparently being realized in actual fact, is meeting with nothing but the warmest approval in France, where there is no evidence of a desire to find excuses for encroachment upon the Spanish zone of Morocco and any move tending to pacify the Riff district and simplify the Moroccan problem is looked upon with favor. It is also believed that an energetic assumption of her responsibilities in the Riff on the part of Spain will disarm the recent agitation in Italy and tend further to withdraw the question from international discussion.

The whole matter has received but scant mention in the French press the past week, although a very interesting resumé of the situation appeared in L'INFORMATION of June 22nd. A copy of this article, which is entitled: "The Consequences of the Downfall of Abd-el-Krim and the Future of Northern Morocco", is enclosed herewith in French and translation.

It is anticipated that a certain "Te Deum" touch will be added to the July 14th celebrations in Paris owing to the success of French arms in Morocco. The Sultan of Morocco himself will be present for the occasion, as well as the victorious French generals, and probably a contingent of Spanish troops will march in the parade.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,


Myron T. Herrick.

Enclosures:

1. L'Information, June 22, 1926.
2. Translation of Encl.#1.

In quintuplicate.

COPY TO E.I.C.

L'INFORMATION, June 22, 1926.

TRIBUNE LIBRE

Les conséquences de la chute d'Abd el Krim et l'avenir du Maroc septentrional

par E. DERMENGHEM

L'air de la République rifaine, de la « Nation délibérante du Rif » (c'est le sens littéral de *Doula djemaouria rifia* ; la *djema* étant l'assemblée qui gouvernait démocratiquement la tribu, la fraction, le village, avant qu'Abd el Krim ne centralisât le pouvoir) a définitivement abdiqué. Abd el Krim s'est reconnu vaincu après six ans d'une guerre acharnée, et avoir conduit les plus vastes et avoir joué dans le monde entier, en Egypte comme en Suisse (où on le comparait à Guillaume Tell), aux Indes aussi bien qu'aux Etats-Unis, d'un prestige considérable et d'une notoriété inouïe.

L'organisation qu'il avait donnée au Rif et qui constituait non seulement un tour de force, mais un réel progrès sur l'anarchie ancienne et les guerres intestines continuelles, s'est écroulée, semble-t-il, avec lui. Presque tous ceux qu'il avait groupés autour de lui pour encadrer et gouverner ce pays, partagent son exil, aussi bien son frère Si M'hamed, que son beau-frère Azoukane, chefs des deux camps opposés.

C'est un écroulement complet, si complet même qu'il n'est pas sans présenter des inconvénients. Après avoir taillé, il faut coudre ; mais coudre est toujours plus difficile, surtout quand on a tant décousu.

On se demande comment le chef rifain n'a pas essayé de préserver son œuvre, de conserver à son pays un minimum d'organisation et d'autonomie, quand cela était sans doute encore possible. La lumière complète n'est pas faite sur la façon dont furent présentées, l'été dernier, les offres de paix. Toujours est-il qu'Abd el Krim eût pu alors nous prendre au mot. Et il y a deux mois encore, n'eût-il pas pu obtenir des conditions meilleures qu'aujourd'hui où il se soumet sans conditions ?

Le Sultan déclarait alors que la paix était possible, et insinuait qu'on pouvait négocier avec les autorités de fait qui régneraient au Rif. Aurait-on fini par demander à Abd el Krim lui-même de rester ? Rien n'est impossible ; et l'on a vu au Maroc des renversements de situation encore plus extraordinaires. Aurait-il eu un remplaçant qui, soumis à la suzeraineté chérifienne, eût pu conserver au Rif une certaine autonomie, une certaine organisation en même temps que la paix ?

Cette solution, d'ailleurs peu différente au fond du régime du Maroc méridional, aurait eu l'avantage d'être la plus économique, et, à divers points de vue, la moins dangereuse, en évitant l'anarchie qui peut donner prise à des influences indéterminées et constitue un foyer permanent de troubles. Elle est devenue impossible, soit qu'Abd el Krim aveuglé se soit fait des illusions, soit que ses représentants à Oudjda, interprétant ses instructions de façon trop stricte, aient pris sur eux de décider de mourir en beauté, soit encore qu'ils aient été les uns et les autres persuadés qu'on ne voulait pas la paix, après le lamentable regrettable de Camp Ber-

aux et des « conditions préliminaires ».

Le sort d'Abd el Krim

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Le sort d'Abd el Krim

Quoi qu'il en soit, l'idée de paix s'étant
introduite dans les esprits rifains, l'auto-
rité du chef qui l'avait promise et ne la
donnait pas se trouva ébranlée avec la
rapidité habituelle en ce pays. M. Parent
constata ce revirement complet et cet
ébranlement du moral rifain entre son
voyage du début d'avril et celui du mois
de mai. L'héroïsme n'est pas chose quo-
tidienne et sans fin. Les Africains sont
étonnamment nerveux et impressionnables.
Après un effort prodigieux de plu-
sieurs années, et après avoir songé un
instant à se faire tuer sur le front espa-
gnol, Abd el Krim écouré, découragé, an-
goissé, se rendit à la France qui, ne vou-
lant ni l'exalter ni l'humilier, le traite
honorablement, lui sait gré d'avoir été un
adversaire malgré tout loyal (M. Fonsot
rendit cet hommage aux négociateurs
d'Oudjda) et d'avoir sauvé les prisonniers.

Que fera-t-on de lui ? Sans doute le relé-
guera-t-on quelques années dans un pays
d'Europe (la Corse par exemple), comme
Abd-el-Kader qui passa quelque temps à
Amboise avant de se fixer à Danzas, où
l'on sait quel rôle généreux il joua au
moment des émeutes. Agir autrement se-
rait colère de faibles ; la France est as-
sez forte pour être généreuse, selon l'ex-
pression de M. Steeg, et tout le monde en
Afrique est impressionné de la sentir mai-
tresse d'elle-même et dénuée de tout esprit
de vengeance, à l'égard de celui qu'on
appelait le roghi aussi bien qu'à l'égard
des tribus qu'il avait entraînées.

L'Espagne ne manquera pas de com-
prendre les considérations qu'inspire à la
France sa situation de grande puissance
musulmane. On a évoqué le souvenir du
dernier roghi, Bou Hamara, mis par Mou-
lay Hafid dans une cage de fer qu'on voit
encore aujourd'hui au musée de Batha, à
deux pas du palais de la Résidence. Mais
il y a, outre beaucoup d'autres, une diffé-
rence essentielle entre les deux cas : Bou
Hamara avait été pris de force, les ar-
mes à la main, pendant le combat et dans
des circonstances dramatiques ; tandis
qu'Abd el Krim s'est rendu volontairement
et confié à la France : selon les idées
orientales, il devient dès lors sacré.

L'organisation du Rif

C'est la question de l'organisation du
Rif qui va être la plus épineuse et il ne
faut pas que sa solution soit viciée par des
arrière-pensées. Ce qui la rend délicate,
c'est la haine traditionnelle et séculaire
des Rifains et des Espagnols qui considèrent

ТУ Деабрь 1906

Extract from L'INFORMATION of June 22, 1926.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOWNFALL OF ABD-EL-KRIM
AND THE FUTURE OF NORTHERN MOROCCO.

by E. Dermenghem.

The Emir of the Riffian Republic, of the Deliberating Nation of the Riff", (that is the literal meaning of Doula djemaouria rafia; the djemaa being the assembly which governed democratically the tribe, the fraction and the village, before Abd-el-Krim centralized the power), has definitely abdicated. Abd-el-Krim has avowed himself conquered after six years of desperate warfare, after having had the wildest dreams and enjoyed throughout the whole world, in Egypt as in Switzerland, (where he was compared to William Tell), in India as well as in the United States, considerable prestige and unprecedented notoriety.

The organization which he gave to the Riff, and which constituted not only a feat, but a real progress over the former anarchy and continual internal wars, has crumbled, it seems, with him. Nearly everyone he grouped around himself for the purpose of supporting him and governing this country, shares his exile; his brother Si M'hammed as well as his brother-in-law Azerkane, chiefs of two opposite qafs.

His downfall is complete, so very complete that it presents certain inconveniences. After having cut the material, it is necessary to sew; but sewing is always more difficult, especially when so much has been unsewn.

One asks oneself how it is that the Riffian chief has not endeavored to preserve his work and retain for his country a minimum of organization and autonomy, when that was doubtless still possible. Full light has not been thrown on the manner in which offers of peace were presented last summer. The fact remains that Abd-el-Krim could have taken us at our word at that time. And even two months ago, could he not have obtained better conditions

than to-day when he surrenders unconditionally?

The Sultan declared at that time that peace was possible and that an understanding could be come to with the de facto authorities who governed the Riff. In the end would one have finished by asking Abd-el-Krim himself to remain? Nothing is impossible; in Morocco even more extraordinary reversals of situations have been seen. Would he have had a substitute who, obedient to the Shereefian sovereignty, could have retained a certain autonomy for the Riff, a certain organization as well as peace?

This solution, which, furthermore, differs very little basically from the régime of Southern Morocco, would have had the advantage of being the most economical, and, from various points of view, the least dangerous, since it would prevent the anarchy which may give a foothold to undetermined influences and constitute a permanent source of trouble. It has become impossible, either because Abd-el-Krim was blind and may have had illusions, or because his representatives at Ujda, interpreting his instructions too strictly, may have taken it upon themselves to decide to die nobly, or, again, because they may have been convinced that peace was not really desired after the regrettable misunderstanding of Camp Berteaux and of the "preliminary conditions".

THE FATE OF ABD-EL-KRIM.

However it may be, the idea of peace having penetrated the Riffian minds, the authority of the Chief, who had promised peace and did not give it, found itself shaken with the rapidity that is customary in this country. M. Parent noticed this complete change and this undermining of the Riffian morale which took place between his journey at the beginning of April and that of the month of May. Heroism is not a daily and unending thing. Africans are astonishingly nervous and impressionable. After a prodigious effort lasting over several years, and after having thought for a time of allowing himself to be shot on the Spanish front, Abd-el-Krim, sick at heart, discouraged, distracted, surrendered to France who, not wishing

either to exalt or to humiliate him, treats him honorably, recognizes that he has been a loyal opponent (M. Ponsot rendered this homage to the Ujda negotiators), and has saved the prisoners.

What will be done with him? No doubt he will be relegated for a few years to a European country (Corsica for example) like Abd-el-Kader who spent some time at Amboise, before settling at Damascus, where, it will be remembered, he acted nobly during the riots. To do otherwise would be to give vent to the anger of a weak person; France is strong enough to be generous, according to M. Steeg's expression, and everyone in Africa is impressed at seeing her mistress of herself and without any spirit of vengeance with regard to him who was called the Roghi, as well as with regard to the tribes he led.

Spain will not fail to understand the considerations which inspire France because of her position as a great Moslem power. The memory has been evoked of the last Roghi, Bou Hamara, placed by Moulay Hafid in an iron cage which can still be seen to-day in the Batha museum, two paces from the residency. But there is, among many others, an essential difference between the two cases: Bou Hamara was taken by force, bearing his arms, during a fight, and under dramatic circumstances; while Abd-el-Krim surrendered voluntarily and entrusted himself to France; according to oriental ideas, he then becomes sacred.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE RIFF.

The question of the organization of the Riff will be the most thorny one and its solution must ~~not~~ be vitiated by ulterior designs.

What makes this problem delicate is the traditional and secular hatred of the Riffians and Spanish who rather consider the Moroccan war in the light of a crusade. The attitude is in contrast with the feelings of reciprocal esteem which animate the Riffians and French of Algeria, who are in the habit of having excellent economic relations. The Riffians and the Moroccans in general know that we respect Islam. They are grateful to us for not having used asphyxiating gases, which would have created lasting ill-will.

In Morocco, people shake each other's hand cordially after having honorably shot at each other, according to the caida; but it is no longer the same when one sees men, women and children die slowly, their lungs destroyed by undermining gases. They know that French and Spanish methods are different, and that we bring, in spite of any criticisms that may be made, an uncontestable progress, at least materially. This is why the Spanish alliance should remain within the limits of the purely technical objectives it had in view and should not become a compromising act.

In spite of all the forces we have there, we do not desire adventures. Abd-el-Krim was a result much more than a cause. His departure does not solve ipso facto the question of the Riff. At Ujda, and since then, we have fully and faithfully discharged our obligations toward the Spanish. It is necessary to maintain friendly and correct relations with them, but it is also necessary not to sacrifice vital interests. We must not be involved indefinitely in the difficulties which they may have in the future as they have had for centuries. Castilian honor itself would not endure that a foreign Power should, as is said, make "Spain's bed" in Northern Morocco.

Interest of course, common sense, and the experience of those who know the country, advise a prudent attitude.

The question of the frontiers is not the most serious one. Those of the two zones have never been fixed in an absolutely precise and definite manner, since for the most part it was a question of unoccupied territories. The treaties are very vague. It is known that at first Taza was almost placed in the Spanish zone, but it was necessary to take into consideration the necessities of our communications with Algeria. To-day, it is important that tribes such as the Beni Zerouals and the Gueznaia should not be divided. What is essential for us is the security and organization of our zone; and we should consider this above everything. Let us limit ourselves to this zone and really organize it. Let us organize

frontier outposts with officers of the Intelligence Department, who are clever and diplomatic and will maintain good relations with the people on the other side, whether they are subjugated or not to the Spanish it does not matter, not forgetting to say to them: "Near here there is a souk where you can come and sell your wool and buy your sugar. Further along there is a larger souk, the beautiful town of Fez....."

They could also take advantage of our infirmaries, of our mobile sanitary groups, etc., without our occupying ourselves with their status, administration, policy, and their kind of life, contenting ourselves with ensuring the security of our own zone and having for this purpose, if necessary, a certain "right of action" in the case of Djouchs or Razzias. This conception of frontier outposts, of the peace glacis, supple and wise, would only be similar to the régime which was formerly in force on the Algero-Moroccan borders.

This friendly collaboration, this purely economic and moral influence, this pacific magnetization of the Berber mountain in our direction, are desired by the rest of Morocco and Algeria as much as by the Riff. It would be paradoxical that victory should have rendered their realization more difficult./.

881.00/1248

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SOLICITOR

Mr Anderson,

If your further
efforts fail to reveal
anything we will then
consider the further
steps to be taken.

[Signature]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SOLICITOR

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1925.

My dear Mr. Hackworth:

I have had the Index Bureau looking for two days in order to ascertain what matters still remain unsettled in the Spanish Zone, Morocco. They have not been able to produce anything that throws much light on the matter. In the meantime I have done a little searching myself and have come across a statement in a despatch from Blake dated September 15, 1921, with respect to the proposed abrogation of extraterritorial rights in the French Zone in Morocco, which throws some light on our question. Blake states on page 19 of this despatch as follows:

"In order to meet this contingency (the request of the Spanish Government for recognition of its protectorate in Morocco), this Diplomatic Agency has under preparation for submission to the Department a list of outstanding cases, the liquidation of which would become a preliminary requirement to recognition, should the precedent followed by the American Government with respect to the recognition of the French protectorate be similarly observed in regard to the Spanish Zone of influence in Morocco.

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"Actual conditions ~~that~~, it may be stated, would seem to render it necessary to await developments before any consideration could appropriately be given to the surrender of the American extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Spanish Zone of Morocco.

"Spanish authority should be securely established throughout the region assigned to its administration. A proper judicial regime for the administration of justice should be set in operation, conditions which present circumstances appear to render remote."

The same conditions appear to exist in the Spanish Zone today.

I suggest that either a written or telegraphic instruction be sent to Blake to furnish the Department with a list of outstanding matters in the Spanish Zone.

There is attached hereto the only papers which the Index Bureau have been able to produce and the only claim mentioned appears to be the Kittany claim referred to on page 3 of the telegram from Tangier dated February 18, 1916, noon. I have obtained from the Index Bureau and also append the correspondence with regard to the Kittany claim.

SO:FMA:JR



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

881/10
No. 258

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Casablanca, Morocco, June 17, 1926

INDEX BUREAU
JUL 17 1926
SUBJECT: Results of the Surrender of Abd-el-Krim.
DEPT. OF STATE
1-1056
JUL 12 1926
Very good

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON

SIR:



I have the honor to report herewith certain developments following the surrender of Abd-el-Krim, which somewhat tend to complicate matters.

Few Moors really believe that the Riff leader is actually in captivity. One of our American missionaries, whose headquarters are at Meknes and who travels extensively among the Berber tribes of Northern French Morocco, and one of our Moorish protégés residing at Marrakech have reported to me specifically upon this point, and the same report has come to my ears from other less reliable sources as well. The general native belief is that Abd-el-Krim is still at large, and that the report of his surrender is purely French propaganda.

Up to the present time the Riff leader has been detained at Fes in absolute seclusion from the outside world, while the French and Spanish governments decide definitely as to his future, and this has aided in coloring the popular idea. To correct this belief on the part of the natives, there are two possible methods open.

The captive leader could be publicly exhibited in important

(centers

INDEX BUREAU

JUL 20 1926
FBI

centers, such as Fez, Meknes, Rabat, Casablanca and Marrakech. I do not understand why the French have not adopted this method as I can not see that it would be open to any political objection on the part of either French or Spanish, and would have a powerful effect, I believe, in quieting the restless tribes.

The other course would be for the Sultan to address the customary letters announcing important public events to the various Cadis throughout the country, which letters are read to the natives in the mosques after they have been summoned thither at an appointed hour by the public crier. This would probably be objectionable to the Spanish, and be viewed by them as hostile to their claims with regard to the disposition of the rebel leader, inasmuch as such a proclamation announcing the end of the rebellion and the detention of Abd-el-Krim would be construed as an attempt to treat him as a captured enemy rather than one that had surrendered unconditionally.

The Spanish are showing unexpected firmness in their insistence as to the method of dealing with the former Riff leader. As his treatment of French prisoners was not unduly harsh, and also from a point of view of policy, the French Protectorate Government feels that it would be best to simply exile him from Morocco for a more or less indefinite period, keeping him under surveillance in France or some French possession, Corsica being prominently mentioned as a place of detention. The Spanish Government on the other hand is extremely bitter against him, not only for the years of bloodshed and expenditure caused by his insurrection, but more especially for his alleged

(brutal

brutal and inhuman treatment of Spanish prisoners, fully half of whom are said to be still unaccounted for. The Spanish argue that he should not be treated as an honorable enemy leader in view of these facts, that no obligation has been incurred to treat him as such in view of his unconditional surrender forced by his repudiation by his own people, and that he should be brought to trial before a military tribunal charged with violating not only the recognized rules of warfare, but also the dictates of sheer humanity.

The disposition of Abd-el-Krim is the first item on the list in the negotiations now going on between the French and Spanish Governments at Paris, and the latest reports would tend to indicate that the French are beginning to incline to the view of their Allies.

One thing is certain: Abd-el-Krim must at least be exiled and never allowed to return to Morocco, as, in the contrary case, if he is ever allowed to return, he will at once become a rallying point for the discontented elements among the Moors. The history of Moorish leaders in the past shows that, whatever may have been their faults and errors in the day of their power and however heartily they may have been at that time hated by their people, the passage of time has always dealt gently with their reputation, and their reappearance has always been a threat of future unrest and a signal for trouble.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

H. Earle Russell
H. Earle Russell
American Consul.

IN QUINTUPLICATE
COPY TO TANGIER

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


EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 100.

San Sebastián, July 6, 1926.

PM RECD



JUL 1926



For Distribution	
yes	No ☒
The Honorable	

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

S i r:

In connection with the reported divergence of views between the governments chiefly concerned on the question of the desirability of holding an international conference to discuss the Moroccan situation, I have the honor to transcribe the following remarks attributed to General Primo de Rivera by the Madrid INFORMACIONES in an interview published in that newspaper on the 4th, instant:

"There is much talk about a new international conference to discuss the problem of Morocco. The time for such a conference has not arrived. It is necessary to wait until the disarmament of the tribes is.....

INDEX BUREAU

88.00/1251

JUL 22 1926

is a reality. When there is no longer any menace directed against the protecting Powers (France and Spain), then we will be able to speak again of the international problem. We desire that Tangier shall form a part of the Spanish zone. If we can not have sovereignty there as we have in Ceuta and Melilla, we at least desire that Tangier shall remain within our Protectorate with the remainder of the zone."

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Ambassador,


Edward L. Reed

Edward L. Reed
Secretary of Embassy.

Copy to E.I.C., Paris
" " Diplomatic Agency, Tangier.


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No. 118.



American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate-General.

Tangier, Morocco, July 7th, 1926



SUBJECT: Tangier Police investigations accompanied by torture of natives.



INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1252

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

JUL 31 1926

Sir:-

I have the honor to transmit to the Department herewith a cutting from the issue of July 3rd, 1926, of the English local weekly newspaper "Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa and Tangier Gazette," entitled: "Grave Scandal. Mal-treatment of Natives" which reveals the employment by the Police officials of the International Administration, of methods of torture upon native Moors and Jews, in
the


the process of the preliminary examination of arrested persons, prior to their presentation for trial.

The exposure of these regrettable conditions has caused sensation and indignation in the Tangier community, and it is hoped that the matter will be adequately dealt with by the Authorities, notwithstanding the very marked efforts, both on the part of French officials in the Tangier Administration and of the local French press, to smother the investigation, and to minimize the charges against the functionaries directly involved.

Under the Tangier Convention, unprotected native Moors and Jews are subjected to a native judicial organization, which is under the exclusive control of French Agents. As a result of the revelations, now brought to the attention of the public, there is a strong current of opinion that the Tangier Convention should be so revised as to bring within the province of the Committee of Control, i.e. of all the Foreign Representatives in Tangier, the supervision of all affairs connected with the government of the native section of the population.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,



Maxwell Blake.
American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul-General.





GRAVE SCANDAL.

MALTREATMENT OF NATIVES.

We reproduce below, as a part of this editorial, an article written by Walter B. Harris, which appeared in the "Times" of last Thursday. If the information contained there in is correct... and we have every reason to believe it so to be, having secured corroboration from a source whose veracity is unquestionable, we are confronted with a state of affairs, the nature of which is such, that, if the abuses mentioned are not immediately discontinued and individuals concerned in them punished, every European in Tangier will, have cause to hide his face in shame.

"In the International Government of Tangier exists, apart from the Gendarmerie which should eventually replace the French and Spanish military police, a regular civil police force composed of Europeans and natives under European officials and controlled by the International Administration. It is the duty of these policemen to arrest persons accused or suspected of crime and to hand them over to the competent courts. Under the Tangier Convention these Courts are in the case of Europeans the Mixed Tribunal, and for natives the Mendub's native court.

For some time past there have been persistent rumours amongst the natives of Tangier that accused or suspected persons have been forced to confess, or to give evidence, to the police by illegal methods. It is currently reported that, not only have they been flogged but also that a cruel form of torture has been applied in the precincts of the International police station. The course of procedure is described as follows. On an European police official being unable to obtain confession or evidence, the accused person is handed over to two Moorish policemen, whose identity and names are known. They lock the victim into a room and flog him or apply the other method of torture. The confessions, or evidence, thus extorted are sent with the prisoner to the Mendoub's court and used against him at his trial. The victim may or may not be guilty of the crimes of which he is accused, but that, under an International Administration introduced by the Powers of Europe, a system of illegal cruelty should be in practice is a very serious matter. It may be asked why the natives have not complained before. The answer is perhaps more significant than the actual reported persecutions. It is that they have abandoned all hope of justice. In any case these reports, which are common knowledge amongst the natives, have never, till lately reached the ears of the European authorities outside the police.

In the interests of humanity and justice steps must be taken immediately. A properly constituted Court of Enquiry should be held and at the earliest possible moment the native population should be informed that no reprisals will be allowed against people giving evidence. It may be difficult to obtain statements as the police have instituted a reign of terror amongst the peaceable natives of Tangier.

From time to time this paper, frequently against the wishes of some of its readers, has been obliged, through its Editorial columns, to draw attention to the more obvious defects of the Statute under which we are governed. We have also made public some of the more glaring misdeeds of the Administration and its employees. But this is the first occasion, since the application of the Statute on June 2nd 1925, we have had to deal with, if the allegations made are correct, what appears to be actual criminal conduct by individuals whom we have every right to regard as upholders of the law.

Some years ago, the European Diplomatic Agents in Tangier, by pressure upon the Sultan, managed to secure the abolition of flogging and torture of native prisoners awaiting trial. To-day this inhuman practice seems to have been resumed by the servants of a European Administration which is responsible to a Legislative Assembly upon which sit three British representatives. What a spectacle for consideration by the intelligent Moor!

It has been said that this is an isolated case of criminal sadism and that the removal of the European official directly, responsible will stop the practice. Unfortunately the more evidence we collect, the more we are persuaded that physical mistreatment of the Moors by the police is general. It has been urged by some that a public investigation of the affair is not desirable and if an enquiry is forced, the matter will assume an aspect unfavourable to a harmonious solution of our outstanding questions of International politics.

To this latter monstrous suggestion, that we hush up, the whole affair, thus sacrificing the call of humanity and justice to play the game of International politics, we can only reply that the temper of Englishmen has been misjudged.

By all means let us have an investigation. We have representatives on the Legislative Assembly. Let them ask questions. If the answers are evasive or unsatisfactory we have our representative on the Committee of Control whose duty it will be to bring the matter up in that body. Those of our Community who have contact with the British Press, will spare no efforts to get a question raised in the British House of Commons, and it will be the duty of every English man and woman in Tangier, to exert all his or her influence to the end that, the disgraceful treatment of our Moslem fellow citizens be discontinued and those responsible be severely punished.



W. B. H.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, July 15, 1926.

No. 6497



For Distribution

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INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1253

AUG 9 1926
FBI

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Franco-Spanish Conference on Moroccan Affairs completed its work on July 10th with the signature of an accord officially described as "relative to the pacification of Morocco and to the establishment of a border régime between the French and Spanish zones of influence." Marshal Pétain and M. Berthelot signed on behalf of France and Ambassador Quinones de Leon and General de Jordana on behalf of Spain. M. Briand and General Primo de Rivera also later affixed their signatures.

The accord, which has not yet been published, appears to deal with only two questions and to have disposed of both of them in the manner of foregone conclusions. Spain definitely agreed to complete her occupation of the Spanish zone of influence and arrangements were made for the better surveillance by both parties of the border area.


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Each party is reported to have been granted the right of pursuit of disorderly bands into the territory of the other, and a mixed commission was provided to delineate the frontier more thoroughly, without alteration in principle of the line of 1912.

The Conference sank more and more out of public interest with the general subsiding of the Moroccan agitation, and not even the conclusion of the final accord aroused any large comment. There are enclosed, however, a copy and translation of an article in the JOURNAL DES DEBATS of July 12th rejoicing in the happy termination of the affair and urging a continuance of Franco-Spanish co-operation.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, likely belonging to Myron T. Herrick, is written over the typed name.

Myron T. Herrick.

Enclosures:

1. Article from the
JOURNAL DES DEBATS of
July 12, 1926.
2. Translation of No. 1.

In quintuplicate.

Copy to E. I. C.

JOURNAL DES DEBATS,

July 12, 1926.

L'accord franco-espagnol sur le Maroc

Le maréchal Pétain et M. Philippe Berthelot pour la France, M. Quinones de Leon et le général de Jordana pour l'Espagne ont signé hier l'accord qui règle les questions relatives à la collaboration des deux pays à la frontière de leurs zones au Maroc, et en général tout ce qui concerne la liquidation de l'affaire riffaine. Le texte du document ne sera publié que dans quelques jours, quand le général Primo de Rivera, qui sera demain soir à Paris, et M. Briand l'auront ratifié. Mais les lignes générales sont connues. Abd el Krim et ses compagnons seront internés à Madagascar. La frontière de 1912 n'est pas modifiée. Comme elle n'avait alors pu être indiquée que vaguement en raison de l'ignorance où l'on était de la topographie de la région, une commission mixte de délimitation la fixera sur le terrain. Nous avions recommandé cette solution pour des raisons qui s'imposaient à tous les esprits sérieux. Un remaniement de la frontière impliquait des négociations avec toutes les autres puissances signataires des traités marocains. Il comportait en outre des discussions assez âpres entre la France et l'Espagne. Or de nouvelles négociations nous eussent probablement obligés à des concessions diverses tout à fait disproportionnées aux avantages douteux qu'une extension de notre zone nous procurerait. D'autre part il aurait été imprudent et illogique de compromettre par des discussions territoriales la collaboration si heureusement rétablie entre Madrid et Paris.

Le gouvernement français a donc renoncé décidément à la politique où le poussaient depuis longtemps des hommes qui prétendaient substituer la France à l'Espagne dans la zone espagnole. Cette politique a causé de graves dissensions, des troubles considérables de toute sorte, et c'est à elle qu'il faut imputer la plupart de nos déceptions dans l'empire chérifien depuis le traité d'Algésiras. Nous l'avons constamment combattue depuis 1908, et nous nous félicitons qu'elle ait succombé. Il n'y aurait jamais eu d'attaque riffaine si les autorités espagnoles et françaises s'étaient toujours entendues pour combiner leur action. Dès que les opérations des deux armées ont été combinées, Abd el Krim a été battu, contraint à la capitulation. Il eût été fou de revenir après la victoire aux fâcheux errements d'autrefois. Du reste le gouvernement espagnol a détruit le principal argument de nos marocains intégraux en consentant finale-

ment à administrer sa zone au lieu de persister dans le système d'évacuation que le général Primo de Rivera avait adopté lorsqu'il avait saisi le pouvoir. Les circonstances ne sont plus les mêmes qu'il y a deux ans. Grâce au grand effort militaire qui vient d'être couronné de succès, au désarmement des populations, au prestige des armes chrétiennes enfin regagné, les tribus de la zone espagnole sont à peu près réduites à l'impuissance. Il suffit de légers efforts pour parachever l'œuvre de ces derniers mois. Avec un peu de tact et d'esprit de suite le Cabinet de Madrid pourra désormais gouverner sa zone sans courir de gros risques.

Mais, pour qu'il en soit ainsi, et pour que notre propre protectorat fonctionne pacifiquement, il est indispensable que l'accord continue entre Madrid et Paris et que, à tous les degrés de la hiérarchie, les agents des deux pays s'inspirent de l'esprit de solidarité. A cet effet des instructions catégoriques et précises doivent être adressées aux chefs civils et militaires, ainsi qu'aux membres de la Commission de délimitation. Le récent voyage du roi Alphonse XIII à Paris, la prochaine arrivée du général Primo de Rivera et sa présence à la revue du 14 juillet, les démonstrations qui ont accompagné et accompagneront ces démarches attestent publiquement un accord auquel chaque citoyen doit s'efforcer de contribuer. Les Français n'ont pas à se préoccuper en la circonstance du régime actuellement en vigueur en Espagne. Ils sont en présence d'un gouvernement qui a loyalement collaboré avec le nôtre, qui désire sincèrement continuer cette collaboration. Il convient donc de lui témoigner les égards dus à une puissance amie et, on peut le dire en ce qui touche le Maroc, alliée. En saluant mercredi le général Primo de Rivera les Français rendront hommage non pas à une dictature, mais à une confraternité d'armes qui doit être suivie d'une confraternité d'esprits.

AUGUSTE GAUVAIN.

Translation.

JOURNAL DES DEBATS,

July 12, 1926.

THE FRANCO-SPANISH AGREEMENT REGARDING MOROCCO

Marshal Pétain and M. Philippe Berthelot for France, Señor Quinones de Leon and General de Jordana for Spain signed yesterday the agreement which regulates the questions relative to the collaboration of the two countries at the frontier of their zones in Morocco, and in general everything which concerns the liquidation of the Riffian affair. The text of the document will be given out in a few days, when General Primo de Rivera, who will be in Paris to-morrow evening, and M. Briand shall have ratified it. But the general lines are known. Abd-el-Krim and his companions will be interned at Madagascar. The frontier of 1912 is not changed. As it would only be vaguely indicated at that time on account of lack of knowledge of the topography of the region, a mixed boundary commission will determine it on the ground. We had recommended this solution for reasons which were obvious to all serious minded persons. A change in the frontier involved negotiations with all the other Powers signatories of the Moroccan treaties. Moreover, it gave occasion for rather bitter discussions between France and Spain. Now, new negotiations would probably have necessitated our making various concessions entirely disproportionate to the doubtful advantages which an extension of our zone might procure for us. On the other hand, it would have been imprudent and illogical to compromise by territorial discussions the collaboration so happily re-established between Madrid and Paris.

The French Government has, therefore, definitely renounced the policy which for a long time the men who aimed at substituting France for Spain in the Spanish zone tried to make that Government follow. That policy has caused grave disagreements and numerous misunderstandings of every kind, and it is to it that there must be ascribed most of our disappointments in the Sherifian Empire since the Treaty of Algeciras. We have fought it constantly since

1908.

1908, and we congratulate ourselves upon its having succumbed. There would never have been a Riffian attack if the Spanish and French authorities had always arranged to act in concert. As soon as the operations of the two armies were combined, Abd-el-Krim was beaten and forced to capitulate. It would have been foolish to return after the victory to the previous unfortunate methods. Moreover, the Spanish Government has destroyed the principal argument of our integral Moroccans by finally agreeing to administer its zone instead of persisting in the system of evacuation which General Primo de Rivera adopted when he came into power. The circumstances are no longer what they were two years ago. Thanks to the great military effort which has just been crowned with success, to the disarmament of the populations, to the prestige of Christian arms which has finally been regained, the tribes in the Spanish zone are almost reduced to helplessness. Only a slight effort is necessary to complete the work of the last few months. With a little tact and consistency the Madrid Cabinet can henceforth govern its zone without running great risks.

But, in order that this may be the case, and in order that our own Protectorate may function peacefully, it is indispensable that Madrid and Paris should continue to be in agreement and that, in all ranks of the hierarchy, the agents of the two countries should be inspired with a spirit of solidarity. To this end categorical and definite instructions should be addressed to the civil and military chiefs, as well as to the members of the Boundary Commission. The recent journey of King Alfonso XIII to Paris, the coming arrival of General Primo de Rivera and his presence at the review on July 14th, the demonstrations which have accompanied and will accompany these actions publicly confirm an agreement to which each citizen should endeavor to contribute. The French have nothing to be anxious about as regards the régime now in force in Spain. They are faced by a Government which has loyally collaborated with our Government and which sincerely desires to continue this collaboration. It is desirable, therefore, to treat it with

with the deference due to a friendly and, one can say it with respect to Morocco, allied Power. In saluting General Primo de Rivera on Wednesday the French will render homage not to a dictatorship, but to a fraternity in arms which should be followed by a fraternity of minds.

AUGUSTE GAUVAIN.

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 852.00/1588 FOR #822

FROM Spain (Martin) DATED Feb. 1, 1926
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Attempt on part of Captain Gordon Canning to use the international zone as locus for further activities on behalf of Abd-el-Krim.

INDEXED BY MAIL

851.00/1254

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 865.00/1557 FOR Despatch #936

FROM Italy (Fletcher) DATED July 16, 1926
~~TO~~ NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Newspaper articles intimating that Italy has agreed to
adhere to the Tangier Statute. Condition.

See copy attached.

orc

881.00/1255

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FML

RECEIVED

FROM

AUG 3 1926
Dep't. of State

Green

Paris

Dated Aug. 3, 1926.

Rec'd 9 A.M.

SOLICITOR'S OFFICE

AUG 3 1926

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,

Washington.

305. August 3, Noon.

Have been informed by Foreign Office that measures set forth in my 364, July 3, 5 P.M., 1925, regarding the surveillance of the Moroccan Coast have been withdrawn from August 1st. Text of memorandum being forwarded by mail.

HERRICK

HPD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUG 3 1926

DIVISION OF

WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

RECEIVED BUREAU

881.00/1256

RML
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CORRECTED COPY

Green

FROM

San Sebastian

Dated Aug. 5, 1926.

Rec'd 7.17 P.M.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

59. August 5, Noon.

Embassy's despatch number 630, July 3, 1925.

Following is substance of Foreign Office note of August first, 1926: reference to communications of July 2, 1925 to interested powers regarding French and Spanish vigilance coasts of Morocco, the two governments now consider return to common law possible and have set forth their agreement in attached memorandum of August 1, 1926 to become effective that day.

Resume of memorandum by paragraphs as follows:

One. Along Moroccan littoral of Spanish and French territories under sovereignty as well as protectorate Spanish and French warships shall assure respectively in Spanish French zones and jointly between Wadbusedra and Wadlau strict observance international regulations which prohibit (a) all stretches Moroccan coast with the exception of open ports and (b) all imports of war material into Morocco.

Two. Vigilance confinement six mile limit territorial waters with right of pursuit beyond this limit.

Three.

881.00/1257
INDEX RETURNED

No. 56 from San Sebastian.

Three. Ships of war shall visit if necessary, conforming to international usage, ships suspected of contravening above mentioned regulations both as regards arms, munitions and war material as well as merchandise suspected bound for natural harbors not open to commerce.

Four. Maritime vigilance in territorial waters of Tangier to be exercised in conformity with article four agreement of December 28, 1923.

Five. Suspected ships shall be turned over to appropriate local jurisdiction.

Six. This communication cancels and replaces communication of July 2, 1925.

HAMMOND

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

OJC

FROM Green.

San Sebastian.

Dated Aug. 5, 1926.

Rec'd 7.17 p.m.

SOLICITOR'S OFFICE

AUG 6 1926

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INDEX BUREAU
RECEIVED

AUG 4 1926

Dep't. of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.



AUG 7 - 1926

59. August 5, noon.

881.00/1110

Embassy's despatch number 630, July 3, 1925.

Following is substance of Foreign Office note of August first, 1926: reference to communications of July 2, 1925 to interested powers regarding French and Spanish vigilance coasts of Morocco, the two governments now consider return to common law possible and have set forth their agreement in attached memorandum/August 1, 1926 to become effective that day.

Resume of memorandum by paragraphs as follows:

One. Along Moroccan littoral of Spanish and French and foreign warships shall assure respectively in Spanish foreign zones and jointly between Wadbusedra and Wadlau strict observance international regulations which prohibit (a) all stretches Moroccan coast with the exception of open ports and (b) all imports of war material into Morocco.

Two. Vigilance confinement six mile limit territorial waters with right of pursuit beyond this limit.

INDEX BUREAU

SEP 8 1926

FILED

-2- #56 from San Sebastian.

Three. Ships of war shall visit if necessary, conforming to international usage, ships suspected of contravening above mentioned regulations both as regards arms, munitions and war material as well as merchandise suspected bound for natural harbors not open to commerce.

Four. Maritime vigilance in territorial waters of Tangier to be exercised in conformity with article four agreement of December 28, 1923.

Five. Suspected ships shall be turned over to appropriate local jurisdiction.

Six. This communication cancels and replaces communication of July 2, 1925.

HAMMOND

CSB

Index Bureau

7 TELEGRAM RECEIVED

~~INDEX BUREAU~~

Index Bureau

FROM

August 6, 1926.

AI 7 26
Dep't of State

881.00/1257

There is an omission of ten groups in number 59,

August 5, Noon, from San Sebastian. Have asked Telegraph Company to repeat cable and supply missing groups.

TELEGRAPH SECTION

French and Spanish vigilance on coasts of Morocco.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 6 1926
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

WE
IB

F.W. 881.00/1257

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SOLICITOR

Mr. Baker

Aug. 6 '26

CR:

*I suggest
elimination of words
"to be".*

JRB

PREPARING OFFICE
ALL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$



PM RECD TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

August 6, 1926.

AMEMBASSY

AUG 7 26

SAN SEBASTIAN (SPAIN)

38
Your 59, August 5, noon.

At your discretion you may remind the Spanish Government
that the position of this Government remains ~~to be~~ that set
forth in the Department's 43, July 31, 1925, 3 p.m.

Runyon


881.00/1257

WE: 40: JDD
WE: 881.00/1257

Enciphered by *PMI*

Sent by operator *M.*, 19 *PM*

PM RECD



Copy ~~in~~ WE.
- 27 - 11

Post 926

AUG 9 1926

AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AGENCY AND CONSULATE GENERAL.

Tangier, Morocco.

Very good
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
File
AUG 10 1926
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Political Report. Confidential. *J.H.*

INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1258

A Demonstration of Fascism in Morocco under
Official Sanction.

From:-

Franklin B. Frost
Franklin B. Frost.
American Vice Consul.

AUG 18 1926

Approved:-

Maxwell Blake
Maxwell Blake.
American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul General.

Prepared:- July 20th, 1926

Mailed:- July 24th, 1926.

**A Demonstration of Fascism in Morocco under
Official Sanction.**

In connection with the current discussion, principally in the British press, of the possibility of ultimately satisfying Italy's aspirations in some way that will secure her adhesion to the Tangier Statute, a recent Fascisti manifestation at Tangier is significant and has not failed to receive notice in English and French journals. Its importance is accentuated when it is added that it was carefully arranged by the Italian Diplomatic Agent under the express authority of his Government.

There is an inclination on the part of the various groups at Tangier to promote their nationalistic interests in an assertive fashion. The Italian Diplomatic Agent, residing in an imposing Legation owned by his Government, furnished with a uniformed guard of Carabinieri (retained after the occasion which caused their dispatch here long ago), loses few opportunities to provide an Italian demonstration to impress local opinion. The recent manifestation is of more than merely colorful interest, however, in view of the political propaganda which is associating Italy with an early adhesion to the Tangier Convention.

The ceremony of blessing the flags of the Fascisti units of Morocco being so timed as to coincide with the visit of several hundred members of the Italian Navy League, there was an important aggregation in the gardens of the Italian Legation on the day following the local observance of the French National Fete. The date was not accidental. Informal invitations had been sent by Count Vanutelli to the Representatives of the Foreign Powers, suggesting that

while

while the ceremony would have official significance only for Italians, they and the members of their respective colonies would be welcome to assist. Practically all of those thus invited were present.


The ceremony was conducted with dignity, but Fascism was none the less fervid in its expression. The Italian standard covered an improvised altar. The large assemblage was even emotionally enthusiastic. It seized every opportunity to resound the name of Benito Mussolini, to cheer for rejuvenated Italy, and for Fascism in Morocco. Black-shirted delegates from Fez, from Rabat, from Marrakesh, from Casablanca, and from Tangier participated with an almost religious solemnity in the ritual of receiving the flags. Each recipient announced in grave tones the significant figures of the membership of his particular unit. Each announcement was applauded. An orchestra frequently played the Fascisti hymn. The Diplomatic Agent omitted no salute, never relaxed his grave mien. On this occasion he showed himself to be no less Fascist than El Duce.

To an address of the Fascisti of Morocco, Count Vanutelli responded with studied eloquence. He stressed the statement that Italy had, with France and Spain, embarked upon a work of civilization in Morocco. The statement was duly acclaimed. It was quietly noted by the representatives of the Powers to which reference was made.

This demonstration, upon which was focused the interest of Italians throughout Morocco, was more than incidental. It had an obvious political purpose. There is a large and
loyal

loyal Italian colony in Tangier. In the French Zone, the Italian colonists outnumber the settlers of French origin. The local press however has sedulously avoided any reference to the demonstration, but the Italian Diplomatic Agent has not concealed an interest in its possible reactions.

-----0-----



American Diplomatic Agency.

Tangier, Morocco, July 24th, 1926.

~~CONFIDENTIAL.~~



SUBJECT: The Constellation of the Powers at Tangier
and the prospects of Italian adhesion.

INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1259

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:-

I had the honor to inform the Department recently that overtures had been made by the British Ambassador in Rome, a short while ago, to obtain the full list of conditions under which Italy would consent to adhere to the Tangier Convention of 1923.

The first efforts in this direction were made by

Sir

Sir Ronald Graham as early as the month of April last and, subsequent to this occasion, repeated endeavors were undertaken by him to extract from the Italian Government a concrete reply. During the first week of June, in response to the pressure and persistence of the British Ambassador, the Italian Government finally formulated its conditions in a Memorandum covering some six pages of typescript.

The preamble of the Note expresses the regret of the Italian Government that the necessity—although through no fault of its own—should have arisen at this belated juncture for pressing such an inquiry, since the Italian Government had specifically indicated its point of view and had laid down, as far back as 1923 when the Tangier Convention was in the process of elaboration, the conditions under which it was prepared to adhere to that Convention, but Italy's right to a voice in the proceedings, as a Mediterranean Power possessing legitimate interests in the settlement of a Mediterranean problem, had been deliberately ignored at that time. The Note then proceeds to indicate that Italy has seen no reason to modify the principles of her policy as then enunciated but in order to respond to the friendly intervention of Great Britain, she is not unwilling again to formulate her requirements.

However before proceeding to precise the conditions which she would present, as points upon which negotiations might be undertaken, Italy desired to assert
the

the following basic principle—which she must see recognized as a preliminary to any further discussion concerning particulars or details—namely, that she would look to the three contracting Powers of the Tangier Convention (Great Britain, France and Spain) to give formal satisfaction to the Italian point of view that, as a Great Mediterranean Power, she is entitled by right to full political equality, with the Powers named, to participate in the adjustment of Mediterranean questions affecting her interests and prestige. Although the Memorandum is silent on the form which such recognition shall assume, it is presumed that the three Powers would be expected to exchange identic Notes in this sense, according to an accepted formula.

Following this adamant reservation (the phraseology of which is vague but satisfying) Italy then lays down nine points upon which diplomatic negotiations might proceed, but it is interesting to note that she now apparently makes no insistence upon the convocation of an open conference. These points are enumerated in the Italian Note, in the following interesting order:-

1. The residence of an Italian Officer, similar in position to the French, Spanish and British Officers, to be designated under the terms of the Statute for the supervision of the neutrality of the Zone.
2. Participation of the Italian Navy with those of Great Britain, France and Spain in the control of the Tangier waters.
3. An Italian member of the Legislative Assembly to hold the position of Vice-President of
that

that body on the same footing as the British, French and Spanish Vice-Presidents.

4. The appointment of a Judge of Italian nationality on the Mixed Tribunals.
5. The adaption of the Judicial Codes to conform to Italian law.
6. Participation of Italian enterprises in Public Works, and international organizations.
7. Security of Customs régime as affecting Italian interests.
8. An Italian Clerk of the Courts to be attached to the Mixed Tribunals.
9. Employment of labor and participation of Italian interests in the enterprise of the Tangier Port.

From the above it will be seen that there is now sufficient in the known situation—aside from public rumor—to enable us to recognize facts without exaggeration, and to be convinced that present conceptions with regard to the Italian adhesion are entirely consistent with the inferences drawn in my Despatch No. 111 of June 10th, 1926, entitled: "Italian Anxieties and the Tangier Question. Altering perspectives and elemental issues. The inconveniences of a Conference."

The realities being clear rather than puzzling or impenetrable, some further history in connection with these negotiations may be interesting as shedding more light upon the situation.

The Italian Note which rewarded the persistence and tenacity of Sir Ronald Graham was placed in his hands early in June last and, for the moment, agitation and interest in the situation temporarily subsided. It

appears,

appears, however, that in the last days of June, the Italian Ambassador in London acting upon his own initiative and quite unknown to his Government, addressed an inquiry to the British Foreign Office, concerning what action was contemplated in regard to meeting the conditions which his Government had formulated.

On the 10th day of July, in a lackadaisical communication, the British Foreign Office replied to the Italian Ambassador that Sir Austin Chamberlain had given consideration to the Italian conditions, but that the dictates of courtesy prevented him from giving any expression of his official opinion, since the interests of both the French and Spanish Governments were equally concerned and their view point he had not yet solicited. Mr. Chamberlain esteemed however that the demands of the Italian Government were excessive (there was even a veiled suggestion that they were arrogant) and would appear difficult to realize, but that he nevertheless entertained some hope that the situation might be so adjusted as to permit the contents of the Italian Note ultimately to form a basis upon which negotiations might be initiated.

This Note from the British Foreign Office to the Italian Ambassador—to put it coldly—although couched in mellifluous terms but devoid of all accents of veneration, was a subtle, evasive and disingenuous reply to the Italian Ambassador's representations, and was unquestionably a proper reward for his injudicious, meddling, meddlesome,

meddlesome, and insipid intervention.

It is believed that both the Italian Ambassador in London and the British Ambassador in Rome are aspiring to play important personal roles in the settlement of the Tangier question. Sir Ronald Graham—under the orders of his Foreign Office, disturbed over the possible collapse of the international régime at Tangier and the growing strength of the French position here—is endeavoring to bolster up the situation by means of Italian adhesion. This also would further counteract the persistence of Spanish aspirations, which were vented with emotion during the recent visit of the Spanish Monarchs to London and became a disturbing element at the British Foreign Office.

On the other hand, the activities of the Italian Ambassador in London are believed to be influenced by his personal desire to be kind and serviceable to the British Government and incidentally to reap the distinction of being somewhat responsible for the favorable settlement of a question involving the international prestige of his country, and the inopportune demarche which he has made is believed to be considered in Rome as a serious "faux pas."

These impressions are based upon some indirect facts, and are certainly not the result of any personal impressions of my own.

The French Government, having been forced to consent to the intervention of Great Britain for the
purpose

purpose of exploring the Italian attitude, remains behind the screen, and now having full knowledge of the Italian terms, France, without any confessions on her part, is in a position to play her cards at will according to her interests.

Spain, as usual, has been outmanoeuvred if not ignored, and undoubtedly looks with silent disgust upon the efforts of the British Government to secure the adhesion of Italy to the Statutes, a result which she realizes would constitute a further impediment to the materialization of her slumbering ambitions for the sole control of the Tangier enclave.

As regards the French attitude it is difficult in the first place to see how this Power can recede from the opposition, which she has hitherto consistently taken up against the right of Italy to a voice in the question of Tangier, on the grounds—as contended by France—that Italy is committed under the terms of previous understanding with France to renounce all political intervention in any part of Morocco.

Secondly, the intrusion of Italy into the Administration and Government of the Tangier Zone, on any basis exceeding the limits laid down in this respect in the Statute, will threaten the present local distribution of power in which the scales are now heavily weighted in favor of French preponderance.

Unless therefore the position of France is fundamentally weakened elsewhere, it is difficult to foresee

any

any acquiescence on her part in the Italian demands, and notably, in regard to those which would invest local Italian representation with an authority visibly equal to that of France and her original associates. The materialization of such changes could not but enfold a threat of frustration to the ultimate views of France in Morocco, by strengthening the individualist element of the important Italian colonies established in Tangier and in French Morocco, by raising the prestige of Italy throughout North Africa, and provoking everywhere throughout these regions passionate political intoxication. /

With regard to Italy, if her moral aspirations with respect to the Mediterranean problem of Tangier are frustrated, what conditions could she see fulfilled to compensate her for this defeat?

There is a possible satisfactory adjustment of the precarious Italian nationality situation in Tunis, resulting from the French denouncement of a Franco-Italian Treaty. This treaty protected the Italian colonists in Tunis from the effect of the French Presidential Decrees of 1921 tending to impose French nationality on foreigners residing in Tunis and Morocco. The advantages to be derived from the recent Anglo-Italian Accord relative to Abyssinia may also depend in some measure upon the active support of France and Great Britain, but my lateral lines of communication are not sufficiently intact to enable me to state with any confidence or certitude that such considerations may be involved.

involved. However, this sequel of events is conceivable and entirely plausible under the operation of the laws of expediency and opportunism.

It is possible therefore that these and such other substantial considerations might be deemed to outweigh the acquisition by Italy of a position in Tangier, which is preeminently sentimental in character, and with but remote or secondary material benefits.

From what has preceded it is obvious that political aspirations, military strategy and the diplomatic machinery of Europe, in spite of all moderation in language, continue to make of Morocco a mosaic of intricate political conflicts. If the present interplay of influences should eventually result, in the enlistment of Italy to the Tangier Convention, a new situation will have arisen which the American Government will be expected to consider, being possibly invited to show tokens of precautionary friendship by a similar gesture, but this is a phase of the question which it is premature as yet even to speculate upon, much less to explore.

It will be obvious from the above discussion that the decision which Italy will eventually take is still a matter of conjecture. However, in the meantime it is noted that the British press, undoubtedly under inspired direction, is playing, with almost a complete orchestra, the tune of acquiescence and adhesion.

The blunt facts are that Great Britain in the Tangier question, is disconcerted over a specious


bargain,

bargain, but while shrinking from her own increasing apprehensions, she is endeavoring to impose upon the credulous the supposed advantages of the régime which has been evolved. She desires to convince the world that her Anglo-Saxon idealism is applicable everywhere, even in the eastern community of Tangier, where she seeks to assert the belief, in spite of the resistance of all parties concerned—including her own colony—that the best solution for the Government of this city of 60,000 people is a control exercised by the representatives of nine different races, although she is aware that the participating Powers do not even pretend to mask the insincerity of their adhesion, or the predatory nature of their separate designs.

England still has a Mediterranean policy which once she vigorously asserted but which to-day she endeavors to defend by methods of evasion and compromise. Having betrayed Spain in Morocco to accommodate France in Europe, she now seeks to inveigle the world into her net at Tangier, for the preservation of a selfish but vital interest of her own which she fatuously impaired as the result of her weak vacillating and incompetent diplomacy at Paris in 1923.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,



Maxwell Blake.
American Diplomatic Agent.

Note:-


Copy of this Despatch sent to E. I. C., Paris,
and to the Embassies at London, Rome and Madrid.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, August 3, 1926.

No. 6542

881.00



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to my cable No. 305, August 3, 12 A.M., I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy and translation of a Note dated July 29, 1926, from the Foreign Office together with the text of the Memorandum concerning the Maritime Surveillance of the Moroccan Coast from August 1, 1926.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

For the Ambassador:

Sheldon Whitehouse
Sheldon Whitehouse.
Counselor of Embassy.

Enclosures:

1. From Foreign Office.
2. Memorandum.
3. Transl. of Encl. #1.
4. Transl. of Encl. #2.

In triplicate.

PTT ED
AUG 14 1926

REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
- - - - -

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères.
- - - - -

Paris, le 29 juillet 1926.

Direction des Affaires politiques
et commerciales.
- - - - -

AFRIQUE-LEVANT.

A la date du 2 juillet 1925, le Gouvernement français, d'accord avec le Gouvernement espagnol, avait adressé aux Puissances intéressées deux avis relatifs aux mesures concertées entre les deux Gouvernements en vue d'assurer conjointement la surveillance maritime des côtes du Maroc.

A la suite d'un nouvel examen de la situation, les deux Gouvernements ont estimé que le retour au droit commun était désormais possible, et ils ont constaté leur accord dans le mémorandum ci-joint, dont les dispositions entrèrent en vigueur le 1er août 1926./.

B.

AMBASSADE DES ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE

A PARIS.

Paris, le 20 juillet 1926.

MEMORANDUM AU SUJET DE LA SURVEILLANCE MARITIME DES COTES DU

MAROC, à partir du 1er août 1926.

Au large du littoral des territoires français et espagnols, tant de souveraineté que de protectorat, situés au nord et à l'ouest de l'Afrique et compris entre la frontière algéro-marocaine, 2°13' de longitude ouest de Greenwich et l'embouchure de l'Oued Draa 28°41' de latitude nord, les bâtiments de guerre français et espagnols, assureront, respectivement dans les zones française et espagnole, et conjointement entre l'Oued Bou Sedra et l'Oued Draa, c'est-à-dire entre les parallèles de 29°51' nord et 28°41' nord, la stricte observation des dispositions internationales et des règlements interdisant, d'une part, tout accès des côtes marocaines en dehors des ports ouverts, et, d'autre part, toute importation d'armes, de munitions et de matériel de guerre au Maroc. Dans l'ensemble de ces côtes, la surveillance est limitée aux six milles des eaux territoriales avec le droit de suite hors de cette limite.

A cet effet les dits bâtiments surveilleront et visiteront, s'il y a lieu, conformément aux usages internationaux, en pareille matière, tous les navires qui seraient soupçonnés pour des motifs raisonnables, de contrevenir aux prescriptions visées. Cette surveillance portera aussi bien sur les armes, les munitions et le matériel de guerre que sur les marchandises suspects d'être dirigées sur les ports ou pour les mouillages naturels non ouverts au commerce.

La surveillance maritime dans les eaux territoriales de Tanger continuera à s'exercer conformément aux stipulations de l'article 4 de la Convention du 18 décembre 1923.

Les bâtiments et embarcations qui seront reconnus par les bâtiments de surveillance comme se livrant au trafic des armes, munitions, matériel de guerre et marchandises suspects d'être

dirigées

dirigées sur des ports ou mouillages naturels non ouverts au commerce, seront déferés à la juridiction locale compétente.

La présente communication annule et remplace les communications du 2 juillet 1925 sur le même sujet./.

F R E N C H R E P U B L I C

- - - - -

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

- - - - -

Paris, July 29, 1926.

Division of Political and
Commercial Affairs.

- - - - -

Africa-Levant.

On July 2, 1925, the French Government, in agreement with the Spanish Government forwarded to the interested Powers two notices relative to the concerted measures of the two Governments with a view to ensuring together the surveillance of the Moroccan coast.

Following another examination of the situation, the two Governments deem that a return to common law is henceforth possible, and they have set forth their agreement in the enclosed memorandum, the provisions of which will come into force on August 1, 1926./.

B.

Embassy of the United States of America

at Paris.

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE MARITIME SURVEILLANCE
OF THE MOROCCAN COAST FROM AUGUST 1, 1926.

On the offing of the coast of French and Spanish territories, both as regards dominions and protectorates, situated to the North and West of Africa and included between the Algero-Moroccan frontier, 2°13' West Longitude (Greenwich), and the mouth of the Oued Draa, 28°41' North Latitude, French and Spanish warships will ensure, in the French and Spanish zones respectively, and jointly between Oued Bou Sedra and Oued Draa, that is to say between the parallels 29°31 and 28°41 North, the strict observance of the international measures and rules forbidding, on the one hand, any access to the Moroccan coast with the exception of open ports, and, on the other hand, any importation of arms, munitions and war material into Morocco. Along the entire coast the surveillance is limited to the six miles of territorial waters with the right of pursuit outside of this limit.

To this end the ships will survey and visit, if necessary, pursuant to international custom in such matters, any vessels which may be suspected, for well grounded reasons, of contravening the orders in question. This surveillance will be exercised both as regards arms, munitions and war material as well as merchandise suspected of being directed to ports or natural anchoring grounds not open to trade.

The maritime surveillance in the territorial waters of Tangier will continue to be exercised pursuant to the stipulations of Article 4 of the Convention of December 18, 1925.

Ships and boats recognized by the surveying ships as trading in arms, munitions, war material and merchandise suspected of being directed to ports or natural anchoring grounds not open to trade, shall be brought before the competent local jurisdiction.

The present communication cancels and takes the place of the communications of July 2, 1925, on the same subject./.

R.M.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

SOLICITOR'S OFFICE
AUG 17 1926
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Index Bureau
RECORDED

Gray

AUG 16 1926

FROM

San Sebastian

Dep't. of State

Dated August 15, 1926.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Handwritten: L. to C. 10/26
AUG 16 1926
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 16 1926
AUG 16 1926
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

60. IMPORTANT. August 15, 1 P.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~. The Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me yesterday and said that he had been instructed by Primo to inform me of the resumption of negotiations regarding Tangier. Following is substance of his remarks.

Spain and Great Britain have agreed to admit participation of Italy in administration of international zone if the latter country will adhere to the statute. Negotiations to this end are now going on in Rome. France has not yet concurred in this proposition but has submitted matter to consideration by experts and a decision is expected shortly.

Spain is very anxious to obtain control of international zone and therefore intends to propose that the zone be incorporated in her protectorate or, failing this, that the powers interested grant Spain a mandate over the zone for twelve or fifteen years as a trial period preparatory to ultimate definitive cession of control. In either case Spain, prompted by the desire that the Straits be neutralized, would guarantee the neutrality

of

INDEX BUREAU

DEC 14 1926

No. 60, from San Sebastian.

of the zone and agree not to construct fortifications or establish naval bases therein. She would also guarantee it absolute equality of treatment in trade and commerce.

He asked that I communicate these proposals to the Department by cable adding that Spain is very anxious to gain the acquiescence of the United States as an interested power and party to the Treaty of Algeciras which treaty would of course have to be modified if Spain's aspirations are realized. In conclusion he expressed the opinion that the proposals are calculated to meet the views of the United States regarding the neutralization of the Straits and the open door. Similar pour parlers are being had with the representatives of the other governments interested and he expects the negotiations to go forward rapidly.

In response to my question he denied categorically that the recent convention between Spain and Italy which has elicited so much comment in the European press relates to other than the arbitration of disputes and the neutrality of either country in case of an attack on the other by a threatening state. He promised me a copy of this treaty which I shall send by the pouch.

Copies of this telegram mailed to London, Rome, Paris and Tangier.

HAMMOND

HPD

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT PM RECD


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CONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Department of State



16, 1926.

B-1

This cable was sent in confidential code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

AMEMBASSY

AUG 16 26

LONDON (ENGLAND)

161

Reference Hammond's telegram 60, August 16, 1 p.m. to
the Department regarding Spanish control of Tangier zone.

Have you any information regarding the ^{possible} attitude of the
British Government towards the Spanish proposal? CONFIDENTIAL
The fact that Spain has approached this Government should not
be divulged.

861.00/1261

Hammond
ACTING

CE
AUG 16, 1926
manned

WE: JDD
WE

Sp. [Signature]

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

PREPARING OFFICE
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CONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State



B-1

16, 1926.

AMEMBASSY

PARIS (FRANCE)

AUG 16 26

213

Reference Hammond's telegram 60, August 16, 1 p.m. to
the Department regarding Spanish control of Tangier zone.

Have you any information regarding the ^{possible} attitude of the
French Government towards the Spanish proposal? CONFIDENTIAL
The fact that Spain has approached this Government should not
be divulged.

881.00/11261

Hammond.
ACTING

AUG 16, 1926
M

S. J. [Signature]

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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TELEGRAM SENT PM RECD

TO BE TRANSMITTED

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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Department of State

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.



Aug 16, 1926

AMEMBASSY

ROME (ITALY)

MSG 16 25

71 Reference Hammond's telegram, 60, August, 16, 1 p.m., to
the Department regarding Spanish control of Tangier zone,
Have you any information regarding the attitude of the
Italian Government towards the Spanish proposal? CONFIDENTIAL,
The fact that Spain has approached this Government should not
be divulged.

881.00/19261

Hammond.
ACTING

Aug 16, 1926

WE:HG:JDD
Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

August 16, 1926

Memorandum.

We have not yet recognized the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco owing to Spanish inability or unwillingness to settle a number of outstanding cases involving our interests in the Spanish Zone. Presumably a satisfactory ^{settlement} of these cases will be a necessary prerequisite to any consideration we may decide to give to the present Spanish proposal. Hence the telegram to Blake.

Before replying to Hammond's telegram which calls for some kind of an answer, it seems important to ascertain whether the Spanish proposal is merely designed to supply them with ammunition for their campaign for the Tangier Zone, in addition to that which they have presumably secured from Italy-- Hammond and Primo to the contrary-- or whether it is a bona fide proposal made with the knowledge of the other interested Powers.

~~WE~~

PREPARING OFFICE
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
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington

August

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CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE



AUG 16 26

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

AMLE

TANGIER (MOROCCO)

5 Reference Hammond's telegram, 60, August, 16, 1 p.m. to
the Department, regarding Spanish control of Tangier zone,

Please wire list of cases involving Spanish sphere of
influence whose settlement should be required before recognizing
the Spanish protectorate in that zone as it now exists, and
brief statement of further safeguards prerequisite in your
judgment to such recognition,

CONFIDENTIAL, The fact that Spain has approached this
Government should not be divulged.

Harrison.
ACTING

CR

AUG 16, 1926

DISTRIBUTION

WE: JDD
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Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

881.00/1261

^{this cable}
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RML

INDEX BUREAU
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AUG 18 1926
Dep't. of State

~~was received~~
in the Department
ments Confidential
Code FROM

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being communi-
cated to anyone

Paris

Dated Aug 17 1926.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Rec'd 3:45 P.M.

AUG 17 1926
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

~~WE~~
~~50~~
SOLICITOR'S OFFICE

AUG 24 1926

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State

Washington.

323. August 17, 6 P.M.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~. Your 213, August 16th.

Had an opportunity this afternoon in a conversation with Seydoux to mention Primo's declaration about Tangier. He said that the French Government had not been consulted and was naturally opposed not only to any such solution but to any reopening of the question of Tangier which the French Government had been steadily maintaining was now closed.

While he thought it possible that the Spanish Government had put Tangier forward for bargaining purposes, in connection with the Council of the League he did not think it probable since they would prefer Tangier ^{since they} ~~to be denied a~~ humiliations seat on the Council.

(Haring no)

WHITEHOUSE

WSB

INDEX BUREAU

88100/1262

OCT 8

RML

CORRECTED COPY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

SOLICITOR'S OFFICE
AUG 21 1926
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WE
So

RECEIVED
AUG 23 1926
Dep't. of State

Paris

FROM

Dated Aug. 18, 1926.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Rec'd 4:13 P.M.
AUG 23 1926
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,
Washington.

335. August 18, 6 P.M.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~. Have just received by mail text of Hammond's 60, August 15th. My 323, August 17th, referred to a declaration of Primo to the A.B.C. reported in the French press that on account of Spain's sacrifices in Morocco Tangier should be incorporated in the Spanish zone, et cetera. It was this declaration that Seydoux denied any prior knowledge of. I did not make any reference to Italian participation of administration of the zone under the present statute. The great desire in France is to avoid any validity of the question by an international conference lest Italy use the occasion for demanding concessions in Tunisia.

WHITEHOUSE

WSB

INDEX BUREAU

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

OCT 8 1926

RML

~~THIS CABLE~~
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

~~in the Depart-~~

~~Index Bureau~~
RECEIVED

AUG 19 1926

Dep't. of State

Secretary of State,
Washington.

325. August 18, 6 P.M.

~~ments Confidential~~
~~6-12~~ FROM

Paris

It should be
closely para-
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being communica-
ted to anyone

Dated Aug. 18, 1926.

Rec'd 4.12 P.M.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUG 19 1926

DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SOLICITOR'S OFFICE
AUG 24 1926
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~. Have just received by
mail text of Hammond's 60, August 15th. My 323, August
17th, referred to a declaration of Primo to the A.B.C.
reported in the French press that on account of Spain's
sacrifices in Morocco Tangier should be incorporated in
the Spanish zone, et cetera. It was this declaration
that Seydoux denied any prior knowledge. I did not
make any reference to Italian participation of adminis-
tration of the zone under the present statute, The
great desire in France is to avoid any validity of the
question by an international conference lest Italy (?)
(?) (concessions?) in Tunisia.

WHITEHOUSE

WSB

OCT 8 1926

Confidential File

881.00/1263

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

August 24, 1926

Mr. Castle:

On second thought I am inclined to agree with you that the suggestion that we resume discussions on the recognition of the present Spanish Zone is, perhaps out of place in this telegram.

However I would not be averse to recognition if the Spanish Government brings up the question, offers to settle our claims-- which amount to \$20,000 roughly speaking,-- and gives adequate assurances. In any case we would retain our capitulatory rights.

I am on the whole favorable to the Spanish suggestion with regard to Tangier as appears to offer the only hope of a reasonable solution to the Moroccan problem, and in making my original suggestion about recognition of the Spanish Zone, I wanted to give the Spaniards what little direct encouragement we could with propriety.

It is purely a question of policy and can perfectly well await a later stage of such negotiations as may take place.

WE: ~~de~~

with approval

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

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What is the value of π 3 ?
It would seem to be a question
of suggestion. The same point
of recognition and distinction
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the value of the value of π 3

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Aug 28

WLC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

WIRC

SO (Mr. Anderson)

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

WP

TELEGRAM SENT

August 25, 1926, 6 p. m.

AmEmbassy,

San Sebastian, (Spain).

40. Your 60, August 15, 1 p. m.

Inasmuch as this Government has repeatedly dis-
claimed all political interest and responsibility in
Morocco it is not at present in a position to comment
on the Spanish suggestion that Tangier be assimilated
to the present Spanish sphere of influence in Morocco.

Should the other signatories of the Act of
Algeciras entertain such a proposition the United
States would be inclined to examine the question of
its future position in Morocco in a sympathetic spirit.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~. Information reaching the
Department indicates that the Spanish Government is in
this instance maneuvering for American support to be
used in its conversations with the other signatories of
the Act of Algeciras. While willing to treat Moroccan
matters in a friendly spirit, this Government has no
intention of permitting itself to be used to support any
particular ^{political} thesis. Mail cipher copies to London, Paris,
Rome, and Tangier.

KELLOGG

WE:HC:JDD
WE:881.00/1263

881.00/1263

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT REG

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.



25
August 24, 1926.

AMEMBASSY

SAN SEBASTIAN (SPAIN)

AUG 25 26

6pm

40 Your 60, August 15, 1 p.m.

Inasmuch as this Government has repeatedly disclaimed all political interest and responsibility in Morocco it is not at present in a position to comment on the Spanish suggestion that Tangier be assimilated to the present Spanish sphere of influence in Morocco.

881.00/1263

Should the other signatories of the Act of Algeciras entertain such a proposition the United States would be inclined to examine the question of its future position in Morocco in a sympathetic spirit.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.~~ Information reaching the Department indicates that the Spanish Government is in this instance maneuvering for American support to be used in its conversations with the other signatories of the Act of Algeciras. While willing to treat Moroccan matters in a friendly spirit, this Government has no intention of permitting itself to be used to support any particular political thesis. Mail cipher copies to London, Paris, Rome, and Tangier.

WE:HC:JDD
WE:881.00/1263

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

Index Bu.—No. 50.

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

PM REC'D

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RML

Index Bureau
RECEIVED

AUG 19 1926
Dep't. of State

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It should be
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being communi-
cated to anyone

Secretary of State,
Washington.

August 13, 3 P.M.

Your telegram number 5, August 16, 7 P.M. For
list of American claims in Spanish zone see my despatch
number 246 of November 22, 1921.

The individuals mentioned therein in enclosures
two, three and five have presented various claims sub-
sequent to that date, and in addition to this list
further claims are on file from the following named
persons: Atlantic Refining Company, David Bergel and
Rah Amin Company here.

On a satisfactory adjustment of these claims,
formal recognition if extended should be preceded by
a precautionary understanding embodying the following
principles: 1st, that recognition does not imply on our
part any relinquishment of American judicial rights
under the capitulations (see my despatch number 242 of
September 15, 1921) or any other impairment of American
rights and privileges under existing ^{treaties} (?) including
those of the Madrid convention and equality of treatment

as

Tangier

Dated Aug. 18, 1926.

Rec'd. 5.12.11 EIMIF

AUG 19 1926
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

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INDEX BUREAU

JAN 19 1928

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881.00/1261

881.00/738

August 18, 3 P.M. from Tangier.

as provided for by the Act of Algeciras; 2nd, that no fiscal legislation outside that authorized by existing treaties which may be enacted by the Spanish authorities in their zone shall be applied to American nationals or proteges until previously accepted by the American Government; 3rd, that Spain will agree not to apply to American nationals or proteges at any time in the future without the consent of the American Government the double payment of customs duties upon merchandise entering either the Spanish or international zones from ~~the one~~ or the other, as mentioned in article 20 of the Tangier Convention (see my despatch number 106 of June 5, 1926); 4th, that Spain will agree to the suppression of classes of visa charges other than nominal chancery fees on the passports of Americans traveling in Morocco and will not reimpose them in the future without the consent of the American Government (see my despatch number 61 of February 5, 1926). *881-20/1236* *811.11101 Waiver 81/1*

The principles underlying these reservations were all accepted by the French Government prior to our recognition of the French protectorate and their observance still continues.

However sympathetically the ultimate aspirations of Spain in Morocco may be generally considered, it would not appear at this moment that we could either safely or

consistently

August 18, 3 P.M. from Tangier.

consistently show in its favor any relaxation of the conditions which we have hitherto considered to be of elemental importance to our own interests in this country. Furthermore, for trading purposes or otherwise some powers may set up adventitious reservations as the price of their consent to the realization of Spanish desires, and consequently I suggest that our attitude now should be one of caution (with explanations if necessary) in order that we may not be placed in a compromising position later on by the terms of our reply to the first overtures made to us by Spain in the direction of an objective which it is not conceded she may realize in the form of a definite political reality.

Cipher copy of this telegram mailed Embassy at Madrid.

BLAKE

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

~~This cable~~
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LONDON

It should be August 19, 1926
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SOLICITOR'S OFFICE
AUG 23 1926
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Index Bureau
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AUG 23 1926

Dep't. of State

Secretary of State
Washington

191 August 19, 6 p.m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ Your 161, August 16th, and
Madrid's 60 to the Department. In conversation today
with Villiers of the Foreign Office I brought up the
subject of Spanish pretensions by referring to Primo
de Rivera's recent press interview. Villiers scouted
the idea that they would be granted stating that France
would never consent. Nor would the British Government
agree, I gathered, being content with the status quo.
They intended however, to hide their refusal behind
France.

He intimated that recent demonstrations in Tangier
were being fomented by Spanish authorities to show
failure of existing regime and give point to Spanish
claim.

As regards Italian participation in administration
of zone, he stated that while Italy had formulated her

requirements

FILED
APR 22 1927

INDEX BUREAU
881.00/1265-
Confidential File

file

London -2-

requirements and the British Government had agreed to consider them Spain had never replied so far as the Foreign Office was aware and instead had made the unexpected proposals. Cipher text to Paris, Madrid, Tangier and Rome.

HOUGHTON

PT

INDEX BUREAU
AUG 23 1926
DEPT OF STATE

AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AGENCY AND CONSULATE GENERAL.

Tangier, Morocco.

Political Report. Confidential

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 23 1926
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

**The First Anniversary of the Inauguration of the
International Regime at Tangier. Pessimism among
the French.**

From:- Franklin B. Frost.
Franklin B. Frost.
American Vice Consul.

Approved:- Maxwell Blake.
Maxwell Blake.
American Diplomatic Agent
and Consul-General.

Prepared:- July 30th, 1926.

Mailed:- July 31st, 1926.

AUG 25 1926

**The First Anniversary of the Inauguration of the
International Regime at Tangier. Pessimism among
the French.**

The so-called international regime of Tangier came into existence a little over a year ago. Its conception had been dubious. Its advent, after disquieting delays, had not been without travail. While the new government was not robust and was handicapped from the start, its sponsors predicted with apparent confidence that it would yet gain strength and fulfil its destined mission of leading Tangier into a better day. With these assurances popular misgivings were quieted and the new regime was acclaimed.

A year has passed. The first anniversary has been observed, although in a rather cheerless and dispirited way. A reasoned disappointment has succeeded an unreasonable hope. The new administration has not acquired the predicted strength. Hopes have not yet been realized. With its finances based upon the fluctuating franc, there are monetary dangers which occasion some alarm. There is a growing belief that the international regime was not born under a happy star. Current comments indicate an increasing presentiment that it is doomed to a short life.

Tangier has been restive for several months. Before a year had elapsed there was considerable intelligent British criticism of the new regime. Despite the present apparent attempts of Great Britain to use Italy for a blood transfusion for the moribund regime, many British observers continue skeptical. Spain has never
been

been whole-heartedly interested in the international administration. She is at present openly indicating her willingness to administer the effects when it shall have become defunct. The third interested party, France, has appeared to be satisfied with her diplomatic achievements at the Paris Convention and French criticism has not hitherto been in the open. Recent developments have indicated a popular if not an official reaction, however. French residents have in large numbers been quitting Tangier without intention of returning. Finally there is an official note of disquietude. In the public appraisal of local conditions which the French Consul permitted himself on the observance of the French National Fete, we find the following significant comment:-

"Let us not forget that the Statute was born of a compromise between several Powers; its dispositions necessarily bear the marks of it; but it has been especially studied to be adapted to this Zone and it must be accepted such as it is. Within this compass commercial and industrial enterprises can freely develop: the initiative belongs to us and the future of this city is after all in our hands."

"It is necessary then to continue to strive and not allow oneself to be overcome by a spirit of pessimism and weakness, which would lead to no other result than to abandon the place to more tenacious and more prudent rivals."

While the local English and Spanish press has not refrained from expressing its dissatisfaction with present conditions, the French press has generally combatted any notion of change. Following the commencement of the second year under the Statute however, the "Echo de Tanger", an independent French weekly, editorially figured up the
balance

balance sheet of the first year's operations. It found little to put in the credit column. It called attention to new taxes, heavier obligations, an abnormal increase in the cost of living and in rents, and a numerically imposing corps of functionaries; to the future necessity for paying for a gendarmerie to replace the present French and Spanish military police; to the customs cordon erected by the Spanish and the probable necessity of the payment of a heavy imposition as one of the terms of its removal; to the continuance of gambling from which the city derives no profit (while the Statute prohibited the operation of gambling resorts, they have been allowed to continue on the argument that the international administration was without power to effect the closing of those establishments operated by citizens of nations which have not adhered to the Statute); to increased moral delinquencies of various descriptions; and to a long list of other unhappy conditions which it asserted characterize Tangier at the present time. For the sacrifices required and the conditions which have to be tolerated, it found only modest compensation in the improved condition of the streets, a municipal dispensary, a somewhat cleaner city, and a better administration of justice.

Thus the disillusionment of Tangier continues. The recent removal of the customs cordon which had been maintained about the Zone by the Spanish authorities, and which had proved disastrous to the business of the city, brought only slight encouragement. While many dare to hope that the Tangier-Fez Railroad will finally be completed next year, there is an apparent feeling that it will require much more than this to revive the city.

881.00
No. 122.



American Diplomatic Agency.

Tangier, Morocco, July 29th, 1926.



~~VERY CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE

SUBJECT: British Diplomacy by Press Propaganda. Official Remonstrances from Italy. Secret Shifting of Moroccan Issues at Paris.

881.00/1267
INDEX BUREAU

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:-

As the methods pursued regarding the negotiations over the Tangier question—no less than their possible results—are of almost equal interest, I have the honor to supplement the contents of my No. 121 of July 24th, 1926,

AUG 30 1926

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1926, by some further details which, it is a definite certainty, diplomacy in Europe has been secretly feeding upon during this brief interval.

It is interesting and of primary significance to know that the Italian Ambassador in London was telegraphically charged by his Government last week to protest, in unmistakable terms, to the British Government, against its discourtesy in revealing to the Press the contents of the Italian Memorandum regarding Italy's possible association with the Tangier Statutes, and to express the surprise of the Italian Government that the British Foreign Office had seen fit so far to depart from the conventional forms and courtesies of diplomatic intercourse.

Four days ago, Count Vanutelli Rey, Diplomatic Agent of Italy at Tangier, read to me a Telegram from his Government to the effect that it was only the result of persistent pressure on the part of the British Government that Italy drew up the Memorandum in regard to the Italian position with respect to Tangier; that this was in no respect the outcome of Italy's own initiative; that it did not constitute conditions in any way binding upon Italy, nor had any steps been taken, up to that hour, which altered, in the slightest degree, the attitude previously adopted by the Italian Government in regard to the question.

Referring back to real causes I can state without any abuse of confidence that the London "Times," acting
upon

upon the directions of the British Foreign Office, instructed its Correspondent in Morocco to favor and to agitate the admission of Italy into the Tangier Administration, in accordance with the terms and requirements expressed in the Italian Memorandum. As will be seen, there is much that is significant behind this manoeuvre.

Suspensions have existed for some time that secret clauses were attached to the Franco-Spanish Accord which was signed in Paris on July 13th, 1926, for the ostensible purpose of adjusting, within the frame of existing treaties, the position of France and Spain in Morocco following the exile of Abdelkrim. These suspicions are rapidly developing into fixed convictions.

Very confidential information has just been transmitted by the Belgian Ambassador in Madrid to his Government to the effect that he is in possession of information which entitles him to suppose that France has secretly agreed to remove her obstruction to Spain's revindications for the absorption of Tangier into the Spanish Zone of Influence. The measures which will be resorted to in pursuit of these ends will proceed by a mechanical sliding scale progression leading up eventually to the global incorporation of Tangier into the Spanish Zone.

In exchange for these concessions Spain will consent to a permanent occupation by France of the chain of mountain tops and passes, stretching across the Riff

in

in the Spanish Zone, within 20 miles from the coast line, and composing the key of access to the Mediterranean from the Riff hinterland. These positions were occupied by the French troops and have remained in their hands, since the conclusion of the Franco-Spanish joint operations against Abdelkrim.

When the mists of Paris were sufficiently lifted to reveal these unexpected developments the British Foreign Office was no longer able to set aside or explode as a fantastic theory the reality of French intentions to reach the Mediterranean. Following these discoveries a hasty effort was made by Great Britain to win the support of Italy, and a diplomatic and press propaganda was feverishly started to induce Italy to adhere to the Statutes, it being suggested in London, from inspired quarters, that, with the adhesion of Italy, no modification to the Tangier Statutes could be effected without the consent of that Power, although it is interesting to know that this was not one of the conditions laid down by Italy.

A few days after the circulation of reports that Italy was to join hands with the other Powers in upholding the international régime at Tangier, and following what constituted practically an official press denial by the Italian Government of these reports, the Representative of Spain in Tangier expressed to his Italian Colleague his great relief from the anxiety which such reports had caused him. He stated that Italy's adhesion

at

at this juncture would be premature, if not actually embarrassing to Spain, for this Power had in no way relinquished its desire to bring about by treaty or by negotiation the inclusion of Tangier into its Moroccan Zone, in accordance with the reiterated demands of Primo de Rivera.

The above would appear to fix the sequence of events which led to the situation described in my No. 121 of July 24th, 1926, and the subsequent disclosures now related have crystallized Italy's conviction that the overtures of the British Foreign Office had been prompted by a desire to utilize Italy as an instrument to serve British political ends rather than by any chivalrous consideration of Italy's legitimate pretensions.

As a consequence it is now indisputable that the first friendly inclinations of the Italian Government have cooled and subsided, under the influences of disillusionment in dramatic form.

As a result of this confusion growing out of the shallow subtleties indicated, the international situation over the local Tangier régime becomes singularly increased in delicacy and in complexity. Great Britain finds herself committed to the strenuous support of the immutability of the admittedly impracticable Statutes of Tangier, as the only alternative to maintain the safeguard of her strategic interests in the undisturbed balance of influences on the Straits of Gibraltar. With the object of under-pinning the international régime,

tottering

tottering at its base from the effect of the increasing intrusion of French local power, on the one hand, and the unabated restlessness of Spain on the other, she has sought, but seems to have lost through indiscreet and clumsy manoeuvres, the support of the Italian Government. Simultaneously with this disappointment she now finds herself confronted with the above mentioned coalescence of France and Spain, and is therefore not only completely isolated in the Chancelleries of Europe over this question, but is burdened with the problem of opposing single handed the local execution of the secret Franco-Spanish understanding.

It is believed that the initial moves of the last mentioned Powers in this direction will be the transfer to Spanish control of the Military Police and Gendarmerie and perhaps, after the lapse of a discreet interval, of the Customs Administration at Tangier. Organized agitation will promote the substitution of the Spanish Peseta in lieu of the Franc as the sole currency in the Tangier Zone, and likewise the popular election, (instead of the present method of designation by the Consulates General), of the members of the local Legislative Assembly. It is understood that Spain is assured the tacit support of France for the realization of these measures, which would materially reinforce the Spanish position in Tangier, and inevitably lead to the eventual elimination of all traces of international administration in favor of the exclusive ascendancy of Spain. On the other hand it is deemed that Great Britain has very materially

weakened

weakened her justification to resist attempts to break up the present Tangier régime since she has herself, under the pressure of her associates, given her acquiescence to fundamental derogations from the provisions of the Tangier Convention.

If reports are as accurate, absolute and as confounding as seem herein to be indicated, let us before concluding concentrate upon a few points deserving final emphasis.

The unexpected closing up of France and Spain over the Tangier question, and the evident embarrassments resulting therefrom to Great Britain, and the residual reminiscences of Italy, are elements all pointing in the direction of a resuscitation of the problems of North Morocco before an International Conference.


It is obvious that in virtue of the concessions exchanged between France and Spain, the former Power very skilfully evades the issue of facing a condition under which she might be forced to recognize the pretensions of Italy for equality in the Mediterranean, (the aspects of which have been discussed in my No. 111 of June 10th, last), for under the private arrangements reached between France and Spain this issue is now deferred, the moral question generally involved remaining in abeyance.

However, the reported agreement above discussed, being secret, is in effect artificial and precarious, for in spite of the first appearances of friendly understanding

understanding between the two Powers, who should be naturally allied in their association for the solution of a common problem, there are outside factors which indicate that the resolution of the Moroccan question cannot be definitely adjudicated on any such magical lines. It must inevitably remain a question within the realms of international transaction, until it is finally settled upon broader principles than upon an occult understanding, violating existing treaties, and cunningly reached between two Powers, (after so many evil thoughts of one another), for the purpose of meeting their respective conveniences, the one, hoping to satisfy a vague domestic expectation, and the other, endeavoring to evade, (temporarily at least), the political obligations of a distressing international commitment.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,



Maxwell Blake.
American Diplomatic Agent.

Note:

Copy of this Despatch sent to E. I. C., Paris,
and to the Embassies at London, Rome and Madrid.

P. S. To be absolutely correct, I would state that, as I now learn, it was Mussolini himself, who protested to the British Ambassador in Rome, in respect of the lapse of discretion on the part of the British Government. The Italian Ambassador in London was informed of these representations, but he was not, as I originally conceived, the channel through which they were made.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This cable
was received
in the ~~Department~~
ments Confidential Rome.
tial Code

SOLICITOR'S OFFICE
AUG 20 1926
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MCL Index Bureau
RECEIVED
UG 23 1926
Dep't. of State

Dated August 20, 1926.

It should be
closely para-
phrased before
being communi-
cated to anyone

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Received

AUG 20 1926
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,
Washington.

98, August 20, 1 P. M.

Department's 71, August 16, 7 P. M. Ambassador
Hammond's telegram 80, August 15, received today.

In a conversation with Under Secretary for
Foreign Affairs Grandi the subject of Spanish control of
Tangier was informally mentioned. He endeavored to impress
on me that Italy was little more interested in the affair
than the United States and said that "Italy had merely
agreed to adhere to Tangier Convention at the request of
other powers and only provided she were given equal rights"

My opinion is that Italy is interested in these
last developments referred to in Ambassador Hammond's tele-
gram but does not consider it necessary to become actively
involved as he prefers to lay the burden of the controversy
for the present on Spain and Great Britain as against France.

FLETCHER.

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 865.00/1560 FOR \$956

FROM Italy (Martin) DATED Aug 6-26
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Political Situation - Italy and Tangier.
ojs

INDEX BOARD
865.00/1560
1269

IRAKI AND TANGIER.

Italy's relation to the Tangier question, discussed in my weekly despatch No. 936 of July 16, 1934, is the subject of comment in the London TIMES, according to an article in the fascist "TRIBUNA". The TIMES states that there appears to be a certain amount of confusion regarding Italy's position. Following conversations between Rome and London, the Italian Government declared its readiness to adhere to the Tangier Convention provided their right be acknowledged to participate in the present and future administration of the International City on an equal footing with France, Spain and England. To facilitate matters, the Italian Government transmitted

a

ITALY AND TANGIER.

Statements in the London "TIMES" of July 10th and a communication by the Reuter agency published recently intimating that Italy has agreed to adhere to the Tangier Statute on condition that Italians have a share in the local administration corresponding to that of France, Spain, and Great Britain, and that no further change will be made in the Statute without the consent of Italy, have been commented upon by the press.

As stated in my previous telegraphic and written reports on the subject, Italy has been insisting and still insists upon full participation in the administration of Tangier on an equal footing with the other powers. In this connection, the responsible "CORRIERE DELLA SERA" states that the Reuter and "TIMES" communications are equivocal and need clarification; the phrase, "Italy has consented to adhere", might be interpreted to mean that Italy has consented, after submitting to pressure, to adhere to the present statute which would be in contradiction to Italy's point of view that she would go to

Tangier

Tangier as a contracting, and not as an adhering, power. According to the "CORRIERE DELLA SERA", Italy is interested in maintaining the status quo in Morocco and is, therefore, opposed to the Spanish suggestion to include Tangier within the Spanish protectorate. In order to nip any such aspiration in the bud, the newspaper concludes, it is advisable to solve the Tangier question as rapidly as possible.

The "MESSAGERO" states that from the Reuter communication, it might be inferred that the other two powers also have come to an agreement with Italy; in the opinion of this reliable newspaper, however, the "TIMES" communication is the more exact and it may be assumed that the agreement is solely between Downing Street and the Palazzo Chigi. "We are now awaiting the second phase of the conversations", concludes the "MESSAGERO", "i.e., between Rome and Paris and between Rome and Madrid."

The press also indicates that Italy desires to prevent any of the other powers signatory to the Act of Algeciras who may have been excluded from the present regime to put in a claim for participation along with her. The "POPOLO DI ROMA" states that Italy was unjustly excluded from the Tangier administration, first, because her interests, as an exclusively Mediterranean power, in the systemization of a zone which is most delicate from many points of view were refused recognition; and second, because her direct interests in the Tangier zone, where a

large

large Italian colony resides, whose development could be better supervised and safeguarded by Italian participation in the Regime of the city, were not recognized. "These few concise considerations", says the "POPOLO DI ROMA", "will serve in advance to meet certain strange arguments according to which other states signatory to the Act of Algeciras ought to be allowed to participate in the Statute along with Italy's participation. We hold that any serious discussion regarding this point is superfluous, since it borders on the absurd."





EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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80
File

No. 128.

San Sebastian, August 5, 1926.



For Distribution

ON YES

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1257

With reference to my telegram No. 59 of to-
day's date, I have the honor to transmit herewith copies

1 / of the original text and translation of a note and sub-
2 / joined memorandum from the Foreign Office, both dated
August 1, 1926, and referring to Spanish and French
measures of maritime vigilance off the coasts of Morocco.
Copies of the note and memorandum have been transmitted
to the American Diplomatic Agency and Consulate General
at Tangier.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Ogden H. Hammond

Enclosures: 1 Copy & translation
of F.O. note of Aug. 1;
2 Copy & translation
of subjoined memorandum.

Copy to E.I.C., Paris.

Enclosure N.º / in Despatch N.º / 28.

(Copy)

Ministerio de Estado.

Política General.

N O T A V E R B A L.

Núm C--9

Con fecha 2 de Julio de 1925 el Gobierno de Su Majestad, de acuerdo con el de la Republica francesa dirigió á las Potencias interesadas, dos comunicaciones relativas a las medidas concertadas entre las dos Naciones para asegurar conjuntamente la vigilancia de las Costas de Marruecos. Como consecuencia de un nuevo examen de la situación, los dos Gobiernos han estimado que la vuelta al derecho común es ya posible y han hecho constar su acuerdo en el medmorandum adjunto. Dichas disposiciones entrarán en vigor el día 1 de Agosto de 1926.

Madrid 1 de Agosto de 1926.

A la Embajada de los Estados Unidos de America.

MEMORANDUM.

1º - A lo largo del litoral de los territorios españoles y franceses tanto de soberanía como de Protectorado, situados en el Norte y Oeste de Africa y comprendidos entre la frontera argelino-marroquí del Mediterraneo (2º 13' longitud Oeste de Greenwich) y en la desembocadura del Uad Draaa en el Atlantico (28º 41' de latitud Norte), los buques de guerra españoles y franceses, respectivamente, asegurarán en las zonas española y francesa y conjuntamente entre el Uad Busedra y el Uad Lau (entre los 29º 31' latitud Norte y 28º 41' latitud Norte) la estricta observancia de las disposiciones internacionales y de los reglamentos que prohíben, de una parte, todo acceso á las costas **Marroquíes** fuera de los puertos abiertos y de otra parte, toda importación de armas, de municiones y de material de guerra en Marruecos.

2º - En el conjunto de dichas costas la vigilancia se limita á las seis millas de las aguas territoriales, con derecho de persecución fuera de ese limite.

3º - A este fin los barcos de guerra vigilarán y visitarán, si hubiere lugar, conformes á los usos internacionales en la materia, todos los buques sospechosos por motivos razonables de contravenir las prescripciones mencionadas. Esta vigilancia se ejercerá tanto sobre las armas, municiones y material de guerra, como sobre las mercancías sospechosas de dirigirse á los puertos ó fondeaderos naturales no abiertos al comercio.

4º - La **vigilancia** marítima en las aguas territoriales de Tanger se ejercerá conforme a las estipulaciones del art. 4º del Convenio de 28 de Diciembre de 1923.

5º - Los buques y embarcaciones que sean reconocidos por los barcos que ejercen la vigilancia, como sospechosos de dedicarse al trafico de armas, municiones, material de guerra y mercancías sospechosas de dirigirse a puertos o fondeaderos naturales no abiertos al comercio, serán entregados a la jurisdicción local competente.

6º - Esta comunicacion anula y reemplaza las comunicaciones de 2 de Julio de 1925, sobre las misma materia.

(Translation)

MINISTRY OF STATE

General Policy.

No. C - 9.

N O T E V E R B A L E.

On July 2, 1925, the Government of His Majesty, in agreement with that of the French Republic, addressed to the interested Powers two communications relative to the measures agreed upon between the two nations to assure conjointly vigilance over the coasts of Morocco.

As a result of a new examination of the situation, the two governments have considered that a return to the common law is now possible, and have stated their agreement in the annexed memorandum. The said regulation will go into effect on August 1, 1926.

Madrid, August 1, 1926.

To the Embassy of the United States of America.

(Translation)

M E M O R A N D U M.

1^o Along the littoral of the Spanish and French territories under sovereignty as well as protectorate, situated in the north and west of Africa and comprised between the Algerian- Morocco frontier of the Mediterranean (2^o 13' Longitude W. of Greenwich) and the mouth of the Uad Draa on the Atlantic (28^o 41' North Latitude) Spanish and French warships, respectively, shall assure in the Spanish and French zones, and jointly between the Uad Basedra and the Uad Lau (between 29^o 31' and 28^o 41' North Lat.) the strict observance of the international regulations and rules that prohibit, on the one hand, all access to the Morocco coast with the exception of open ports, and, on the other, all importation of arms, munitions and war material into Morocco.

2^o Along the said coasts, vigilance is limited to the six miles of territorial waters, with the right of pursuit beyond this limit.

3^o For this purpose, the war ships shall watch and visit, if necessary, in conformity to international usage in the matter, all ships which with good reason may be suspected of contravening the regulations mentioned.. This vigilance shall be exercised with respect to arms, munitions and war material as also to merchandise suspected of being bound for ports or natural harbors not open to commerce.

4^o Maritime vigilance in the territorial waters of Tangier shall be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Article 4 of the Agreement of December 28, 1923.

5° Ships and boats that may be considered by the vessels exercising vigilance, as suspected of being engaged in the traffic of arms, munitions, war material and merchandise, suspected of being bound for ports or natural harbors not open to commerce, shall be turned over to appropriate local jurisdiction.

6° This communication cancels and replaces the communication of July 2, 1925, on the same subject.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RML

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~~So~~

Index Bureau
RECEIVED

AUG 24 1926

Dept. of State

FROM

Green.

Rome

Dated Aug. 24, 1926.

Rec'd 10.32 A.M.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

100. August 24, Noon.

Tangier question. The Italian press publishes very fully the English, French and Spanish despatches Spain's desire regarding Tangier but the GIORNALE ITALIA is the only paper which has ventured to express the Italian attitude which it states will soon be made clear. It says that the new political friendship between Spain and Italy cannot but find in the Spanish demands a good occasion for confirmation but that this problem must be discussed and that Italy must be represented in its discussion.

FLETCHER

INDEX BUREAU

881.00/271

FTY END
MAR 23 1927

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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Index B7, 300
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AUG 24 1928

Dep't. of State

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~~tial Code~~ FROM

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being communi-
cated to anyone

Secretary of State,
Washington.

London

Dated Aug. 24, 1928.

Rec'd 2.23 P.M.



193. August 24, 3 P.M.

881.00/1265 conf.
My 191, August 19, 6 P.M. I am informed from a

source usually reliable that "In a recent conversation a week ago with the British and French Ambassadors at Madrid Primo de Rivera insisted that either Spain's claim to a permanent seat on the League Council or her pretensions over Tangier be recognized. The two Ambassadors pointed out that the two questions were in no way connected and urged Rivera to give them a formal note for transmission to their governments rather than asking them to transmit a report of the conversation. I understand no note has been received but the British Admiralty has I am informed reported categorically against any acceptance of the Spanish pretensions in Tangier which is in contrast with Chamberlain's alleged attitude that a too abrupt refusal might cause considerable embarrassment to the League meeting in September."

HOUGHTON

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MA. 21 1928

INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1278

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Under Secy.
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AUG 25 1926
Dept. of S.

Secretary of State
Washington

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cated to anyone

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 25 1926
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Dated August 24, 1926

Rec'd 3:35 p.m.

file

INDEX BUREAU
88.00/1273

101 August 24, 1 p.m.

~~Strictly Confidential.~~ Department's telegram 71,
August 16th and my reply number 98, August 20th, Tangier
question.

Spanish Ambassador has informed me today in strictest confidence that Mussolini has told him that he favors the incorporation of Tangier in the Spanish zone; that he has reported this fact to Madrid and has been instructed to express to Mussolini the "great gratitude" of Primo de Rivera, which he has already done. He also tells me that he has informed Mussolini that Spain has approached our government as well as France, England and Italy on this subject. He says that he has no information regarding the probable attitude of England and France but is inclined to believe that France will eventually agree.

In view of the fact that this information was given to me in the strictest confidence I have not communicated it to Madrid, London, or Paris. I should not be surprised if Mussolini were soon to make a public statement of Italian position.

Em

FLETCHER

FT ED
APR 22 1927

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUG 23 1926

DIVISION OF

WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FROM

JK

Index Bureau
RECEIVED

AUG 23 1926

Dep't. of State

GREEN

SAN SEBASTIAN

Dated Aug. 25, 1926

Rec'd 7:35 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

*Index to Paris, Rome
Bern, London*

Subsidiary + London

8/26/26 AUG 26 1926

DOUBLE PRIORITY 62 August 25, 4 p.m.

My telegram number 60 August 25, 1 p.m. Note just received from Foreign Office invites the United States together with France, Great Britain and Italy as well as all states adhering to Tangier statute to participate with Spain in a conference at Geneva September first to examine Tangier question with special reference to Spain's desire for incorporation of international zone with Spanish zone. Full text of note follows by telegraph. Repeated to London, Paris and Rome.

HAMMOND

OX

INDEX BUREAU

DEC 14 1926

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Telegraph Room:

Will you please give
this telegram to Geneva a
Berne Legation number so
that it will not be confused
with the Arms Conference
telegrams?

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER


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Department of State



Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

AUG 26 26

August 26, 1926.

302

AmMission,

Geneva (Switzerland)

84

For Gibson.

Hammond cables Department that note from the Foreign Office invites the United States with France, Great Britain and Italy and all States adhering to Tangier Statute to participate with Spain in a conference at Geneva September first to examine Tangier question with special reference to Spain's desire for incorporation of international zone with Spanish zone.

Should this conference occur and the text of the invitation prove such that the United States desires to be represented, you would probably be instructed to act as observer and Rand with files in the matter would be sent to Geneva to assist you.

Please

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

881.00/1274

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Washington,

(AmMission, Geneva, page 2)

Please hold yourself in readiness. Definite decision will be cabled as soon as invitation is received.

*advise Legation of
receipt of this number*

*Kellogg
J. S.*

881.00/1274
WE WRC/AB

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
Aug 26, 1922

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Index Bu.—No. 50.

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Department of State

Washington,

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PLAIN

August 26, 1926.

302

AmEmbassy,

Paris (France)

221

San Sebastian's No. 62, August 25

to the Department.

Please inquire urgently of Foreign
Office whether France will accept Spanish invitation
to conference and inform Department by telegraph.

Kellogg
1-5

881.00/1274

WE WRC/AB

WRC


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Department of State

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PLAIN

August 26, 1926.

30m

AmEmbassy,

London.

171

San Sebastian's No. 62, August 25

to the Department.

Please inquire urgently of Foreign
Office whether Great Britain will accept Spanish
invitation to conference and inform Department by
telegraph.

Kennedy

881.00/1274

881.00/1274


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AUG 26 1926

AUG 26 26



Enciphered by _____

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Index Bu.—No. 50.

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE PM RECD

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TELEGRAM SENT.

Department of State

Washington,

August 26, 1926

AUG 26 26

AmEmbassy,

San Sebastian (Spain)

41 881.00/ ✓
Your 62, August 25, 4 p. m.

Department, can make no decision until receipt of note, but Rand should hold himself in readiness to go to Geneva should it appear necessary. If he thinks that files on the subject in Madrid and Paris sufficiently cover the ground, he should be prepared to collect them to take with him to Geneva. Otherwise, you should telegraph Tangier to prepare a proper file which Frost could take to Geneva. Please telegraph text of Spanish note to Tangier.

~~If the conference occurs and the Department should decide to send representative, he would probably be an observer.~~

WE WRC/AB

881.00/1274

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

August 26, 1926.

302

AmEmbassy,

Rome (Italy)

77

San Sebastian's No. 62, August 25 to
the Department.

Please inquire urgently of Foreign
Office whether Italy will accept Spanish invitation
to conference and inform Department by telegraph.

Kellogg
J. S.

DISTRIBUTED

881.00/1274

AUG 26 26

WE WRC/AB

Kellogg



Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

PM RECD
1-128

881.00/1274

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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AUG 27 1926

Dep't. of State

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ALL
AUG 23 1926
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

San Sebastian Aug 8/30/26

Dated Aug. 26, 1926.

Rec'd 10.40 P.M.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

63. URGENT, August 26, 4 P.M.

(Green)

My number 62, August 25, 4 P.M. Translation of

Tangier note dated August 23rd follows:

"The Government of His Catholic Majesty directs me to submit to Your Excellency the Spanish point of view regarding the problem of Tangier as defined in recent declarations by the President of the Council General, Primo de Rivero.

Spain has demonstrated by deeds known to all, the fullness of her intentions and her spirit of sacrifice on the altars of the common interest whenever an attempt has been made to find a formula for settling the eternal Tangier question. She attempted in the treaties of 1904 and 1912 the amputation of Tangier, a living cell of the zone of her protectorate; she took part in elaborating the international statute even though she did not have in its effective working out a confidence which the facts have since shown would have been unjustified; she displayed a willingness to make every renunciation in order to facilitate the

INDEX BUREAU

DEC 14 1926

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881.00/1275

the regime of internationalization. Her attitude would now be the same if the international regime could last. But the failure of this attempt is notorious. The good intentions of those who created it have been shattered by the truth and the question of Tangier continues being today as it has always been a cause of eternal preoccupation for the States interested in insuring that that important port of the straits shall not be used for military purposes and that it shall not be converted into a navy or aviation base. His Majesty's Government is profoundly convinced that the solution which is most just and at the same time most consistent with the great interests of universal peace would be the incorporation of Tangier with the Spanish zone in Morocco or the adoption of some other feasible and permanent solution free from the complicated and unworkable mechanism of internationalization.

Geographically and economically Tangier is linked with the Spanish protected zone and it lacks the necessary resources to exist separately. The Spanish Government has tried to facilitate the execution of the statute and to this end it has lifted at a cost of economic sacrifices its customs cordon but it cannot of course dispense with a cordon of vigilance around the extensive zone outside Tangier which, contrary to our wishes, will always obstruct communication between that city and the interior of Morocco.

The

The commerce of Tangier is undergoing a crisis as a result of this local isolation; the low value of the Hassan I peseta which is a consequence of the separation from our zone is making life more difficult; facilities are lacking for the employment of labor; and communism is beginning to ferment in a labor element which cannot under the present regime count upon a protective and energetic intervention by the authorities in accordance with the circumstances and necessities of the case. This Government considers unnecessary to emphasize the important influence which such a focus of communistic radiation might exert in the Islamic world and at the doors of Western Europe.

Spain is carrying on in North Africa a work of civilization, for the international good rather than for her own profit. Her enormous sacrifices are for the purpose of guaranteeing the neutrality of that coast and opening a channel for free communication and for the commerce of all on a footing of perfect equality without discrimination. It would be unjust to deny her the indispensable means for carrying out this work which will never be completed if Tangier continues to be an asylum for rebels, a nest of conspiracies and a passage way for contraband of war. Tangier internationalized will always constitute a danger to peace. Tangier administered and governed by a responsible neutral country will cease being a constant source of worry
for

for all and will result in insuring the pacification of northern Morocco and the neutrality of that place which dominates the straits that are the key to the Mediterranean.

The Government of His Catholic Majesty has the honor to inform Your Excellency that it has initiated appropriate negotiations simultaneously with the Governments of London and Paris, co-signatories with that of Madrid to the Statute of Tangier, and with those of Rome and Washington who were invited to adhere to the statute, which negotiations it now desires to make extensive to all the states adhering to the statute, having at the same time the honor to suggest the great convenience of holding a meeting to examine the question jointly.

To this end it has the honor to propose the date of September first for holding such a meeting at Geneva and it trusts that the Government of the United States will receive this suggestion favorably.

I avail myself of this occasion, et cetera, Yanguas".
(End Green).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~. Spanish endeavors to bring about conference at Geneva in such a short time appear to confirm many other indications that Foreign Office is attempting to establish connection between Spanish aspirations in the

Tangier

No. 63, from San Sebastian.

Tangier zone and the attitude of Spain regarding permanent seat in Council of League of Nations. (Green).

Repeated by mail to Tangier, London, Paris and Rome.

HAMMOND

JHB

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department /
OR

Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT RECD

Department of State


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PLAIN



1926

AMEMBASSY,

AUG 31 26

SAN SABASTIAN, (SPAIN)

44 Your, 63., August 26, 4 p.m. ,

Please inform the Spanish Government, as follows:

While, reserving, its, attitude, towards the, specific proposal
of, the Spanish Government, for the future, administration,
and, government of Tangier, the Government of the United
States, would be, disposed to give, favorable consideration,
to, participating in, a conference to discuss, the, Tangier,
question, provided that, all of the, major, Powers, interested
in, Morocco should be present., The Government of the
United States, however, doubts, if any, useful, purpose, could
be, served, by such, a conference, unless the, attendance of, all,
of these, major, Powers, interested in, Morocco, should be, as-
sured.

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881.00/1275

OR

Aug 31 1926


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Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

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P.M. RECD

RML

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

INDEXED
RECEIVED
AUG 27 1926
Dep't. of St.

was received
in the Depart-
ments Confidential Code
FROM Rome

Dated Aug. 26, 1926.

Rec'd 11.29 P.M.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

It should be
closely para-
phrased before
being communi-
cated to anyone

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUG 26 1926

DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

103. August 26, 7 P.M.

My Confidential telegram 101, August 24, Tangier
question.

In a conversation with Mussolini this afternoon he informed me that the Spanish Government had approached the Italian Government on this subject proposing at first the inclusion of Tangier in the Spanish zone but subsequently proposing a mandate be given them. He said that he had replied that Italy was disposed to give the Spanish proposition friendly and sympathetic consideration provided an examination of the question would show that Italian interests were safeguarded.

Referring to the Spanish invitation to a conference on the subject to meet at Geneva on September first (Ambassador Hammond's telegram of yesterday) he said that he had replied that Italy would accept this invitation on the condition that the conference meet at Lausanne rather than Geneva as he wished to make it clear that this question was entirely separate both actually and apart from the questions to be discussed at the approaching meeting of the League,

INDEX BUREAU

OCT 8 1926

881.00/1276

~~-2-~~

No. 103, from Rome.

League, especially that relating to permanent seats on the Council.

I told him that I had had no intimation as to the attitude the United States Government would take with regard to the question or to the approaching conference but I called his attention to the reserves we had made in connection with the signature and ratification of the Algeciras Act and spoke of our traditional disinclination to become involved in political questions of purely European concern. I referred however to our economic interest in the open door there.

I understand that the Italian Government is instructing its diplomatic representatives to communicate its views in Washington, London and Paris.

I assume that if the mandate shall be given her it will emanate from the powers signatory to the Algeciras Act and gather that Mussolini wishes to separate this matter completely from the League. Repeated to Madrid, Paris and London.

FLETCHER

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RMT
AUG 27 1926
Dep't. of State

FROM Green

Rome

Dated Aug. 27, 1926.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



104. August 27, 1 P.M.

Department's telegram 77, August 26, 3 P.M.

As I telegraphed to you yesterday Italian Government
has accepted invitation to Tangier conference on
September 1st., but to meet at Lausanne and not Geneva.

August 27, 1 P.M.

FLETCHER

WSB

INDEX BUREAU

881.00/1277

DEC 14 1926

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WE
7p

AUG 30 1926

FROM

Green

San Sebastian

Dated August 27, 1926

Recd. 10.50am.

AUG 27 1926
Dep't. of St.

Office of Foreign Affairs
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 30 1926
AUG 23 1926
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

64, August 27, 11am.

Ans 5/30/26

Department's 41, August 26, 5pm. Should

Rand go to Geneva, commissioned staff of this embassy
will be reduced to myself and third secretary as
Reed is leaving for Berlin September 1st, in
accordance with the Department's instructions.
White will not apparently arrive before October.

MR 151
MR 154

INDEX BUREAU
881.00/1278

HRMMOND

RR

MAR 28 1927

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department

OR

Charge to

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TELEGRAM SENT *Green*
Department of State

Washington,

August 30, 1926

AmEmbassy,

San Sebastian (Spain)

43

Your No. 64, August 27, 11 a. m.

1.5. As it appears to be clear that there will
at present,
be no conference on Tangier, the Department does not
intend to send Rand to Geneva. Reed, therefore,
should proceed to Berlin as directed.

881.00/1278

Green

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Aug 30 1926


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Sent by operator

M.,

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Index Bu.—No. 50.



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